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?£i?:
BART.

m,
IT is fit tlie public ,shoulJ receive through your hands
what was written originally for the as istance of your younger
studies, and was then presented to you. .
It was by the repeated irripcwtunities of our learned friend
l\Ir. John Eames, that I was persuaded to revise these Rudiments of Logic ; and when I had once suffered myself to begin the work, I was drawn still onward far beyond my first design, even to the neglect, or too long delay of other pressing
and important demands that were upon me.
,
It has been my endeavour to form every part of this treatise
both for the inst.ruction of students, to open their way into
the sciences,
for the more extensive and general service of
mankind, that the Gentleman and the Christian might find
tlaeir account in the perusal as well as the Scholar. I have
therefore collected and proposed the chief principles and rules
of right judgment in matters of common and sacred importance,
and pointed out our most frequent mistakes and prejudices in
the concerns of life and religion, that we might better guard
against the springs of error, guilt and sorrow, which surround
Ill in every state of mortality.
You know, Sm, the great design of this noble science is to
reacue our reasoning pow·ers from their unhappy slavery and
clarkne~s ; and thus with a11 due submission and deference it
offers a humble assistance to divine revelation. Its chief Lusiea is to relieve the natural.weaknesses of the mind by some
tter efforts of nature ; it is to diffuse a light over the underding in 'Our inquiries after truth, and not to furnish the
e with debate and controversy. True Logic is not that
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noisy thing that deals all in dispute and wrangling,
wl1ich
former ages had debased and confined it; yet its disciples must
acknowledge also, that they are taught to vindicate and defend
the truth, as well as to search it out. True Logic does not
require a long detail of hard words to amuse mankind, and to
puff up the mind with empty sounds, and a'pride of false learning;
yet some distinctions and terms of art are necessary to range
every idea in its proper class, and to keep our th~ughts from
confusion. The world is now grown so wise as not to suffer
this valuable art to be engrossed by the Schools. In so polite
:ind knowing an age, every Man of Reason will covet some
acquaintance with Logic, since it renders its daily service to
wisdom and virtue, and to the affairs of common life as well as
to the sciences.
I will not presume, Sm, that this little book is improved
since its first composure, in proportion to the improvements of
your manly age. But when you slrnll please to review it in
your retired hours, perhaps you may refresh your own memory
in some of the early parts of Learning; and if you find all the
additional remarks and rules made so familiar to you already by
your own observation, that there is nothing new among them
it will be no unpleasing reflection that you have so far antici
pated the present zeul and labour of,

SIR,
Your most Faithful and
Obedient Servant,

I. WATTS.
LONDON,

Aug. 24, 1724.
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LOGIC is the art of using REASON # wen in

OUl'

inquiries after truth, and the communication of
it to others.
REASON• is the glory of human nature, and one
of the chief eminences whereby we are raised above
our fellow-creatures, the brutes, in this lower world.
Reason, as to the power and principle of it, is the
common gift of God to all men, though all are not
farnured with it by nature in an equal degree; but
the acquired improvements of it in different men,
make a much greater distinction between them than
nature had made. I could even venture to say, that
the improvement of reason hath raised the learned
and the prudent in the European world, almost a5
much above the Hottentots, and other savages of
Africa, as those savage5 are by nature superior to
the birds, the beasts, and the fishes.
Now the design of Logic is to teach us the right
use of our reason, or intellectual powers, and the
impl'.ovement of them in ourselves and others. This
is not only necessary in order to attain any competent knowledge in the sciences, or the affairs of learning, but to govern both the greater and the meaner
actions oflife. It is the cultivation of our reason by
which we are better enabled to distinguish good
• The word Reason in this place is not confined to the mere faculty
of reasoning, or inrerring one thing from another, but includes all the
ln1ellectual powers of mau.

10
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from evil, as well as truth from falsehood; nncl both
these are matters of the highest importance, whether we regard this life, or the life to come.
The pursuit and acquisition of truth is of infinite
eoncernment to mankind. Hereby we become acquainted with the name of things both in heaven
and earth, and their various relations to each other.
It is by this means we discover our duty to God and
our follow-creaturei; by this we arrive at the knowled.,.e of natural religion, and learn to confirm our
faith in divine re,·elation, as well as to understancl
what is revealed. Our wisdom, prudenfe, and piety,
our pre~cnt conduct and our future hope, are all influenced by the use of our rational powers in the
search after truth.
There are several tl1ings that make it very necessary that our reason should have some assistance io
the exercise or use of it,
The first is, the depth and difficulty of tnany truths,
and the weakness of our reason to see far into things
at once, aud penetrate to the bottom of them. It
wa's a saying among the ancients, Ve,·itas in pule<>,
truth lies in a well; and; to cany on this metupho~
we may very justly say, that ]t)(~ic does, as it wE-re1
supply us with steps whereby we may go down to
reach tlie water: or it frames the links of a chain,
whereby we may draw the water up from the
bottom. Thus, by the means of many rea1.onings
wt:11 connected together, philosophers in our age
have drawn a thousand truths out of the depths of
clarknf'ss, which our fathers were utterly unacquaint•
ed with.
Another thing that makes it necessary for our reason to have some assistance given it, is the disguise
and false colours in which many things appear to us
in this present imperfect state. There are a thousand things which are not in reality what they appear to be, and that both in the natural and moral
world ; r.o that the sun appears to be fiat as a plate

tNTltODUCTIO:S.
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of 1ilver, and to be less than twelve inches in diameter ; the moon appears to be as big as the sun ; and

thtl rainbow appeal's to be a large substantial arch in
the sky: all which are in reality gross falsehoods.-

So knavery puts on the face of justice; hypocrisy and
111perstition wear the ,izard of piety; deceit and evil
are often clothed in the shapes and appearances of
truth and goodness. Now logic helps us to strip off
the outward disguise of thingll, and to behold them
and judge of them in their own nature.
There is yet a farther proof of our intellectual or
rational powers needing some assistance, and that is,
because they are so frail and fallible in the p1·esent
state.
e are imposed upon at home as well as
abroad; we are deceived by our senses, by our imaginations, by our passions and appetites; by the authority of men, by education and custom, &c.; and we
are led into frequent errors, by judging according to
these flllse and flatterin~ pri11ciples, rather than ac·cording to the nature ot things. Something of this
frailty is owing to our very cons~itution, man being
compounded of flesh and spirit; something of it
arises from our infant state, and our gowing up by
sgiall degrees to manhood ; so that we form a thousand judgments before ou1· reason is mature. But
there is still more ofit owing to our original defection
from God, and the foolish and evil dispositions that
are found in fallen man; so that one great part of the
design of locric is to gual'd us against the delusive influences of iur meane1· powers, to cure the mistakes
of immature judgment, and to raise us in some measure from the ruins of our fall,
It is evident enough from all these things, that
our reason needs the assistance of art in our enquiries
after truth or duty ; and without some skill and diligence in forming our judgment aright, we shaU be
Jed ittto frequent mi~takes, both in matters of science
and in matters of prnctice; and some of these mis•
t.1kes may prove fatal too.

,v
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The art of logic, even as it assists us to gain tl1e
knowledge of the sciences, leads us on towards virtue
and happiness : for all ou1· speculative acquaintance
with things should be made subservient to our better conduct in the civil and the religious life. This
is infinitely more valuable th.an all speculations, and
a wise man will use them chiefly for this better purpose.
All the good judgment and prudence that any man
exerts in his common concerns of "life, without the
advanta~e of learning, is called natural logic; and it
is but a nigher advancement, and a farther assistance
of our rational powers, that is designed by and expected from this artificial logic.
In order to attain this, we must enquire what are
-the principal operations of the mind which are put
forth in the exercise of our reason; and we shall find
them to be these four, viz. Perception, juqgment, argumentation and disposition.
Now the ar~ oflogic is composed of those observa•tions and rules, which men have made about these
four operations of the mind: perception, judgment,
reasoning, and disposition, in order to assist and im•
prove them.
I. Perception, conception, or apprehension, is the
mere simple comtemplation of things offered to our
mind, without affirming or denying any thing concerning them. So we conceive or think of a .horse,
.a tree, high, swift, slow, animal, time, motion, matter, mind, life, death, &c. The form under which
.these things appear to the mind, or the result of our
conception or apprehension, is called an idea.
I I. Judgment is that operation of the mind where.by we join two or more ideas together by one affirmation or negation ; that is, we either affirm or den1
this to be that. So this tree is high ; that horse is
not swift; the mind of man is a thinkinu bein";
mere matter ha5 no thought belonging to it; Godis

INTRODUCTION,
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juat; good men nre often miserable in this world; a
righteous governor will make a difference betwixt
the evil and the good; which sentences are the effecli
of judgment, and are called Propositions.

Ill. ARGUMENTATtc.>N or reasoning is that operation of the mind, whereby we infer one thing, that
ia, one proposition from two or mere propositions
premisell: or it is the drawing a conclusion, which
before was either unknown, or dark or doubtful, from
ll'Omepropositions whicb are more known and evident.
So when we have judged that matter cannot think,
that the mind of man doth think, WC then infer
0,11d conclude, that thrrcforc the mind of man is not
matter.
So we judge that a just ~oYernor will make a difference between the evil and the good; we judge also
that God is a just governor; and from thence we conclude, that God will make a difference betwixt the
evil and the good.
This argumentation may bo carried on farther;
thus, God will one time or another make a difference:!
between the good and the evil; but them is little or
no llilfcrcnce made in tl1is world : Therefore there
must be another wol'l<l wherein this difference shall
be made.
These info1·e:nces or conclusions are the effects of
ren~oning; and the three propositions taken all toge•
thcr are called a syllogism or argumeut.

and

IV. D1sposn10:-. is that operation of the mind,
whereby we put tlie idetts, propositions, and arO'U •
ments, whicl1 we ha\'e formed concerning one s~bject, into such an order as is fittest to gain the clearest knowledge of it, to retain it longest, and to explain it to others in the best manner; or, in short,
It is the ranging of our thoughts in such order as is
best for our o,vn and others conception and memory.
The effect of this orieration is called method. This

B
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very description of the four operations of the mind,
and their effects in this order, is an instance or example of method.
Now as the art of logic as!>ists our conception, so
it gives us a lar$e and comprehensive view of the
subjects we inqmre into, as well as a clear and distinct knowledge of them. As it regulates our judgment and our reasoning, so it secures us from mis-takes, and gives us a true and certain knowledge of
things ; and as it furnishes us with method, so it
makes; our knowledge of things both easy and regular, and ~uards our thoughts from confusion.
Logic 1s divided into four parts, according to these
four operations of the mind, which it directs;, and
&herefore wr ~I-tall treat of it in this order.

.'

...
,

~

THE

JTtr~t Jl:)art
OF

OF PERCEPTION AND IDEAS, .

THE first part of logic contains observations and
precepts ubout th:! lirst operation of the mind,
perception, or conception ; und since uU our knowledge, how wide and large soever it grow, is founded
upon our conceptions and iJeas, here we shall con-

•ider,

1. The general nature of them.
2. The objects of our conception, or the archetype1
bl' patterns of these i<leas,
S. The several divisions of them •
.t,. The words and terms wherel>y our ideas arc,

expressed.

5. General directions about our ideas.
6. Special rules to direct our conceptions.

CHAP. I.
OP THE NATURE OF IDEAS,

FiasT, the nature of conception or perception•
just be mentioned, though this may seem to beg to another science rather than logic,
• 'a. WGl'da Conception and Perception are often used promiscu.
, • l •" done here, because I would not embarrau a learnn
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Perception is that act of the mind (or, as some
philosophers call it, rather a passion or impression),
wl1ereby the mind bE'comes conscious of any thing,
as when I feel hunger, thirst, or cold, or heat ;
when I see a horse, a tree, or a man; when I hear
a human voice, or thunder, I am conscious of these
things, and this is called perception. If I study,
meditate, wish, or fear, I am conscious of these inward acts also, and my mind perceives its own
thoughts, wishe:.., fears, &c.
An idea i,; genertl.lly defined a representation of a
thing in the mind; it is a representation -of something
that we have seen, felt, heard, &c. or been conscious
of. That notion or form of a horse, a tree, or a
a man, which is in the mind, is called the idea of a
horse, a tree, or a man.
That notion of hunger, cold, sound, colour,
thou~ht, or wish, or fear, which is in the mind, ia
called the idea of hunger, cold, sound, wish, &c.
It is not the outward object or thing which is per~eived, viz. the horse, the man, &c. nor is it the very
perception or sense and feeling, viz. of hunger or
cold, &c. which is called the idea; but it is the
thing as it exists iii the mind by way of conception
or representation that is properly called the idea,
whether the object be present or abseot.
As a horse, a man, and a tree, are the outward
objects of our perception, and the outward archetypes or patterns of our ideas, so our own sensations
of hunger, cold, &c. are also inward archetypes or
patterns of our ideas-; but the notions or pictures of
. these things, as they al'e considered or conceived in
the mind, are precisely the ideas that we have to do
with in logic. To see a horse, or to feel cold, is
one thing : to think of and converse about a man,
a ·horfi':l, hunger, or cold, is another.
with too many distinctions ; but if I were to distinguish them, I would
&ay perception i5 the consciousness of an object when present; coucep..
ti1111. is the forminJ an idea of the obJect whether present or absent,

THE RIGHT USE OF REASON,
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Among all these ideas, such as represent bodies
are generally called images, especially if the idea of

the shape be included. Those inward representations which we have of spirit, thought, love, hatred,

eame,

effect, &c. are more pure and mental ideas,

belonging more especially to the mind, and carry
nothing of shape or sense in them. But

I shall have

occasion to speak more particularly of the ori&inal,
and the distinction of ideas, in the third chapter. I

proeeed therefore now to consider the objects of our

ideas.

CHAP. II.
or

TUE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.

SECT.

THE

I. -Of Bei11g in General.

object of perception is that which is repre-

sented in the idea, that which is the archetype or
pattern, according to which the idea is formed; and
thus judgment, propositions, reasons, and long diseourses, may all become the objects of perception;

but in this place we speak chiefly of the fo·st and
more simple objects of it, before they are joined and
formed into propositions or discourses.
Every object of our idea is called a theme, whe1her it l,e a being 01· uot-being; for 11ot-being may

be proposed to our thoughts, as well as that which .
a real being. But let m, first treat of bein crs,
0
that in the largest extent of the word.
A being is considered as possible, ot· as actual.

When it is considered as possible, it is said to have .
euence or nature. Such were all things before
creation. When it is considered as actual, then.
said to ha,·e existence also. Sueh are all things
are created, and God himself the creator.
ce, therefore, is but the Yery nature of any
whether it be actually existing or no. A

Ba

/
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rose in winter has an essence, in summer it h as existence also.
Note, There is but one being which includes existence in the very essence of it, and that is God,
who therefore act~ially exist:; by natural and eternal
necessity; but the actual existence of every creature
is very distinct from its essence, for it may be or
may not be, as God pleases.
Again, every beino is consid ered either as subsisting in and by itse~f, and then it is called a substance; or it subsists in and by another, and then
it is called a mode or manner of being. Thou oh
fow writers allow mode to be called a being in th e
same perfect sense as a substance 'is : and some
modes have evidently more of real entity or being
than others, as will appear when we come to treat
of them. These things will furnish us matter for
larger discourse in the following sections.

SECT,

II.-Of Substances and tlieir va1·ieus K inds.

A SUBSTANCE is a being which can subsist by it&elf, without dependence upon any other created being. The notion of s11bsistin~ by itself gives occasion to logicians to call it a substance. :So a horse,
a house, wood, stone, water, fire, a spirit, a body,
an angel, are called substances, because they depend
on nothing but God for their ·existence.
It has been usual al ~o in the description of substance to add, it is that which is the subject of modes
or accidents; a body is -the substance or subj ect, its
shape is the mode.
But lest we be led into mistakes, let us h ere take
notice, that when a substance is said to subsist without dependence upon another created being, all that
we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utterly
destroyed and reduced to nothing, by any power inferior to t_h :it of our Creator, though its present par-

•ART I.
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ticular form, nature and prope1 ties may be altered
and destroyed by many inferior causes; a horse may
die and turn to dust; wood may be turned into fire,
smoke, and ashes; a house into rubbish, and water
into ice or vupour; but the substance or matter of
which they are made still remains, though the forms
and shapes ofit are altered. A body may cease to be
a horse or a house, but it is a bocly still; and in this
sense it depends only upon God for its existence.
Among substances, some are thinking ot conscious
beings, or having a power of thou~ht, such as the
mind of man, God, angels. Some are extended, and
solid or impeuetrable; that is, they have dimensions
of length, breadth, and depth, and have abo a power
of resbtance, or exclude every thi~ of the same kind
from being in the same place. This is the proper
character of matter or boc.ly.
As for the ic.lea of space, whether it be voic.l or
full, that is, a vacuum or a plenum, whether it be interspersec.l among all bodies, or may be supposed to reach
beyond the bounds of the creation, it is an argument
too long and too hard to be di;;puted in this place
what the nature of it is. It has bee11 much debated
'"·liether it be a real substance, or a mere conception
of the mind; whether it be the immensity of the di,·ine nature, or the mere order of co-exi~tent beings;
\\'hether it be the manner of our conception of the
di11tnnct'S of bodies, or n mere nothing. Therefore
I drop the mention of it here, and refer the reader
to the first essay among the Plzilosoplzical Essays by
J. It: published 1733.
Now, if we scclu<le space out of our consideration,
there will rcmnin but two sorts of substances in the
,rnrl<l, that is, matter and mind ; or, as we otherwbe call them, body au<l spirit ; at least we have no
ideas of any other &ubstance but these"'.
• Because men have different id.-as and notions of substa, ce, I
....ht it not proper entirely to omit all accounts of them1 and therelcnban thrown them into lhe margin,

20
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Among substances, some are calle<l simple, so
are compound, whether the words be taken in a p
losophical or a vulgar sense.
Some philosophers suppOS<', that our acquaintance with matter or
mind reaches no farther than the mere properties of them, and that
there is a sort of unknown being, which is the substance or the subject by which these properties of solid extem,ion and of co,:iitation 11'1
supported, and in which these properties inhere or exiet. But per.
haps this notion arises only from our turning the mere abstracted or
logical notion of substance or self subsisting into the notion of a di.
stinct, physical, or natural being, without uny necessity. Solid u.
tension seems to me to be the ,cry substanre of matter, or of all ~
dies ; and a power of tt,inking, which is always in act, seems to be
the very substance of all spirits; for God himself is an intelligent, almighty power; nor is there any neL'<l to seek for any other secre&
and unkno\\ n being or abstracted sub,tance entirely distinct from
these, in order to support the sLvernl modes or properties of matter
or mind ; for these two ideas are suJiicicnt for that purpose; therefore I rather think these a, e subst:mccs.
It must be confossed, when we say, spint is a thinking substance,
and matter is an extendld solid substance, we are sometimes ready to
imagine, that exten,ion and solidity are but mere modes and proper.
ties of a certain unknown substance or suhjcct which supports them,
and which we call body; and that a power of thinking is but a mere
mode and property of some unknown substance or suhject which
supports it, and which we call spirit; but I rather take this to l,e •
mere mistake which w,• arc led into by the grammatical form and
use of words; and perhap~ our logical way of thinking by substancee
and modes, as well as our grammatical way of talking by substao.
tives and adjectives, help to delude us into the supposition.
However, that I may not be wanting to any of my readers, I
would let them know J\lr Locke's opinictn, which ha~ obtained much
in the present age, and it is this : « That our idea of any particular
substance is only such a combination of simple ideas as represents
that thing as sub,bting by itself, in which the supposed or confused
idea of substance (such as it is) is always ready to oiler itself. It is
a conjunctiou of iileas co.existing in such a cause of their union, and
makes the whole ,ubj~ct subi.ist by itself, though the cause of their
union be unknown; and our general idea of i,ub,tanee arises from
the self-sub:.istence of this collection of ideas.
Now if this notion of substance rc,t here, and be considered merely as :m unknown cause oft, c union of properties, it is much more
easy to be admitted; but if we proceed to support a sort of real sub.
stantial, distinct bciug, different from 10lid quantity or extension in
bodies, and different from a power of thinking in spirits, in my opi.
r:.ion it is the introi:Juction of a needless, scholastical notion into the real
nature of things, and then fancying it to have a real e,i.,,tence.
Mr Locke, in his E=y of Human Understanding, Book II. chap.
~. § 2 seems to ridicule this common idea of subatance, which roe11

baTe generally sul'posed to be a aon i>! aubstratwn1 W$till,l froiu all
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Simple substances, in a philosophical sense, are

either spirits which have no manner of composition
in them, and in :this sense God is called a simple
being; or they are the first principles of bodies, which
are uswilly called elements, of which all other bodies
are compounded : elements are such subi,umces as
cannot be resolved or reduced into two or more substances of different kinds.
The various sects of philosophers have attributed
the honour of this name to various things. The
Peripateticks, or followers uf Aristotle, made fire,
air, earth, and water, to be the four elements of
which all earthly things were compounded; and they
supposed the heavens to be a quintessence, or a fifth
sort of body, distinct from all these; but since experimental philosophy and ·mathematics have been
better understood, this doctrine has been abun<lantly
refuted. The chemists make spirit, salt, sulphur,
water, and earth, to be their five elements, because
they can reduce all terrei,trial things to these five.
This seems to come nearer the truth, though they
are not all agreed in this enumeration of elements.
In short, our modern philosophers generally suppose matter or body to be one simple principle or
solid extension, which being diversified by its various
shapes, quantities, motions, and situations, makes all
' the varieties that are found in the universe, and therefore they make little use of the word element.
properties what,oever, and to be the support of all properties. Yet,
la Book IV. chap. 3. § 6. he seems to suppose there may be ,ome
111cb unknown sulistrafum, which may be capable of receiving the pro•
ptl1iee both of matter and of mind, viz. extension, solidity, and cogi.
tlldon; for be supposes it possiL,le for God to add cogitation to tliat
lllbltance which i. corporeal, and thus so cause matter to think. Ir

tli. be true, then spirit• (for ought we know) may l.>e corporeal
Wnr or thinking bodies, which is a doctrine too favourable to the
III01'tality of the soul. Dut l le1l'•e these debates to the philo,ophers
ti die age, and will not be too po,,ithc in my opinion of this abstruso
~more of this argument in Phlloi0phic11l E1say•, befort rited,
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-Compound substances are made up of two or
more simple substances; so every tbing in this whole
material creation, that can be reduced by the art of
man into two or more different principles or sl}bstances, is a compound body in the philosophical
sense.
But if we take the words simple and compound in
a vulgar sense, then all those are simple substances
which are generally esteemed uniform in their natures.
So every herb is c.alled ·a simple;· and every metal
and mineral, though the chemist perhaps may find
all his several elements in each of them. So a needle
is a simple body, being only made of steel; . but a
sword or a knife is a compound, because its haft or
handle is made of materials different from the blade.
So the bark of Peru, or the juice of sorrel, is a simple medicine; but when the apothecary's art has
mingled several simples together, it becomes.a c~mpound, as diascordium or mitlzradite•.
· . The terms. of pure and mix.eel, when applied to
bodies, are much akin to simple and compound~ So
a guinea is pure gold, if it has nothing but gold.(n
it, without any alloy or baser metal; but if any other
mineral or metal be mingled with it, it is called a.
mixed substance or body.
Substances are also Jivided into animate and inanimate. Animate substances are either animal or
vegetable*.
Some of the animated substances have various
organical or instrumental parts, fitted for a variety
of motions from place to place, and a spring of life
within themselves, as beasts, birds, fishes, and insects; these are called animals. . Other animated
substances are called vegetables, which have within
themselves the principles of another sort of life and
• Vegetables as well as animals have gotten the name of animated
•ubstances, because some of the ancients supposed herbs and plants,
beasts and birds, &c, to have a wrt of eouls distinct from matter or
body.
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pwth, and of various productions of leaves, flowers,

iPcl fruit, such as we see in plants, herbs, and trees.
And there are other substances, which are called
~ate, because they have no sort of life in them,
a earth, stone, air, water, &c.
There is also one sort of imbstance or being, which
ii compounded of body and mind, or a rational spirit
lliited to an animal; such is mankind. Angels, or
,w other beings of the spiritual and invisible world,
,rJao have· assumed visible shapes for a season, can
).idly be reckoned among this order of compounded
lfeings; because they drop their bodies, and divest
dleniselves of those visible &hapes, when their par,icular message is performed, and thereby shew that
~ bodies do not belong to their natures •

.8Jcr, III.-Of Modes, and tlzeir various Kinds, and
first

ef essential and

accidental Modes.

THE next sort of objects which are represented in
au.ideas, are called modes, or manners of being"".
J,. mode is that which cannot subsist in and of italt; but is always esteemed as belonging LO, and subtkting by, the help of some substance, which, for
6at reason, is called its subject. A mode must <leFtJ on that substance for its very existence and be!iM; and that not as a being depends on its cause,
fa' so substances themselves depend on God their
lftltor), but the very being of a mode depends on
• e substance for its subject, in which it is, or to
ph it belongs; so motion, shape, quantity, weight,
Ill modes of the body; knowledge, wit, folly, love,

The term Mode is by some authors applied chiefly to the rt'laor relative manner! of being; but, in logical treatises, it is often
in a larger sense, and extends to all attributes whatsoever, and
the most esscnlial and inward properties, as well as outward
and relations, :ind reaches to actions themselves, as well a•
of action,
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doubting, ju<lging, are modes of the minds for the
one cannot subsist without body, and the other cannot subsist without mind.
Mo<les have their several divisions, as well as sub_.
stances.
I. MonEs are either essential or accidental.
An essential mode or attribute is that which belongs to the very nature or essence of the subject
wherein it is, and the subject can never have the
same nature without it. Such is -roundness in a.bowl,
hardness in a stone, softness in water, vital motion
in an animal, soli<lity in matter, thinking in a spirit;
for though tbat piece of wood which is now a bowl
may be made square, yet if roundness be taken away
it is no longer a bowl ; so that very flesh and bones
which is now an animal, may be without life or inwar<l motion; but if all motion be entirely gone, it
•is no l0nger -an animal but a c-1rcase; &o if a body
or matter be divested of solidity, it is a mere void
space or nothing; and if spirit be entirely without
thinking, I have no idea of any thing that is left in
it; therefore so for as I am able to judge, consciousness must be its essential attribute"" ; thus, all tl1e
-perfections of Goel are called his attributes, for he
..cannot be without th em.
An essential mode is either primary or 5econdary.
A primary er-.sential mode is the first or chief
thing that constitutes any being in its particular cs•
sence or nature, and makes it to be that whie,11 it is,
and clistingHishes it from all oth ..:r beings ; that is
c,dled the difference in the definition of thing•, or
which here after ; so roundness is the primary essen•
• \\nen I call solitl ,•xtcnsion an essential mocle or attribute ol
matter, and a power of tbiuking nn csseotiol mode or at.tribute of a
gpirit, I do it in compliance with comfflon form s of speech, but per.
hll!,s in reality these are the very essences or sul»t.ances themselves,
and tbe most sub,lantial irlcas lhnt we can frnme of body and spiri~
1ind have no need of any (we know uot wbnt) sub,trntum or unin tcli1.:ible subs: ance to Slipport them in their exi.tencil-Or being.
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ri,ode or differeuce of n bowl : the meetin$ of
mode, or the d1ffeof an angle : the perpendicularity of these lines
81Clt other is the difference of a right angle: solid
-lateosion is the primnry attribute or difference of
liter; consciousness, or at least a power of thinkis the difference or primary attribute of a spiand to fear and lo,·e God is the primary att1·i•
of a pious man.
J, secondary essential mode i,- any other attribute
of a thing, which is not of primary consideration;
• 11 called a property.
Sometimes indeed it goes
18Wards making up the essence, especially of a combeing, so far as we are acquainted with it:
.-ietimes it depends upon, and follows from, the
essence of it; so-volubility or aptness to roll, is the
fltOperty of a bowl, and is derived from its roundMobility and figure or shape are properties
.t'matter; and it is the property of a pious man to
love his neighbour.
'
An acdJe11tul mode, or nn accident, is such a
ode as is not 11el·essnry to. the bei11g of a thing; for
ilae tubjcct may be without it, uml yet remain or the
tf11M natut~ that it was before; or it is that mode
whic11 may be separated or aboli~h••<l from its sub.Ject; so smootl111e. s or rouglllles~, blackness or
..taheness, motion or rest, nrc the uccidents of a bowl;
these may be nil changed, and yet the l,ouy re. a bowl still. Learning, justice, folly, sickness,
health, are the accidents of a man; motion, squareor any particular ~hape or size, nre the acciof n body; yet shape und sizJ in general are
tial modes of it; for a body must have some
and sbnpe, nor can it he without them; so hope,
r, v.·1shing, assenting, and doubting, are accident~
• - -· ·mind, though thiµking in gcnernl seems to be
·al to it.

•Dbe. is the primary essential

• &·c the precedini ncte.
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Here observe, that the name of accident has been
oftentimes given by the ol<l Peripatetick philosophers
to all modes, whether essential or accidental; but
the moderns confine this word accident to the sense
in which I have described it.
Here it should be noted also, that though the
word property be limited sometimes in logical treatises to the secondary ess,,ntial mode, yet it is used
in common language to signify these four sorts of
mo<le11, of which some are essential, and some accidental.
(I.) Such as belong to everi subject of .that kind,
but not only to those subjects. So yellow colour
and ductility are properties of $old; they belong to
all gold; b.ut not .only .to gold, for saffron is also
yellow, and lead is ductile.
(2.) Sucl1 as belong only to one kind of subject,
but not to every su~ject of that kind. So learning,
reading, and writing, are properties of human nature;
they belonp; only to men, but not to all men.
(3.) Such as belong to every subject of one kind,
and only to them, but not always. So speech or
language is a property of man, for it belongs to all
men, and to men only; but men are not always
speaking.
(4.) Such as belongs to every subject of one kind,
nod to them only and always. So shape and divisi,bility are properties of body; so omniscience and
omnipotence are properties of the.divine nature; for
fo this sense properties and attcibutes are the same;
and, except in logical treatises, ther.e is scarce any
distinction made between them. These are called
propria quarto modo in the schools, or propertie11 of
the fourth sort.
}:fote. WHERE there is any one property or essential attribute so superior to the rest, that it appears plainly that all the rest a'l:e derived from it,
,and such as is sufficient to give a .full distinction of
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from all other subjects, this attribute or

ii called the essential difference, as is beed; and we commonly say the esst:.ncc of
consiists in it; so the essence of matter in
seems to consist in solidity~ or solid extenBut, for the most part, we are so much at a
ia 6ndi• g oot tbe· intimate essence of particulai;bodies, that we are forced to distinguish the
· tlifference of most things by a combination
rties. So a sparrow is a bird which has
eoloure<l fuuthcr~, nml such a particular size,
and d1oti0n. So-wormwood is an herb which
ab II luuf of such a colour ancl shupe, and taste,
111eh a root and stalk. So beasts and fishes.
s, metals, and works of art, sometimes: us
u of nature, are distinguished bY. such a colof. properties.
·

IV.-The farther Div£sio11s

ef Mode.

second division of modes is into absolute
An absolute mode is that which beto its subject, without respect to any other
whatsoever; but a relative mode is derived
the regard that one being has to othe1 s. So
ness and smoothness are the absolute modes
I bowl; for if there were nothing else existing in
whole creution, a bowl might be round and
th; but greatness and smallness are relative
: for the very ideas of them are derived mereiom the comparison of one being with others •.
bowl of four inches diameter is very great comwith one of an inch and a half; l.,ut it is very
I in comparison of another bowl, whose <.liame. eighteen or twenty inches. Motion is the abmode of a body, but swiftness or slowness are
· e ideas; for the motion of a bowl on a bowlTHE

relative.
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in$-green is swift, when compared 'With a snail; and
it 1s slow when compared with a cannot-bullet.
These relative modes are largely treated of by
some logical and metaphysical writers, under th e
name of relation; and these relations themselves are
farther subdivided into such as arise from the nature
of things, and such as arise merely from the operation of our mind. One sort are called real relations,
the other mental; so the likeness of one egg to another is a real rdation, because it arises fro m th e
real nature of thingi.; for whether there was any
man or mind to conceiv~ it or no, one egg wo uld be
like another; but when we consider an egg as a
noun substantive in grammar, or as signi fied l.iy the
letters, e, g, g, these are mental relations, and derive
their very nature from th e mind of man. T hese
sort of relations arc called by the schools entia rationis, or second notious, whi ch have no real being
but by the operutions of the mind.

III. THE third division of mode shows us they
are either intrinsical o r extrinsical.
Intrinsical
modes are conceived to be in the subject or substance, as when we say a globe is round, or swift,
1·olling, or at rest; or wh en we say a man is tall or
learneu, these are intrinsic modes ; but extrinsic
modes are such as arise from something that is not
in the substance or subject itself; but it is a manner
of being which some sub.;tnnces attain, by reason of
something that is external or foreign to the subject;
us, this globe lies within two yards of the wall; or,
this is beloved or hated. Note. Such sort of modes
as this lastexample are called external denominations.
IV. THERE is a fourth division much akin to this,
whereby modes are said to be inherent or adherent;
that is, proper or improper. Adherent or improper
modes arising from the joining of some accidental
substance to the chief subject, which yet may b~ se-

.... ,.
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t.ed &om it; so when

11

bowl is wet, or a boy is

clothed, these are adherent modes; for the water
and the clothes·are distinct substances, which adhere
tethe bowl or to the boy; but when we sny the bowl

illtwift or round; when we say tl1e boy is strong or
witty, these are proper or inherent mo1les, for they
M\'e a sort of inbeing in the substance itself, and
do not arise from the addition of any other substance
&o it.

v.

ACTION

and passion nre modes or manners

whieh belong to substances, nncl should not entirely

be omitted here. ,vhen a smith with a hammer
mikes a piece of iron, lite hammer and the smith
ate both agents or subjects of fiction; the one is the ,
~

or supreme, the other the subordinate; the

llllll is the patient, or the subject of passion, in n.

philOBOpbical sense, because it receives the operation
m-the ~nt; though this ~ense of the words passion
ud pat1e11t differs much from the vulgar meaning

of them•.

VI. THE sixth division of modes may be into phy.. lieal, that is, natuml, ch·il, morn], and supernatural.
wbent we consider the Apostle Puul. who was a
lltle man, a Roman by the privilege of his birth, n
of virtue or honesty, and an inspu-ed apostle ;

low stature is n physical mode, his being a Roil. a civil privilege, his honesty is a moral con- .

tilllntion,

anJ his being inspired is supernatural.

II, MonEs belong either to body or to spiri~
both, Modes of body belong only to matter
le corporeal beings ; and these are shape, size,.
~ or place, &c. Modes of spirit belong to
elgni&a the doer, patient the sufferer, action is doing;

Ja aull'cring; ag~nt and a.:tion have rctaio<.-d their origiluil
inl eense, though 11:1tic,1t and pas5ion have acquired a
in common languge,

~
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mind; such are knowledge, assent, cli!,scnt, doubting,
reasoning, &c. Modes which belong to both have been
sometimes called mixe<l modes, or 1-iuman modes;
for these are only found in human nature, which is
compounded both of body an<l spirit: such are sensation, imagination, passion, &c. in all which there
is a concmrence of the operations both of mind and
body, that is of animal aud intellectual natur~.
But the modes of body may be yet farther distinguishe<l. Some of them are primary modes or qualities, for they belong to bo<lies considered in th emselves, whether there were any man to take notice of
them or no; such are these before mentioned, viz.
shape, size, situ:1tion, &c. Secon<lary qualities or
modes are such ideas as we ascribe to bodies on account of the various impressions which are made on
the senses of men bv them, ancl these are called sensible qualities, which are rnry numerous; such are
.all colours, as red, green, blue,, &c.; such are all
sounds, as sharp, shrill, loud, hoarse ; all tastes, as
sweet, bitter, sour; all smells, whether pl easant, offensive, or indifferent; aud • all tactile qualities, or
such as affect the touch 01· feeling, viz. heat, cold,
&c. These are properly called secondary 9,ualities ;
for though we are ready to concciYe them as existing in the very bodies themselves which affect our
aenses, yet true philosophy has most undeniably
provt-d, that all these are really various id eas or perceptions excited in human 110.ture by the different
impressions that bodies make upon our senses by
their primary modes, that is, by means of their dir:.
fcreut shapes, size, motion, and position of those little invisible parts tha t compose them. Thence ii
follows, that a secondary quality, ccnsi<lered as in
the bodies themselves, is nothing else but a power
nnd aptitude to produce such sensations in us. See
Locke's Essay on the Understanding, Book II. Ch. 8.

VIII. I

llIIGUT

nc!d, in the last place, that . a,

•es
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belong to substnnces, so there ure some aho

that are but modes of oth <> r nw<le:, : for though they
. \lbsist in and by the sub ,tance, as the original l'UU•

Ject of them, yet they are properly and d irectly ut.tribute<l to some mo<le of that substance. Motion is
the mode of 11 body; but the swifrness or slow11C'ss
of it, or its direction to t he north or :,outh, nre bu t
~es of motion. 1Valk in~ is the mode or mmm rr
of man or of a beast: but wulk: ng g racefally implie-.
a manner or mode supernJd cd to th::it action. All
cemparative and superlatiYe d<;gr<-'es of any quality,
are the modes of a moJe, as swifter impliC's a
greater measure of swiftn c~s.
It would be too tediou!> here to run throa crh all
the modes, accidents, llllCI relations at large tli~t belong to various being~, and are copiously treated of
in general in the science cal led metaphysics, or m01 e
properly ontology; they are also treated of in particular in those sciences \\hich have assumed them
se,·erally as their proper subjects.

&er. V. Of the ten Categorzes.-Oj Substances modified.

W.E have thus given an account of the two chief
~eels of out· ideas, viz. Substances and modes, and

their Tdrious kinds; and in these last sections, we
have bridly comprised the greatest part of what is
necc>ssary in the famous ten ranks ot being, called
the ten predicaments or categories of Aristotle, on
which there art' endless volumes of discourses formed by several of his followers. But that the reader
JDay not uttC'rly be ignorant of them, let him know
Ule names are these : &bstance, quantity, quality,
rrlation, action, passion, where, when, situation, and
cltl4J,ing. It would be mere loss of time to show how
loose, how injudicio~s, and eyen ridiculous is this
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tenfold division of things; and whatsoever farther
r elates to them, and which may tend to improve
useful knowledge, should be sought in ontology,
and in other sciences.
Besides substance and mode, some of the moderns would have us consider the substance modified, as a distinct object of our ideas; but I think
there is nothing more that need be said on this subject tlrnn this, viz. There is some difference between
a substance when it is considered with all its Jnodes
about it, or clothed in all its manners of ex istence,
and when it is distinguished from them, and considered naked without them.

SEcT. VI.-Of Not-Being.
As being is divided into substance nnd mode, so we
may consider not-being with regard to both these.

I. NoT-BEING is considert:d as excluding all substance, and then all modes are ah.o necessarily excluded, and this we call pure nullity, or mere nothing.
This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a philosophical sense; so we say there is nothing in the cup,
in a vulgar sense, when we mean there is no liquor
in it: but we cannot say there is nothing in the cup,
in a strict philosophical sense, while there is air in
it, and perhaps a million of rays of light are there.
II. NoT•BEING, as it has relation to modes or
_manners of being, may be considered either as a
mere negation, or as a privation.
A negation is the absence of that wh ich does not
naturally belong to the thing we are speakina of, or
which bas no right, obligation, or necessity t~be present with it: as whtm we say a stone is inanimate, or
blind, or deaf, that is, it has no life, nor sig ht, nor
hearing; or when we say a carpenter or a fisherman
is unlearned, these are mere negations.
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• privation is the absence of what does natural-

""•mg to the thing we are speaking of, or
ought to be present with it, as when a man
is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a physidivit1 be unlenrned, these nrn called pri, lb die sinfulne s of any human action is
he a privation ; for sin is that want of conto t11e law of God, which ought to be found
ry action of man •

are some writers who make a11 sort
ftft>des or relntions, as well as all external
ons, to be mere creatures of the mind, and
f"Otionis, and then they rank them also under
head of qot-beings; but it is my opinion,
ver may be determined concerning mere
f rel ·ons and eXtt!rnal denominations, which
to b11ve somethiqg less of entity or being in
"~t there are mnny ren1 relations which ought
tie reduced to so low a class; sue~ are the situabodies, their mutqal distances, their particu·ons and m~ures, the notions of fathererhood, sonship, Ste. all which nre relative ~
er, essence of virtue or holiness cone conformity of our actions to the ruJe of
...l'lllllliMn, or the law of God ; the nature and
e~rity is the conformity of our words
tt1 onr thoughts, all which are but mere
; ,-nd I think we must not reduce such
as piety, virtue, and truth, to the rank
, which have nothing real in them,
or rather die sinfulness of an action) may
called a not-being, for it is a waut of
VI ue. This is the most usual, and perr-...-.,..._..t, way of representing tl1ese matters.
• THERE

. .. .tM.l'P

LOGIC, OR,

PART I.

CHAP. III.
OF TUE SEVERAL SORTS OF PERCEPTIO!,S OR IDEAS,
loEAS may be divided with regard to th~i~· or-ig.inal,_
their nature, thei1· objects, arul their q,ualitl~

"
8EcT.

___ ....................
,,

I.-Of sensible, spiritual, and abstracted Ideas.

THERE has been a g1·ent controversy about the origin of ideas, viz~ Whether any of our ideas are innate or no, that is, born with us, and naturally belonging to our minds? Mr. Locke utterly denies it;
otners as positively affirm it: Now, though this controversy may be compromised, by allowing that there
is a sense, wherein our first ~deas of some things may
be said to be innate, (as I have shewn in some re•
marks on Mr. Locke's essay, which have lain long.
by me),. yet it does not belong to this place and busi.,.
ness to have that point debated at large, nor will it
hinder our pursuit of the present work.to. Bass it over.
in silence.
There is sufficient ground to say, .tha.t alf our ideas,
with regard to their original, may be divided into
three sorts, viz. Sen.sible,:spiritual, and abstracted ideas.

I. SENSIBLE or corporeal·ideas are derived originally from our senses, and from the. communication
which the soul has with the animal body in this
present state; such. are the notions we frame of all colours, sounds, tastes, figures or shapes, and. motions :
for our senses being conversant about particular sensi•bleobjects, become the occasions of several distinctconcepti~ns in the mind; and thus we come hy the ideas
of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet,
and all those which we call sensible qualities. All
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the ideas which 'Ye have of body, and ti1e sensible modes and properties that belong to it, seem to
be derived from sensation.
And howsoevel' these may be treasured .up in the
memory, and by the work of fancy may be increased,
diminished, compounded, divided, and diversified,
(which we are ready to call our invention), yet they
all derive their first naturn and being from something
that has been let into our minds by one or other of
our senses. If I thiuk of a golden mountain, or a
sea of liquid fire, yet the single ideas of sea, fire,
mountain and gold came rnto my tl1oughts at fir.t by
sensation; the mind has only compounded th.em.
II. * SPIRITUAL Ol' intellectual ideas are t110se
.which we gain by reflecting on the nature and actions
of our o.wn souls, and turning our thoughts within
ourselves, and observing what is transacted in our
own minds. Such are .the ideas we have of thought,
assent, dissent, judging, reason, knowledge, understanding, will, love, fear, hope.
By sensation the soul contemplates things (as it
were) out of itself, and gains corporeal ,rep1·esentations or semible ideas; by reflection [the soul contemplates itself, and things within itselt~ and by this
mean·s it gaius spiritual ideas, or representations of
thin()'s intellectual.
Here it may be noted, though the first original
of these two sorts of ideas, viz. Seusible and spirituaJ, may be entirely owiug to these two principles,
sensation and reflection, yet . the recollection aud
fresh excitation of them may be owing to a tl1om,and
other occasions and occurrences of lifo. We could
never inform a man who was b01·n blind or deat;
what we mean by the words yellow, blue, 1·ed, or
by the words loud or shrill, nor convey a • y just ideas
of these things to his mind, by all the powers of
• Herc the word S11irit1.:il is u1cd in
relii;iou, sense,
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language, unless he has experienced those sensations
of sound and colour; nor could we ever gain the ideas
of thought, judgement, reason, doubting, hoping,
&c. by all the wm·ds that man could invent, without
turning our thoughts inwnrd upon the actions of our
' own souls. Yet when we once have attained these
ideas by sensation and reflection, they may be excited afresh by the use of names, words, signs, or by
any thing else that has bee11 connected with them in
our thou~hts; for when two or more ideas have been
associated .t ogether, whether it be by custom, or accident, or design, the one presently brings the other
to mind.
III. BESIDES those two which we have named,
there is a third sort of ideas, which are commonly
called abstracted ideas, because though the original
ground or occasion of them may be se11satio11, or
reflection, or both, yet these ideas are fram ed by
another act of the mind, which we u ually call abstraction. Now the word abstraction signifies a
withdrawing some parts of au idea from othe1· parts
of it, by which means such abstracted ideas are
formed, as neither r.epresent any thing corp ,real or
spiritnt1I, that is, any thing peculiar or proper to
miud or body. Now these are of two kinds.
Some of these abstracted ideas are di e most absolute, general, and u11iversal conceptions of thin C}'s
considered in the1n-el ves, \\ i thout respect to oth e1~,
such us entity or bcin~, and not-bt:iug, essence, existence, act, power, substance, mode, accident, &c.
The other sort of abstracted ideas is relatirc, as
when we compare several things togethe1·, and consider merely the relations of one tl1ing to another,
entirely dropping the subject of those relations, whether they be corporeal or spiritual; such are our
ideas of cause, effect, likeness, unlikeness, subject,
object, identity, or samene~s, and contrariety, order,
natl other thinl!c; which are tre:1ted of in ontolo•~v.
o.
~
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Most of the terms of art in several sciences may

be ranked under this head of abstracted ideas, as
pronoun,. verb, in grammar, and the several
prticles of speech, as wherefore, therefore, when,
.,.., although, howsoever, &c. So connections,
vusitions, similitudes, trnpes, and their variou:oirms in rhetoric.
The abstracted ideas, whether absolute or relative,
GDDot so properly be said to derive their immediate,
Oftlllplete, and distinct original, either from sensalNII or reflection, (1.) bE.cause the nature and the
,Mtions both of body and spirit give us occasion to
lrao,e exactly the same ideas of essence, mod~, cause,
likeness, contrariety, &c. Therefore these
,-nnot be called either sensible or spiritual idetts,
they are not exact representations either of the
peculiar qualities or actions of spirit or body, \mt
aeem to be a distinct kind of idea framed in the
mind, to represent our most general conceptions of
tuig,,, 01· their relations to one another, without
my reg:m1 to their natures, whether they be CGrPf'renl or spiritual. And, (2.) the same general
ideas of cau~e au<l effect, likeness, &c. may be transferred to a thousand other kinds of beiug, whether
bodily or spiritual, besides those from 11 hence we
int derived them : e,·en those abstracted i<leas,
'1'hich might be first occasioned by bodies, may be
• properly afterwnrd attributed to spirit.
'ow, though Mr. Locke supposes seusation and
Mlection to be Lhe «mly two springs of all ideas,
ad these two are suflicient to furnish our miudi
rith nil that rich variety of ideas which we have;
Jet ab!>traction is certainly o. different act of tlie
mind, \\hence these abstractetl itleas have thei1· ori1; though perhaps sensation or reflection may
i5h us with all the first objects and occasions
nee these abstracted it.leas are excited and derivNor in this sense and view of things can I thiuk
, Locke himself would deny my rcprcsent,tt:un of
DOUD,
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the original of abstracted ideas, nor forbid them t
stand for a distinct species.

Note. TaouGH we hm·e divided i<leas in this cha
'. ter into three sorts, viz . . Sensible, spiritual and a
,stracte<l, yet it may not be amiss just to take notic
here, that as man may be called a compound sub
.stance, being made up of body and mind, and th
modes which aPise from this compO&ition are caUe
mixed mode,;, such as sensation, passion, .discourse
&c. so the ideas of this substance or being calle
man, and of these mixed .modes may be caJled mi-x
cd ideas, for they are nQt properly and strictly spirit
.ual, sensible or Qbstn\cted. See a much larcrer a
count of every -pwt of this ,chapter in the Pl1ilo
_phical Essays by J. W. Essay 3-, 4, .&c.

SECT.

11.-0J simple and complex, compound.and col
lective Ideas.

lnEAs, considered in their nature, are either sim
ple or complex.
A simple idea is one uniform idea, which canno
be divided or distinguished by the mind of man int
two or more ideas; such are a multitude of our sen
· sations, as the idea of sweet, bitter, colc,l, beat, white
red, blue, hard, soft, motion, rest, and perhaps ex
tension and duration; such are also many of ou
spiritual ideas, such as thought, will, wish, know
ledge, &c.
A complex ,<lea is made by joining two or mor
simple ideas together; as a square, a triangle,
cube, a pen, a table, reading, writing, truth, fals
hood, a body, a man, a horse, an angel, a heav
body, a swift horse, &c. Every thing that can
divided by the mind imo two or more ideas is call
complex.
Complex ideas are often considered as single an
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distinct beings, though they may be made i1p of se•
vcral simple ideas; so a bocly, a spirit, a house, a
tree, a flower; but when several of these ideas of a
different kind are joined together, wl1ich are wont
to be considered as distinct single beings, this i~
c.1lled a compound idea, whether these united
id eas be simple or complex. So it man is com•
pounded of body and spirit, so mithridate is a
compound medicine, becau e it is made of many dit:.,
feren~ ingredients. This l have sl~ewn under the
<loctrnie of substances. And modes also may be
compounded; harmony is a compound idea, made
up of difl't!f<'nt sounds uni.tcd; so se,·eral different
, irtues must be u11ite<l to make up the compounded
idea or character either of a hero or a saint.
Ilut when many" ideas of the same kind are joined•
together, and united in one name, or under one
view, it is called a colJective idea;. so an army, or
a par.l iament, is a· collection of men ; a dictionary, •
or nomenclature, is a collection of words ; a flock is
a collection of sheep;. a forest or grove a collection
of trees;. a heap is a collection of: sand, or corn, or
duit, &£. i a city is a collecti0n of houses; a nosegay is a collection of flowers; a month or a year is
n..rollectiou of days;. and a thousand is a collection
of ·units.
.
The precise difference between a compound and
collective idea is this, that a compound idea unites
things of a different kind, but a collective idea thing!i
of the same kind, though this distinction in some·
cases is not accurately <Jbserved, and custom oftenti1pes uses the word compound for collective.

SECT.

lll.-Of universal and particzilar Ideas, real
and imagin01'!J.

!nus, according to their objects, may first be diTided into particular or uni versa!.
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A particular Idea is that which represents one
1
thing only.
1
Soqietimes the one thing is represented in a loose
and indeterminate 'manner, as when we say some man,
:my man, one man, another man ; some horse, any
horse: one city, or another, which is called by the
,chools individuwn vagum:
'
Sometimes the particuhu· idea represents one thing
in a determinate manner, aml then it is called a singular idea; such is Bucephalus, or Alexander's horse,
Cicero the orator, Peter the hpostle, the palace of
Versailles, this book, that river, the new forest, or
ihe city of London. That idea which represents
one particular determinate thing to me, is called a .
singular hlea, whether it be ~imple, or· comi1Iex, or
compound.
,
·
The object of any particular idea, as well as the
idea itself, is sometimes called an individual: so Pei er
is an individual man, London is an individual city.
So this book, one horse, another horse, are all individuals ; though the word individuals is more usually
limited to one singular; certain, and determined object.
An universal idea is that which represents a common nature agreeing to several particular things; so
a horse, a man, or a book, are called universal ideas,
because they agree to all horses, men, or books.
And I think it not amiss to intimate, in this place,
that these universal ideas are formed by that act of
the mind which is called abstraction, that is, a withdrawing some pai't of an idea from other parts of it;
for when singular ideas are first let i,nto the mind by
sensation or reflection, then, in order to make them
universal, \\ e leave ' out or drop all those peculiar
anµ determinate characters, qualities, modes, or circumstances, w_h_ich belong merely to any particular
individual being, an<l by which it differs from other
beings; and we only contemplate those properties
of it -wherein it agrees with other l>ej11gs.
Though it !.DUSt be · confoss<:d, that the name- of -
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ideas is sometimes attributed lo universal

both sensible or spiritual, yet this abstraction
so great, as when we drnp <mt of our idea

1ensible or spiritual representation, and retain
but the most general and absolute concepo things, or their mere relations to one onother,
ut any regard to their particular natures,
r they be sensible or spiritual. And it is to

ia kind of conception,; we more properly give the
of abstracted ideas, as in the first section of
cbApter.

An unh·ersal idea is either general or special.
A general idea is called by the schools a genus ;
it is one common nature agreeing to several
common nature,;. So animal is a genus, bellllle it agrees to horse, lion, whale, butterfly, which
also common ideas ; so fish is a genus, because
agrees to trout, herring, crab, which are commoa
res also.
A special idea is called by the schools a species ;
ii one common nature that agrees to several singuindh·i<lual beings; so hori,e i~ a special idea, or
ies, because it agrees to Ilucephalus, Trott,
Snowball. City is a special idea, for it agrees
• London, Paris, llristol.

Nole. 1st, So~rn of these universals are ~enuses,
aampare<l with natures more common. So. bird
a genus, if compared with eagle, sparrO'I\', raven,
• are also conuuon nature5; but it is a specie5t
compared with the more general nature, animal.
same may be said of fish, bea.;t, &c.
l'his sort of universal i<leas, which mny either be
· ered as a genus or 11 species, is culled subaltern;
tbe highest geuus, which is never 11 specier., is
the most general ; and the lowe!>t speci~s,
is ne6er a genus, is callc<l the most speciaL
l may be ob~ervt><l here also, that that gencrul na'OJ' property wherein one thing agrees with mo~/
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other things, is cnlled its more remote ~enus; so
substance is the remote genus of bird or benst, becnuse it agrees not only to all kinds of animals, but
also to things inanimate, as sun, stars, clouds, metals,
stones,' air, water, &c. Dut animal is the proximate
or nearest genus of bird, because it agrees to fewest
other things. Those general natures which stand ·
Letween the nearest an<l most remote are called intermediate.
Note. 2dly, In universal ideas it is proper to consider their comprehension an<l thei1· exteHsion"'.
The comprehension of
idea regards all the essential modes and prope1 ties of it: so body in its
comprehension takes in solidity, figure, quantity,
mobility, &c. So a bowl in its comprehension includes roundness, volubility, &c.
. The extension of an uni1·en,al idea regards all the
particular kinds and single beings that are contained
under it. So a body in its extension includes sun,
moon, star, wood, iron, plant, animal, &c. which
nrc several species, or individuals, under the general
name of body. So 11 bowl, in its extemion, iucludes
:i wooden uowl, 11 bra!is bowl, a white aml black
\,owl, a heavy bowl, &c. an<l ali kin<ls of bowls, together with all the particular iu<lividual bowb in the
world.

,m

Note. THE comprehension of an idea is sometimes
taken in so large a St:!nse, as not only to include the
~ssential attributes, but all the properties, mo<les,
and relations whal.ioe,·er, that belong to any being,
ns will appear, Chap. YI.
This account of genus and species is part of that
famous doctrine of universals, \\hich is taught in the
schools, with diverse other formalities belonging to it;
for it is in this place that they introduce difforence,
"hich is the primary essential mode, aad property,
• 111e word extension here is taken iD a mere logical &ellS"1 anll 118'
in a l'hys;cal and mathematical litDH,_
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or the secondary essential mo<le, and accidl!nt, or ,
the accidental mode; and these they call the five
predicables, because every thin~ that is affirmed concerning any being must be either the genus, the
species, the difference, some property, some accident; but what farther is necessary to be said concerning these things will be mentioned when we
treat of definition.
Having finished the doctrine of universal and par-·
ticular ideas, I should take notice of another division of them, which also hath respect to their objects;
and that is, they are either real or imaginary.
Ilea.I ideas are such as have a just foundation in
nature, an<l have real objects, or exemplars, wllich
did or do, or may actually exist, ~ccor<lillg to the
present state and nature of things; such are all our
ideas of long, broad, swift, slow, woo<l, iron, men,
horses, thoughts, spirits, a cruel master, a proud beggar, a man seven feet high.
Imaginary ideas, which are also called fantastical,
or chimerical, are such as nre made by enlarging,
diminishing, uniting, dividing real i<leas in the mind,
in ~uch a manner as no objects or exemplars did or
~ver will exist, according to the present course of
nature, though the several parts of these id~as are
borrowed from real objects: such are these conceptions we have of a centaur, a satyr, a golden mountain, a flying horse, a dog without a bea<l, a bull
less than a mouse, or a mouse as big as a bull, and
a man twenty feet high.
Some of these fantastical ideas are possi 1·le, that.is,
they are not utterly incousi~tent in the nalure of
things, and therefore it is within the reach of divine
11ower to make such ol ,jects; ~uch are most of the
instances already given; but impossibles carry.an utter inconsistence in tht:! ideas which are joined, sucn
are self-active matter, and infinite or eternal men,
a pious man witho1.1t honesty, or benven without

boline~,.
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IV.-Tlie Division qf Ideas, with regard to
tl1eir qualities.
IDEAS, with regard to their qnalities, afford us
these several divisions of them. 1. They are either
clear and dis'.inct, or obscure and confused. 2. They
are vulgar or learned. S. They are perfect or imperfect. 4. The;:y are true or false.
SECT.

I. Oua ideas are either clear and distinct, or obscure and confused.
Several writers have distinguished the clear ideas
from those that are distinct; aud the confused ideas
from those that are obscure; :u1d it must be acknowledge<l, there may be some ditforence between them;
for it is the clearness of i<leas for the most part makes
them distinct; ancl the obscurity of ideas is oue thing
tl1at will always bring a sort of confusion into them.
Yet when these writers come to talk largely upon this
subjec.t, nncl to explain and adjust their meaning with
great nicety, I have generally found that they did not
keep up the distinction they first designeu, but they
confound the one with the other. I shall therefore
treat of clear 01· distinct ideas, as one and the same
sort, and obscure or coufused ideas as another.
A clear and distinct idea is that which represents
the object of the mind with full evidence and strength,
and plainly distinguishes it from all other objects
what:,oevcr.
An obscure anJ confused idea represents the object either so faintly, so imperfectly, or so mingled
with other ideas, that the object of it doth not appear
plain to the mind, not purely in its own uature, nor
sufliciently distinguished from other things.
When we see the sea and skv nearer at hand, we
bave a clear and distinct idea of' each; but when we
look far toward the horizon, especially in a misty day,
our ideas of both are but obscure and confused; for

we know

not

whic~

~ Ilea

and which ia iky. So

TI,
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•en we look at the colours of the rainbow, we have
a clear idea of the red, the blue, the greeu in the
IDiddle of their several arches ; and a distinct idea
tDo, while the eye fixes there; but" when we consider the border of those colours, they so run into one
Mer, that it renders their ideas confused and obbre. So the idea which we have of our brother,
«our friend, whom we see daily, is clear and dis1inet; but when the absence of many years has inthe- idea, it becomes obscure and confused.
ale here, that some of our ideas may be very
Mt and distinct in one respect, and very obscure
,md confused iu another. So when we speak of a
iftljagonum, or a figure of a thousand an.,les, we may
Wl a clear and distinct rational idea ofthe number
dll thousand anglei.; for we can demonstrate various
properties concerning it by reason ; but the image,
or eensible.idea, which we have of the figure, is but
CODfused and obscure; fot· we cannot precisely dis~ish it by fancy from the ima~e of a figure that
llli nine hundred angles, or nme hundred and
-Y• So when we speak of the infinite divisibility
efmatter, we always keep in our minds a very clear
afld distinct idea of division and divisibility. But
after we have made a little progress in dividing, and
e111e to parts that are far too small for the reach of
oat senses then our ideas, or sensible images of
t"9e little 'bodies, become obscure and ~ndi!,tinct,
Ull the idea of infinite is very obscure, imperfect,

ilaconfused.

I.

IDEAS

are either vulgar or lc~rned.

A vul~ar

idta represents to us the ~ost <;>bv1ous ?nd sens1ule
nces that are contamed

111

the obJect of them;

a learned idea penetrates farther into the nu~ure,

Jll'operties, reasons, causes and effects of thmgs.

ftis is best illustrated

by some examples.

.

Jt is a vul,.,ar idea that we }u1ve of a rambow,
"1len we conc~ive a large arch in the clouds, ma<le
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up of various colours parallel to each other; but it is
e learned idea which a philosopher has when he considers it as the various refieclions and refractions of
sun-beams i~ drops of falling rain. So it is a vulgar
i1lea which we have of the colours of solid bodies,
when we perceive them to be, as it were, a red, or
blue, or green tincture of the surface of those bo<lies;
hut it is a philosophical idea when we consider the
various colours to be nothing else but different sensations excited in us by the variously refracted ray5
of light reflected on our eyes in a diflerent manner,
according to the different size, or shape, or situation
of the particles of which the surfaces of those bodies
are composed. It is a vulgar idea, which we ha1·e of
a watch or clock, when we conceive of it ns a pretty
instrument made to shew us the hour of the day; but
it is a learned idea which the watchmaker has of it,
who knows all the several parts of it, the spring, the
balance, the chain, the wheels, their axles, &c. t~
gether with the various connections and adjustments
of each part, whence the exact and uniform motion .
of the index ie derived, which points to the minute..
or the hour. So when a common understanding ·
reads Virgil's lEneid, he has but a vulgar idea of
that poem; yet his mind is naturally entertained with
the story, and his ean with the verse; but when a
critic, or a man who has skill in poesy, rrnds it, he
has a learned idea of its peculiar beauties ; he tastes
and relishes a superior pleasure; he a<lmires the Roman poet, and wishes he had known the Christian
theology, which woul<l have furnished him with nobler materials aud machines than all the heathen
idols.
It is with a vulgar idea that the world beholds the
cartoons of Haphael at Hampton-court, and every
one feels his share of 1>leasure end entertainment;
but a painter contemplates the wonders of that lta:lian pencil, and sees a thousand beauties in them
whid1 the vulgar eye neglected: bis learned ideas
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ve him a transcendent delight1 and yet, at the same
, discm·cr the blemishes which the common
r ne\'er observed.

111.

IDEAS are either perfect or imperfect, which
9therwise called adequate or inadequate.
Those are adequate ideas which perfectly repretheir archetypes or objects. Inadequate ideas
. . but a partial or incomplete representation of
archetypes to which they are referred.
All our simple ideas are in some sense adequate
«perfect; because simple ideas, considered merely
a our first perceptions, have 110 parts in them : so
we may be said to have a perfec~ idea of white,
black, &weet, sour, length, light, motion, rest, &c.
We have also a perfect i<lea of various figures, as a
lliangle, a square, a cylinder, a cube, a sphere, which
are complex ideas; but our idea or image of a fipre of a thousand sides, our idea of the city of Lontlon, or the powers of a loadstone, are very imperfect,
well as all our ideas of infinite length or breadth,
afinite power, wisdom, or duration ; for the idea of
~ite ii; endless and ever growing, and cau never
completed.

Note I. \VnEN we h1we a -pa·rect idea of any
thing in all its parts, it is called a complete idea;
llhen in all its properties, it is called -comprehensh·e.

iJet when we have

but an inadequate and imporfect

Wea, we are only said to apprehe1,d it; therefore use
die term apprehension, when we speak of our knowJidge of God, who can never be comprehended by

ms creatures.

Note 2. Though there are a multitude of ideas

'ch may be called perfect or adequate, in a vulgar
se, yet there are scarce any ideas which are adete, comprehensive, and complete in a philosophical
; for there is scarce any thing in the workl that
know, as to all the parts, and powers, and properties of it, in perfection. Even so plain an idea
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as that of a triangle, has perhaps infinite properties
belonging to it, of which we know but a few. Who
can tell what nre the shapes and positions of those
particles, which cause all the variety of colours that
appear on the surface of things? Who knows what
·_ are the figures of the little corpuscles that compose
and distinguish different bodies ? The ideas of brass,
iron, gold, wood, stone, hyssop, and rosemary, have
an infinite variety of hidden mysteries contained in
the shape, size, motion, and position of the little
particles of which they are composed ; and perhaps also infinite unknown properties nnd powen
that may be derived from them. An<l if we m·ise
to the animal world, or the world of ~pirits, our ,
knowledge of them must be amazingly imperfect,
when there is not the least grain of sand, or empty
space, but has too many questions an<l tlifficulties
belongiug to it, for the wisest philosopher upon
earth to answer and resolve.

IV. Oun ideas are either true or false; for an idea
' bein~ the representationofa thing in the mind, it must
· •be either a true or a false representation of it. Jf tl1e
idea be conformable to the object or archetype ofit, it
is a true idea; if not, it is a false one. Sometimes
our i<leas are referred to things really exir,ting without us as their archetype5. If T see bodies in their
proper colonr~, I hare a true idea; but when a man
under the jaundice sees all bodies yell0w, he has a
false idea of them. So if we see the sun or moon
rising or setting, our idea represents them Ligger
than what they are on the meridian; and in this sense
it is a false idea, because those heavenly bodies are
all day an<l all night of the same Ugness. Or when
I see a straight staff appear crooked while it
is half un<ler water, 1 say the water gives me a
false i<lea of it. Sometimes our ideas refer to the
i<leas of other men, denoted by such a particular
,ror<l as their archetn1es. So when I licar a Protes~
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tant use the words church and sacraments, if I understand by these words a conO'regation offaithfulmen
who profess Christianity, and the two ordinances, baptism and the Lord's supper, I have a true idea of those
words in the common sense of Protestants; but if
the man who speaks of them be a Papist, he means
the church of Rome and the seven sacraments, and
then I have a mistaken idea of those words, as
spoken by him, for he has a different sense and
meaning ; and in general, whensoever I mistake the
sense of any speaker or writer, I may be said to
have a false idea of it.
Some think that truth or falsehood properly belongs only to propositions, which shall be the subject of discourse in the second part of logic; for if
we consider ideas as mere impressions upon the
mind made by outward objects, those impressions
will ever be conformable to the laws of nature in
such a case ; the water will make a stick appear
crooked, and the horizontal air will make the sun
and moon appear bigger. And generally, where
there is falsehood in ideas, there seems to be soma
secret or latent proposition, whereby we judge falsely of things. This is more obvious where we take
up the words of a writer or speaker in a mistaken
sense: for we join his words to our own ideas, which
are difiercnt from his. Hut after all, since ideas are
pictures of things, it can never be very improper
to pronounce them to be true or false, according to
their confonnityor non-conformity to their exemplars.

,,.
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•r- WITII
WORDS,
THEIR SEVERAL DIVISIONS, TOGETHER
TUE ADVANTAGE
DANGER OF THEl'tl,
A~"D

AND

SECT.

I.-Of Words in General, a12cl their C:se.

THOUGH our ideas are first acquired by the perception of objects, or by various sensations an<l reflections, yet. we convey them to each other by the
means of certain sounds, or ,v.ritten marks, which
v.:e call words; and a great part of our knowledge
is both obtained and communicated by these means,
which are called speech or languaO'e,
But as ,we are led into the knowledge of things by
words, so we are oftentimes led into error, or mis••
,tike, by the ,use or abuse of words also. And in
• order to guard against such mistakes, as well as to
• promote our improvement in knowledge, it is necessary to acquaint ourselves a little with words and
terms. We shall begin with these observations.

Observ. 1. WonDs (whether they are spoken or
written) have no natural connection with the ideas
they are designed to signify, nor with the things
which are represented in those ideas. There is no
manner of relation between the sounds white in
English, or black in French, and that colour which
Tt'e represent by that name; nor ba,·e the letters of
which these words are composed. any natural apt,neEs to signi~v that colour more than red or green.
Words and names therefore are mere arbitrary signs
invented by men to communicate their thoughts or
ideas to one another.
Observ. 2. If one single. word were appointed to
express but one simple idea, and nothing else, as
, 'Wliite, blaclc, sv:eet, sour, sharp bitter, extension, dum_, tio11, there would be scarce any mistake about them.
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alas! it is a·common unhaJ>piness in lnngnagc,
dift'erent simple ideas are sometimes ex'})rcssed
snrne word; so the worc.ls sweet and shatip
pplied both to the objects of hearing and tast•
as we shall see hereafter ; · and this, perhaps,
be one cause or foundation · of· obscurity aml
arising from words.
ftt'V, 3. Ju communicatin<T orn: complex ideas
e another, if we could j~in as many peculinr
tppropriated words together in 011c sound, a-;
'n simple itleas to make one complex one, "'t~
d seldom be in clanger of mistaking : "\-Vhen I
s thP. taste of'; an apple, which we call the
sweet, none can mistake "hat I mean.
tt this sort of composition would make all la11..a most tedious and unwieldy thing, since most
· ideas are compl~x, and many of them ha"e
or ten simple ideas in them; so that the rernecly
be worse than the disease ; for what is now
ed in one short word, as month or year, •
require two lines to express it. It is necessary,
e, that single words be invented to express
ex ideas, in order to make language short and
here is one great infelicity, that when single

signiry complex ideas, one word can never di•

1 manifest all the parts of a complex idea; and
y it will often happen, that one man includes
or less in his idea, than another does, wliil!!
es the same word to it. In this case there
be danger of mistake between them, for they
t menu the same object, though they use the
name. So if one person or IJation, by the
yenr mean twelve months of thirty deys. each,
is, three hundred and sixty-five days, another
a solar year of three hundred and sixty days,
a third mean a lunar year, or twelve lunar
that is, three hundred and fifty-four days,
will be a great variation and error in tbeJr ae-
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count of things, unless they are well apprised of
each other's meanings beforehand. This is sup.
posed to be the reason why some ancient histories
and prophecies, and accounts of chronology, are so
hard to be adjusted. And this is the true reason of
so furious anc..L endless debates on many points in
divinity ; the words clwrch, worship, idolatry, repentance, faith, election, merit, grace, and many
others which signify very complex ideas, are not applied to include just the same simple ideas, and the
same number of them, by the various contending
parties : Thence arises confusion anc.l contest.
Obsen,. 4,, Though a single name does not certainly manifest to us all the parts of a complex idea,
yet it must be acknowledgcxl, that in many of our
complex ideas, the single name may point ont to us
some chief property which belongs to the thing the
word si"uifies; especially when the word or name
is trace~ up to its original, through several languages
from whence it is borrowed. So an apostle signifies
one that is sent forth.
But this tracing of a word to its original, (which
is called etymology), is sometimes a very precarious
and uncertain thing; and, after all, we have made
but little progress towards the attainment of the full
meaning of a complex idea, by knowing some one
chief property of it.
e know but a small part of
the notion of an apostle, by knowing barely that he
is sent forth.
Observ. 5. Many (if not most) of our words which
nre applied to moral and intellectual ideas, wh~n
traced up to the original in the learned languages,
will be found to signify sensible and corporeal things:
Thus the words apprehension, understanding, abstraction, invention, idea, inference, prudence, religion, church, adoration, &c. have all a corporeal
signification in their original. The name spirit itself
signifies breath or air, in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew:
. Such is the poverty of all languages, they are forced
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use these names for incorporeal ideas, which thing

1111 a tendency to error and confusion.
Observ. 6. The last thing I shall mention that

lads us into many a mistake is,

the multitude of ob-

~ that one name sometimes signifies : There is

Uinost an infinite variety of things and ideas both
Plple and complex, beyond all the words that are
lavented in any language; thence it becomes almost
aecessary that one name should signify several things.
Let us but consider the two colours of yellow and
Yue; if they are mingled together in any ccnsiderable proportion, they make a green : Now there may
he infinite differences of the proportions in the mixture of yellow and blue; and yet we ha\'e only these
'11iree words, yellow, blue, and green, to signify all
..rthem, at least by one single term.
When I use the word shore, I may intend thereby a coast of land near the sea, or u drain to carry
ti water, or a prop to support a building; and by
sound of the word porter, who can tell whether
mean a man who bears burdens, or a servant who
flaits at a nobleman's O"ate? The world is fruitful in
die iuvention of utensiYs of life, and new characters
ad offices of men, yet names entirely new are selinvented ; therefore old names are almost ne-.arily used to signify new things, which may ocesion much confuston and error in the receiviug
ud communicating of knowledge.
Gi\'e me leave to propose one sir:igle instance,
wherein all those notes shall be remarkably exeml..
plified. It is in the word bishop wl1ich in the French
• called eveque; upon which I would m~ke these
,everal ob.,ern1.tious. (1.) That there is no natural
eonner.tion between the sacred office hereby signifi~
ed, and the letters or sound which siqnity this office;
for both these words eveq1te and bistiop signify the
un1e oflice, though there is not one letter alike in
them; nor have the letters which compose the Engllh or the French wol'<l any thing sacred belonging to
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them, more than the letters that compose the words
king or soldier. (2.) If the meaning of a word could
be learned by its derivation or etymology,yet the original derivation of words is oftentimes very dark and
uqsearchable; for who would imagine that each of
these words are derived from the Latin episcopus, or
the Greek f1Mx01l'!I,? Yet iu this instance we happen
to know certainly the true derivation ; the French
being anciently writ evesque, is borrowed from the
first part of the Latin word ; and the old English
biscop from the middle of it. (3.) The original
Greek word signifies an overlooker, or one who
stands higher than his fellows and overlooks them;
it is a compound word, that primarily signifies sensible ideas, translated to signify or include several
moral or intellectual ideas ; therefore all will grant
that the nature of the office can be never known by
the mere sound or sense of the word overlooker.( 4.) I add farther, the word bishop or episcopus,
even when it ~s thus translated from a sensible idea,
to include several intellectual ideas, may yet equally
signify an overseer of the poor; an inspector of the
customs; a surveyor of the high-ways; a supervisor of the excise, &c. But by the consent of men,
and the langua~e of scripture, it is appropriated to
signify a sacreu office in the church. (5.) This very
idea and name thus tram,lated from things sensible,
to signilya spiritual and sacred thing contains but one
property of it, viz. one that has an oversight, or
care over others; but it does not tell us whether it
includes a care over one church, or many; over the
laity, or the clergy. (6.) Thence it follows, that
those who in the complex idea of the word bishop
include an oversight over the clergy, or over a whole
diocese of people, a superiority to presbyters, a dis•
tinct power of ordination, &c. must necessarily disagree with those who include 'in it only the care of a
single congregation. Thus according to the various
opinions of men, this word signifies a pope, a Galli..
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bi,hop, a Lutheran superintendant, an English
te, n pastor of a single assembly, or u presby01 elder. Tl1us they quarel with each other perUy; and it is well if any of them all have hit
' ily the sense of the sacred writers, and includt the same idi>as in it, and no others.
might make all the same remarks on the word
b or kirk, which is derived from ••e'v .,,.,, or the
of Lhe Lord, contracted into kyriok, which
ll suppose to signify an a~sembly of Christians,
take it for all the world that profess Christianand some make it to mean only the clergy, and
these accounts it lut5 been the occasion of as many
as furious controversies as the wonl bishop,
• was mentioned before.

SECT.

IT.-Of negative and pojitive Terms.

these and other considerations it will fol, that if W-! would avoid error in our pursuit of
ledge, we must take good heed to the use of
irds and terms, and be acquainted with the varikind of them.
Fl.011

I.

TER::11S are either posith-e or negative.
egative terms are such as have a little word or
llallle of denying joined to them, according to the
• us idioms of every language, as unpleasant, im-dent, immortal, irregular, ignorant, infinite, endlifeless, deathl ess, nonsense, abys. , anonymous,
here the prepositions un, im, in, 11011, a, an, and
termination less, signify a negation, either in
1glish, Latin 01· Greek.
Posith-e terms are those which have no such ne've appendices belonging to them, as lite, death,
sen~e, mortal.
'But so unhappily are our words and ideas linked
ther, that we can never know which are positive
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ideas, and ll'hich are negative, by the word that ii
used to express them, and that for these reasons :
There are some positive terms which are made
to signify a negative idea; as dead is properly a
thing that is deprived of life ; blind implies a nega•
tion or privation of ~ight; deaf a want of hearing;
c.lumb a denial of speech.
2dly, There are abo some negative terms which
imply positive ideas, such as immortal and deathless,
which signify ever-lidng, or a continuance in life;
insolent signifies 1 ude and haughty; indemnify, to
keep safe; an<l infinite perhaps has a positive idea
too, for it is an idea ever o-rowing; aud when it is
11ppliccl to God, it signifit:s liis complete perfection.
Sdly, There are both positive ancl negative terms,
i1wcntcd to signify the same and contrary ideas; as
unlrnppy and miserable, sinless and holy, pure and
undefiled, impure and filthy, unkind and cruel, irreligious and profane, unforgiving and revenrreful,
kc. and there is a great deal of beauty and co1~ve11ience deri\'Cll to any language from this rnriety of
expression; though sometimes it a little confounds
our conceptions (jf beiug an<l not being, our positive
nnd negative ideas.
4thly, I may add also, that tl:ere are some words
which are negath-c in their ori,rinal languacre, bnt
beem positive to an Englishman: because th~ negation is unknown; as abyss, a place without a bottom;
nnodync, ~n easing medicine ; amuesty, an unremembrance, or general par<lon; anarchy, a state
without go\·ernment; anonymous, that is, nameless;
inapt, that is, not fit; iniquity, that is, unrighteousness; infuut, one that cannot speak, vi.i:. a child; injurious, not doing justice or right.
The way therefore to know whether a1 1y idea be
negative or not, is to consider whethe1· it primarily
jmply the absence of any positive being, or mode of
being; if it doth, then it is a negation or ne,,ative
idea; otherwise it is a positive one,.whethcr the°word
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t expresses it be positive or negative. Yet after
1111; in many cases this is very hard to determine, as
amnesty, infinite, abyss, which are originally reWve terms, but they signify pardon, &c. which
._. to be positives. So darkness, madness, clown,
• positive terms; but they imply the want of light,
the want of reason, and the want of manners; and
~ps these may be ranked among the negative

...

Here note, that in the English tongue two nega-

llte te"!1s are equal to one positive, and signify the
aie

thmg,as not unhappy, signifies happy; not im-

llOl'tal, signifies mortal ; he is no imprudent man,
. . is, he is a man of prudence ; but the sense and
ifte of the word in such a ne~ative way of expreslim seem to be a little diminished.

----....

-,_,...,

SECT.

III.-Of simple and complex Terms.

II. TERMS are divided into simple and complex •
.&simple term is one word, a complex term is when
an words are used to signify one thing.
Some terms are complex in words, but not in
ame, such is the second emperor of Rome; for it
acites in our minds only the idea of one man, viz.
Augustus.
Some terms are complex in sense, but not in
words; so when I say an army, a forest, I mean a
altitude of men, or t1·ees ; and almm,t all our moral
ideas, as well as many of our natural ones, are expressed in this manner; religion, piety, loyalty,
knavery, theft, include a variety of ideas in each term.
There are other terms which are complex both in
words and sense ; so w11en I say a fierce dog, or a
pious man, it excites an idea, not only of those two
ereatures, but of their peculiar characters also.
.Among the terms that are complex ii:i, sense, but
not in words, we may reckon those s1mpl~ ter~s
which contain a primary and a secondary idea m
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them; as when I hear my neighbour speak that
which is not true, an<l I say to him this is not true,
or this is false, I only convey to him the naked idea
of his error; this is the primary idea : but if I say
it is a lie, the word lie carries also a secondary idea
in it, for it implies both the falsehood of the speech,
and my reprnach and censure of the speaker. On
the other hand, if I say it is a mistake, this carries
also a secondary idea with it; for it not only refers
to the falsehood· of his speech, but includes my tenderness and civility to him at the same time. Another instance may be this ; when I use the words
incest, adultery, and mur<ler, I convey to another
not only the pr-imary idea of those actions, but I , in•
clude also the secondary idea of their unlawfulnt:ss,
and my abhorrence of them.
Note I. Hence it comes to pass, that among words
which signify the same · principal ideas, some are
clean and decent, others unclean ; some ~haste,
othcl's obscene; some are kind, others are affronting
and reprnachful, because of the serondary idea which
custom has affixed to them. And it is the part of a
'IVise man, when there is a necessity of expressing
any evil actions, to do it either by a word that has a
secondary idea of kindness or softness ; or· a word
that carries in it an idea -of rebuke and severity, according as the case requires. 80 when then:: is a
necessity of expressing things unclean or obscene, a
wise man will do it in the most decent language, to
excite as few uncleanly ideas as possible in the minds
of the hearers.
Note 2. fo length of time, and by the power of custom, words sometimes change their primary ideas,
as shall be declared, aml sometimes they have chano-.
ed their secondary ideas, though the primary ide~s
may remain: so words that were once chaste, by
frequent use grnw obscene and uncleanly; and words
that were once honourable, may in the next genera•
tion grow mean and contemptible. So the word dame
originally signified a mistress of a family, who "t\"ita

5!>
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it.is used still in the En.,.Jish lnw to sicrnify
'
.
0
y; out 111 common use now-a-days it represents
C)

er's wife, or a mistress of n familv of the lower

in the country. So those words of Rabshaketh,
nxvi. 12. in our translation, (eat their own
&c.) were doubtless decent and clean language,

our.translators wrote them above a hundred
.ago. The word dung has maintained its old
idea and ·inoffensive sense to this day ;
die other word in that sentence has by custom
'red a more uncleanly idea, and should now
lie changed into a more decent term, and so
uld be read in public, unless it should be
ht more proper to omit the sentence• .
.For this reason it js, that _the Jewish rabbins ha,,e
,rlied other chaste wotds in the margin of the
¥-'°rew bible, where the wQrds of the text through
._ and custom ,are d.egeAeratecl, so as to catry any
1-e and unclean secondary idea in them ; and they
•
the word ,which .is in the marwn, which they
.U i-eri, and not that which.was written in the tex~
.wch they call clietib.

E

!ECT.

IV.-Of Words common and p·op'er.

Ill. Wo:n.ns and names are either common or
proper.

Common names are such as stand for uni-

wnal ideas, or a ,vhole rank of beings, whether
pral or special. These are called appellntives;
11G

fish, bird, man, .eity, . frtler, are common names;

and so are t1·out, eel, lohst~, (for they all agree to
many individuals, and some of them to ma~y species:
but Cicero, Virgil, Bucephalus, London, Rome,
Etna, the Thames, a.re proper names, for ea.ch of
them agrees only to one single being.
• So in some places of the sncrccl historians, where it is writtea
nery one that pi•~cs ~ainst the wall, wo 1hould rc.1d crery. roale,
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Note here first, that a proper name may beconie
in some sense common, when it hath been given to
several beings of the same kind; so Cresar, which
was the proper name of the first emperor Julius, became also a common name to all the following emperors. And tea, which was the proper name of
one sort of Indian leaf, is now-a-days become a
common name for many infusions of herbs, or plants,
in water, as sage-tea, ale-hoof-tea, limon tea, &c.
So Peter, Thomas, John. William, may be reckoned common names also, because they are given to
many persons, unless they are determined to signify
a single person at any particular time or place.
Note in the second place, that a common name may
become proper by custom, or by the time or place, or
persons that use it; as in Great Britain, when we say
the King, we mean our present rightful sovereign King
George, who now reigns; when we speak of the
prince, we intend his royal highness Frederic Prince
of Wales: if we mention the city when we are near
London, we generally mean the city of London;
when in a country town, we say the parson or the
esquire, all the parish kn6ws who are the single
persons intended by it; so when we speak of the
l1istory of the New Testament, and use the words
Peter, Paul, John, we mean those three apostles.
Note in the third place, that any common name
whatsoever is made proper, by terms of particularity ,
added to it, as the common words, Pope, King,
horse, garden, book, knife, &c. are designed to signify a singular idea, when we say the present Pope;
the King of Great Britain ; the horse that won the
Jast plate at Newmarket; the royal garden at Kensington ; this book;. thut knife, &c.
SECT. V.-Of concrete and abstract Terms.
IV. Wonos or terms are divided into abstract or

concrete.
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t terms signify tl1e mode or quality of a
without any regard to the subject in which
as whiteness, l'oundness, length, breadth, wismortality, life, death.
rete terms, while they express the quality,
either express, or imply, or refer to some
to --which it belongs; as white, round, long,
wise, mortal, living, dead : but these are not
noun adjectives in a grammatical sense ; for a
• knave, a philosopher, and many other conare substantives, as well as folly, knavery,
pltilosophy, which are the abstract terms that
to them,.

er. VI.-Of tmivocal and equivocal Words.
Wonos and M!rms are either uni vocal or equiUnivocnl words are such as signify but one
1»r at least but one sort of thing; equivocal
are such as signify two or more different ideas,
nt sorts of objects. The words book, bible,
use, elephant, may be called univocal words;
bow not that they !iignify any thing else but
.ideas to which they are generally allixed; but
is an equivocal word, for it signifies the head
· or of a pin, as well as of an animal : nail
equivocal word, it is used for the nail of the
r foot, and for an iron nail to fasten any thing;
· equivocal, it is a piece of timber, or a switt
r. A church is a religious assembly, or the
fair building where they meet ; and liOmetimes
word means a synod of bishops or of presand in some places it is the Pope and a geC(¥lncil.
let it be noted, that when two or more words
• the same thing, as wave and billow, mead
llea(iow, they are usually calle<l synonymous
; but it seems very strange, that words, which

F
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are directly contrary to each other, should sometimes
represent almo1c<t the same ideas; yet thus it is in
some few instances: a valuable, or an invaluable blessing ; a shameful, or a shameless villain ; n thick
skull, or a thin skull'd fellow, a mere paper skull;
a man of a large conscience, little conscience, or no
conscience ; a famous rascal, or an infamous one : 90
uncertain a thing is human language, whose founda
tion and support is custom.
As words signifying the same thing are called synonymous; so equivocal words, or those which sig•
nify several things, are called homonymous, or am,
biguous; and when persons use such ambiguous
words, with a design to deceive, it is called equivocation.
Our simple iJeas, and especially the sensible qualities, furnish us with a great variety of equivocal or
ambiguous wor<ls ; for these being the first and
most natural ideas we have, we borrow some of their
names, to signify many other ideas, both simple an~
complex. The word sweet expresses the pleasant
perceptions of almost every sense ; sugar is sweet;
but it hath not the same sweetness as music; nor
hath music the sweetness of a 1·osP.; and a sweet
prospect differs from them all; nor yet have any of
these the same sweetness as discourse, counsel, or
meditation hath : yet the royal Psalmist saith of a
man, we took sweet coutuel together ; and of God,
my meditation of him shall be sweet. Bitter is also
such an equivocal word ; there is bitter wormwood,
there are bitter words, there are bitter enemies, and
a bitter cold morning. So there is a sharpness in
vinegar, and there is a sharpness in pain, in sorrow,
nnd in reproach ; there is a sharp eye, a sharp wit,
and a sharp sword : but there is not one of these
seven sharpnesses the same as anol.her of them, and
a sharp east wind is different from them all.
There are also verbs, or words of action, which
are equivocal, as well as nou11s or names.
The
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same way as a bowl for drinking; but the pronunciation of all these is different.
But those words, which are most commonly and
justly called equivocal, are such as are both written
and prnnounced the same way, and yet have differ•
ent senses or ideas belongin~ to them; such are all
the instances which were given in the preceding
section.
Among the words which are equivocal in sound
only, and not in writing, there is a large field for
persons who delight in jests, and puns, in riddles
and quibble~, to sport themselves. This sort of
words is also used by wanton persons to convey
lewd ideas, under the covert of expressions capable
of a chaste meaning, which are called double e11tendres: or when persons speak falsehood with a design
to deceive, under the covert of truth. Though it
must be confessed, that all sorts of equivocal words
yield suflicient matter for such purposes.
There are many cases also, wherein an equivocal
word is used for the rnke of decency to cover a foul
iclea; for the most chaste and modest, and well-bred
persons, having sometimes a necessity to speak of
the things <>f nature, com•ey their ideas in the most'
inoffensive language bv this means. And indeed,
the mere poverty of all ianguages makes it necessary
to use equivocal words upon many occasions, as the
common writings of men, and even the holy book
of God, sufficiently manifest.
2dJy, Equh·ocal words are usually distinguished,
according to their original, into such, whose various
senses arise from mere chance or accident, and such
as are made equivocal by design ; as the word bear
signifies a shaggy benst,. and it signifies also to bear
or carry a burJen ; this seems to be the mere effect
of chance ;J{mt if I call my clog, bear, because he is
5haggy, or call one of the northern constellations by
that name, from a fancied situation of the stars in the
i;hape of that animal, then it is by design that the
word is made yet farther equivocal.
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But because I think this common account of the

-,ring or origin of equivocal words is too slight

-1

imperfect, I shall rcsef\'e this subject to be

AN&ted of by itself, and proceed to the third division.
Sdly, Ambiguous, or equivocal words, are such
are sometimes taken in a large and general sense,
sometimes in a sense more strict and limited,
have different ideas affixed to them accordingly.
igion, or virtue, taken in a large sense, includes
our duty to God and our neighbour; but in a
t strict, limited, and proper sense, virtue signiour duty towards men, and religion our duty to
Virtue may yet be taken in the strictest sense,
--1 then it signifies power or courage, which is the. .
'8IIJC ofit in some places in the New Testament.grace, taken in a large sense, means the favour
Ill God, and all the spiritual blessings that proceed
am it, (which is a frequent sense of it in the bible,)
liatin a limited sense it si;nifies the habit of holiness
ht in us by divine tavour, or a complex idea
the Christian virtues. It may be also taken in
strictest sense; and thns it signifies any single
· tian virtue, as in 2 Cor. viii. 6, 7. where it is
for liberality. So a city, in a strict and proper sense, means the houses inclosed within the
-'1a; in a larger sense it reaches to all the suburbs.
This larger and stricter sense of a word is used
almost all the sciences, as well as in theology, and
common life. The word geography, taken in a
· sense, signifies the knowledge of the circles of
earthly globe, and the situation of the various
of the earth; when it is taken in a little larger
it includes the knowledge of the sea:; also; and
the largest sense of all, it extends to the various
ms, habits and governments of nations. When
J111tronomer uses the word star in jts proper and
· sense, it is applied only to the fixed stars, but
large sense, it includes the planets also.
inia equivocal sense of words belongs also to
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many proper names ; so Asia taken in the largest
-sense, is one quarter of the world; in a more limited
sense it signifies Natolia, or the Lesser Asia; bu&
in the strictest sense it means no more than one little province of Natolia, where stood the cities of
Ephesus, Smyt'na, Sardis, &c. And this is the most
frequent sense of it in the New Testament. Flan•
ders and Holland, in a strict sense, are but two single provinces among the se\'enteen, but in a forge
sense, Holland includes seven of them, and Flanders
ten.
There are also some Yery common and little words
in all languages, that are used in a more extensive
or more limited sense; such as all, every, whatsoe\'er,
&c. When the apostle says, all men have sinned,
and all men must die, all is taken in its most univer•
snl and extensive sense, including all mankind, Rom.
v. 12. When he appoints prayer to be made for
all men, it appears by the following verses, that he
restrains the word all to signify chiefly all ranks and
degrees of men, 1 Tim. ii. 1. But when St. Paul
says, I please all men i11 all things, l Cor x. 33., the
word all is exceedingly limited, for it reaches no farther than tl1at h'! pleased all those men whom he
conversed with in all things that were lawful.
4thly, Equivocal words are in the fourth place
distinguished by their literal or figurative sense.
Words are used in a proper or literal sense when
they are designed to signify those ideas for which
tl1ey were originally made, or to which they are primarily and generally annexed: but they are used
in a figurative or tropical sense, when they are
. made to signify some things, which only bear eitl1er
a reference or a resemblauce to the primary ideas of'
them. So when two princes contend by their armies,
we say they are at war in 11 proper sense; but when
we say there is a war betwixt the winds and the
waves in a 11torm, this is called figurative, and th
peculiar figure is a metaphor. So when the scrip-
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say, riches make themselves wings, and fly
as an eagle toward heaven, the wings and the
t of the eagle are proper expressions; but when
t and wings are applied to riches, it is only by
of figure and metaphor. So when man is said
nt, or laugh, or grieve, it is literally taken;

when God is said to be grieved, to repent, m·

.--u. &c; these are

all figurative expression~, bo1·from a resemblance to mankind. And when
rds Job or Esther are used to signify those
~ persons, it is the literal sense of them; but
•
they signify those two books of scripture, tl1is
~ative sense. The names of Horace, Juveand Milton, are used in the same manner, eitor books or men.
hen a word, which originally signifies any partlillar idea or object, is attributed to 1,everal other
not so much by way of resemblance, but
• ••" on the account of some evident reference or
• n to the original idea, this is sometimes pely called an analogical word ; so a sound or
.. -.1-my pulse ; a sound digestion ; sound sleep; are
d, with reference to a sound and healthy conon; but if you speak of sound doctrine, or
-1 speech, this is by way of resemblance to
and the words are metaphorical : yet many ·
analogy and metaphor are used promiscuously
ache same sense, and not distinguished.
e uote, that the clesi~n of metaphorical lan~1-•an<l figures of speech 1s not merely to represent
ideas, but represent them with vivacity, spirit,
'on, and power; ancl though they often make a
r imprt:ssion on the mind of the hearer, yet
do as often lead him into a mistake, if they are
at imprnper times and places.
Therefore,
the design of the speaker or writer is merely
lain, to instruct, and to lead into the knowof naked truth, he ought, for the most part~
• plain and proper words, if the language af~
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fords them, and not to deal much in figurative speec
Dut this sort of terms is used very profitably l>J
poets and orators, whose business is to move, awl
persuade, and work on the pas~ions as well as on tlit;
understanding. Figures are also happily employed
in proverbial moral sayings by the wisest a11d th•
best of men, to impress them deeper on the memory by sensible images; and they are often used for
more valuable purposes in the sacred writings.
5tlil!), I might adjoin another sort of equivocal
words; as there are some \\ hich have a different
meaning in common language, from what they have
in the sciences; the word passion signifies the receiv•
ing any action in a large philosf)phical sense; in a
more limited philosophical sense, it signifies any "
the affections of human nature, as love, fear, joy,
i,orrow, &c. But the common people confine it onl,:
to anger. So the word simple philosophically sig-,
nifies single, but vulgarly it is used for foolish.
6tlily, Other equivocal words are used sometim~
in an absolute sense, as when God is cal!ed perfect,,
which allows of 110 defect; and sometimes in a com..
perative sense, as good men are oftentimes ca.Heel
perfect in !.Cripture, in comparison of those who are
much inferior to them in knowledge or holiness•
but I have dwelt rather too long upon the subject al..
ready, therefore I add no more.
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VIII. -Tlic Origin r,1· Causes if equivocal Word!

Now, that we may become more skilful in guard..
ino ourselves and others against the danger of mis..
ta~e which may arise from equivocal words, it maJ
not be amiss to conclude this chapter with a short
account of the various ways or means whereby t
word changes its signification, or acquires any ne
sense, and thus becomes equivocal, especially if iJ
keeps its old sense also.
_,,

'l'Hl.: RIGHT USE OF REASON,

69

1. MERE chance sometimes gives the same word
- aire·nt senses; as the word light signifie':i a body
ia not heavy; and it also signifies the effect of
beams, or the medium whereby we see objects:
is merely accidental, for there seems to be no
tion between these two senses, nor any reason

them.
Error ancl mistake is another occasion of nO'ivinl!
•J
s senses to the same word; as when different
lflbons read the names of prie:;t, bishop, clzurcl,,
. , ., &c. in the New Testament, they affix differideas to them, for want of acquaintance with
true meaning of the sacred writer ; though it
laast be confessed, these various senses, which might
Wise at first from honest mistake, may be culpably
llpported and propagated by interest, ambition,
~udice, and a party-spirit on any side.
S, Time and custom alters the meaning of words.
Knave heretofore signified a diligent servant, gnauus;
a villain was a nearer tenant to the lord of the
llilnor, villicus; but now both these words carry an
lea of wickedness and reproach with them. A bal1111 once signified a solemn and sacred song, as well
one that is trivial, when Solomon's Song was
ed the ballad of ballads; but now it is applied
nothing but trifling verse, or c9~ical subjects.
+. Words change their sense by figures and metapilors, which are derived from some real analogy or
tesemblance between several things; as when wings
111d flight are applied to riches, it signifies only,
6at the owner may as easily lose them, as he would
1Gee a bird who flew away with wings.
And I think, under this head, we may rank tlwse
Jfl,rds, which signify different ideas, by a sort of an
•ccountable far-fetched analogy, or distant resemblance that fancy has introduced between one thing
lbd another; as when we say, the meat is green,
when it is half-roasted: we speak of airing linen by
the fire, when we mean drying or warming it: ,re
•
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call for round coals for tl1e chimney, when we me
large square ones : and we talk of the wing of
rabbit when we mean the fore-leg: the true rea
of these appellations we leave to the critics.
5. \Vords also change their sense by the
occasion of using them, the peculiar manner
pronunciation, the sound of the voice, the moti
of the face, or gestures of the body; so when
angry maste1· says to his servant, it is b_ravely do
or you are a fine gentleman, he means JUSt the co
trary; namely, it is very ill done; you are a sor
fellow: it is one way of giving n severe reproa
for the words are spoken by way of sarcasm or iron
6. \Vords are applied to various senses, by ne
ideas appearing or rising foster than new words
framed. So when gunpowder was found out, t
word powder, which before signified only dust, w
made then to signify that mixture or composition
nitre, charcoal, &c. ; and the name canon, whi
before signified a law, or a rule, is now also giv
to a great guu, which gives laws to nations. So foo
boys, who had frequently the common name of Ja
given them, were kept to turn the spit, or to pull
their masters' 0oots; but when instruments were ·
vented for both these purposes, they were both calle
jacks, though one was of iron, the other of wood,
very different in their form.
7. Words alter their significations according
the ideas of the various persons, sects) or parti
who m,e them, as we have hinted before ; so when
Papist uses the word heretics, he generallly me
the Protestants ; when a Protestant uses the wor
he means any persons who were wilfully (and perhaps contentiously) obstinate in fundamental erro
When a Jew speaks of the true religion, he mea
the institution of Moses; when a Turk mentions it,
he intends the doctrine of Mahomet: but when a
Christian makes use of it, he designs to signify
Christianity, or the truths and precepts of the gospeL
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Words have different significations acconlinrr

1he book, writing, or discourse in which they
So in a treatise of anatomy, a foot signifies
anember in the body of man: but in a book of
try or mensuration, it signifies twelve inches.
I had room to exemplify most of these particuin one single word, I know not where to choose
than the word sound, which seems (as it were)
nee to signify three distinct ideas, viz. healthy,
,anus) as a sound body; noise, (from sonus) as
'11 sound: and to sound the sea (perhaps from
nch sonde, a probe or an instrument to find
depth of water.) From these three, which I
call original senses, various derivative senses
as sound sleep, sound lungs, sound wind and
a sound heart, a sound mind, soumi doctrine,
.,.:a,,111110,d divine, sound 1·eason, a sound caslc, sonnd
.....- ......, a sound rep1·oef, to beat one soundly,
••·-1111'1 o,1e's meaning, or inclination, and a sound or
....,...._sea: turn all these into Latin, and the vawill appear plain,
eou.fess, some few of these which I have menas the different springs of equivocal words,
be reduced in some cases to the same original:
must also be granted, that there may be other
besides these whereby a word comes to extend
lignification, to include various ideas, and beequivocal. And though it is the business of a
marian to pursue these remarks with more vaand and particularity, yeL it is also the work of
"cian to give notice of these things, lest darkconfusion and perplexity be brought into our
ptions by the means of words, and thence our
ents and reasonings become erroneou~.
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CHAP. V.
GENERAL DIRECTIONS RELATING TO OUR IDEAS.

Direction I. FunNISII yourselves with a rich va•
1·iety of ideas; acquaint yourselves with things an•
cient and modern; things naturnl, civil and religious;
things domestic and national; things of your native
land, and of foreign countries; things present, past
and future; and above all, be well acquinted with
God and yourselves; learn animal nature and the
workings of your own spirits.
Such a general acquaintance with things wiJl be
~ of very ,great advantage.
The first benefit of it is this: it will assist the use
of reason in all its following operations; it will
teach you to juclge'of things aright, to argue justly, and
methodize your thoughts with accuracy. When yo11
shall find se,·eral things a-kin to each other, and several diffe1·ent from each other, agreeing in some
part of their -idea, and disagreeing in other parts,
you will nmge your ideas in better order, you will
be more easily led into a distinct knowleqge of
things, and will obtain a rich store of proper thoughts
and arguments upon all occasions.
You will tell me, perhaps, that you design the
study of the law or divinity; and what_good can uaturnl philosophy or mathematics do you or any other
science, not directly subordinate to _your chief design? but let it be considered, that all sciences have
a sort of mutual connection ; and .knowlc:dge of all
kinds tit the mind to reason and judcre better C<'Dcerning any particular subject. I have known a
judge upon tl1e l·euch betray his ignorance, and appear a little confused in his sentiments about a case
of suspected murd er brought before him, for want
of some acquaintance with animnl nature and philo-
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nother benefit of it is this: such a large and
ral acquaintance with things will secure you
perpetual admirations and surprises, and guard
against that weakness of ignorant persons, who
e never seen any thing beyond the confines of
· own dwelling, and therefore they wonder at
t every thing they see ; every thing beyond
1moke of their own chimney, and reach of
own windows, is new and strange to them.
third benefit of such an universal acquaintance
things, is this : it will keep you from being too
• ·ve and dogmatical, from an excess of credulity
unbelief, that is, a readiness to believe, or to
y e\·ery thing at first hearing; when you shall
e often seen, that strange and uncommon things,
ch often seemed incredible, are found to be true;
things very commonly received have been found
e way of attaining such an extensive treasure
, is, with diligence to apply yourself to read

best books, converse with the most knowing and
wisest of men, an<l endeavour to improve by
person in whose company you are; suffer no
to pass away in a lazy idleness, and impertinent
ring, or useless trifles: visit other cities and
tries, when you have seen your own, under the
of 011e who can teach you to profit by travelling,
to make wise observation&; indulge a little cu•
ity in seeing the wonders of art nnd nature;
h into things yourselves, as well as learn them
others: be acquainted with men as well as books;
all things as much as you can at first hand; and
as many of your ideas as possible be the repretions of things, and not merely the representaof other men's ideas: thus your soul, like some
le building, shall be richly furnished with origi•
paintings, and not with mere copies.
Direct. U. Use tlze most proper methods to retain
-,_, treasure of ideas wlticli you have acquired; for
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the mind is ready to let many of them slip, unless
some pains and labour be taken to fix them upon th,
memory.
And more especially let those ideas be ]aid up aO,
preserved with the greatest care, which nre moti&
directly suited, either to your eternal welfare as •
Christian, or to your particular station and profesl>i<ll
in this life; for though the former rule 1·ecommendt,
an universal acqu~intance with things, yet it is hlit
a more general and superficial knowledge that is required or expected of any man, in things which are
utterly foreign to his own business ; but it is nece
.sary you should have a more particular and accur~
' ficquaintance with those things that refer to your
peculiar province and duty in this life, or YOUII
happiness in another.
There are some persons who never arrive at BJ?
deep, solid, or valuable knowledge in any science.,
or any business of life ; because they are perpetuall1
fluttering over the surface of things in a curious ani
wandering search of infinite variety : ever heari°'
reading, or asking after something new, but impa,patient of any labour t9 lay up and preserve
ideas they have gained : their souls may be compar
to n looking-glass, that wheresoever you turn it,
J·eceives the image of all objects, but retains non!!.
In order to preserve your treasure of ideas and
knowledge you have gained, pursue these advi
especially in your younger years.
I. Recollect every day the things you liave seen,
lzeard, .or read, which may have made any additi
to your understanding : read the writings of G
and men with diligence and perpetual reviews:
not fond of hastening to a new book, or a new chap;
ter, till yoa have well fixed and established in yout
minds what wns useful in the last : make use 4
your memory in this manner, and you will sensib'
experience a gradual improvement of it, while yo
take care not to load it to excess.
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Talk over tl1e things whiclt you !lave seen, heard
llarned, 'With some proper acquaintance ; this
make a fresh impression upon• your memory;

if ~ou have no fellow student at hand, none of
rank with yourselves, tell it over to any of
acquaintance, where you can do it with propridecency; and whether they leart1 any thing
tor no, your own repetition of it will be an imement to yourself: and this practice also will
· h you with a variety of wor-<ls and copious lanto express your thoughts upon all occasions.
C(}'llf,mit to writing some qf the most considerable
zents w!ticll you daily make, at least sucli lzints·
recatb them again to your mind, wllen per/taps
are vanished and lost. And here l think Mr.
s method of adversa.ria or common p1acef1 ,
he describes in-the end of the .first volume of
humous works,. is the best: using no learni..-..- ....... od at all, setting <lowu things as they occur,
111·-1-...,. a distinct page for. eaah subj,ect, and making
to the pages •..
the end of every week, ·ot month, or year, you
teview your I"emarks, for these reasons; first, •
ge of your own improvement, when you !!hall
t many of your younger collections are ei~ak and trifling, or if ihey are just and proyet they are grown now so familiar to you, that
will thereby· see )OUr own advancement in
ge. And in the next place, what remarks
find there worthy of your riper. observations-,
!ma.y note them with a mai·ginal star*, instead
scribing them, as being worthy of your second
review, when the others are neglected.

JG&e,

this advice of'writing, marking and reviewing your marks,

• y to those occasional notions you meet with either in read-

in eonversation ; but when you are directly and professedly
any subject of knowledge in a good system in your younger

the system itself is your common-place book, and must be enreviewed, The same may be said concerning any treatise which
, 1uccinctly1 and accurately handles any particular theme¥

76

LOGIC:

on,

PART L

To shorten something of this labour, if the boob
which ) ou read are your own, mark with a pen, or
pencil, the most considerable things in them whicla
you desire to remember. Thus you may read that
book the second time over with half the trouble,
by your eye runnin~ over the paragraphs which
your pencil has noted. It is but a very weak objection against this practice, to say, I shall spoil mJ
book; for l persuade myself, that you did not buy
it as a bookseller, to sell it again for gain, but a! a
scholar to improve your mind by it; and if the.
mind be improved, your advantage is abundant,
though your book yields less money to your exec•
tors.
_
Direct. III. As you proceed both in learning anl
in life, make a wis~ observation what are the idea1,
'What the discourses and the parts ef kn<Jwledge,, th.al
have been more or less usiful to :yourself or other,.
In our younger years, while we are furnishing our
minds with a treasure of ideas, our experience ii
but small, and our judgment weak ; it is there!o~
impossible at that age to determine aright concern,,
ing the real ad\'antage and usefulness of many things
we learn. But when a~e and experience have matured your judgment, then you will gradually drop
the more useless part of your younger furniture,.
and be more solicitous to retain that which is mort
necessary for your welfare in this life, or a better,
Hereby you will come to make the same complaint
that almost every learned man has done after lonr
experience in study, an<l in the study of human life
nnd religion; alas ! how many hours, and days, ancl
months have I lost in pursuing some parts of learning, and in reading some authors, which have turned to no other account but to inform mE', that they
were not worthy my labour and pursuit! happy the
man who has a wise tutor to conduct him through
all the sciences "in the first years of his study, and
who has a prudent friend always at band to point
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to him, from experience, how much of every

e is worth his pursuit ! and happy the student
· so wise as to follow such advice.
· ect. IV. Learn to acquire a government over
iileas and your tlzoughts, that they may come
they are called, and depart when they an bidThere are !Orne thoughts that rise and intrude
us while we shun them; there are others that
us, when we would hold and fix them.
the ideas which you would willingly make die
of your present meditations are ready to fly
you, you must be ob&tin:ite in the pursuit of
oy a babit of fixed meditation; you must keep .
soul to the work, when it is ready to start at
moment, unle s you will a 1· andon yourself to
lave to e\'ery wild imagination. It is a combut it is an unhappy and a hameful thing, that
trifle that comes acros the senses or fancy
divert us, that a buzzing fly should teaze our
and scatter our best i<leas; but we must learn
deaf and regardless of other things, besides
bich we make the pre ent subject of our men: and in order to help a wandering and fickle
r, it is useful to have a book or paper in our
which has some proper hints of the subt we design to pur ue. We must be resolute
rious, and sometimes conflict with ourselves
ould be wise and learne<l.
I would not be too severe in this rule; it must
fessed that there are seasons when the mind, or .
the brain is overtired or jadt:d with study or •
; or upon some other accounts animal nature
be langui<l or cloudy, and unfit to assist the pimeditation ; at such seasons (provided that they
not too often) it is better !,Ometimes to yield
present indisposition; for if nature entirely
nothing can be done to the purpose, at least
t subject or science. Them you may think it
to give yourself up to some hours of leisure
03
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and recreation, or useful idleness ; or if not, t
turn your thoughts to some other alluring subj
and pore no longer upon the first, till some brigh
or more fa,·ourable moments arise. A students
do more in one hour, when all things concur to ·
vite him to his special study, than in four hours,
a dull and improper season.
I would also give the same advice, if some vain
worthless, or foolish idea will crowd itself into y
thoughts, and if you find that all your labour
wrestling cannot defend yourself from it, then div
the importunity of that which offends you, by t
ing your thoughts to some entertainin~ subject,
may amuse a little and draw you off trom the t
blesome and imposing guest; and many a time
in sucJ1 a case, when the impertinent and intrud'
ideas would divert from present duty, devotion
prayer have been very successful to overcome s
obstinate troublers of the peace and profit of the s
If the natural gellius and temper be too vola ·
fickle and wandering, such persons ought in a
especial manner to apply themselves to ma
matical learning, and to begin their studies w·
arithmetic and geometry; wherein new truths, c
tinually arising to the mind out of the plainest
easiest principles, will allure the thoughts with ·
credible pleasure in the pursuit; this will give
student such a delightful taste of reasoning, as
fix his attention to the single subject which he
sues, and by dt>grees will cure the habitual levity
his spirit; but let him not indulge and pursue
so far, as to neglect the prime studies of his desi
profession •

•
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CHAP. VI.
TO DIRECT OUil CONCEPTIONS
THINGS,

OF

GREAT part of what has been already written is
· ed to lay q foundation for those rules, which
guide and regulate our conceptions of things:
is our main business and design in the first part
gic. Now if we can but direct our thoughts to
t and happy manuer in forming our ideai of
, the other operations of the mind will not so
· y be perverted ; because most of our errors in
ent, and the weakness, fallacy, and mi.stake of
argumentation, proceed from the darkness, conn, defect, or some other irregularity in our con'ons. The rules to assist and direct our concepfjis are these:
l. Conceive of things clearly and distinctly in their
own natures.
S. Conceive of things completely in all their parts.
a. Conceive of things comprehensively in all their
properties and relations •
._ Conceive of things extensively in all their kinds •
.$. Conceive of things orderly, or in a proper
method.

I.-Of gaining clear and distinct ideas.
TeE first rule is this, seek after a clear and dist conception of things as they are in their own
-.re, and do not content yourselves with obscure
ad confused ideas, where clearer are to be attained.
There are some things indeed whereof distinct
W.S are scarce attainable, they seem to surpass the
GlpllCity of the understanding in our present state:
ach are the notions of eternal, immense, infinite,
,rhether this infinity be applied to number, as an inmultitude; to quantity, as infinite length,
SECT,
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breadtl1; to powers and perfections, as strength, wi
dom, or goodness infinite, &c. Though mathem
ticians in their way demonstrate several things in tht
doctrine of infinities, yet tl1ere are still some insol
able difficulties that attend the idea~ of infinity, whea
it is applied to mind or body; and while it is in r
ality but an idea ever growing, we cannot have
clear and di,;tinct a conception of it as to secure
from mistakes in some of our reasonings about it.
There are many other things that belong to th~
material worlJ, wherein the sharpest philosopherr
have not yet ai-rived at clear and distinct ideas, such
as the particular shape, situation, con texture, moti
of the small particles of minerals, metals, plants, &
whereby their very natures and essences are disti
guished from each other. Nor ha,·e we either sensei
or' instruments suflicientlv nice and accurate to fini
them out. There are other things in the world of.
spirits wherein our ideas are very dark and confused,
such as their union with animal nature, the way of
tlieir action on material beings, and their converse
wiili each other. And though it is a laudable amb ition to search what may be known of these matters,
yet it is a vast hindrance to the enrichment of our
un<lerstantliugs, if we spend too much of our time
and pains among infinities and un searchables, and
those things for the investigation whereof we are not
furnished with proper faculties in the present state.
It is therefore of great service to the true improvement of the mind, to Jistinguish well bet ween knO"JJables and unknowables.
As far as things are knowable by us, it is cf excel•
lent use to accustom ourselves to cleat· and distinct
iµeas. Now among many other occasions of the
darkness and mista kes of our minus, there are these
two things which most remarkably bring confusion
into our ideas.
1. That from our infancy we have had the ideat'
of things so far conne_c ted with the ideas of word
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we often mistake words for things, we mingle

ad confound one with the other.
I. From our youngest years we have been ever

'Jlady to consider things, not so much in their own
llllares as in their various respects to ourselves, and
wiefly to our senses; and we have also joined and
~led the ideas of some things, with many other
to which they are not akin in their own n atures.
ln order therefore to a clear and distinct know~ of things, we must unclothe them of all these
Jilations and mixtures, that we may contemplate
naked, and in their own natures, and dii,tinthe subject that we have in view from all other
• ts whatsoever : . now to perform this well, we
here consider the definition of words, and the
athition of things.

cr. II.-Of tlie Definition of Words or Names.
lfwe conceive of things as angels and unbodied

ipirits do, without involving them in thoi,e clouds
· h words and language throw upon them, we
in danger of such mistakes as are
parpetually committed by us in the present state ;
11(1 indeed it would be of unknown advantage to u~
accustom ourselves to form ideas of things without
'1, that we might know them in their own proper
la&Ures. But since we must use words, both to learn
to communicate most of our notions, we should
it with just rules of caution. I have already deOared in part, how often and by what means our
_ .,--'..t., become the occasions of errors in our concepof things. To remedy such inconveniences,
• must get exact definitions of the words we make
of, i. e. we must determine precisely the sense of
• words, which is calhtcl the definition of the name.
ow a definition of the name being only a declarin what sense the word is used, or what idea
object we mean by it, this may be expressed by

-1d seldom be
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any one or more of the properties, effects or circ
stances of that object, which do sufficiently dis ·
guish it from other objects: as if I were to tell what
I mean by the word air, I may say it is that th'
matter which we breathe in and bteathe out con ·
nually; or it is that fluid body in which the birds
a little above the earth, or it is that invisible mat
which fills all places near the earth, which immedia
encompasses the globe of earth and water, So if
would tell what I mean by light, l would say it •
that medium whereby we see the colours and shape9'
of things; or it is that which distinguishes the <la
from the night. If I were asked what I menu
religion, I would answer, it is a collection of all
duties to God, if taken in a strict and limited sen
but if taken in a la~e sense, it is a collection of
our duties both to Uod and man~ These are called
the definitions of the name.
Note, in defining the name, there is no necessity
that we should be acquainted with the intimate essence or nature of the thfog ;- for any manner of description that will but sufficiently acquaint another
person what we mean by such a word, is a sufficient']
definition for the name, And on this. account, a sy,
nonymous wor_d, or a mere negation of the contrary.
a translation of the word into another tongue, or a
grammatical explication of it, is sometimes sufficien~
for this purpO!,e; as if one woul<l know what I mean,
by a sphere, I tell him it is a globe; if he ask what
is a triangle, it is that which has three angles; or an
oval is that which has the shape of an egg. Dark is
tbat which has no light; asthma is a difficulty of
breathing; a diaphoretic medicine, or a sudorific, issomething that will provoke sweating; and an insol•
vent is a man that cannot pay his debts.
Since it is the design of logic, not only to assist:
us in learning, but in teaching also, it is :necessar1
that we should be furnished with some particular directions relating to the definitions of names, both in
teaching and learning.
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III. Directions concerning the D'tfinitions. OJ
Names.
· ect. I. HaVE a care of making use of mere
instead of ideas, that is, such wot ds as have
aning, no definition belonging to them: do uot
~ im11Jiae that there are ideas wheresoever there
es : for though ma11ki11d hath so many milof ide s more than they have names, yet so
and lavish are we, that too often we use some
in mere waste, and have no ideas for them;
least, our ideas are so exceedingly scattered
;ROnfused, broken and blended, various and un- .
that they can signify nothing toward the iment of the understanding. You will find a
deal of reason for this remark, if you read the
schoolmen, or the mystic divines.
er rest satisfied therefore with mere words
have not ideas belon~ing to them, or at least
tded and determinate ideas. Deal not in such
ware, whether you are a learner or a teacher;
reby some persons have made themselves rich
and learned in their own esteem : whereas
'ty their understandings have been poor, and
knew nothing.
me give, for instance, some of those writers
rs who deal much in the words nature, fate,
d,ance, perfection, power, life, fortune, instinct,
that even in the most calm and instructive
of their discourse; though neither they themnor their hearers have any settled meaning
those words; and thus they build up their
"ngs, and infer what they please, with an amof the name of learning, or of sublime elevain religion; whereas in truth they do but amuse
Ives and their aomirers with swelling words
"t , understan<ling neither what they say, nor
they affirm. But this sort of talk was reof old by the two chief apostles, St. Peter
St. Paul, 1 Tim, i, 7, and 2. Pet, ii. 18.
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When pretenders to philosophy or good se
grow fond of this sort oflearning, they dazzle and c
found their weak hearers, but fall under the negl
of the wise. The Epicureans are guilty of this faul
when they ascribe the formation of this world
chance; the Aristotelians, when they say, na
abhors a vacuum; the Stoics when they talk of fa
which is superior to the gods·: and the gamestert
when they curse their ill-luck, or hope for the favo
of fortune. "1·hereas, if they would tell us, t
by the word nature they mean the properties of
being, or the order of things established at 'the er
tion ; that by the word fate they intend the decrett
of God, or the necessary connection and influe
of second causes and effects; if by the word luck
chance they signify the absolute negation of
determinate cause, or only their ignorance of
such cause, we should know how to converse wi
them, and to assent to, or dissent from their opini
But while they flutter in the dark, and make a no·
with words which have no fixed ideas, they talk
the wind, and can never profit.
I would make this matter a little plainer s'till
instances bouowed from the Peripatetic philosop
which was taught once in all the schools. The p
fessor fancies he has assigned the true reason, w
all heavy bodies tend downward, why amber
draw feathers or straws, and the loadstone d
iron, when he tells you, that this is done by cer •
gravitating and attractive qualities, which pr
from the substantial forms of those various bodi
He imagines that he has explained why the lo
!>tone's• north pole shall repel the north end o
magnetic needle, and attract the south, when l:e
firms that this is done by its sympathy with ene
of it, and its antipathy against the other
• Note, Some writen c-all that the south pole of a loadstone
attracts the south end of tbc needle; but I choose to follo,Y th11se
call it the north pole.
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eas in truth, all these names.of sympathy, an ..

y, substantial forms and qualities, when they
t up for the causes of these effects in bodies,
ut hard words which only express a learned and
us ignorance of the true cause of natural ap-,
nces; and in this sense they are mere words
ut ideas.
is will evidently appear, if one ask me, why a
ve mirror or convex glass will burn wood iu
n-benms, or why a wedge will clearn it? and
d tell him, it is by an ustorious quality in the
r or glass, and by a cleaving po1Ver in the
arising from a certain unknown substanti1rl
in them, whence they derive these qualities;
he should ask me, why a clock strike·s, and
to the hour ? and I should say, it is by an
·ng form and sonorific quality; whereas I
to tell him how the sun-beams are collected
united by a burning glass; whence the mechanice of a wedge is derived; and what are the
and springs, the pointer and hammer, and
whereby a clock gives notice of the time, both
eye an<l the ear. But these ustorious and cleav..ers, sonorous and indicating forms and qualido either teach the inquirer nothing at all but
he knew before, or they are mere words with-

•

,qay be objected here, " And what docs the modern philowith all his detail of mathematical numbers, and diagrams, do
this toward the solution of these dilTiculties? does he not
gravity by a certain unkuown force, whereby bodies tend
to the centre ? }1ath he fo1md the certain and mechaniCll]
ot attraction, ma~netism," &c. I answer, that the moderns
nd a thousand things by applying mathematics to natural
:y, whid1 the ancients were ignorant of; and wheu they use
of this kind, viz. gravitation, attraction, &c. they u!ie them
signify, l11:it there arc such effocts and such causes, with a
t a>ofesbion of their ignorance of the true springs of them :
not pretend to make these words stand for the real causes of
a though they thereby assigned the true philosophical solIL1hese ditficulties; for in this sense they will still be words wit!J~
wbelhcr iu the mouth of an ,old philosopher or a new one.
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And there is many a man in the vulgar and in
the learned world, who imagines himbelf deep~
skilled in the controversies of divinity, whereas be
lms only furnished himself with a parcel of s~
.lastic or mystic words, under some of which tht
authon; themselves had no just ideas; and the learn,.
er, when he hears, or pronounces them, hath scam
any ideas at all. Such sort of words sometimes have
become matters of immortal conteution, as thoul(h
the gospel could not stand without them ; and yet the
zealot perhaps knows little more of them than he
does of Shibboleth, or Higgaion, Selah. Judges xii.
6. Psal. ix. 16.
Yet here I would lay down this caution, tliat tbeN
are several objects of which we have not a clear aml
distinct idea, much less an adequate or compreben,
sive one, and yet we cannot call the names of tbea
things, words without ideas; such are the infinity
and eternity of God himself, the union of om owa
soul and body, the union of the divine and human
natures in Jesus Christ, the operation of the holy
Spirit on the mind of man, &c. These ougit
not to be called words without ideas, for there i
sufficient evidence for the reality and certainty of tbe
existence of their objects ; though there is some con,
fusion in our clearest conceptions of them ; and oar
ideas of them, though imperfect, are yet suffici•
to converse about them, so far as we have need, allll
to determine so much as is necessary for our owa
faith and practice.
·
Direct. II. Do not suppose that the natures or•
sences if things always differ from one anotlzer, as m,_
as t!zcir names do. The.re are various purposes ..i
human lifo, for which we put very different names 1111
the same thin~, or on things whose natures are nea,
A-kin; and thereby oftentimes, by makino- a DS
nominal i;pecies, we are ready to deceive gurseh,s
witl~ 'the idea of another real species of beings: aij1
those whose understandings are le<l away by•
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sound of wor~ls, fancy the nature ·of those
to be very different whose- nameg are so, and :
cl them accordingly.
y borrow a remarkable inst.ance for my purJ}most out, of every garden 1 which contains ~
of planbl 1n it, Mbst or all plants agree in
ihat they have a root, a stalk, leaves, buds,
. and seeds : but the gardener ranges them
ery different names, a~ though they were realent kinds of. beings 1 merely because of th~
t use and service to which they are applied
: · as for ,instlancet .those planti whose roots
shall appropriate the name of roots to them; such as carrots, turnips,' ra<lishes, &c. ] f
ves td·e of · chief use to us-, then we call them
; as sage, mint, thyme : · if the li>aves are ea ten
they are termed . salla<l ; ait lettuce, purslain :
, they ~come.pot-herbs~ .as spinage, coleaflrl some of those same -· plants, - which are
bs in one family, -are sallad i11 another, If'
4s are made our food, they are called heads,
I so cabbage-heads, heads of asparagus, and
ks, If the blossom be of u10st importance,
it a flower; such are dai5es, tulips, and carwhich ar-e the mere blossoms of those plants.
husk or seeds are eaten, they are cnlled the ·
the gt'<>und, as pense, · beans, strawberries,
any part of the plant. be of known and comse to us in medicine, we call it a physical he1•b,
ns, scurvy grass ; but if we count no part
we call it a weed, and throw it out of the
; and yet perhaps our next neighbour knows
nable property and use of it; he plants it in
ffl, and •rives it the title of an herb, or a
• You see he1·e lww small is the real distincthese several plants, considered in their geatnre as the lesser vegetables: yet what very
t ideas we vulgarly form concerning them,
ilke different species ·of them, chiefly because.
different names given them.
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Now when things are set in this clear light, it a
pears how ridiculous it would be for two persons
contend, whether dandelion be an herb, or a we
whether it be a pot-herb or sallad; when by
custom or fancy of different families, this one pl
obtains all these names according to the several
of it., and the ,•alue that is put upon it.
Note here, that I find no manner of fault with
variety of names which are given to several plan
according to the various uses we make of them.
I would not have our judgments imposed upon he
by, to think that these mere nominal speci.es,
herbs, sallad, and weeds, become three really
ferent species of beings, on this account, that t
have different names and uses. But I proceed
other instances.
It has been the custom of mankind, when ti
have been angry with any thing, to add a new
1mme to it, that they may convey thereby a ha
idea of it, though the nature of the thing still obi
the same. So the Papists call the Protestants he
tics ; a pr.:>fane person calls a man of piety a pr
sian: aud in the times of the civil war in the
century, the royalists called the parliamentari
fanatics, round heads, and sectaries. And they
requital called the roJ alists, malignants : but
partizans on each side were really neither better
worse for these names.
It has also been a frequent practice on the ot
hand, to put new favourable names upon ill ideas,
purpose to take off the odium of them. But, n
withstanding all these flattering names and titl~
man of profuse generosity is but a spendthrift; a
tural son is a bastard still; a gallant is an adulte
and a lady of pleasure is a whore.
Direct. III. Take heed ef believing the nature
essence ef two or· more things to be certainly the sa
bPcause they may have the same name given the,n,
This has been an unhappy and fatal occasion

&9'
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d mistakes in the natural, in tl1e civil,- and'in
· ·ous affairs of life, both amongst the vulgar
e learned. I shall give two or tlir-ee instances
in the matters of natural philosophy, having
several dangers of this kind relating to theo•
m- the foregoing discourse concerning :equivoc;il.
r elder philosophers h:we generally made use

word soul to signify that principle whereby a.
f'ows, and they call it the vegetative soul:,
ciple of animal motion of a brute has been.
· called a soul, and we have been taught ~o
it the sensitive soul : they have also given tho.
,of soul, to that superior• principle in m:xn
by he thinks, judges, reµsons, &c. An<l thoug\l
cfutinguished this by the houournble title of the
soul, yet in common discourse. and \fl'iting
e ont the words vegetative, serrsiLive, al'l.d ra..
; and make the word soul serve .for all theoo
Jes: thence we ar:e led early into this , i~ ag\•
that there is a sort of spjritual bei ng iT\
and in brutes, like that in men. Whereas,
did but abstract and separate these things from
and compare the cau<;e of gro_yvFh in a plant,
the cause of reasoning in man (\Vitliout the w~d
we shall never think that Fhese two principles
all like one another; nor should we perl1al?s ~
and peremptorily conclude, that brutes need.
lligent. min<l to perform their animal actions.
ther instance may be the word of life, which
attributed to plan ts, to brutes, and to men, and
of them ascribed to the soul, has very easily
ed us from our iufancy into this mistake, that
· it, or mind, or thinking prinoipl_e, in man, is
-,ring of vegetative uml animal lifo to bis body;
it is evident, t mt if the spirit or thinking
'ple of' man gave h fo to his animal nature, t)1e
wsave men from dying would not be to use medibut to persuade the sµirit to µ,bide in the body.
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I might deriYe a third instance from the word h
which is used to signify the sensation we have wh
we are near the fire, as well as canse of that s
sation which is in the fire itself; and thence we
elude from our infancy, that there is a sort of heat
the fire resembling our own sensation, or
heat which we feel; whereas in the fire there is
thing but little particles of matter of such particu
shapes, sizes, situations and motions as are fitted
impress such motions on ou1· flesh or nerves as
cite the sense of heat. Now if this cause of ours
sation in the fire had been always called by a
tinct name, perhaps we had not been so rooted
this mistake, that the fire is hot with the same
of heat that we foe!. This will appear with m
evidence, when we consider that we are secure fr
the same mistake when there have been two difie
names allotted to our sensation, and to the cause
it; as, "'e do not say, pain is in the fire that bu
us, or in the knifo that cuts and wounds us; for
call it b11rnihg in the fire, cutting in the knife,
pain only when it is in ourselves.
Numerous instances of this kind might be deri
from the words sweet, sour, loud, shrill, and aim
all the sensible qualities, whose real natures "e
take from our very infoncy, and we are ready to s
pose them to be the same in us, and in the bod
that cause them; partly because the words wh'
signify our own sensations, are applied also to si
fy those unknown shapes and motions of the h
corpuscles which excite an<l cause those sensatio
Direct. IV. In conversation or reading be dili
to find out the true se11se, or distinct idea, which
speako· or 'U.!riter affe.ces to his words ; and especi
ta those words •which are the cliief suiject qf his
course. As far as possible tnke heed, lest you
more or fewer icleas into one word, than the pe
did when he wrote or spoke; an<l endeavour
your _ideas of t!Yery word may be the same as
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; then you will judge better of what he speaks
"tes.
is for want of this that men quarrd in the dark,
that there are so many contentions in the seveiences, and especially in divinity: multitudes of
arise from a mistake of the true sense or commeaning, in which words are used by the writer
~ker; and here 1,y sometimes they seem to
when they really d iffer in their sentiments ;
sometimes they seem to differ, when they really
. Let me give an instance of both.
en one man by the word church shall underall that believe in Christ; and another by th e
chnrch means only the church of Rome; they
bo.h assent to this proposition, there is no salout of the church, and yet their inward sents may be widely different.
in, if one writer shall affirm that virtue adcle:l
"th is sufficient to make a Christian, and another
as zealously deny this proposition, they seem
er widely in w.,rds, and yet perhaps they may
really agree in sentiment: if by the word virtue,
affirmer intends our whole <lu\y to God and
and the denier by the word virtue means only
e, or at most our duty towards our neighbour,
t including in the idea of it tl1e duty which
e to God.
ny such sort of contentions as these are, traced
ir original, will be found to be mere logomaor striles and quarrels about names and
and vain janglings, as the apostle calls them
first letters of advice to Timothy.
order therefore to attain clear and distinct ideas
t we read or hear, we must search the sense
<ls; we must consider what is their original
derivation in our own or foreign languages;
is their common sense amongst mankind, or in
authors, especially such as wrote in the same
, in the same age, abo~t the same time, and
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upon the samt subjects: we must consider in wli
sense the same author uses any particular word
phrase, and that when he is disctmrsing on the s
matter, and especially about tlie same parts or
ragraphs of his writing: we must consider whet
the word be used in a strict and limited, or in a Jar
and general sense; whether in a literal, in a figu
tiv<::,. or in a prophetic sense; whether it bas any
condary idea annexed to it besides the primary
chief seme.
e must inquire farther what is
scope and design of the writer; and what is the c
nection of that sentence with those that go before
aucl those which follow it. By these and other
tho<ls we are to search out the definition of nam
that is, the true sense and meaninO' in wl1ich
au1hor or speaker usec; any word, which may be
chi ef su l~ect of cliscoun,e, or may carry any co •
dcrnble importa11ce in it.
Direct. V. "/then we communicate our notion,
others, merely with . a design to inform and impr
their knowledge, let us, in the beginning <Ji om· d
course, take care to adjust the definitions ef 1
'IJ.1he1"esoever there is need ef it; that is, to det
plainly 'lJJliat we mean by tl1e chief words n,kich are
suqject ef our discourse ; atid be sure always to ·
tlze same ideas, whensoever we use the sam.e words,
lrss we give due notice ef tl1e change. This will h
a very large and happy influence, in securing
only others but ourselves too from confusion and •
take ; for even writers and speakers themselves,
wunt of <lue watchfulness, are ready to affix diffi
ideas to their own words, in different parts of lh
discourses, and hereby bring perplexity into
own reasonings, and confound their hearers.
It is by an observation of this rule that math
ticians have so happily secured themsehe& and
sciences which tlrny have profes&ed, from wrana
and controversy; because whtmsoever in the pr
of ~heir treatises they have &:caii~ t9~ use a,
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known word, they always define it, and tell
sense they shall take it; and in many of their
you will find a heap of definitions at the
.beginning. Now, if the writers of natural phiy and morality bad used the same accuracy
e, they had effectually secluded a multitude
and fruitless debates out of their several
: nor had the sacred theme of divinity
perplexed with so many intricate disputes, nor
urch of Christ been torn to pieces, by so many
d factions, if the words grace,faith, rigliteous •
entance,justijication, ivorsltip, church, bishop,
er, &c. had been well defined, and their sig'ons adjusted, as near as possible, by the use
words in the New Testament; or at least.
writer had told us at first in what sense he
use those words.
t. VI. In your own studies, as well as in the
ication of your thoughts to others, merely for
fnjormation, avoid ambiguous and equivocal tenns
as possible. Do not use such words as have
r three definitions of the name belonging to
that is, such words as have two or three senses,
there is any danger of mistake. Where your
siness is- to inform the judgment, and to exa matter, rather than to persuade or affect, be
of expre<;sing yourselves in figurative Ianwhen there are any proper words that signify
idea in their literal sense. It is the amof names, as we have often said, that brings
infinite confu&ion into our conceptions of
t where there is a necessity of using an ambiword, there let double care be used in defint word, and declaring in what sense you take
d be sure to suffer no ambiguous word ever
e into your uefinitions.
t. VII. 111 co,mnwiicathig your notions, "se
,oord as near as possible iii tlte same seme in
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'tJJhich manlcimJ, C(»»mo'ltly uses it ; or 'tlJldcl,, 'tcrite1'1
that l1ave gone before _you have uS?.uzlly qjfized. to it.;
tcpon conditi()11, that it i$freefr011i amhiguity. Thouglr
names are in their original merely arbitrary, yif
we should always keep to the established meaning ol
them, unle.s great neces ity require the alterntit>n
tbr when any word lms been used to signify an ide
that old idea will recur in the mind, when the wonl
ii. beard or read, rather than any new idea- whicW
we may fasten to it. And this is one reason why tbll
received definition of names should be changed •
little ns passible.
But I add farther, that though a wor<l. C'ntirei,
new, introduced into a language, may be affixed
what idea you please, yet an ol<l word ouo-ht. ne.\·ett
w .be fixed to an uR-Accilsoomed idea, witliout -jusJ
and evident necessity, or withont-present or p:reviouf
JMltice, lest we introduce the~by a. litonce.- fot all
J11a11ner· of pernicious e(tlJi ocations and falsehood
u for ifflltllnce; when an idle, boy~ who has not see•
bi&. book all the momingt 11hall tell his mas~r, th
he has learned hi• lesson, he can ne~er excuse him,.
self by saying, that by the word lea7ning he-meami
his break.fa&, and by the word losiion he meant e11tw
iug.; surely this would be construed a downriglitlie;i
IU'ld his fancied wit would hardly procm·e his pardon~
In using any ambiguous word, . which has been
used in di&rent sense&, we may choose what wei
think the ruost proper sense, us I have done, p., 84, i&
naRling the poles of the loadstone, north or south.
Aud when a word ha been used in two or thr~
senses, and has made a great inroad for error uponi
tl,at account, it is of good service to drop one or
two of those senses, and leave it only one remaining,..
and affix the other senses or ideas to other words.
So the modem philosophers, when they treat of thtl
hunian soul, they call it the mind or mens l1uman"and leave the word anima or soul to signify the prin•
ciple of life and motion in mere animal beings.
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poet Juvenal l1as long ago given us a hint to
uracy and distinction, when he says of brutes
ll,

Indulait mundi communls eonditor illis
Tmtum animas; nobis animum quoque.
.

S ..T. xvi.

V. ( 34,

tion. There is one case, wherein some of
last rules concerning the definition of words,
in some measure dispensed with ; and that
hen strong and i-ooted prejudice hath establishfavourite word or phrnse, and long used it
ress _some mistaken notior1, or to unite some
· tent ideas; for then it is sometimes much
to lead the world into truth by imlulging their
s for a phrase, and by assigning and applyideas and notions to their favourite word;
is is much safer also than to awaken all theit·
s by rejecting both their old words, and
and notions, and introducing all new at
: therefore we continue to say, there is heat in
there is coldness in ice, rather than invent
words to express the powers which are in fire
to excite the sensations of heat or cold in us.
e same reason some words and phrases which
proper, rnay' be continued in theology, while
are led into clearer ideas with much more
d success, than if an attempt were made to
all their beloved forms of speech.
other cases these logical directions should genebe observed, and different names affixed to <lifideas.
I c:,.nnot but take occasion to remark, that
a considerable a<lva.ntage to any lang uage to
'8 variety of new words introduced into it, that
in course of time new obj ects and new ideas
there may be new words and names assigned
: and also where one single name has sus- .
two or three ideas in time past, these new
may remove the ambig uity by being affixed to
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some of those ideas. This practice would by
grecs take away part of the uncertainty of langus
And for this reason I cannot but congratulate
English tongue, that it has been abundantly enrich
with the translation of words from all our neighbo
nations, as well as from ancient languages, and th
words have been as it were enfranchised amon~
us; for French, Latin, Greek, and German na
will signify English ideas,· as well as words that
anciently and entirely English.
It may not be amiss to mention in this place, th
as lhe determination of the particular sense in whi
any word is used, is called the-0efinition of the na~
so the enumeration of the various senses of an equivcj
.cal word, is sometimes called the division or disti
tion of the name ; and for this purpose good di
tionaries are of excellent use.
This di.stinction of the name or word is greatlJ
necessary in argumentation or dispute; when a falf
lacious argument is used, he that answers it disti
guishes the several senses of some word or phrase •
it, and shews in what -sense it is true, and in whatsense it is as evidently false.

S~cT. IV.-Of the Definition

ef

Thi11gs.

As there is much confusion introduced into 0111
ideas, by the means of those words to which the,
are aflixed, so the mingling our i<leus with each o,,
ther without caution is a farther occasion where
.they become confused. A court lady, born aud br
up amongst pomp and equipage, and the vain n
tions of birth a11d quality, constantly joins and mi114
all these with the idea of herself, and she imagin
these to be essential to her nature, and as it wellJ
nf'cessary to her being; thence sh~ is tempted tf
look upon menial servants and the lowest rank«
mankind, as another species of beings quite distiDGt
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herself. A plough-boy that has never travelled
his own village, and has seen nothing but
d houses and his parish-church, is naturally
imagine that thatch belongs to the very nature
uuse, and that must be a church, which is built
, and especially if it has a spire upon it. A
whose uncle has been excessive fond, and his
aster ver) severe, easily believes, that fondways belongs to uncles, and that severity is
· to masters or instructors. He has seen also
1 with red coats, or ministers with long black
and therefore he persuades himself that these
are essential to the characters, and that he is
minister who has not a long black gown, nor
be a soldier who is not dressed in red. It
be well if all such mistakes ended with child· ht be also subjoined, that our complex ideas
confused, not only by uniting or blending tomore simple or single ideas, than really be•
them, as in the instances just mentioned ;
urity and confusion sometimes come upon
also, for want of uniting a sufficient numaingle ideas to make a complex one : so if I
•,e of a leopard 011ly as a spotted beast, this
distinguish it from a tyger or a lynx, nor
y <logs or horses, which are 9potted too ;
refore a leopard must have some more ideas
to complete and distinguish it.
t that it is a large and free acquaintance
world, a watchful observation and diligent
into the nature of things, that must fully cor. kind of errors : the rules of logic are not
t to do it: but yet the rules of logic may inua by what means to distinguish one thing
ther, and how to search and mark out as
y be, the contents and limits of the nature
ct beings, and thus may give us great nsto.warJs the remedy of these mistakes.
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As the definition of names frees us from that
fusion which words introduce, so the definition
things will, in some measure, guard us againi.t
eonfuaion which mingled ideas have introduced :
as a definition of the name explains what any w
means, so a definition of the thing explains w ha&
the nature of that thing.
In order to form a definition of any thing,
must put forth these three acts of the mind.
First, compare the thing to be defined with o~
things that are most like to itself, and see whe •
its essence or nature agrees with them ; and th.
called the general nature or genus in a definitiCJl!I
so if you would define what wine is, first compa~f
with other things like itself, as cyder, perry, Ii
and you will find it agrees essentially with them ,.
this, that it is a sort of juice.
Secondly, consider the most remarkable and
mary attribute, property or idea, wherein this th.
:differs from thoie other things that are most like ·
aad that is its .essential or specific difference :
wine diff'e.rs from cyder and perry, and all o
juices, in that it is pressed from a grape. This
be called its special nature, which distinguish
from other juices.
Thirdly, join the general and special nature
,ther, .or (which is all one) the genus and the '
.rence, and these make up a definition. So the j
of a grape, or juice pressed from grapes, is the
nnition of wine.
So if I would define what winter is, I con ·
first wherein it agrees with other things which
most like it, vi:.11. summer, sp1-ing, autumn, and I
they are all !ieasons of the year ; therefore a
of the year is the genus. Then I observe wb
it differs from these, and that is in the shortneai
the days; for it is this which does primarily d'
guish it from other seasons; therefore this may
called its special nature of its difference. T
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these together I make a definition.
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Winter

aeason of the year wherein the days are
I confess indeed this is but a ruder deof it; for to define it, as an aecurate astro' I must limit the days, houn, and minutes.
r the same manner, if we would explain or
what the picture of a man is, we consider
genus or general nature of it, which is a retion; and herein it agrees with many other
as a statue; a- shadow, a pr-int, a verbal deof a man, &c. Then we consider wherein
from these, and we find it differs from a
description in that it. is a representation to the
not w the ear; it diffhs frcm a statue in that
'I representation upon a flat surface, and not in a
figure; it di:lfers from a shadow, in that it is an
representation and not a fleetin~ one :·it di~
a print or draught, because It representa ,
lours by paint as weJI as the shape ·of the ob,.
delineation. Now so many or rather so few
ideas put together, as are just sufficient to
· h a picture from all other representatioos,lp its essential differenoe or its special nature;
these are included in ita being painted on a
..-face.. Then join this to the genus, which is
ntation; and thus you have the complete
of the picture of a man, viz. it is the repre• n of a man in paint upon a surface (o.r a
it must be observed, that when we speak of
and difference as composing a definition,
always be understood that the nearest genus
'fie difference are required.
next general nature, or the nearest genus,
~ used in a definition, because it includes all
and if I would define wine; I must say wine
which is the nearest genus; and not say,
· a liquid, which is a remote general nature;
ii a 1ub6tance, which is yet more remote, f•r
118
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juice includes both substance and liquid. Besid
neither of these two remote general natures wo
make any distinction between wine and a thous
other substances or other liquids; a remote gen
leaves the thing too much undistinguished.
·
The specific difference is that primary attriboa
which distinguishes each species from one anotbel\
while they stand ranked under the same general
ture or genus. Though wine differs from other II,
quids, in that it is the juice of a certain fruit, yet th1s
is but a general or generic difference, for it does nat
distinguish wine from cyder or perry ; the 1,pecifll
difference of wine therefore is its pressure from the
grape ; as cyder is pressed from apples, and pe"'f
from pears.
In definitions also we must use the primary atbi
bute that distinguishes the species or special nat~
and not attempt to define wine by its particular tas
or effects, or other properties, which are but sec01-.
dary or consequential, when its pressure from the
grape is the most obvious and primary distincti~
of it from all other juices. I confess in some casfj
it is not so easily known, which is the primary idea
that distinguishes one thing from another ; and therefore some would as soon define winter by the cold,
ness of the season, as by the shortness of the daya;
though the shortness of the days is doubtless the
most just, primary and philosophical difference be,:
twixt that and the other seasons of the year, sincp
winter days are always shortest, but not always die
coldest; I add also, that the shortness of the days ill
one cause of the coldne5s, but the cold is no caUII
of the shortness.

V.-Rules of the Definition of 7 kings.
special rule2 of a good definition are these
Rule I. A definition must be universal, or as some
call it adequate; that is, it musl agree to all the
SECT,
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species or indiviJuals that are included under
idea; so the juice of a grape itgrees to all
wines, whether red, white, French, Spanish,
ce, &c.
e II. It must be proper and peculiar to tlze tl,ing
and agree to tkat alone I for it is the very
of a definition effectually to distingnish one
from all others : so the juice of a grape agrees
other substance, to no other liquidi to no other
but wine.
two rules being observed, will always ren•
dtfinition reciprocal with the thing defined;
is a scholastic way of speaking, to signifl tliat
nition may be used in any sentence m the ·
of the thing defined, or they may be mutually
concerning each other, or substituted in the
of each other. The juice of the grape is wine,
is the juice of the grape. And wheresoever
rd wine is used, you may put the juice of the
instead of it, except when you consider wine
as a word than a thing, or when it is men•
in logical rules.
e III. A definition ought to be clear and plain ;
design of it is to lead us into the knowledge
thlng defined.
it will follow, that the words used in a defi..
ought not to be doubtful, and equivocal, and
• but as plain and easy as the language will ·
and indeed it is a general rule concerning
nition both of names and things, that no
9hoold be used in either of them, which has
kness or difficulty in it, unless it has been
explained or defined.
it will follow also, that there are many
which cannot well be defined, either as to the
the thing, unless it be by synonymous words,
a negation of the contrary idea, &c. fol' learnknow not how to make them more evident or
· lligible than the ideas which every man ha,

Is
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· gained by the vulgar methods of teaching. Such
the ideas of extension, duration, thought, consci
ness, and most of our simple ideas, and particular.Ir
sensible qualities, as white, blue, red, cold, heat, ~
hitter, sour, 4'c.
We can say of duration that it is a continuance
being, or a not ceasing to be ; we can say of conacf,,
ousness, that 'it is us it were a feeling within out
selves; we may say, heat is that which is not cold;
or sour is that which is like vinegar; or we may poill&
to the clear sky, and say that is blue. These an
the vulgar methods of teaching the definitionsofnama
or meaning of words. But there are some phil054>'
phers, whose attempts to define these things learnedly, have wrapt up their ideas in greater darknesr.
and exposed themselves to ridicule and contempl:
as when they define heat, they say, it is qualitas COio
gregans homogenea ~ segrega12s heterogenea, i. e. a
quality gatherin~ together things of the same kind,
and separating things of a different kind. So thff
define white, a colour arising from the prevalenCII
of brightness: but every child knows hot and whit.I
better without these definitions.
There are many other definitions given by the
peripatetic philosophers, which are very faulty bJ
reason of their obscurity; as motion is defined bl
them the act of a being in power, so far forth as it •
in power. Time is the measure or number of motion acco1ding to past, present, and future. The soal
is the act of an organical natural body, having ·
in power; and several others of the same stamp.
Rule IV. It is also commonly prescribed am~
the rules of definition, that it should be short, so tha&
it must have no tautology in it, nor any words superJiit.
ous. I confess definitions ought to be expressed in•
few words as is consistent with a clear and just explication of the nature of the thing defined, and a <l'
tinction of it from all other things beside : but it is rl

•

much mort! impo.rtance, and far better, that a defini ·
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explain clearly the subject we treat of, though
words be many, than to leave obscurities in the
ce, by confining it within too narrow limits.the definition which we have given of logic,
it is the art of using reason well in the search
truth, and the communication of it to others, it
indeed many words in it, but it could not well be
• Art is the genus wherein it agrees with
· , poes7J, arithmetic, wrestling, sailing, building,
or all these are arts also : but the difference or
• nature of it is drawn from its object, reason;
the act, using it well, and from its two great
or designs, viz. the search of truth, an<l the
unication of it, nor can it be justly described
explained in fewer ideas.
, If we add a fifth rule, it must be, that neither
thing defined, nor a mere synonymous name
make any part of the definition, for this
be no explication of the nature of the thing;
a synonymous word at best could only be a de. n of the name.
, VI.-Observations concerning tlie Definition of
Things.
ORE I part with this subject, I must propose
l observations which relate to the definition of

Observ. There is no need that in definitions
uld be confined to one single attribute or pro, in order to express the difference of the thing
, as sometimes the essential difference conin two or three ideas or attributes. So a grocer
n who li>uys and sells sugar and plumbs and
for gain. A clock is an engine with weights
wheels, that shews the hour of the day both by
· g and striking : and if I were to define a reclock, I must add another property, viz,
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that it also repeats the hour. So that the true
primary essential difference of some complex i
consistmg in several distinet properties, cannof
well expressed without conjunctive particles of
2d. Observ. There is no need that definitions sit
alwaysbti positive, for some things differ from o
merely by a defect of what others have; as if a
be defined a seat for a single person with a back
longing to it, then a stool is a seat for a single
son without a back; and a form is a seat for se
persons without a back : these are negative
ences. So sin is a want of conformity to the 1
God ; blindness is a want of sight; a vagabond •
person without a home. Some ideas are ne •
and their definitions ou~ht to be so too.
3d. Obse, v. Some thmgs may have two or
definitions, and each of them equally just and g
as a mile is the length of eight furlongs, or
the third part of a league. Eternal is that
ever was and ever shall be : or it is that which
no beginning and shall have no encl. Man• is u
ly defined a rational animal: but it may be m
· better to define him a spirit united to an animal
such a shape, or an animal of such a peculiar
united to a spirit, or a being composed of such
animal and a mind.
4tlt Observ. Where the essences .of things are
dent, and clearly distinct from each other, there
may be more exact and accmate in the definitio
them; but where their essences approach neu
each other, the definition is more difficult. A b'
may be defined a feathered animal with wings, a
may be defined a large hollow building made to
• The common definition of man, viz. a rational animal, i,
faulty. 1. Because the animal is not rational ; the rationality of
arise11 from the mind to which the animal is uniteJ. 2, Becalllt
spirit should be united to a horse, and make it a ra•ional being,
t:ii~ would nat l,e a man; it is evident therefore that the peculiar
- must. enter into the definition of a man to render it Just and pc
iilr waot of II full description thcrcof1 :lU our d! !Wti11na pre deJi
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the sea with sails: but if you ask me to define
t, which is between a bird and a beast, or to
a bar~e and hoy, which are between a boat
a ship, 1t is much harder to define them, or to
the bounds of their essence. This is very et in all monstrous births and irregular producof nature, as well as in many works of art,
h partake so much of one species and so much
other, that we cannot tell under which species
k them, or how to determine their specific
nee.
e several species of beings are seldom precisely
ted in the nature of things by any certain and
terable bounds.~ the essence of many things do
JIit consist in indiv,~ibility, or in one evident ind1visipoint, as some have imagined; but by various dethey approach nearer to, or differ more from
s that are of a kindred nature. So (as I have
d before) in the very middle of each of the
ltehes of a rainbow, the colours of green, yellow and
are sufficiently distinguished; but near the borof the several arches they run into one another,
that you hardly know how to limit the colours,
whether to call it red or yellow, green or blue.
t,th Observ. As the highest or chief genuses, viz.
· g and not-being, can never be defined, because
re is no genus superior to them ; so neither can
• ular ideas or individuals be well defined, because
er they have no essential differences from other
ividuals, or their differences are not known;
ad therefore individuals are only to be described
theil' particular circumstances : so King George is
tinguished from all other men and other kings, by
scribing him as the first King of Great Britain of
e house of Brunswick ; and Westminster Hall ii,
cribed by its situation and its use, &c.
That individual bodies can hardly have any estial difference, at least within the reach of our
owledge, may be made thus to appear; Methuse-
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J_ah, whtn he was nine- hundred and sixty yean
and perhaps worn out with age and weakness,
the same person as when he was in his full ·,
of manhood, or when he was an infant newly
but how far was his body the same? who can
whether there was any fibre of his fle11h or his
that continued the same throughout his whole I'
or who can determine which were those fibres?
ship in which Sir Francis Drake sailed round
world might be new built and refitted so often,
few of the same timbers remained; and who can
whether it must be ulled the same ship or no?
what is its essential difference? how ihaU we d
Sir Francis Drake's ship, or :make a dennition
Methuselah ?
·.,....
To this head belongs that most difficult questi
what is the principle of individuatien? or what ·
that makes any one thing the same as it was
time before; this is too large and laborious an in
ry to dwell upon it in this place :· yet I cannot
bear to mention this hint, viz. Since our own
must rise at the last day for us to receive rewar
punishments in them,. there may be perhaps
original fibres of each human body, some stami1UJ
tte, or primeval seed of life, which may remain
changed through all the stages of life, death, and
grave; these may become the springs and princ'
of a resurrection, and sufficient to denominate iti
the same body. But if there be any such con
and vital atoms which distinguish every human
they are known to God only.
6tk Obsero. Where we cannot find out the es
?r essential difference of any ipecies or kinds of
ings that we would define, we must content ou
with a collection of such chief parts or propertie,
it, as may best explain it so far as it is known,.
best distinguish it from other things : so a ma ·
is a flower which hath many long yellow I
round a little knot of seeds-in the midst, withs
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stalk, &c. So if we would define silver, we

ais a white and hard metal,

next in weight to

if we would define an elder-tree, we might
is on.i among the lesser trees, whose younger
are soft and full of pith, whose leaves are
or indented, and of such a particular shape,
bears large clusters of small black berries; so
t define water, earth, stone, a lion, an eagle,
t, and the greatest part of natural beings, by
ction of those properties, which according to
observation distinguish them from all other
This is what Mr. Locke calls nominal esand nominal definitions. And indeed since
~ntial differences of the various natural beings
bodies round aLout us arise from a peculiar shape,
motion, and situation of the small particles of
they are composed, and since we have no suft method to inform us what these are, we must
eontented with such a sort of definition of the bothey compose.
ere note, that this sort of definition, which is
up of a mere collection of the most remarkable
or properties, is called an imperfert definition
a description; whereas the definition is called
ect, when it is composed of the essential differadded to the general nature or genus.
7 Obsero. The perfect definition of any being al•
includes the definition of the name wherelJy it
called, for it informs us of the sense or meaning
that word, and shews us what idea that word is
ed to : but the definition of tht: name does by no
s include a perfect definition of the thing; for
we have said uefore, a mere synonymous word, a
tion of the contrary, or the mention of any one
two distinguishing properties of th~ thing, may be
cient definition of the name. Yet in those
where the essential difference or essence of a
' g is unknown, there a definition of the .name by
chief properties, and a description of the thing
much the same.
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And here I think it necessary to take notice of
general sentiment, that seems to run through
excellent performance, Mr. Locke's Essayofthe
man nderstanding, and it is this, " That the
sences of things are utterly unknown to us, and
fore all our pretences to distinguish the essences
things can reach no farther than mere nominal
sences : or a collection of such properties as we kn
to some of which we affix particular names,
others we bundle up, several together, under
name: and that all our attempts to rank beings '
different kinds of species can reach no farther
to make mere nominal species: and therefore our
.finitions of things are but mere nominal descripti
or ddi.nitions of the name."
Now, that we may do justice to this great auth
we ought to consider that he confines this sort of ·
course only to the essence of simple idefis, and
the essence of substances, as appears evide~t in
fourth and sixth chapten. of his third book; for
allows the names of mixed modes always to si
the real essences of their species, Chap. V., and
acknowledges artificial tl1ings to have real dis ·
species, and that in the distinction of their essen
there is generally less confusion and uncertainty ti
in natural, Chap. VI. Sect. 40, 41.; though it m
be confessed th.at he scarce makes any distinc ·
b~tween the definition of the name, and the de
•tion of the thing, as Chap, IV. ; and sometimes
current of his discourse decries the knowledge
-essences in such g{tneral terms, as may justly give
.casion to mistake.
It must be grnnte<l, that the essence of most of
simple ideas, an.cl the gi·eatest part of particular
tural substances, are much unknown to us; and th
, .fore the essential differ.ence of sensible qualities,
of the various kinds of bodies (~s I have said befo
lie beyond the reach of our understandings : we
not what makes the prim ary real inward distinc ·
between red, green, sweet, sour,. &c. between w
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oil, stone, fire, water, flesh, clay, in their
natures, nor do we know what are the in-

and prime distinctions between all the particus of species in the vegetable, animal, mineral,
or liquid world of things. See Philosoph.
essay xi. sect. 1.
still there is a very large field for the knowof essences of things, and for the use of pernitious amongst our complex ideas, the moranees and changes of nature, the works of
matters of science, and all the affairs of the
:the moral, and the rel igous life : and indeed it
uch more importance to all mankind to have
acquaintance with the works of art for their
velihood and daily use, with the affa,irs of motheir behaviour in this world, and with the
of religion, that they may be prepan•d for
ld to come, than to be able to give a perfect
of the works of uature.
particular essences of natural bodies are unto us, we may yet be good philosophers, good
good neighbours, good subjects, and good
ns, without that knowledge, and we have just
to be content.
that the essences of some of the modal aps and changes in nature, as well as things of
nee and morality, are sufliciently known to
ke perfect definitions of them, will appear
apecimen of a few definitions of these things.
o is a change of place. Swiftness is the
o,•er a long space in a short time. A nais the time of one alternate revolution of
d darkness, or it is the duration of twentyrs. An eclipse of the sun is a defect in the
smission of light to us by the moon inter• Snow is congealed vapour. • Hail is
lJand, hill, grove, are not designed here iD their more
nbstantial natures (if I may so express it) or as the matter
1111h; far in thill 11cnse we know not their essence, but
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congealed rain. An • island is a piece of land rism,
above the surrounding water. An • hill is an e).,
vated part of the earth, and a • grove is a piece r/.
ground thick set with trees. An house is a buildina
made to dwell in. A cottage is a mean house in th.
.country. A supper is that meal which we make qi
the evening. A triangle is a figure composed of
three sides. A gallon is a measure containing eiaht
pints. A porter is a man who carries burdens 19'
bii;e. A king is the chief ruler in a kingdom. Vt?
racity is the conformity of our words to our thougbi,
Covetousness is an excessive loYe of money, oro~
possessions. Killing is the taking away the life o(
an animal.
Murder is the unlawful killing of t
man. Rhetoric is the art of speaking in a manmr
fit to persuade. Natural philosophy is the knowlecta.
of the properties of bodies and the various effi
of them, or it is the knowledge of the various
pearances in nature, and their causes ; and logw. ·
the art of using our reason well, &c.
Thus you see the essential differences of v ·
beings may be known, and are borrowed from
qualities and properties, their causes, effects, obj
adjunct, ends, &c. and indeed as infinitely va ·
as the essences of things are, their definitions
needs ha,·e very various forms.
After all it must be confessed, that many logic'
and philosophers in the former ages, have made
great a bustle about the exactness of their defini ·
of things, and entered into long fruitless contro
sies and very ridiculous debates in the several
ences about adjusting the logical formalities of e
definition : ~ hereas that sort of wrangliug is
grown very justly contemptible, since it is
that true learning and the knowledge of things
pends much more upon a large acquaintance
their various properties, causes, effects, subject,
only a• considered in their modal appearances, wherel,y one
4;11rt!J is distiugui!ihcd from another. The same may be said 0£
ball, &c.
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ends arid designs, than it does upon tbe formal

_______

bola&tic niceties of genus ......,.
and difference.

. VII.-Of a compkte ·conception ef Tltings,•
·ng dwelt so long upon the first rule to direct
.conceptions, and given an account of the defini-·
of nt1mes an<l things in order to gain clear
diatinct ideas, we make haste now to the second
guide your cbnceptions, artd that is, conceive
• !I completely in all their parts,
parts have a reference to some whole : no"'
isan old distinction which logical writers make
whole and its parts iuto four several kinds, nnd.
be proper just to mention them-here.
ere is a metaphysical whole, when the essence
· g is •said to consist of two parts, the gennS1
fhe difference, that is, the general and the spee, which being joined top.ether make up a
ition. This has been the subject of the foresections.
There is·n mathematical' wliole, which is better
integral, when the several parts, which go to
up the whole, are really distinct from one anoand, each· of them may subsist apart, so the
the limbs and the trunk are the integral parts
animal body; so units are the integral parts
y large number : so these discourses which I
,n-itten concerning perception, judgment, reaand disposition are the four integral parts of
This sort of parts goes to make up the comof any subject, aud this is the chief and
direct matter of our discourse in this section.
ere is a physical or essential whole, which is
made to signify and include only the two esparts of man, body and soul: but I think the
of it may be better altered, or at least enlargso include all the essential modes, attributes

perties which are contained in the comprehen..
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1ion of any idea. This shall be the subject of
tourse under the third rule to direct our concepti
4. There is a logical whole, which is also call
an universal; and the parts of it are all the parti
lar ideas to which this universal nature extends.
a genus is a whole in respect of the several sp
which are its parts. So the species is a whole,
all the individuals are the parts of it. This shall
treated of in the fourth rule to guide our concepti
At present we consider an idea as an inte
whole, and our second rule direct!! us to contemp
it in all its parts ; but this can only refer to compld
ideas, for simple ideas have no parts.
SECT,

VIII.-Of Definition and the rules

ef ii.

our minds are narrow fo their capaciti
and cannot survey the i,everal parts of any comp
being with one single view, as God sees all things
once; therefore we must as it were take it to pie
and consider of the parts separately, that we
have a more comt)lete conception of the whole.
if I would learn the nature of a watch, the wor
takes it to pieces and l>hews me the spring,
wheels, the axles, the pinions, the balance, the
plate, the pointer, the case, &c. and describes e
of these things to me apart, together with their
gures and their uses. If I would know what an
ma! is, the anatomist considers the head, the tru
the limbs, the bowels, apart from each other,
o-ivcs me distinct lectures upon each of them. '
kingdom is divided i11to its several provinces; ab
into its several chapters; and any science is divi
according to the several subjects of which it trea
This is what we properly call the division of
idea, which is an explication of the whole by its
veral parts, or an enumeration of its several
that go to compose any whole idea, and to render
eomplete. And I think when man is divided ·
SINCE
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and soul, it properly comes under this part of
doctrine of integral division, as well as when the
body is divided into head, trunk, and limb~ :
division is sometimes called partition.
en any of the parts of any idea are yet farther
· d, in order to a clear explication of the whole,.
is called a subdivision; as when a year is divided
months, each month into days, and each day
hours, which may also be farther subdivided inminutes and seconds.
It is necess.ary, in order to the full explic3tion of
being, to consider each part, and the properties
it, distinct by itself, as well as in its relation to the
e: for there are many properties that belo'ng to
die several parts. of a being, which cannot properly
ascribed to the whole, though these properties
fit each part for its -proper station, and as it
s in that relation to the whole complex being:
ID a house, the doors are moveable, the rooms
e, the ceilings white, the windows transparent,
the house is neither moveable, nor square, nor
nor transparent:
y_

The special rules qf a good division are these :

1. Rule. Eack part singly taken must contain less
. . the whole, but all the parts talcen collectively (or
her) must contain neither more nor less than tlie
• Therefore in discow·sing of a tree, if you di•
i it into the trunk and leaves, it is an imperfect .

sion, because the root and the branches are needmake up the whole. So logic would be ill di ..
into app1·ehension, judgment, and rli?asoning ; ·
method is a considerable part ofJ.:he art which
es us to use our reason right, and .should by no
s be omitted.
Upon this account, in every division wherein we
• a p.erfect exactness, it is nece5isary to examine
whole idea with diligence, lest we omit any part
it through want of care ; though in some cases it
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is not possible, and in others it is not necesi,ary,
we should descend to the minutest parts.
II. Rule. In all divisi01u we should first c
the lmger and more immediate parts ef tlze suqject,
not divide it at once into the mo1't minute and r
parts. It would by no means. be proper to div'
kingdom first into streets, and lanes, and fields,
it must be first divided into provinces or coun
then those counties may be divided into towns,
lages, fields, &c. and towns into streets and lanes.
III. Rule. The several parts ef a division
lo be opposite, that is, one part ouglzt not to c
another. It would be a ridiculous division of an
mal into head, limbs, body, and brain, for the b
are contained in the head.
Yet here it must lw noted, that sometimes
subjects of any treatise, or the objects of any p
culnr science, may be properly and necessarily so
vided, that the second may iuclude the first, and
third may include the first and second, without
fondin~ agaim:t this rule, because in the second
following parts of the science or discourse, these
jects are not considered in the same manner as in
first; as for i11stance, geometry divides its obj
into lines, surfaces and solids : now though a
be contained in a surface, or a solid, yet it is
considered in a surface, separate and alone,
a mere line, as it is in the first part of geom .
which treats of lines. So logic is rightly divided
to conception,judgment, reasoning, and method.
though ideas or conceptions are contained in the
lowing parts of logic, yet they are not there tr
of as s.eparate ideas, which are the proper subj
the first part.
IV. Rule. Let not subdivisions be too mun
'U:ithoot necessity: for it is. better many times to
tinguish more parts at once, if the subject will be
than to mince the discourse by excessive <livi •
and subdividing. It is preferable therefore in
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·se of geography to say, that in a city we will
si<ler its walls, its gates, its buildings, its streets,
lanes, than to divide iL formally first into the enassing and encompassed parts; the encompasparts are the walls and gates; the encompassed
includes the ways and the buildings; the ways
the streets and lanes; buildings com,ist of the
dations and the superstructure, &c.
Too great a number of subdivisions has been efby some persons in sermons, treatises, z'nstrua' &c. under pretence of greater accuracy : but
sort of subtleties hath ofLen given great confuto the understanding, ancl sometimes more diffito the memory. In these cases it i.s only a good
1gment can determine whatsubdivisions are needful.
V. Rule. Divide ever!/ subject according to the
"al design you have in view. One and the same
or subject may be divided in very different
ers, according to the different purposes we
in discoursing of it. So if a printer were to
ider the several parts of a book, he must divide
• to sheets, the sheets into pages, the pages into
, and the lines into letten;. But a grammarian
· es a book into periods, sentences and words,
~rts of speeeh, as noun, pronoun, verb, &c. A
ciao considers a book as divided into chapters,
'ons, arguments, propositions, ideas ; and with
help of ontology, he divides the propositions inrulrject, oqject, property, relation, action, passion,
e, effect, &~. But it would be very ridiculous for
ician to divide a book into sheets, pages, and
; or for a printer to divide it into nouns and pros, or into propositions, ideas, properties or ca uses.
VI. Rule. In all ,your divisions observe witlt greattzactness tlle nature if tilings. And here I am
ained to make a subdivision of this rule into
very necessary p;irticulars.
(1.) Let the parts of your division be such as are
perly distinguished in nature, Do not divide a-
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sunder those parts of the i<lea which are intim
unite<l in nature, nor unite those things into one
which nature has evidently disjoined: this woul
.very improper in treating of an aniibal body, to
vide it intathe superior und inferior halves: f°'
would be h:u<l to say how · much belongs by na
to the inferior half, and how much to the supe •
Much more improper would it be still to divide
nnimal into the right-hand parts and left-hand
which would bring greater confusion. This wo
be as unnatural us a man who should cleave ah
nut in halves through the husk, the shell, and
kern el, at once, and say a nut is divided into
two parts ; wh ereas nature leads pl ainly to the t
fold distinction of husk, shell, and kernel.
(2.) Do not affect duplicities nor t1-iplicities,
a ny certain number of parts in your division ofth'
for we know of nv !.uch certain number of
which God the creator has observed in forming
the varieties of his creatures, nor is there any
form determin ed numbe1· of parts in the var'
subjects of human art or science; yet some pe
have disturbed the order of nature, and abused
readers by an affectation of dichotomies, triclwl
sevens, livelves, &c. Let the nature of the sub'
considered togethe.r with tl1e design which you
,in view, always determine the number of parts
which you divide it.
After all it must be confessed, that an intim
knowledge of things, and a judicious observa ·
will as!:ii1>t in the business of division, as well a,
c1ifinilion, better than too nice an:l curious an a
.tion to the mere formali ties of logical writers, wi
.:i real acquaintance with things.

IX.-Ofa comprehensive Conception if Tk'
and qf Abstracti<,n.
THE third rule to direct our conception req
us to conceive o[things comprehensively. And u
SECT,
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t survey an object in all its parts to obtain a comidea of it, so we must consider it in all its modes,
· es, properties, and relations, in order to oba comprehensive conception of it.
The comprehension of an idea, as it was explainunder the doctrine of universals, includes only the
ntial modes or attributes of that idea; but in thi9
the word is taken in a larger sense, and implies
the various occasional properties, accidental
es, and relations.
The necessity of this rule is founded upon the same
n as the formc>r, viz. That our minds are narand scanty in their capacities, and as they are
,._ al>le to consider all the parts of a complex idea
once, so neither can they at once contemplate all
different attributes and circumstances of it: we
therefore consider things successively and grayin their various appearances and circumstances:
our natural eye cannot at once behold the six sides
a dye or cube, nor take cog11isance of all the
• ts that are marked on them, and therefo1·e we
up the sides successively, and thus survey ancl
IUlber the points that are marked on each side,
lat we may know the whole.
In order to a comprehensive-view of any idea, we
first consider, whether the object of it has an
aistenc~as well as an essence; whether it be a simple
coinpl:ex idea; whethe1· it be a substance or a
e: if it be a substance, then we must inquire
tare the essential modes of it, which a.re necesto its nature, and what are those properties or
· ents of it, which belong to it occasionally, or Bi·
· placed in some particular circumstances : we
t view it in its internal an<l absolute modes, and
ve it in those various external relations in which
<ls to 0th.er beings~ we must consider it in its
ers and capacities either to <lo or suffer: we must
it up to its various causes whether supreme ?r
dinate, We mus.t descend to t.he vanet,>: of 1~
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effects, and fake notice of the several ends and d
signs which are to be attained by it. We must
ceive of it as it is either an object or a subject; wbait
are the things that are a-kin to it, and what are
opposites or contraries of it; for many things are tO
be known both by their contrary and their kindrtl
ideas.
• If the thing we discourse of be a mere mode, ,.._
must inquire whether it belongs to spirits or bodies
whether it be a physical or moral mode: if mor9'
then we must consider its relation to God, to OUJlo
selves, to our neighbours; its reference to this lilt;
or the life to come. If it be a virtue, we must s
what are the principles ofit, what are the rules of·
what nre the tendencies of it, and what are the fal
virtues that counterfeit it, and what are the real vi
that oppose it, what are the e11ils which attend
neglect of it, what are the rewards for the pra ·
of it both here and hereafter.
If the subject be historical or a matter of fact,
may then inquire whether the action was done at
whether it was done in such a manner, or by su
personR as is reported: at what time it was done;·
what place; by what motive, and for what design
what is the evidence of the fact; who are the witnesses; what is their character and credibility; whd
signs there are of such a fact; what concurrent tes~
monies, which may eitl1er support the truth of it, at
render it doubtful.
In order to make due inquiries into all these
many other particulars which go towards the
plete and comprehensive idea of any being, the scie
of ontology is exceedingly necessary. This is what w
wont to be called the first part of metaphysics in
peripatetic schools, It treats of being in its m
general nature, and of all its affections and relatio
I confess the old Popish schoolmen have mingle
number of useless subtilities with this science; tli
have exhausted their own spirits, and the spirits
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readers in many laborious and intricate trifles,
some of their writill{l:!i have been fruitful of names
ut ideas, which hath done much injury to the
study of diviuity. Upon this account many
die moderns have most unjustly abandoned the
e iicieuce at once; and thrown abundance of
mpt and raillery upon the very name of meta•
ics; but this contempt and censure is very un•
nahle, for this science separated from some
telian fooleries and scholastic subtilities, is so
sary to a distinct conception, solid judgment,•
just reasoning on many subjects, that sometime3
it introduced as a part of logic, and not withou~
n. And those who utterly despise and ridicule
either betray their own ignorance, or will be sup-,
to make their wit and banter a refuge and exfor their own laziness. Yet thus much I would
that the late write1·s of ontology are generally
best on this account, because they have left out
IIIICh of the ancient jargon. See the brief scheme
i ontology in the Philosophical Essays by I. W.
Here let it be noted, that it is neither useful, nery, or possible to run through all the modes,
•
stances, and relations of every subject we take
)wid; but in ontology we enumerate a great va•
of them, that so a judicious mind may choose
are those circumstances, relations and proper~
• of any subject which are most necessary to the
t design of him that speaks or writes, either
explain, to illustrate, or to prove the point.
we arrive at the complete knowledge of an idea
1its parts by that act of the mind which is called
· 'on, so we come to a comprehensive conception
A thing in its several properties- and relations, by
act of the mind that is· called abstraction, that is,
consider each single relation or property of the
· t alone, and thus we do as it were withdmw
separate it in our minds both from the subject
as well as from other properties and relations,
order to make a fuller observation of it.
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This act of abstraction is said to be twofold, ei
precisive or negative.
Precisive abstrnction is when we consider t
things apart which cannot really exist part: aa
we consider a mode, without considering its
stance and subject, or one essential mode wi
,mother. Negative abstraction is when we cons
one thing separate from another, which may
exist without it; as when we conceive of a su
without conceiving of its accidental modes or
tions; or when we conceive of one accident wi
thinking of another. If I think of reading or
ing, without the express idea of some man, this:
precisive abstraction ; or .if I think of the attrac ·
of iron, without the express idea of some partic
magnetic body. But when I think of a needle, w·
out an idea of its sharpness, this is negative abst
tion; and it is the same when I think of its sharpn
without conside.r ing its length.
,,
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X.-OJ tile extensive Conception
and of Distribution.

As the completeness of an idea refers to the sev
parts that compose it, and the comprehension of
idea includes various properties, so the extension
an idea denotes the various sorts .or kinds of bei
to which the same idea belongs; and if we would
fHlly acquainted with a subject, we must observe,
Th.is f,,urth rule to direct our conceptions, v'
Conceive of things in all their extension, that is,
must sear{'h out the various species or special
tures \\hich are contained under it as a genus,
general nature. If we would know the nature of
animal perft>ctly we must take cognizance of be
birds, fishe& and insects, as well as men, all
are contained under the general nature and name
animal.
As an integral whole is distinguished into its
l'eral parts by division, l;O the word diitributioo
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properly m,ed when we distinguish an universal
into its several ~inds of species; and perhaps
been better if this word had been always
ed to this signification, though it must be con..
, that we frequently speak of the division of an
into its several kinds, as well as into several
e rules of a good distribution are i;nuch the ·
with those which we have before applied to
• n, which m1_1y be just repeated again in the
st manner, in order to give e)i:amples to them.
Rule, Each part singly taken must contain less
the whole, but all the parts taken collectively
t,gether, must contain neither more nor less than
l wnole; or, as logicians sometimes express it, the
of the division ought to exhaust the whole
which is divided. So medicine is justly distriinto prophylactic, or the art of preserving
; and therapeutic, or the art of restoring
; for there is no other sort of medicine besides
two. But men are not well distributed into
or short, fo_r the.re 11re some of .a middle stature •
. Rule. In all distributions we should first conthe larger and more immediate kinds of speor ranks of being, and not divide a thing at
into the more minute and remote. A genus
nut at once be divided into individuals, or
into the lowest species, if there be a specie$ su• r, Thus it would be very improper to divide ·
l into trout., lobster, eel, dog, bear, eagle, dove,
, and butterfly, for these are inferior kinds;
eas animal ought fin,t to be distributed into
beast, bird, fish, insect; and then beast should
tributed into dog, bear, &c. bird into eagle,
&c. fish into trout, eel, lobster, &c.
is irregular also to join any inferior species in
IIIUlle rank or order wilh the superior; as if w~
d distinguish animals into birds, bears, an<J oy&c. it would be a ridiculous distribution.
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III. Rule. Tke se'Oeral parts of a distri
<JUgltt to be opposite; tltat is, one species or clast
beings in the same rank of division ought not to
tlliti or include anotlt:er ; so men ought not to be
"ided into the rich, the poor, the learned, and
tttll, for pOtW men may be both learned and talt,
so mav the rich.
:8ut it will be objected, are not animated b
l'ightly distributed into veget11ble and animal,
(as they are usually called) sensitive: now the s
tive contains ·the vegetative nature in it, for ani
grow as well !is pltftJts. I answer, that irt this
all such distributions, the word vegetative sign·
merely vegetativ-e; and in this sense vegetlltive will'
sufficiently opposite to animal, for it cannot be
of an animal that it contains mere vegetation in
idea of i't.
IV. Rule. Let not subdivisions be too num
'dnthout necessity; therefore I think quantity is b
distinguished at once into a line, a surface,
solid, than to say as Ramus does, that quantity
either a line, or, a thiqg lined ; and a thing lin
either a surface or a solid.
V. Rule. Distribute every su!Jject according lo
~ecial design !JOU liave in 'View, S<J far as is nece
or useful to yortr present inqufry. Thus a politi
distributes mankind according to their civil ch
ters into the rulers and the ruled : and a physi •
.divides them into the sick or the healthy ; but a
vine distributes thetn into Turks, Heathens, J
or Christians.
Here note, that it is a very useless thing tc> d"
l\lite any idea into such kinds or members as
no dilferetlt properties to be spoken of; as it is
trifling to divide right angles into such whose
are equal, and whose legs are unequal, fur as
_inere right angle they have no different prope '
VI. Rule. In all your distributions observe tlle
t ure ef things with g1·eat ezactness ; and do not
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.-1w,0111,Ar form ofdistribution, as some pers0Jl8
e, by dividing evet·y genus into two species,
three species ; wher.eas nature is infinitely
and human affairs and human sciences .hav:e '
at a variety, nor is there any one form of dis. n that will exactly suit with Jill subjects. ·
, It is to this doctrine ofdistributionof age-·
it.s several species, - we must also :refer 1.he
ion of a cause according to its several .afmcts, ,
e medicines are heating, some are cooling; or ·
t, when it·ill distinguished by its causes, as
i, .either ·built upon divine testimony or human.
to this head we refer particular artificial bodies,
&hey are distinguished according to the matter
are made of, as a statue is either of brass, of
or wc,od,&c.aud in any other bein~1;, whentbey
· tiuguished according to their end and design,
furniture of body or mind, is either for orna« m;e. . T.o this head also we refer subjects
1hey are divided according to their modes or
t&; as men are either merry or grave, or sad;
odes, when they are divided by their subjects,
pers belong to the fluids, or to the solid
f the animal.
also to this place :we reduce the proposals of
hy under its various cases, whether it be in
·on or practice ; as to shew the reason of
s burning wood, whether it be done by a
x glass or a concave, or to shew the construcmeasuration of triangles, whether you have
angles and a side given, or two sides and an
or only three sides. Here it is necessary to
or divide a difficulty into all its cases, in
ito gain a perfect knowledge of the subject you
late.
might be obser.ved here, that logicians have
· es given a mark or sign to distinguish when
integral whole, that is divided into its parts
bers, or when it is a g,enus, an universal
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whole, that is distributed into its species and indi
duals. The rule they give is this: whensoever
whole idea can be directly and properly affirmed
each part, as a bird is an animal; a fish is an
mal ; Bucephalus is a horse; Peter is a man; t
it is a distribution of a genus into it~ species, or
species into its individuals: but when the whole
not be thus directly affirmed concerning every
then it is a division of an integral into its several s
cies or members ; as we cannot say the l1ead,
breast, the band or the foot is an animal, but we
the head is a part of the animal, and the foot is
other part.
This rule may hold true generally in corpo
·beings, or perhaps in all substances: hut when
iay the fear of God is "isclom, and so is human
vility : criticism is true learning, and so is pbil
phy : to execute a murderer is justice, and to sa
and defend the innocent is justice too : in these
it is not so easily determined, whether an int
whole be divi<led into its parts, or an universal
its species: for the fe ar of God may be called ei
one part, or one kind of wisdom: criticism is
part, or one kind of learning; and the exec
of a murderer may be called a species of j
as well as part of it. Nor indeed is it a matter
great importance to determine this controversy.

SECT,

XI.-Of an orderly Conception of Thi

THE last rule to direct our conceptions is that
should rank and place them in a proper method
just order. This is of necessary use to prevent
fusion ; for as a trader who never places his
in his shop or warehouse in a regular or er
keeps the accounts of his buying and telling,
and receiving in a just method, is in utmost d
ef..plunging all his affairs into confusion and

I,

THE l'I.IGHT USE 01' RE,UO?f,

HJ

a student who is in the search of truth, or an aur or teacher who communicates knowledge to
ers, will very much obstruct his design, and cond his own mind or the mind of his hearers, unhe range his ideas in just order.
lfwe would therefore become successful learners
teachers, we must not conceive of things in a con-heap, but dispose our ideas in some certain
od, which may be most easy and useful both
the understanding and memory ; and be ·sure as
as may be to follow the nature of things, for
ich many rules might be given, viz.
I. Conceive as much as you can of the essentials
any subject, before you consider its accidentals.
t. Survey first. the general parts and properties
lily subject, before you t>Xtend _your thoughts to •
urse of the particnlar kind or species of it•
. Contemplate things first in their own simple naand afterwards view them in composition
other things; unless it be your present purpose
cake a compound being to pieces, in order to find
or to shew the nature of it by searching and disring of what simples it is composed.
Consider the absolute modes or affections of
being as it is in itself, before you proceed to
"der it relatively, or to survey the various relas in which it stands to other beings, &c.
Note, These rules chiefly belong to the method of ·
truction which the learned call synthetic.
But in the regulation of our ideas there is seldom .
"absolute necessity that we should place them in
or the other particular method: it is possible in
cases that many methods may be equally good,
is, may equally assfr,t the unde1·standinga11d the
ory: to frame a method exquisitely accm:ate, ac- •
ing to the strict nature of things, and to mainthis accuracy from the beginnin$ to the encl of
tise, is a most rare and difficult thin a, if not
ssib!c. But a larger account of method would
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be very improper in this place, lest we
what belongs to the fourth part of logic.

SECT,

XII.-Thefive Rules qt Conception exempli

IT may be useful here to give a specimen of
fh•e special rules to direct our conceptions, w
have been the subject of this long chapter, and
present them practically in one view.
·
Suppose the theme of our discourse were the
sions of the mind.
1st, To gain a clear and distinct idea of passi
we must define doth the name and the thing.
To begin with the definition of the name, we
not here to understand the word pa5sion in its
and most limited sense, as it signifies merely
or fury ; nor do we take it in its most extensive
losophical sensi>, for the sustaining the action o
agent; but in the more limited philosophical se
passions signify the various affections of the m'
such as admiration, love, or hatred; this is the·
finition of the name.
We proceed to the definition of the thing: p
is defined a sensation of some special commoti
animal nature, occasioned by the mind's percep
of some object suited to excite that commoti
· Here the genus or general nature of passion ·
eensation of some special commotion in animal
• Since this was written, I have vuhlished, n short treatise
passions, wherein I have so far varied from this definition as le
them sensible commotions of our whole nature, both soul and
occnsioned by the mind's perception of the ohj~cts, &c. I
alteration in the description of the passions in that book, chielly
elude in a more explicit manner the passions of desire and av
which ar<! acts of volition rather than sensation. Yet since
commotions of animal nature attend all the passions, and 1ince
· ia alway• a sensation of these commotions, I shall not change tb6
nition I have written here : for this will agree to all the pa
w hethcr they include any act of volition or not ; nor indeed
matter of any great importance. Nov. 17. 1728.
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; and herein it agrees with hunger, thirst, pain,
The essential difference of it ii, that this com. n arises from a thought or perception of the
, and hereby it is distinguished from hunger,
t, or pain.
tdly, We must conceive of it completely, or survey
several parts that compose it. These are, ( l.)
mind's perception of some object. (~.) The
equeut ruffie or special commotions of the nerves,
blood, and animul spirits. And (3.) The sensaof this inward commotion.
Sdly, We must consider it comprehensively in its
· us properties. The most essential attributes
t make up its nature has been already mentioned
er the foregoing heads. Some of the most conrable properties that remain are these, viz. That
·on belongs to all mankind in greater or lesser
ees; it is not constantly present with us, but
o some certain occasion,s : it is appointed by our
tor for various useful ends and purposes, viz. to
· e us vigour in the pursuit ofwhat is good and agreeto us, or in the avoidance of what is hurtful: it is
proper for our state of trial in this world : It is
utterly to be rooted out of our nature, but to be
erated and governed according to rules of vii-tue
religion, &c.
4thly, We must take cognisance of the various
· <ls of it, which is called an extensive conception
it. If the object which the mind perceives be
ry uncommon~ it excit-!s the passion of admiration:
the object appears agreeable it raises love: if the
ee:ible object be absent ai,d attainable, it is desira: if likely to be obtaineu, it excites hope: if un'nable, despair: if it be present and possessed, it
the passion of joy : if lost, it excites sorrow ; if
object be disagreeable, it causes in general hatred
aversion; if it be alfsent and yet we are in danger
it, it raises our fear: if it be present, it is som;w
sadness, &c.
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5tlily, All the&e things and many more which gotD
compose a treatise on ·this suhject must be placed k
their proper order: a slight specimen of which la
exhibited in this short account of passion, and whtda
that admirable author De~cartes has treated of"1
large;. though for want of sufficient experiments and
observations in natural philosophy, there are some
few mii,takes in his account of animal nature.

SECT.

XIII.-An lllustratbn ef tlzese jive Ruks ly
Similitudes.

TH us we have brought the first part of logic to'.&
conclusion : and it may not be improper here to a,
present its excellencies (so far as we ha-ve gone) by
general hints of its chief design and use, as well •
by a va11ious comparison of it to those instrumea&I
which mankind have invented for their several caiTeniences and improvements.
The dcsi~n of logic is not to furnish us with 1lie
perceiving faculty, but only to direct and assist •
in the use of it: it doth not give us the objects
our ideas, but only casts such a light on those oh'
which nature furnishes us with, that they.may be
more clearly and distinctly known: it doth not .t
new parts or properties to things, but it disco\'ers
various parts, properties, relation - and dependencies'
of one thing upon another, and by ranking all thinp
under general and special heads, il renders the
ture, or any of the properties, powers, and uses
a thing, more easy to be found out, when we seek
what rank of beings it lies, and wherein .it
with, and wherein it differs from others.
If any comparisons would illustrate this, it n1ay
thus represented.
When logic assists us to attain a clear and di ·
conception of the nature of things by definition, i
like those glasses whereby we behold such objects
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y, as by reason of their smallness or their greet
ce appear in confusion to the naked eye : so the
pe discovers to us distant wonders in the heaand shews tQe milky way, and the bright cloady
in a very dark sky, to be a collection of little
which the eye unassisted beholds in mingled conn. So when bodies are too small for our sight to
ey them distinctly, then the miscroscope is at hand
our assistance, to shew us all the limbs and features
the most minute animals, with great clearness and
· ction.
11. When we are taught by loll'ic to view a thing
letely in all its parts by the help of division, it
the use of an anatomical knife, which dissects an
body, and separates the veins, arteries, nerves,
les, membranes, &c. and shews us the several
which go to the composition of a complete ani•
• When logic instructs us to survey an o~ect
rehern.i,·ely in all the modes, properties, rela•
faces and appearances 'Of it, it is of the same
as a terrestrial globe, which turning round on ita
represents to us all the val'iety of land and seas,
oms and nations on the surface of the earth, in
shol't succession of time, shews the situation
various relations of them to each other, and givell
prehensive view of them in miniature. ·
JV. When this art teaches us to distribute any
ive idea into its different kinds or species, it
be compared to the prismatic glass, that receiveil
sun-beams or rays of light, which seem to be
rm when falling upon it, but it separates and
'butes them into their different kinds and colours,
ranks them in their proper succession.
if we descend to subdivisions and subordinate
of being, then dibtribution may also be said
the resemblance of a natural tree, wherein
genu<; or general idea stands for the root or stock,
the several kinds of species, and individuals, are
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distributed abroad, and represented in their .d
dence and connection, like the several bo
branches, and lesser sbodts. For instance, let
ma! be the root of a logical tree, the resenibla
seen by mere inspection, though the root be
placed at the bottom of the page.

U

hilip,
.
ames,.
etcr,
Thomas, &c.

Horse Squirrel'

{ Trott,
Bayard,

Beast
1

Aliimal

Lion

DogBear, &c.
Eagle
,Bird { Lark
DuckGoose, &c.
Trout
Fish { Whale
Oyster, &c.

!FlyingInsect {
Creeping

'English,
{ Muscovy,
Hook Bill,

{ Wasp,
Bee, &c.Worm,
{ Ant,

Caterpillu
The same similitude will serve also to ill
the division and subdivision of an integral whole,
to its several parts.
When logic directs us to place all our ideas •
proper method, most convenient both for instru
and memory, it doth the same service as the
well-contrived shelves in a large library., w
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uartos, octavos, and lesser volumes, are
in such exact order under the particular
of divinity, history, mathematics, ancient and
aneous learning, &c. that the student knows
to find every book, and has them all as it were
his command at once, because of the exact
wherein they are placed.
man who has such assistances as these at
in order to manage his conceptions and regu. ideas, is well prepared to improve his knowand to join those ideas together in a regular
by judgment, which is the second operation
mind, and will be the subj~t of the s.econd

logic,

THE
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OJ' JUDGMENT AND PRO:POSJTIO.N,

WHEN the mind bas got acquaintance with
things by framing idt>as of them, it proceeda
to the next operation, and that is, to compare theae
ideas together, and to join them by affirmation, or
disjoin them by negation, according as we find them
to agree or disagree. This act of the mind is called
judgment: as when we have by perception obtained
the ideas of Plato, philosopher, man, innocent, ft
form these judgments; Plato w,as .a philosopher; DI
man is innocent.
Some writers have asserted, that judgment con ·
in a mere perception of the agreement or disagr
ment of ideas. But I ratlter think there is an act
the will (at least in most cases) necessary to form
judgment; for though we do perceive or think
perceive ideas to agree or disagree, yet we may so
times refrain from judging or asseming to the
ception~ for fear lest the perception should not
sufficiently clear, and we should be mistaken; and
.am well assured at other times, that there are m
tudes of judgments formed and a firm asient given
ideas joined or disjoined, before there is any c
perception whether they agree or disagree; and
JS the reason of so many false judgments or mi
among men. Both these practices are a proof
judgment.has something of the will in it, and does
merely consi.,;t in perception, since we some ·
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(though unhappily) without perceiving, and
times we perceive without immediate judging.
an idea is the result of our conception or apsion, so a proposition is the effect of judgThe foregoing sentences which are examples
act of judgment, are properly called proposiPlato was a philosopher, &c.
re let us consider,
The general nature of a proposition, and the
of which it is composed.
The various divisions or kinds of propositions.
The springs of false judgment, or tlte doctrine
"udices.
General directions to assist us in judging aright.
Special rules to direct us in judging particular

CHAP. I.
.NATURE OF A PROPOSITION AND
PAR)"$,

ITS

S.E VERAL

PaoPOSITION is a sentence wherein two or more
or terms are joined or disjoined by one affiror negation, as Plato was a philosopher :
angle is formed by two lines meeting : no man
on earth can be completely happy. When
are ever so many ideas or terms in the sentence,
they are joined or disjoined merely by one ~ination 9r negation, they arc properly called
e proposition, though they may be resolved
,eral propositions which are implied therein,
I appear hereafter.
descrieing a proposition, I use the word terms
as ideas, because when mere ideas are joined
mind without words, it is rather called ajudgbut when clothed with words, it is called a
ition, even though it be in the mind only, as
as when it is expressed by speaking or writing.
re are three thi-ngs which go to the nature nud

M
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constitution of a proposition, ,·iz. the subject, the
predicate, :md the copula.
The subjecf of a proposition is that concerning
which any thing is affirmed or denied : so Plato.
angle, man living on earth, are the subjects of the
fore"oing propositions.
TY1e predicate is that which is affirmed or denied
of the subject; so philosopher is the predicate of the
first proposition; formed by two lines me_etii:ig, ia
the predicate of the second ; capable of bemg colll-!
pletcly happy, is the proper predicate of the third.
The subject and predicate of a proposition taken
together are called the matter of it; for these are
the materials of which it is made.
The copula is the form of a proposition; it represents the act of the mind affirming or denying, ancl
it is expressed by these words, am, art, is, are, &c.
or, am not, art not, is not, are not, &c.
It is not a thin~ of importance euough to create a
dispute, whether the words no, none, not, never,
&c. which disjoii;i the idea or terms in a negative
proposition, shall be called a part of the subject oi
the copula, or ot the predicate. Sometimes perhap,,
they may seem most naturally to be included in one,
and sometimes ·in another of these, though a propo,,
sition is usually denominated affirmative or negative
hy its copula, as hereafter.
Note l. Where each of these parts of a proposi,.
tion is not expressed distinctly in so many words,:
yet they are all understood, and implicitly containecl
therein; as Socrates di sputed, is a complete proposi.•
tion, for it signifies Socrates was disputing. So I
die, signifies I am dying. I can write, that is, I am
able to write. In Latin and Greek one single word
is many times a complete proposition.
Note 2. These words, am, art, is, &c. when th9
• are used alone without any other predicate, signity
both the act of the mind judging, which incluµes the
copula, and signify also actual existence, which is
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predicate of that proposition. So Rome is, sigRome is existent; there are some strange
rs, that is, some strange monsters are e:i..ist- ·
: Carthage is no more, that is, Carthage has no

te S. The subject and predicate· of a proposiare not alw.ays to be known and distinguished
the placing of the words in the sentence, but by
tin()' duly on the sense of the words, and on
min8 and design of the speaker or writer; as ify, in Africa there are many lions, I mean many
s are existent in Africa; many lions is the suband existent in Africa is the predicate. It is
r fur a philosoph€r to under<;t:md geometry;
the word proper is • the predicate, and all the
is the subject, except is.the copula . .
Note 4-; The subject and p1·edicate-of a --proposition t
t always to be two difforent ideas, or two differ•
terms; for where both the terms and ideas are
same, it is called an identical proposition, which is
e trifling, and cannot tend to promote knowledge; .
as, a rule is a rnle, or a good man is a good man,
nt there arc some propnsitions, wherein the terms
the subject and predicate stem to be the same ;
the ideas are not the same; nor can these be
purely identical, or trifling propositions, such
ome is home; that is, home js a convenient or
btful place : Socrates is Socrates still; that is,
man Socrates is still a philosopher: the hero was
a hero ; that is, the hero did not shew his cou; what I have written, I have written; that is,
t I wrote I still approve, and will not alter it;
is done, is done ; that is, it cannot be undone.
ay be easily observed in these propositions the
is equivocal, for in the predicate it has a differidea from what it has in the subject.
ere are also some propo3itions · wherein the
s of the subject and predicate differ, but the
s are the same; and these are not merely iden-
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tical or trifling propositions ; ns impudent is sha
less; a billow is a wave ; or fluctus (in Latin} is
wave; a globe is a round body. In these pro •
tions either the words are explained by a definit'
of the name, or the ideas by a definition of the thin
and therefore they are by no means useless when
formed for any purpose.

CHAP. 11.
OF TH.E VARIOUS KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS.

may be di , tributed into Yario
kinds, according to their subject, their copula. th ·
predicate, their natut·e or composition, th eir se n
and their evidence, which distributions will be e
plained in the following sections.
PROPOSITIONS

I.-Of w1iversal, particular, indefinite, and
singular Propositions.
PROPOSITIONS may be divided according to th •
subject into uni-.:ersal and particular; this is m,u
called a division arising from the quantity.
An universal proposition is when the subject
t:lken according to the whole of its extensiof! ; so
the subject be a genus, or general nature, it inclu
all its species or kinds; if the ~uhject be a species, •
includes all its individuals. This universality is us
ally signified by these words, all, every, no, none,
thf' like ; as, all men must die : 110 man is ahnigh
every creature had a beginning.
A particular p, opositiou is when the subject is
taken according to its whole extension; that is, wl
the term is limited and restrained to some one
more of those species or i11<lividuals, whose gen
nature it expresses, but reaches not to all ; and
is usually denoted by the words, some, many, a£
there are, which, &c. ns, some birds can sing well
SECT,
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men nre truly wise : there are parrots which will ·
a hundred things.
nder the general name of universal propositions,
lnay justly include those that are singular, and
the most purt those that arc indefinite also.
A singular proposition is when the snbject is a sinor individual term or idea; as DescurtPs was
ingenious philosopher: Sir Isaac Newton has far
decl all his predecessors : the palace at HampCourt is a pleasant dwelling: this day is very
• The subject here must be taken according to
whole of its extension, because being an incJial it can extend only to one, anc.l it must tl1ere•
be regulated by the laws of uni versa] propositions.
n indefinite proposition is when no note, either
universality or particularity is prefixed to a suhwhich is in its own nature general ; as a planet
er changing its place ; angels are noble crea. Now this sort of proposition, especially when
scribes the nature of things, is usually counted
• ersal also, and it supposes the subject to be taken
its whole extension; for if there were any planet
'ch did not change its place, or any angel that
not a noble creature, these propositions would
be strictly true.
Yet in order to secure us against mistakes i11 judO'of universal, particular and inclefinite ·propo~' it is necessary to make these following remarks.
I. Concerning universal propositions.
Note 1. Universal terms may eitner denote a mebysical~ a physical, or a moral universality.
A metaphysical or mathematical universality is
n all the particulars contained under any <renernl
have the same predicate belonging to the~ withany exception whatsoever; or ,vhen the prQ{}iis so essential to the universal subject. that it
roys the very nature of the subject to be without
• as, all circles have a centre and circumference
!ipirits iti their own nature are immortal.

M3
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A physical or natural universality is wlien,
cording to the order and common coun,e of natu
a predicate agrees to all the subjects of that ki
though there mny be some accidental and prete
tural exceptions; as, all men use words to expr
their thoughts, yet dumb persons are excepted,
they cannot speak. All beasts have four feet,
there may be some monsters with five;. or maim
who have but three.
A moral universality is when the predicate ar,
to the greatest part of the particulars which are
tained under the universal subject; as, nll ne
are stupid creatures ; all men are governed by
tion rather than by reason: all the old Romans lo
their country : and the scripture m,es this lan~u
when St. Paul tells us, the Cretes are always tia
Now it is evident, that a specis; l or singular
clusion cannot be inferred from a moral universal"
nor always and infallibly from a physical one, tho
it may always be inferred from an universality wb'
is metaphysical, without any danger or possibility
a mistake.
Let it be observed also, that usually we make
tle or no distinction in common language, betw
subject that is physically or metaphysically unive
Note 2. An universal term is sometimes taken
lectively for all its particular ideas united togt:
aud somt:t imes distributively, meaning each of
single and alone.
Instances of a collective universal are such
these ; all these apples will fill a bushel; all
hours of the night are sufficient for sleep: all
rules of grammar overload the memor51• In
propositions it is evident, that tlte predicate be)
uot to the individuals separately, but to the w
collective idea; for we cannot aflirm the same p
cate; if we change the word all into one or ev
we cannot say one apple, or every apple, will Iii
Lushel, &c. Now such a collective idea, wbea-
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mes the subject of a proposition, ouoht to be
emecl as one single thing, and this renders the
po.;ition singular or indefinite, as we shall show
1e<liatel r.
A distributive universal will allow the word all to
changed iutoevery, or into one, and by this mean$.
distinguished from a collective.
Instances of a distributive universal are the most
iomon on every occasion : as, all meu are mortal;
ry ·man is a sinuer, &c. But in this sort of uni,ersal there is a distinction to be made, which fol ..
s in the next remark.
Note 3. When an universal term is taken distriively, sometimes it includes all the individuals
tained in its inferior species; as when I say e\'ery
fic:lmess has a tendency to death, I mean every indilidual sickness as well as every kind. But some' sit includes no more than merely each species
kind; as when the evangelist says, Chri t healed
Yery disease, or every disease was healed by Christ;
tis, every kind of disease. The first of these,
icians call the distribution of an universal in sin ..
generum; the last is a distribution in genera sin"""1roni, But either of them joined to the subject
render a proposition universal.
Note 4. The universality of a subject is often reained by a part of the predicate ; as when we say
all men learn wisdom by experience; the universal
mbject, all men, is limited to signify only, all those
n who learn wisdom. The scripture uses this
rt of language, when it speaks of all men be• g justified by the righteousness of one, Rom. v. l 8.
tis, all men who are ju tifle<l obtain it this way.
Observe here, that not only a metaphysical or naal, but a moral universality also is oftentimes to
restrained by a part of the predicate; as when we
y, all the Dutch are good seamen : all the llali.rns
are subtle politicians; that is, those among the Dutch
&hat are seamen are good seamen, and those among

•
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the Italians who are politicians are subtle politici
thnt is, they are generally so.
Note s. The uni,·ersality of a term is many ti
restrained by the particular time, place, circ
stance, &c. or the- design of the 8peaker ; as if
me in the city of London and say, all the wea,
"cnt to present their pctiti011s; we mean only all
weavers who dwell in the city. So when it is
in the gospel, ull mell di<l marvel, Mark v. 20,
reaches only to all those meu who heard of the
r:l{'les of our a\'iour.
Here also it should be observe<l, that a m
uuin•rsulity is rcstraiue<l by time, place, and o
<'i rn1111stflnccs, at; well as a natural; so that by t
rnt·ans the wo1 <l all sometimes does not extend
ten th pnrt of those who nt first might &eem to be
el uded i11 thnt word.
One occasion of these difficulties and omhigui
tl1a.t belong to universal propositions, is the com
llumour and temper of mankind, who generally
an ii,clination to ·magnify their ideas, and to
roundly and universally concerning any thing
speak of; which has introduced universal terms
speech into custom an<l habit, in all nations and
languages, more than nature or reason would die
yet when this custom is introduced, it is not at a ·
proper to use this sort uf language in solei:un and
cred writings, as well as in familiar discourse.
II. Remarks concerning indefinite propositiont,.
Note 1. Propositions carrying in them uni\'
forms of expression, may e.ometimes drop the
of universality, and become indefinite, an<l yet
tain the same universal sense, whether mew.phys·
uatural or moral, whether collective or distrib ·
\Ve may give instances of each of these.
Metaphysical; as, a circle has a centre an<l cir
ference. Natural; as, beasts have four feet.
ral; as, negroes are stupid creatures. CollectiVt:;
the apples will fill a bushel. Distributive; as,
are mortal.

JI.
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Note 2. There are many cases wherein a collecidea ii, expressed in a proposition, by an indenterm, and that where it describes the nature- or
lity of the subject, as well as when it declares some
t matters of fact: as, fir-trees set in good order will
a charming prospect; this must signify a colleaof fir-trees, for one makes no prospect. In ma~
of fact this is more evident and frequent; as the
ans overcame the Gauls : the robbers surround• the coach: the wild geese flew over the Thames in
1he form of a wedge. All these arc collective subjects,
Note 3. In indefinite propositions the subject is of• restrained by the predicate, ot by ·the special
time, place, or circumstances, as well as in propositions which are expressly universal; as the Chinese
11'1 ingenious silk-weavers, that is, those Chines_
e
which are silk-weavers, are ingenious at their ~ork.
'l\e stars appear to us when the twilight is gone.
l\is can signify no more than the stars which are
above our horizon. ·
Note 4. All these restrictions ten<l to reduce some
fl,definite propositions almost into partioular, as will
'l'(>t!ar under the next remarks,
Ill. Remark:; concerning particular pmpositio11s.
Note I. A particular proposition may sometimes
'8 expressed indefinitely without any note of particalarity prefixed to the subject: as, in times of con6ision laws are not executed : men of virtue are <lisped, and murderers escape, that is, some laws,
e men of virtue, some murderers: unless we
uld c,\ll this lan~uage a moral universality, though
think it can hare.Uy extend so far.
Note 't. The words some, a fow, &c, though they
erally denote a prope1· particularity, yet somees they express a collective idea; as some of the
aemies beset the general around. A few Greeks
ul<l beat a thousand Indians.
I conclude this section with a few general remark~
• this subject, Yiz.
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Gen. Rem. I. Sinte uni1.,e,·sal, indefinite, and particular terms in the plural uumber, may either ..
taken iu a collective or di!>trilmtive sense, there •
on~ !>hort and easy way to fiud when they are t'(f.
lectrve nnd when di~tributive, Yiz. If the plur11l n8'11ber mny be changed into the singular, that i., if die
prndic11te will agree to one single subject, it is a di,.
tributive idea; if not it is a collective.
Gen. Rem. II. ,Universal and particular terms fa
tl,e plural number, such as, all, sume,few, man!}, &e.
when they are taken in their distributive seuse, hipresent several single idens; and when they are thus
affixed to the subject of a proposition, render t!Nt
proposition unh·ersal or particular, according to the
univers11lity or particularity of the terms afiixed.
Gen• .Rem. III. Universal and pa1-timlar terms:Jb
the plural number, taken !n their collective sen-,
represent generally ohe collective idea.
If this oue collectne idea be thus represent6cl
( whether by universal or paricular terms) as the 1t1\.
ject of a proposition which describes the nature oh
thing, it properly makes either a sin~ular or an indefinite-proposition: for the words, all, some, a ft!t,
&c. do not then denote the quantity of the propesition, but are esteemed tnerely as terms which connect the individuals together, in order to compdlle
one collective idea. Observe these instances, all Ille
sycamores in the garden would make a large gro,6;
that is, this one collection of sycamores, which is:a
singular idea. Some of the sycamores in the ganta
would make a fine grove. Sycamores would mttn 1
uoble grovP. : in these last the rnliject is rather m..
definite than singular. Blrt it is very evident, that
in each of these propositions the predicate cnn only
belong to n collective idea, nnd therefore the subjeci
must be e!.teemed a collective.
Ir this collectiYe idea, (whether represented by
universal or particular terms), be used in describing
past matters of fact, then it is gener~lly to be esteelll-
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singular idea, an<l renders the propositi,m singu- _
; as, all the soldiers of Alexander made but a

army: a few Macedonians vanquished the large
of Darius: some grenadiers in the .camp plun..
all the neighbouring towns.
w we have shewn before, that if a propqsition
"bing the nature of things, has an indefinite
t, it is generally to be esteemed univel·sal in
ropositional sense; and if it has a singular subin its proposjtional sens~ it is always raoke<l
universals.
r all we rnuwt be force<l to confess, that the
age of mankind and the idioms of speech are
exceeding various, that it is hard to reduce them
f few rules; and if we would gain a just and preidea of every universal, particular and indefiexpression, we must not only consider the parr idiom of the language, but the time, the place,
occasion, the circumstances of the matter spoken
d thus penetrate as fru· as possibl';l jntp the de1>f the speaker or writer.

cr. II. Of affirmative and 12egative Propositimis.
a proposition is considered with regard to
q,pula, it may be divided into affirmative an<l ne've; for it is a copula joins or disjoins the two
Others call thii,; a division of propositions ac. g to their quality.
An qffirmatave proposition is when the idea of t11e
icate is supposed to agree to the idea of. the suband is joined to it by the word is, or arc, which
the copula ; as, all men are sinners. But when
predicate is not supposed to agree with the suband is disjoined from it by the particles is not,
not, &c. the proposition is negative; as man is
.innocent; or, no man is innoct-nt. In an affirmproposition we assert one thing to belong to
1>ther, and as il were, unite them io thought an

WHEN
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word: in negative propositions we separate one· •
from another, anri deny their agreement.
It may be thought something odd, that two id
or terms are said to be di~oined as well as joined by
copula: bl.It if we cnn but suppose the negative pa
cles do really belong to the copula of negative pro~
tions, it takes awa} the harshness of the expressi
and to make it yet softer, we may co,nsider that
predicate and subject may be properly said to
joined in a form of words as a proposition, by
nective particles in gramtnar or logic, though
are disjoined in their sense and signification. Ev
youth who has learned his grammar, knows there
sucb words as diajnnctive conjunctions.
:Several things are worthy of our notice on
subject.
·
Note 1. .As there are some ierms .or words,
ideas, (as I have &hewn beFore) concerning which
is hnrd to determine whether they are negative
positive, so there are some propositions concern
which it may be difficult to say, whether they affi
or deny; as, when -we say, Plato was no fool: Ci
was no unskilful orator : Cresar made no expedi ·
to Muscovy: an oyster has no part like an eel: it
not neccessary -for a phyfician to speak French,
for a physician to speak Frellch is needless. 1
sense of these propositions is very plain and
though logicians migl1t squabble perhaps a w
day, whether they should rank them under then
of negative or affirmnti\!e.
Note 2. In Latin and English two 11egative!,jo.
in ·one sentence make an affirmative; as when we
dare, no man is not mortal, it is the same as th
we mid, man is mortal, but in Greek, and oftenti
in French, two negatives make but a i,tronger <le
Note S. If the mere negative term, not, -be ad
to the copula of ,au univer!,al affirmative propositi
it reduces it to a particular ne~ati \ e; as, all
are not wise, signifies the same as, some men are
wise,
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ate 4. In all affirmative propositions, the predi-

is taken in its whole comprehension; that is,
y essential part and attribute of it is affirmed
rninjcr the subject; as when I say, a true Chrisis an 1onest man, every thing that belongs to
esty is affirmed concerning a true Christian.
ate 5. In all negative propositions the predicate
en in its whole extension: that is, every species
individual that is contained in the general idea of
predicate, is utterly denied concerning the sub; so in this proposition, a spirit is not an animal,
exclude all sorts and kinds and particular aniwhatsoever from the idea of a spirit.
rom these two last remarks we may derive this
ence, that we ought to attend to the entire comension of our ideas, and to the universal extenof them, as far as we have proper capacity for
before we grow too confideJ1t in our affirming or
ying any thing, which may have the least darkdoubt or difficulty attending it; it is the want ·
that attentic,m that betrays us into many mistakes.

Slcr. III.-Of the Opposition and Conversion of
Propositions.
Any two ideas being joined or disjoined in varitll forms will afford us several propositions: all
may be distinguished according to their quanand their quality ""' into four, which are marked
lflenoted by the letters A, E, I, 0, thus:
{Universal affirmative
E tl eno t es a
Uni,·ersal
nei.rative
.
~
.
:(
Particular aflirmattve
Particular negative
-I
ing to these old Latin rhymes:
I
Asserit A, Negat E, verum generaliter amba;
I
Asserit I, Negat 0, sed particulariter ambo.

A}

• The reader should rememb~r hrre, that n proposition accol'lli*
Ila q11411tity is called universal or particular, and :iccor<ling to ft.'i
·,1 it is either affirmative or negative,
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This may be exemplified
vine and a tree.
A Every vine is a tree.
E No vme is a tree.
I Some vine is a tree.
0 Some vine is not a tree.
The logicians of the schools have written
large trifles concerning the opposition and conv
&ion of propositions. It will be sufficient here
give a few brief hints of these things, that the le
may not be utterly ignorant of them.
Propositions which are made of the same sub'
and predicate are said to be opposite, when
which is denied in one is affirmed in the o
either in whole or in part, without any considera ·
whether the propositions be true or no.
If they differ both in quantity and quality,
are said to be contradictory ; as,
. .
{These can never be
A E very vme 1s a tree.
t
b tl r_ 1
t
0 1 .1a.ise a
0 Some vine is not a tree. rue,
same w,ue.•
If two universals difft:r in quality, they are
traries ; llli,
These can never be
A Every vine is a tree. {
true together, but
E No vine is a tree,
may be both false.
If two particular propositions differ in qu
they are subcontraries.
·1 So
.
· ·
{These may be both
me vµie
t o ,e th er b ut tl1e can
. .1s a tree.
.O Some vme 1s not a tree. verg be b'oth fia1se.Y
Both -particular and universal propositions, w •
agree in quality but not in quantity, are called su
tern, though these are not properly opposite, u,
A Every vine is a tree.
I Some vine is a tree.
01· thus:
E No vine is a tree.
0 Some vine is not a 1ree.

?:~
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canons of subalternate propositions are usureckoned these three, viz. (1.) lf any universal
"tion be true, the particular will be true also,
not on the contrary. And (2.) If a particular
ition be false, the universal must be false, but
on the contrary. ( 3.) Subaltern propositioni
er universal or particular, may sometimes be
true, and sometimes both false.
Tile conversion of propositions is when the subject
predicate change their plactts with preservation
truth. This may be done with constant cerin all universal negatives and particular affirm; as, no spirit is an animal, may be converted
animal is a spirit; and some tree is a vine, may
tonve1ted, some vine is a tree. But there is more ·
l trifling in this sort of discourse than there ill'<
lid improvement, because this sort of couver..
arises merely from the form of words, as conin a proposition, rather than from the matter.
t it may be useful to observe, that there are
propositions, which by reason of the ideas or
r of which they are composed may be convertwith constant truth : such are those propositions
predicate is a nominal or real definition of the
· t, or the difference of it, . or a property of the
J'flurtb kind, or a supi;!rlative degree of any property
uality whatsoever, or, in short, wheresoever the
icate and the subject have ~actly the same ex. n or the same comprehension ; as, every vine
a. tree. bearing grapes; and every tree bearing
is a vine : religion is the trnest wisdom, and
truest wisdom is religion: Julius Cresar was the
emperor of Rome; and the first emperor of
Jome was Julius Ca:sar. These are the propositions
wich are properly conv<:!rtible, and they are called
mprocal propositions.
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IV.-OJ pure and modal Propositions.

ANoTHER division of propositions among the
Jastic writers is into pure and modal. This may
called (for distinction sake) a division according,
the predicate.
When a proposition merely expresses that
predicate is connected with the subject, it is c
,a pure proposition ; as, every true Christian is
honest man. But when it includes also the
and manner wherein the predirnte is connected ·
the subject, it is called a modal propo&ition; ns, w
I say, it is necessary that a true Chri~tian sl:c
be on honest man.
Logical writers generally make the modality
this proposition to belong to the copula, because
t.hews the manner of the connection between su ·
:ind pre<licate. But if the form of the sentence as
logical proposition be duly considered, the mode·
self is the very predicate of the proposition, and
must n1n thus: that a true Christian &hould be
honest man is a nece&sai·y thing, aud then thew
primary proposition is included in the subject
the modal proposition.
There are four modes of connecting the predi
with the ~ubject, which 1tre usually reckoned up
this occasion, viz. nece sity and contingency w •
ure t"'o oppo,,itcs, possibility and imposibility wbill
arc also two opposites; us, it is necessary that a gl
~hould be round; that a globe be mn<le of wood•
glass is an unnecessa ry, or contingent thing: it is·
pm,sible that a globe should be square: It is impoll
iible that a globe 1,hould be of water.
With regard to the mulal propositions which
schools have introduced, l ,would make these t
1·emarks:
Remark I. The e propositions in English 811
formed by the resolution of the ·words, must bt,
miiht noL be, can be, and cannot be, unto thoa
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logical copula and predi-

is necessary, is contingent, is possible, is im-

'ble ; for it is necessary that a globe should be
, signifies no more than that a globe must be
&mark 2. Let it be noted that tl1is quadruple •
ity is only an enumeration of the natural modes
ners wherein the predicate is connected with
aubject; we might also describe several moral
civil modes of connecting two ideas together,
lawfulaess, and unlawfulness, conveni1:mcy, and
,eniency, &c. whence we may form such modal
sitions as these. It is unlawful for any person
ill an innocent man : It is unlawful for Christo eat flesh in lent: to tell all that we think is
~client: fot· a man to be affable to his neighbour
!tfY convenient, &c.
There are severnl other modes of speaking where..
a predicate is connected with a subject: such as, .
cert:ain, it is dou btful, it is prnbable, it is impro- ··
e, it is agreed, it is granted, it is said by the anit is written, &c. all which will form other
of modal propositions.
But whether the moda-1ity be natural, moral, &c• .
i11 all these propositions it is the mode is the profer predicate, a11d all the rest of the proposition,
pt the copula (or word is) belongs to the suband tln,s they become pure propositions of a .
plex natw·e, of which we shall treat in the next
·on, so that there is no great need of making
ilodels a di&tinct sort.
There are many Jiule subtleties which the schools
aequaint us with concerning the conver&ion and opitiou and equipollcnce of these modal proposis, ~uited to the L at in or Greek tongues rather
'lhan the English, and fit to pa!>s away tlie itile time
a student, rather tlian to eu1ich his understanding• .
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V.-Of single Propositions, whether
complex.

WHEN we consider the nature of propositions,
gether with the formation of them, and the mate
whereof they are made, we divide them into s·
and compound.
A single proposition i! that which has but one
ject au<l one predicate; but if it bas more subjec
more predicates, it is called a compound pro
tiou, and it contains two or more propositions in
A single proposition (which is also called cate
cal) may be divided again into simple and comp
A purely simple proposition is that whose su ·
and predicate are made up of single terms; as vi
is desirable: every penitent ,is pardoned; _no
is innocent.
When the subject or predicate, or both, are
up of complex terms, it is called a complex pro
tion; as, every sincere penitent is pardoned; v·
is desirable for its own sake; no man ali\'e is per
ly innocent.
If the term which is added to the subject of a
plex proposition be either essential or any way n
sary to it, then it is called explicative, for it only
plains the subject; as every mortal man is a son
Adam. But if the term added to make up the c
plex subject does not necessarily or constantly be
to it, tht'n it is determinative, ant! limits the sub'
to a particular part of its extemion; as, every pies
man shall be happy. In the first proposition
word mortal is merely explicative : in the se(
proposition the word pious is determiuative.
,
Here note, that whatsoever mav l•e affirmed
denied concerning any subject, with an explic ·
• As simple ideas are oppo~cd to compl ex, and single ideaa
eompound, •o rropositions are dibtinguish~d in the manner:
English tongue in this respect having some advant11ge al,o,e
learned lirnguages, which have no usual word to distinguir.h ·
hom 5imple.
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ion, may be also affirmed or denied of that subwithout it; as we may boldly say, every man is
of Adam, as well as every mortal man : but it
so, where the uddition is determinative, so we
say, every man shall be happy, though every
man shall be so.
Ra complex prop·osition the predicate or subject
etimes made complex by the pronouns who,
, whose, to whom, &c. which make another
sition ; as every man who is pious, i.hall be
: Juliu·, whose siruame was Cresar, overcame
pey: bodies, which are transparent, have many
Here the whole proposition is called the
ry or chief, and the additional proposition is
an incident proposition. But it is still to bt>
med in this case merely as a•part of the complex
; and the truth or falsehood of the whole comproposition is not to be judged by the truth or
hood of the incident proposition, but by the
ection of the whole subject with the predicate.
die incident proposition may be false, and absurd,
possible, and yet the whole complex proposition
be true, as a hon,e, which has wings, might fly
the Thames.
Beside this complection which.J>dongs to the subjll:t or predicate, logical writers use to say, there is
a,mplection which may fall upon the copula also;
this I have acccunted for in the section concernmodal propositions ; and indeed it is not of much
rtance whether it be placed there or here.
SECT.

VI.-Of compound Propositions.

A COMPOUND proposition is made up of two or
re subjects or predicates, or both; and it co11tains •
it two or more propositions, which are either JJlainexpressed, or concealed and implied.
The fir,.t sort of compound propositions are tbof' e
wherein the composition is expressed and cvi~1t,
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an<l they are distinguished into these six kinds,
copulative, disjunctive, conditional, casual, rel
:ind discretive.
I. Copulative propositions are those which
more subjects or predicates connt-cted by affir
or negative conjunctions; as, riches and honours
temptations to pride; Cresar conquered the 0
and the Britons; neithe1· gold nor jewels will pur
immortality. These propositions are evidently
pounded, for each of them may be resolved into
propositions, viz. riches are temptations to pride,
honour is a temptation to pride; and so the rest.
The truth of copulative propositions depends
the trnth of nil the:: parts of them; for if Cresar
conquered the Gauls, and not the B1 itons, or
Britons and not the Gauls, the second copul
proposition had not been true.
Here note, those propositions, which cannot be
solve<l into two or more simple propositions, are
properly copulative, though two or more ideas
counected and coupled by such conjunctions, ei
in the 1,ubject or predicate: as, two and three
five: majesty and meekness do not often meet:
sun, moon, and stars are not all seen at ouce.
propositions are to Lie esteemed merely comp
because the predicate cannot be affirmed of
single subject, but only of all of them together u
collective subject.
II. Dziunctive propositions are when the parts
disjoiued or oppos-=d to one another by disjun ·
particles; as, it is either <lay or night; the ~ea
is either shining or rainy: quanti ty is either leu
breadth or depth.
The truth of disjunctives depends on the nece
nnd immediate opposition of the parts ; then:IOII
only the last of these examples is tru t'; but the
first are not !.trictl.} true, b, cuw,e:: twilight is a
dium between da.} and uigh t ; and <l iy, clo t,t:Y w
ther is a medium L>etween shining auct ramy.
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• Conditional or ltypotl,etical p1·opositions are
whoi-e parts are united by the conditional parif: as, if the sun be fixed, the earth must
: if there be no fire, there will be no smoke.
e, the first part of these propositions, or that
in the condition is contained, is called the anent, the other is called tbe consequent.
e truth of these propositions depen'Js not at all
e truth and falsehood of their two parts, but on
truth of the connection of tl1em, for each part of
may be false, and yet the whole proposition
; as if there be no providence, there will no fut judgment,
V. Casual propositions are where two propositions
joined by casual particles : as, houses were not
that they might be destroyed : Rehoboam was
appy, because J1e followed evil counsel.
e truth of a casual proposition arises not from
truth of the parts, but from the casual influence
the one part of it has upon the other ; for b9th
may be true, yet the proposition false, if one
be not the cause of the other.
e logicians refer reduplicative propositions to
place, as, men considered as men, are rational
ores, that is, because they are men.
V. Relative propositions have their parts joined by
particles as express a relation or comparison of
thing to another; as when you are silent I will
k; as much as you are worth, so much yon shall
esteemed; as is the father so is the son; where
aere is no tale-bearer, contention will cease.
These are very much a-kin to conditional proposi•
s, an<l the truth of them depends upon the just.-s of their connection.
VI. Discretive propositions are such wherein various
seemingly opposite judgments are made, whose
wiety or distinction is noted by the particles, but,
tlilough, yet, &c. as, travellers may cha11ie their clilllte but not their temper; Job was patient, thouih
hi, ,rief was great.
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The truth and goodness ofa discretive propo
depends on the truth ofhoth parts, and their con
diction to one another; for though both parts sh
be true, yet if there be no seeming opposition bet
them, it is an useless assertion, though we
call it a false one; as Descartes was a philos
yet he was a Frenchman; the Romans were val'
but they spoke Latin; both which pr0position1
ridiculous, for want of a seeming opposition be
the parts.
Since we have declared wherein the truth
falsehood of these compound propositions consi
is proper also to give some intimations how any
tl1ese propositions when they are false may be
posed or contradicted.
All compound propositions, except copulatives
discretives, are properly denied or contradicted w
the negation nflects their conjunctiv~ particles;
the conjunctive proposition asserts, it is either d
night; the oppouent says, it is not either day or n'
or it is not necessary that it should he either day
night, so the hypothetical proposition is denied
saying, it does not follow that the earth must
if the sun be fixed.
A disjunctive proposition may be contradicted
by denying all the partr.; as, it fa neither day
night.
And a casual proposition may be denied or
posed indirectly and improperly, when either
of the proposition is denied: and it must be falae
either part be false : but the design of the pro
tion being to shew the casual connection of the
parts, each part is supposed to be true, and it is
properly contradicted as a casual proposition, u
one part of it be denied to be the c.ause of the
As for copulatives and discretfres, because
truth depends more on the truth of their ports,
fore these may be opposed or denied as many
as the parts of which they are composed may be
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so this copulative proposition, riches and homay be denied by
, riches are not temptations, though honour
: or, honour is not n. temptation, though
may be ; or, neither riches nor honour are
tions, &c.
this discretive proposition, Job was patient,
his grief was great, is denied by saying, Job
t patient, though his grief was great : or, Job
tient, but his grief wa1s not great: or, Job was
'ent, nor was his grief great.
proceed now to the second sort of compound
'tions, viz. such whose composition is not ex, but latent or concealed, yet a small attenwill find .two propositions included in them.
are these that follow :
Erclusives; as the pious man alone is happy,
y Sir Isaac Newton could find out true phiy.
'Ceptives; as, none of the ancients but Plato
nded the soul's immortality. The Protest-hip none but God.
paratives; as, pain is the greatest affliction.
k was fiercer than the Spaniards at Mexico.
note, that the comparative degree does not
imply the positive; as if I c.ay a fool is better
knave, this does not affirm that folly is good,
it is a less evil than knavery ..
Jnceptives and d.esitives, which relate to the
ing or ending of any thing: as, the Latin
is not yet forgotten. No man before Orphete Greek verse. Peter Czar o( Muscovy be•
civilize his nation.
these may be added continuatives; as Rome
to this day, which includes at least two pros, viz. Rome was, and Rome is.
let other authors spend time and pains in
the precise definitions of all these sorts of
'tions, which may as well be understood by

are temptations to pride,
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their names and examples; here let them tell wbat
thei1· truth ch•pends upon, and how they are to be
opposed or contradicted; but a moderate share 0£
common sense, with a review of what is said on the
former compounds, will suffice for all these pur•
poses, \\ ithout the formality of rules.

VI I.-Oj 'tt·ue and false Propositions.
· Propositions are next to be considered according
to their sense or signification, and thus they are die.
tributed into true or false. A true proposition represents things as they are in themselves; but ·
things are represented otherwise than they are in
.themselves, the pl'Oposition is false.
Or we may describe them more particularly thuc
:i true proposition joins those ideas and terms tog
ther whose ohjects are joined and agree,. or it <lisjoi
those ideas and terms, whose objects disagree or
<lisjoined; as, every uird has u.ings, a brute is n
immortal.
A false proposition joins those ideas or terms wh
.vbjects dii;agree, or it disjoins those whose obj
.agree; as, birds have no wings, brutes are imm
tal.
)vote, It is impossible that the same proposi ·
should Lie both true and false at the same time, ·
the same sense, and in the same respect; because
proposition is but the .representation of the ng
ment or disagreement of things: now it is im
blc that the same thing should be and not be, or
.the same thing should agree and not agree at
sa1ne time and in the same respect. This is r. ·
principle of human knowledge.
Yet some propositious ma.y seem to contradict
nuother, though they may be both true, but in
ferent senses or respects or times: as, man was
mortal in para<lisP, and man was mortal in par
But these two propositions mt1st be referred to d'
SEcT.
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times; as, man before his fall was immortal, but
fall be became mortal. So we may say now,
is mortal, or man is immortal, if we take these
itions in different respects: as, man is an im•
creature as to his soul, but mortal as to his
. A great variety of difficulties and seeming
adictions, both in holy scripture and other
· gs, may be solved and explained in this man•
e most important question on the subject is
what is the criterion, or distingui hing mark of
? how shall we know when a proposition is real•
e or fal~e? there are so many disguises of truth
world, so many false appearances of truth,
some sects have declared there is no possibility
· inguisbing truth from fal ehood; and therefore
have abandoned all pretences to knowledge, and
ined strenuou Iy that nothing is to be known.
first men of this humour made themselves fa..
in Greece by the name of Sceptics, that is,
rs : they were also calleJ Academics., borroweir name from academia, their school or place
dy. They taught that all thingi. are uncertain,
h they allowed that some are more probable
others. After these arose the sect of Pyrrho-named from Pyrrho, their master, who would
low any proposition to be more probable than
er; but professed that all things were equally
in. Now all the e men (as an ingenious au ..
expresses it) were rather to be called a sect of
than philosophers, and that censure is just for
reasons. (I.) Because they de term ine<l concern,very proposition thl].t it was uncertain, and be-that as a certain truth, while they professed
was nothing certain, and that nothing could be
mined concerning tn,1th or falsehood ; and thus
very doctrine gave itself the lie. (2.) Because
judged and acted as other men <lid in the comaffairs of life; they would neither run into firi

0

1

158

t:oGic: oit,

nor lfater, though they professed ignorance and
eertainty, whether the one would burn or the
drown them.
There have been some in all ages who haYe
much affected this humour, who dispute
•
every thiag, under pretence that truth has no
tain mark to distinguish it. Let us therefore
quire, what is the general criterion of trnth ?
in order to this, it is proper to consider what ia
reason why we assent to those propositions, w
contain the most certain and indubitable truths,
ns these, the whole is greater than a part; two
three make five.
The only reason why we believe those propo•i •
to be true, is because the i<leas of the subject
predicate appear with so much clearness and str
of evidence to agl'ee to each other, that the
cannot l1elp discernin~ tl1e agreement; nn<l c
doubt of the truth of th em, · but is constrained
judge them true. So when we comµare the ·
of a circle and a triangle, or the ideas of an
and a butterfly, we see such an evident disagree
between them, that we are sure that the butte
not an oyster; nor is a triangle a circle. Tb
nothing but the evidence of the agreement or
agreement between two ideas, that makes us
,or deny the one or the other.
Now it will follo\\ from thence that a clear
distinct perception or full evidence of the
and disngreement of our ideas to one another,
things, is a certain criterion of truth : for sin
minds are of such a make, that where the ev·
is exceeding plain and strong, Wtl cannot wi
our assent, we should then be necessarily e
to believtl falsehood, if complete evidence sho
found in uny propositions that are not true.
surely the God of perfect wisdom, truth and
ness, would never oblige his creatures to l;,e th
e eived ; and therefore he would never have
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us of such a frame as would render it naturally
ible to guard against error.
.
ther cons,quence is naturally derived froin
mer; and that is, that the on1 y reason why
l into a mistake is because we are impatient to
a judgment of things before we have a clear
evident perception of their agreern.e1)t or (lis•
eot; and if we will make haste to judge whil!:
,Wees are obscure and confu!>ed, or before we
ether they agree or disagree, we shall plunge
Ives into perpetual errors. See more on this
in at1 essay on the freedom of will in God
JD&n; publii;hed I 732. Sect. I. p. 13.
, iVh~t is here asserted concerning the' necesof clenr allil distinct ideas, refeTs chi~fly to pm. 'ons which '\l'e form our.selves by our own pow: ._ for propqsitions which we derive from the
· ony of Ci>thers, th~ will be accoltnted for in

IV•

. VIII.-Ofcertain and dubi01.u Propositions, ef
Knowledge and Opinion.
we have found that evidence is the' great
rion and the sure mark of truth; this •leads us
ly to consider propositions according to their
ence; and here we must take notice both of the
ent degrees of evidence, and the different kinds

INCE

't.

1opositions according to their different de"rees
ridence are distinguished into certain and dubi-

•.

ll m&y be objected, that this certainty and uncertainty being on
tbe mind, the division beloniis to propo, itions rather according
degrees of our assent than the degrees of evidence. But it may
answered, that the eviden~e here intended is that which ap., to the mind, and not the mere evidence in the nature of
; besides, (a.a we shall show immediately,) the degree of assent
to be exactly proportionable to the degree of evidence : and
ore the difference is not great, whether propositions be cal. or uo~lllin, accordini to the ~lll'e of eriqence, or of
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Where the evidence of the agreement or dis
ment of the ideas is so strong and plain, that
cannot forbid or delay our assent, the propositio
called certain ; as, every circle hath a centre;
world did not create itself. An assent to such
positions is honoured Y<ith the name of know!
But when there is ally obscurity upon the a
ment or disagreement of the ideas, so that the
does not clearly perceive it, and is not compelled
assent or dissent, then the proposition, in a p
and philosophical sense, is called doubtful or u
tain; as, the planets are inhabited; the souls ofb
are mere matter; the world will not stand a t
sand years longer; Dido built the city of Cartb
&c. Such uncertain propos:tions are called opini
When we consider ourselves as philosophers
searchers of truth, it would be" ell if we always
pended a full judgment or determination about
thing, and made further inquiries, where this p
and perfect evidence is wanting J but we are sop
of ourselves to judge without full evidence, and
some cases the nect:ssity of action in the affairs
life constrains us to ju<lge and determine upon a
leraule degree of evidence, that we vulgarly
those propositions certain, where we have but
little room or reason to doubt of them, though
evidence be not complete or resistless.
Certainty, according to the schools, is distin •
ed into objective and subjective. Objective cer ·
is when the proposition is certainly true in i
and subjective, when we are certain of the truth
it. The one is in things, the otht:r is in our mi
But let it be observed here, that every proposi
in itself is certainly true or certainly false.
though doubtfulness or uncertainty ~eems to
met.hum between certain truth and certain fa)
in our minds, yet there is no such meciium in th'
themselves, no, not even in future events: for
at this time it is certain in itself, that M idsum
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ven years hence will be serene, or it is certain
be cloudy, though we are uncertain and utterly
t what sort of day it will be : this certaint}'
nt futurities is known to God only.
certain or dubious propositions, that is, opiare distingui hed into probable, or improbable.
hen the evidence of any proposition is greater
the evidence of the contrary, then it is a proopinion : where the evidence and arguments
onger on the contrary ide, we call it impro- ·
But while the arguments on either side seem
equnlly strong, and the evidence for and against
proposition appears equal to tl1e mind, then in
on language we call it a doubtful matter. We
call it a dubious or doubtful proposition, when
is no argument on either ide, as ne ·t Chris- ·
ay will be a very sharp frost. And in genern.l
ese propositions are doubtful, wherein we cau ·ve no sufficient mark or evid nee of truth or
ood. In such a case, the mind w l ich is enrchfor truth ought to remain · in a state of doubt or
se, until superior evidence on one !)ide or the
incline the balance of the JU<l~ment, and deter• ·
the probability or certainty to the one ide.
great many propositions, which we generally
·eve or di believe in human affair , or in the scihave very various degrees of evidence, which
arise not to complete certainty, either of truth or
ood. Thus it comes to pass that there are
various an<l almost infinite degr es of probabiand improbability. To a weak probability we
uld give a weak a ·sent; and o. stronger a~sent is
where the evidence is greater, an<l the matter
re probable. If we proportion our assent in all .
gs to the degrees of ev i<lence, we do the utmost .
t human nature is cnpnble of in a rational way to ·
e itself from error.
OS
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IX. Of Sense. Cousciousness, lntelli

Beason, Faith, and Inspiration.
we have considered the evidence of p
sitions in the various degrees of it, we come to
vey the several kinds of evidence, or the diffi
ways whereby truth is let into the mind, and w
produce accordingly several kinds of know!
We shall distribute them iuto these six, viz.
consciousness, intelligence, reason, faith, and ·
ration, and then distinguish the propositions w
are derived from them.
I. The evidence ef sense is when we frame a
position according to the dictate of any of our se
so we judge that gra~s iis green ; that a trumpet '
a pleasant sound ; the fire burns wood ; water is
and iron is hard : for we have seen, heard, or felt
these. It is upon this evidence of sense that
know and believe the daily occurrences in human
and almost all the histories of mankind that are
ten, by eye or ear witnesses, are built upon this p •
ciple.
Under the evidence of sense we do not only•
elude that knowledge which is derived to us by
outwa1 d senses of hearing, seP-ing, feelins-, tas ·
and smelling. but that also which is derived 6
the inward sensations and appetites of hunger, th'
ease, pleasure, pain, weariness, rest, &c. and
those things which belong to the body; as, h
is a painful appetite; light is pleasant; rest is s
to the weary limbs.
Propositions which are built on this evidence,
be named sensible propositions, or the dictates
sense.
II. As we learn what belongs to the body by
evidence of sense, so we learn what belongs to
soul by an inward consciousness, which may be
led a sort of internal feeling, or spiritual sen ·
of what passes iu the mind ; as, I think before
!peak; I desire large knowledge; I suspect my
AFTER
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ce; I studied hard to-day; my conscience bears
of my sincerity: my soul hates vain thoughts;
· an uneasy passi<;>n; long meditation on one
is tiresome.
it appears that we obtain the knowledge of
titude of propositions, as well as of single ideas,
two principles which Mr. Locke calls senand reflection : one of them is a sort of coness of what affects the body, and the other ii
iom,ness of what passes in the mind.
positions which are built on this internal con•
ess, have yet no particular or distinguishing
assigned to them.
Intelligence relates chiefly to those abstractecl
itions which carry their own evidence with
and admit no doubt about them. Our percepof this self-evidence in any proposition is called
· nee. It is our knowl".!dge of those first prinof truth which are (as it were) wrou,:tht into
ry nature and make of our mind ; they are so
t in themselves to every man who attends to
that they need no proof. It is the prerogative
peculiar excellence of these propositions, that
can &carce ever be proved or denied : they canily bt: proved, became there is nothing supto be more clear or certain, from which an
ent may be drawn to prove them. They canwell be denied, because their own evidence is so
and convincin~ that as soon as the terms are
tood the mind necessarily assents; such are
whatsoever acteth hath a being; nothing bas
perlies ; a part is le~s than the whole ; nothing
t be the cau:;e of itself.
ese propositions are called axioms, or maxims,
principles; these are the very foundations of
proved knowledge and reasonings, and 011 this
t these have been thought to be inuate pro'tious, or truths born with us.
e suppose that a great part of the knowledge
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of angels and human souls in the separate state is•
tained in this manner, viz. by such an immediate
view of things in their own nature, which' is callei
intuition.
IV. 'Reasoning is the next sort of evidence, and
that is when one truth is inferred or drawn from othen
by natural and just methods of argument: as, I
there be much light at rui<lnight, I infer, it proceeds
from the moon, because the sun is under the earth •
If I see a cottnge in a forest, I conclude some ma
has been there and built it. Or when I survey the
l1eavens and earth, this gives evidence to my reasoa,
th at th ere is a Go<l who made them.
The propositions which I b lieve upon this kind al
evidence, are calleJ conclusions, or rational truth.,
and the knowledge that we gain this way is properlJ
called science.
Yet let it be noted, that the word science is usuallJ
applied to a whole body of regular or methodical~
scrvations or propositions, which learned men ha11
formed concerning any subject of speculation, de~
ing one truth from another by a train of argumeuta.
If this knowledge chiefly directs our practice, it it
usually called an art. And this is the most remarable dil.tinction between an art and a science, viz. tlie
one refers chiefly to practice, the other to specula ·
Natural philosophy, or physic, and ontology, &II
sciences ; logic and rhetoric are called arts; hll
mathematics include both art and science; for th-,
have much of speculation and much of practice ii
them.
Observe here, that when the evidence of a propo5ition derived from sense, consciousness, intelligena,
or reason, is firm and indubitable, it produce!! suck
assent as we call a natural certainty.
V. When we derive the evidence of any pro
tion from the testimony of others, it is called
• Note. Since this work was written, we have so many appe81'111C9
•f Ule a\lroca bortalia Iii reduce• Ulit infertuce onl7 to a probability,
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of faith ; and this is a large part of our

edge. Ten thousand things there are which
· ve merely upon the authority or credit of
who have spoken or written of them. It is by
'dence that we kno•v there is such a country
· a, and there was such a man as Cicero who
in Rome. It is by this that most of the transin human life are managed: we know our pa•
and our kindred by this means, we know th.and laws of our present governors, rui well
gs that are at a vast distance from us in fonations, or in ancient ages.
rding as the persons that inform us of atty
are many or few, or more or less wise, and
, and credible, so our faith is more or less
or wavering, and the pr~position believed is
certain or doubtful; but in matters of faith, an,
· g great probability is called a moral certainty.
is generally distinguished into divine and hanot witl:r regard to the propositions that are
, but with regard to the testimony upon whieh
· ve them. When God reveals any thing to
·• gives us the evidence of divine faith; but
only acquaints us with, produces a human
In us; the one, being built upon the word of
arises but to moral certainty; but the other be•
ded on the word of God, arises to an abso~
infallible assurance, so far as we understand
ning of this word. This is called superna•
certainty.
sitions which we believe upon the evidence
an testimony, are called narratives, relations,
historical observations, &c. : but such as
'lt on divine testimony, are termed matters of
'on; and if they are of great importance in
n, they are called articles of faith.
are some propositions or parts of knowwhich are said to be derived from observation
erience, that is, experience in ourselves, and
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the observation• we hnve made on other persons #fl
things; uut these are made up of some of the f,
springs of knowledge joined together, viz. sense,
sciousnesi., r ason, foitl1, &c. and therefore are
1·eckoned a distinct kind of evidence.
VI. InSJJiration is a sort of evidence distinct ftwa
all the former, and that is when such an overpo
ing impression of any proposition is mude upon
mind by God himself, that gives a convincing ...
indubitable evi<lence of the truth and divinity of·
so were the ptophets and the apostles inspired•.
Sometimes God may Lave been pleased to
use of the outward seusei;, or the inward worki1115
the imaginatim1, of dreams, apparitions, visioes
voioes, or 1>eq_soninll, <.>r perhaps h\lman nar
to convey divine trµth s to the mind of th~ pro
but none of these would be s~fficient to deserv.e
name of inspiration, without Q. ~operior or
ligbt and power attending them.
This sort of evidence hi also very distinct
what we usually call divine faith ; for every
Christian exercises divine faith when he believe,
propojitioo which G9d lUJs revel\led in the bi\>je.
on this a<.cou.nt, because God has said it, tho
was by 11 train of reasouings that he was led to
lieve that this is tl1e word of God : wheri::as in
case of 'inspiration, the prophet not 9nly ex
divine faith, in believing what God reveals, but
under a :mperior heavenly impression, light and
clence, whereuy he is assured that Go<l reveals·
This is the most emineut kind of supernatural
tainty.
TJ1ough persons might be ossured of their <>Wit
epiration by :,;om~ peculiar und inexpressible
sciousness of this divine inspiration and evideDCI
their own spirits, yet it is hard to make out tbia
spiration to others, and to convince them of it,
cept by some antecedent or consequent prophe ·
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or some public appearances more than bupropositions which are attained by this sort of
ence are called inspired tmtlis. This is divine
atiou at fil'st hand·, and the dictate!! of Ood in
immediate manner, of which theological writers
nrse at large; but since it belongs only to a few
urites of heaven to be inspired, and not the bulk
nkind, it is not necessary to speak more of it
I treatise of logic, which is designed for the geneimprovement of human reason.
e various kinds of evidence upon which we beany proposition, afford us these three remarks:
Remark. The same proposition may be known
II by different kinds of evidence: that the whole
r than a part is known by out senses, and it is
n by the self-evidence of the thing t<> our mind.
God created the heavens and the earth is known
by re11son, and is known also by divine tcstior faith.
Remark. Among those various kinds of evisome are generally stronger than others in
own nature, and give a better ground for cer. Inward consciousness and intelligence, as
u divine faith and inspfration, usually carry much
force with them than seuse or human faith,
are often fallible; though there are instances
in human faith,sense, and reasoning, lay a founn also for complete assurance, and leave no room
-doubt.
on in its own nature would always lead us inshe trpth in matters within its compass, if it were
aright, or it would require us to sm,pend our
ent where there is wa11t of evidence. Hut it is
.-Ioth, precipitancy, sense, passion, and many
things, that lead our reason astr.iy in this deate and imperfect estate: hence it comes to pasi
we are guilty of so many errors in rea&oning, es-

. y about di vine things, because ow· reason eithe1·
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is busy 1:o inquire, and resolved to determine
matters that are above our present reach ; or
we mingle many prt:judices and secret influen
sense, fancy, passion, inclimition, &c. with our
ercises of rea!.on, and judge and determine ac
to these irregular influences.
Divine faith would never admit of any controv
•Or doubting.s, if we wete but assured that God
spoken, and that we rigl1tly understood his me
III. Remark. The greatest evidence and c
of any proposition does not depend upon the va
of the ways or kinds of evidence whereby it is k
but rather upon the strength and degree of evi
and the clearness of that light in or by wliich it
pears to the mind. For a proposition that is
only one way may be much more certain, .and
stronger evidence, than another that is supp
be known many ways. Therefore these proposif
nothing has no properties, nothing cannot mak
self, which are known only by intelligence, are
surer and truer than this proposition, the rai
bas real and inherent colours in it, or than this,
sun rolls round the earth ; though we seem to
both these 18.bt by our senses, and by the co .
testimony of our neighbo.urs. .So any propo
that is clearly eYident to .our conscio.usness of d.
faith, is much more certain to us than a thou
others that have only the evidence of feeble and
iscure sensation&, of more probable reasonings
doubtful arguments, or the witness of fallible
Qr even though all these should join together.

""'-------~
CHAP. III.

THE SPRINGS OF FALSE JUDGMENT, OR
'.J.'RINE OF Pl,l.EJUDlCES.
INTRODUCTION,

IN the end of the forogoing chapter we have
veyed the severnl sorts of evidence, on whieb
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our assent to propositions. These are indeed
general grounds upon which we form our jud~concerning things. What remains in this
part of logic is to point out the several springi
causes of our mistakes in judging, and to lay
some rules by which we should conduct ourin passing a judgment of ~very thing that is
sed to us.
nfess many things which will be mentioned in
following chapters might be as well referred to
diird part of logic, where we shall treat of rea••
and argument; for most of our false judgseem to include a secret bad reasoning in them;
while we show the springs of error, and the
of true judgment, we do at the same time diswhich arguments are fallacious, which reasonare weak, and which are just and strong. Yet
this is usually c.alled a judging ill, or judging
I thin~ we may, without a_ny impropriety, treat
here; and this will lay a surer foundation for
of ratiocin'ation and argument.
h judgments are called prejudices, and so are
rings of them. This word in common life sigan ill opinion which we have conceived of some
person, or some injury done to him. But when
the word in matters of science, it signifies a
ent that is formed concerning any person or
before sufficient examination ; and generally
pose it to mean a false judgment or mistake;
it is an opinion taken up without solid reait, or an assent given to a proposition before
have just evidence ot the truth of it, though the
itself may happen to he true.
113etimes these rash judgments are called preions; whereby is meant, that some particular
ha.'i possessed the mind, and engaged the
without sufficient search or evidence of the

of it.
e is a vast variety of these prejudices aud
p

no
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prepossessions "'·hich attend mnnkind in every
and condition of life ; they lay the foundations of
ny an error, nnd many an unhappy practice, both,
the affairs of r~ligion, ,ind in our civil ooncerom
as well as in matters of ltlarning. It is nece.ssary
a man who pur&ues truth to inquire info those sp ·
of error, that as far 11s possible he may .rid hi
of old prejudices, and watch hourly against new
The number of them is so great, and they
ipterwoven with each other, as well as with the
ers of human nature, that it is sometimes hard
distinguish them apart; yet, for method's sake,
shall reduce them to these four gene1al heads,
prejudices arising from things, or from words,
ourselves, or from other persons; and after the
scription of each prejudice, we .sb11ll propos!'l 011&
more ways of curing it,
SECT.

!.-Prejudices arisingfrom Things.

first sort of prejudices are those which
from the things themselves about which we j
But here let it be observed that there is noth ·
the nature of things that will necessarily lead us
error, if we do but use our reason aright, and
hold our judgnie.nt tiU there appear sufficient
dence of ihem. }lut since we are so unhappily p
to take advanuise of every doubtful appearance
, circumstance of things, to form a wroug jud
and plunge ourselves into mistake, therefore it
pr~pt;r to.consider what there is in the things
sel~es1tlu\t may ocassion our errors.
:I. The obscurity ef some truths, and tlze di
,sea,rclzing them out, is one occasion of rash and
.taken judgment.
Some truths are difficult, because they lie r
·frpm the first principles of knowledge, and w
1ong chain of argument to come at them: such
many of the deep things of algebrn and geo
·THE
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some of the theorems and problems of most
of the mathematic,, _ Many things · nlso io na•
philosophy are dal'k and intri'cnte upon t11is act, because we cannot come at any certain knowof them. without the -labour of many and clilli- ·
as well as chargeable experiments.
re are other tl'tlths whicI1 have g1·eat darkness •
them, because we have no proper means or meto come at the knowledge of them. Thou~h
age we have found out many or tbe deep thingi
nature by the assistance of glasses and other inents; yet we are not hitherto arrived at any
ient matters to discover the -shape of those little
'clcs of matter which distinguish the various vnrs, odom-sf , and colours of bodies; 11or to find
sort of atoma compose · liquid., or so!ids, an<l
~nguish woad, minerals, metals, glass, stones, &c.
e is a darkness also lies upon the actions of the
ctual or angelical wo1·ld; their manners of sulice and agency, the powPr of spirits to move
• 1 and the union of our souls with this animal
of ours, are much unknown to us on this ac•
w in many of these cases, a great part of manis not content to be entirely ignorant; but they
a' choose to form 1·ash and hasty judgment, to
at things without just evidence, to believe someconceniing them before they can know them,
reby they fall into error,
is sort of prejudice, as well· a, most others, is
by patience and diligence in iuquiry and rcag, and a suspension of judgmeut, till we have
·
some proper mediums of knowledge, and
we see sufficient evidence of the trutb.
The appearance ef things in a disguise, is anoepring of prejudice or rash judgment. The out- -0f thing which first strikes us, is oftentimes dift from their inward nature, and we are tempted
suddenly according to outward appearances.
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If a picture is daubed with many bright and g
colours, the vulgar eye admires it as an exc
piece; "hereas the same person judges very con
tuously of some admirable design sketched out
with a black pencil on a coarse paper, though h1,
hand of Raphael. So the scholar spies the na
a new book in public ne"' spnpers, he is charmed
the title, he purchases it, he reads with huge ex
ti<1 ns, and finds it all trash and impertinence:
a prejudice derived from the appearance: we are
ready to judge that volume valuable which had
good a frontispiece. The large hend of encomi
and swelling words of assurance that are besto
on quack-medicines in public advertisements, t
many a reader to judge tl1em infallible, and to
the pills or the plnister with vast hope, and freq
disappointment.
We are tempted to form our judgment of pe
as well as things by these outward appearan
Where there is wealth, equipage and splendour,
are ready to call that man happy, but we see not
vexing disquietudes of his soul: and when we s
person, in ragged garments, we form a despi
opinion of him too suddenly; we can hardly
him either happy or wise, our judgment is so str
ly biassed by outward and sensible things. It
through the power of thi~ prejudi<ie that the Jews
jected our blessed Saviour: they could not s
themselves to believe that the man who appea
the son of a carpenter, was also the Son of G
And because St. Paul was of a little stature, a
presence, and his voice contemptible, some ot
Corinthians were tempted to doubt whether he
inspired or no.
This prejudice is cured by a longer acquain
with the world, and a just observation that things
sometimis better and sometimes worse tha? they
pear to be. We ought therefore to restram our
cessive forwardness to form our opinion of pe
,

.
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things before we have opportunity to search into
more perfectly. Remember that a grey beard
not make a philosopher; all is not gold that
; and a rough diamond may be worth an im..
sum.
L .A mixture qfdifferent gualities in tke same tking
her temptation to judge amiss. We are ready
carried away by that quality which strikes the
or the strongest impressions upon us, and we
of the whole object according to that quality,
rdless of all the rest: or sometimes we colow.,
all the other qualities with that one tinctuu,
er itt be bad or good.
en we have ju!,t reason to admire a man for\'Htues, we are sometimes inclined, not only to
t his weaknesses, but eY1tl\ to put a good collpOD them, and to think them amiable. When
a book that has many excellent truths in it,
divine sentiments, we are tempted to approve
only that whole book, bul even all the writings
author. When a poet, an orator, or a painthas performed admirably in several illustrious
· we sometimes also admh·e his very errors, we
ke his blunders for beauties, and are· so ignorfond as to copy after them.
is thi!, prejudice that has rendered so many
scholars perfect bigots, and inclined them to
Homer or Horace, Livy or Cieero, in all
mistakes, and vindicate all the follies of tlteir
ite author. It is this that tempts some great
to support the sayings of almost all the an- •
lither;; of the church, au<l admire them in thei'r
reveries.
the other hand, if an author has professed
etical sentiments in religion, we throw our scorn
every thing he writes, we <lespise even his cri..
or mathematical le arning~ and will hardly allow .
common sense. If a poem has some blemishes
there is a ~et of' false critics who decry it uniy, a1111 will a llo w no beuuties there.
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This sort of prejudice is relieved by learning.
distinguish things well, and not to judge in the l
There is scarce any thing in the world of nature
art, in the world of morality or religion, that is
fectly uniform. There is a mixture of wisdom
folly, vice and virtue, good and evil, both in
and things. We should remember that some
t.ons have great wit, and little judgment; others
judicious, but not witty. Some are good humo
without compliment; others have all the form
of complaisance, but no good humour. We
to know that one man may be vicious and le
while another has virtue without learning.
many a man thinks admirahly well who has a
utterance; while others have a charming manner
speech, but their thoughts are trifling and im
nent. Some are good neigbours, and ccurteous
charitable toward men, who have no piety to
God; others are truly religious, but of morose n
ral tempers. Some excellent sayings are found
very silly books, and so~e silly thoughts appee
books of value. We should neither praise nor
praise by wholesale, but separate the good from.
evil, and judge of them apart; the accuracy
~oo~ judgment consists much in making such
tmctions.
Yet let it be noted too, that in common dis
we usually denominate persons and things acco
to the major part of their character. He is to
called a wise man who has but few follies: be·
good philosopner who knows much of nature,
tor the most part reasons well iu matters of hu
~cience : and that book should be esteemed well
ten, which has much more of good sense in it th
has of impertinence.
IV. Though a thing be uniform in its own na
yet the different lights iu which it may be pl
and the different views in which it appears to us,
be ready to excite in us mistaken judgments con
ing it. Let an erect cone be placed in a hor·
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~ at a great distance from the eye, and it ap•

a plain triangle ; but we shall judge that very
to be nothing but a flat circle, if its base be obtowards us. Set a common round plate a
e obliquely before our eyes afar off, and we shall
it an oval figure; but if the very edge of it be
towar<ls us, we shall take it for a strait line.
when we view the several folds of changeable
we pronounce this part re<l, and that yellow,
e of its different position to the light, though
tilk laid smooth in one light appears all of one
r.
hen we survey the miseries of mankin<l, and
k of the sorrows of millions, both on ea1·th and
hell, the divine government has a terrible aspect,
we may be tempted to think hardly even of God
If: but if we view the profusion of his bounty
grace amongst his creatures on earth, or the
y spirits in heaven, we shall have so exalted an
of his goodness as to forget his vengeance. Some
dwell entirely upon the promises of his gospel,
think him all mercy : others, under a melanchome, dwell upon his terrors au<l his threatenings,
are overwhelmed with the thought of his severity
vengeance, as though there were no mercy in

.

!fhe true method of deliverin!{ ourselves from this
udice is to view a thing on all sides, to compare

the ,·arious appearances of the same thing \\1th
another, and let each of them have its full
· t in the balance of our judgment, before we
y determine our opinion. It was by this means
the modern astronomers came to find out that
planet Saturn hath a flat broad circle round its
, which is called its ring, by observing the dit'..
t appearances as a narrow or u broader Ol'al, or
· is sometimes seems to be a strait line, in tho
ent parts of its twenty-nine years revolution
ugh the ecliptic. Aud if we take the same just
religious ~urvey of the ireat and bless~d God
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in all the discoveries of his vengeance and his m
we shall at last conclude him to be both ju:ot
goo<l.
V. The casual association of many of our idea,,
comes the spring of another prejudice or rash j
ment, to which we are sometimes exposed.
our younger years we have taken medicines that
been nauseous, when any medicine whatsoever is
ter""nrd proposed to us under sickness, we imm
ntely judge it nauseous: our fancy has so el
ly joined these ideas together, that we know not
to separate them: then the stomach feels the <lis
nnd perhaps refuses the only drng that can pre
life. So a child who has been let blood, joins
ideas of pain and the urgeon together, that he
the sight of the surgeon, because he thiuks of
pain : or if he has drank a bitter potion, he
ceives a bitter idea of the cup which held it,
will drink nothing out of that cup.
It is for the same reason that the bulk of the
mon people are so superstitiously fond of the Ps
translated by Hopkins and Stemhold, and t
them sacred and divine, because they have been
for more than an hundred years bound up in
same covers with our bibles.
The best relief against this prejudice of ass
tion, is to con':lider whether there be any natural
necessary connection between those ideas which
cy, custom or chance, hath thus joined together;
if nature 1111.s not joined them, let our judgment
rect the folly of our imagjnation, and separate
ideas again.
SECT.

II.-Pnjudices arising.f,.om Words,

Oun ideas and wo rds are so li nked together,
while we judge of things nccording to words,
are led into several mistakes. These mav he{!"
buted under two general heads, viz. such as
from single words or phrases, or such ns arise f
words joined iu speech, and composing a discou

THE RIGHT USE OJ' !I.EASON,
17'7
l, The most eminent and remarkable errors of

first kind are these three. ( 1.) When our words
insignificant, and have no ideas; as when the
"cal divines talk of the prayer of silence, the su..
atural and pa&Sive night of the soul, the vacuity
powers, the suspension of all thoughts; or (2.)
our words are equivocal, an<l signify two or
ideas, as the words law, light, flesh, spirit, righ ..
ess, and many other terms in scripture; or (3.)
two or three words are synonymous and si~one idea, as regeneration and new crt'ation m
new testament; both which mean only a change
heart from sin to holiness; or as the elector of
n an:l bishop of Cologn are two titles of the
man.
ese kinds of phrases are tf1e occasions of various
es : but none so unhappy as those in theology:
both words without ideas, as well as synonymous
«iuivocal words have been used and abused by
humours, passions, interests, or by the real ignoand weakness of men, to beget terrible contests
g Christians.
t to relieve us under all those dangers, and to
ve those sorts of prejudices which arise from
words or phra~es, I must remit the reader to
I. Chap. 4, where I have treated about words,
to those directions which l have given concerning
definition of names, Part I. Chap. 6. sect. 3.
1. There is another sort of false judgments or
es which we are exposed to by words ; and
is when they are joined in speech, and compose
urse; and here we are in danger two ways.
lfhe one is when a man writes good sense, or
much to the purpose,'but he has not a happy
engaging manner of expression. Perhaps he
coarse and vulgar words, or old, obsolete, and
ionable language, or terms and phrases that
t'toreign, latinized, scholastic, very uncommon, and
to be understood : and this is still worse, if his
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sentences are long an<l intricrtte, or the sound of
harsh a?<l gmting to the ear. All these indeed
<lefects m style, and lead some nice and unthi
I1earers or readers into an ill opinion of aU that
A person speab OT writes.
Many an excellent
Course of our forefathers has had abundance of
fempt cast upon it by our modern pretenders to
for ,Yant of their distinguishing between the lan
and tha ideas.
• On the other hand, when a man of eloquences
or writes upon any subject, we are too ready to
into his sentiments, being sweetly and insen
drawn by the smootlmess of his harangue, and,
pathetic power of hiS' lanp;ua~e. Rhetoric will
nish every error so that it shall appear in the
of trutl,1 and put such ornaments. upon vice,
make it look like virtue : it is an art of wond
nnd extensive influence : it often conceals, obs
or overwhelms the truth, and places someti
gross falsehood in a most alluring light. The
cency of action, the musio of the voice, the bar
of the periods, the heauty of the style, and all
engaging airs of the speaker, have often ch
the hearers into error, and persuaded them to n
whatsoever is proposed in so ngreeable a m
A large assembly stands exposed at once to the
of these prejudices, 11nd imbibes them all. So c·
and Demosthenes made the Romans and the A
ans believe almost whatsoever they pleased.
The best defence against both these dangers, •
)earn the skill (as much as possible) of separating
thoughts and ideas from words and phrases, to j
of the things in their own natures, and in their
tural or just relation to one another, abst
from the use of language, and to maintain a
and obstinate resolution, to hearken to nothing
truthl in whatsoever style or dress it appears.
Then we shall hear a sermon of pious and
sentiments with esteem and reverence, though
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her has but an unpolished style, and many deThen we 1,hall
t and disregal'd all the flattering insinuations
by the orator woul<l wake way fol' his own se.nti·to take poss.ession of out' s.ouls, if he has not
and instructive sense equal to his language,
is a happy t;a.lent, when it is rightly employ-excite the passions to the practice of virtue and
: but to speak propedy, this art bath nothing
in the se~rch after truth.,

in the manner of his deli,·ery.

£CT.

1II.-;Prtj-,.edices arisingfrom ourselves.

THER

words nor things would so often lead us

from truth, if we had not within ourselves such

of error as these that follow.
any errors are derived from our we:lkness of
, and incapacity to judge of things in our infant
These are called the prejudices of infancy.
bme early mistakes about the common objects
surround us, and the common affairs of life;
y the nurse is our best friend, because childive from their n.urses their foO(l and other
·ences of life. We judge that boo~s are Yf!'fY
ant .things, because perhaps we have been
to ther.n by the scourge. We judge also that
touches the distant hills, because we cannot
ourselves better in childhood. We believe
s are not risen till the sun is set, because we
see them by day. But some of theJ,e errors
teem to be derived from the next spring.
way to cure tbe prejudices of inf1c1ncy is to
isb, as far as we can, which are those opiwhich we framed in perfect chil<lhood, to re•
r that at that time our reason wai; incapable
ing a right Judgment, and to bring these pros again to be examined at the bar of n11J.tu,:e
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II. Our senses give us many a false informati°'
This is ~
led the prejudice of sense, as when we suppose the
sun and moon to be flat bodies, and to be but a few
inches broad, because they appear so to the eye.Sense inclines us to judge that air has no weight,
becauM! we do not feel it press heavy upon us; and:
we judge also by our senses that cold and beat, sweet
and sour, r,ed and blue, &c. are such real propertiet
in the objects themselves, and exactly like those
sensations which they excite in us.
Note. Those mistakes of this sort which all man,,
kind drop and lose in their advancing age, are called
mere prejudices of infancy, but those which abide
with the vulgar part of the work!, and generally w.ida
all men, till learning and philosophy cure tbem, mors
properly attain the name of prejudices of sense.
These prejudices are to be removed several ways.
(1.) By the assistance of one sense we cure them·
takes of another, as wl1en a stick thrust into the w•
ter seems crooked, we are prevented from judging ·
to be really so in itself, for when we take it out o
the water, both our sight {l.nd oµr feeling agree
determine it to be strait. (i.) The exercise of our
reason, and an application .to mathematical and p ·
losophical studies, cures many other prej1,1dices
sense, both with relation to the heavenly, and ear
bodies. (3.) We should remember that our sen
have often deceived us in various instances,
t,hcy give but a confused and imperfect represen
tion of thin(J's in many cases, that tJ1ey often rep11
sent falsely iliose very objects to which they se.em to
&uited, such as the shape, motion, size and situati(>n,
of gross bodies, if they are but placed at a dist
from us; and as for the minute particles of wh'
bodies are composed, our senses cannot <listing ·
them. (t,,) We should remember also, that a
prime and original design of our senses, is to info
us what various relations the bodies that are rou

c,f things, and tempt us to judge ami_ss.
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.about us bear to our own animal body, and to give
as notice what is pleasant and useful, or what is pain•
fal and injurious to us; but they are not sufficient
dthemselves to lead us into a philosophical acquainJance with the inward nature of things. It must be
confessed it is 0y the assistance of the eye, and the
• especially (which are called the senses of discipline) that our minds are furnished with various parts
cl kno\\ledge, by reading, hearing, and observing
things divine and human; yet reason ought always
to accompany the exercise of our senses whenever
we would form a just judgment of things proposed
to our inquiry.
Here it is proper to observe also, that as the weakams of reason in our infancy, and the dictatei of our
tenses, sometimes in advancing years, lead the wiser
part of mankind astray from truth ; so the meaner
part& of our species, persons whose genius is very_
low, whose judgment is always weak, who are ever
indulging the dictates of sense and humour, are but
diildren of a larger size, they stand exposed to ever•
luting mistakes in life, and live and die in the midst
of prejudices.
·
III. Imagin-ition is another fruitful spring of false
judgments. Our imagination is nothing else but the
arious appearances of our sensible ideas in the brain,
where the soul frequently works in uniting, disjoiniog, multiplying, magQifying, diminishing, and alter..
g the several shapes, colours, sounds, motions,
words, and thing that have been communicated to
s by the outward organs of sense. It is no wonder
erefore if fancy leads us into many mistakes, for it
but sense at second-hand. Whatever is strongly
impressed upon the imagination some persons believe
to be trne. Some will chuse a particular number in
a lottery, or lay a large wager on a iingle chance of
t dye, and doubt not of success, because their fancy
els so powerful an impression, and assures them it
ill be prosperou&, A thousand pretended prophe...
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,cies and inspirations and all the ·frensks of,enthusi.asm have been derived from this spring. Dreams
are nothing else but the deceptions-of fancy : a .deli.rium is but a short wildness of the imagination;
.and a settled irregularity of fancy is distraction and
madness.
One way to gain a victory over this unruly faculty,
is to set a watch upon it perpetually, and to bridle it
in all its extravagancies ; never to believe any thing
merely ·because tancy dictates it, any more than I
would believe a midnight dream, nor to trust fancy
any further than it i.s attended with severe reason. It
is a very useful and entertaining power of human nature in matters ·of illusti:ation, persuasion, oratory,
poesy, wit, conversation, &c. but in the calm inquiry
after truth and final judgment of-things, fancy should
;retire, and stand aside, unless it be .called in to ex•
plain or illustrate a difficult point by a similitude.
Another method of deliverance from these preju•
dices of fancy, is to compare the ideas that arise in
our imaginations with the real nature of things, as
often as we have occasion to judge concerning them:
and let calm and sedate reason govern and determine
,· our opinions, though fancy should show never so
great a reluctance. Fancy i~ the inferior faculty,
and it ought to obey.
IV. The various passions or affections of the mind
are numerous .p.nd endless sp1·ings of prejudice.They disguise every object they converse with, and
put their own colours upon it, and thus lead the
judgment astray from truth. It is love that mak•
the mother think her own child the fairest, and will
sometimes persuade us that a blemish is a beauty,
Hope and desire make an hour of delay seem as
long as two or three hours; hope inclines us to think
there is nothing too difficult to be attempted; despair
tells us that a brave attempt is mere rashness, and
\hat every difficulty is unsurmountable. Fear makes
.us imagine that a bush shaken with the wind lias
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savage beast in it, and multiplies the dangers ·
attend our path: but still there • iS' a more uneffect of fear when it keeps millions of souls
very to the enors of an established religion :
could persuade the wise men and philosophers
Popish country to believe the grossest absurdiief the · Roman church, but the fear of torture or ·
,. the galleys 01· the inquisition? Sorrow and
choly tempt us to think our circumstances much
dismal than they arc, that we may have some
for mourning: and en,·y represents the con- ·
of om neighbour better than it is, that there •
t be some pretence for her own vexation and ,
iness. . Ange1· and wrath and revenge, and all •
hateful passions, excite i11 us for worse ideas ol'
than they deserve, and pcrsu:.ule us to beli~ve
at is ill of them. A detail of the evil influence
affections of tho mind upon our judgment,
make a large volume.
e cure of these prejudices is attained by a con- •
je!t.lousy of ourselves, and watchfulness over
passions, that they may never interpose when we
called to pass a judgment of any thing; and when
affections are warmly engaged, let us abstain
judging. It w,puld be also of great use to us •
form our deliberate judgments of persons and
in the calmest and serenest hours of life, when
passions of nature are all silent, and the mind
sits most perfect composure: and these judgso formed should be treasured up in the mind
we might have recourse to them in hours of.
• See many more sentiments and directions
· 1g to this subject in my doctrine of the passions. •
• ThP. fondness we have for SELF, and the relawhich other persons and things have to ourfurnish us with another long rank of prejudices.
indeed might be reduced to a passion of self- •
; but it is so copious an head that I choose to
it as a distinct spring offalse judgments.
e,

,v
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are generally ready to fancy every thing of our
ha11 something peculiarly valuable in it, when ·
there is no other reason, but because it is our
Were we born amon~ the gardens of Italy, the
of Switzer land 1 or the ice and snows of Russia
Sweden, still we should imagine peculiar exce1l
in our native land. We conceive a good idea
the town and village where we first breathed,
think the better of a man for being born neal'
We entertain the best opinion of the persons of
own party, and easily believe evil reports of pe
of a different sect or faction. Our own sex, our
dred, our houses, and our very names, seem to
5omething good and desirable in them. We
ready to mingle all these with ourselves, and ca
bear to have others think meanly of them.
So good an opinion we have of our own sentim
and practices, that it is ver1 difficult to believe w
a reprover says of our conduct; and we are as r
to assent to all the language of flattery. We set
our own opinions in religion and philosophy as
tests of orthodoxy and truth ; and we are prone
judge every practice of other men either a duty
crime, which we think would be a crime or ad
.in us, though their circumstance, are vastly d'
from our own. Thii humour prevails sometime,
such a degree, that we would make our own
and inclinations the standard by which to judge
every di11h of meat that is set upon the table, e
book in a library, every employment, study,
business of life, as well as every recreation.
It is from thh, evil principle of setting up self
a model what other men ought to be, that the
christian spirit of imposition and persecution hacl
original: though there is no more reason for it
there was for the practice of that tyrant, who b
a bed fit for his own size was reported to st
men of low stature upon the rack, tiJl they
drawn out to the length of his bed; and some
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that he cut off the legs of any whom he found
g for it.
ii also from a principle near a-kin to this that
nert and strain the writings of many venerable
i:s, and especially the sacred books of scripture,
e them speak our own sense. Through the
ce which our own schemes or hypotheses have
the mind, we sometimes become so sharpas to find these schemes in those places of
t>, where the holy writers never thought of
nor the holy spirit intended them. At other
this prejudice brings such a dimness upon the
that we cannot read any thing that opposes our
acheme, though it be written as with sun-beams,
ill the plainest language; and perhaps we are in .
r in such a case of winking a little against the..
ought to bring our minds free, unbiassed and,
ble, to learn our religion from the word of
• but we have generally formed all the lesser as
as the greater points of religion beforehand, and
we read the prophets and apostles, on1y to perthem to confirm our own opinions. Were it
r this influence of self, and a bigotry to our
tenets, we could hardly imagine that so many,
e, absurd; inconsistent, wickE>d, mischievous~
oody principles should pretend to support and.
themselves by the gospel of Christ.
ery learned critic has his own hypothesis ; and .
common text be not favourable to his opinion
·ous lection shall be made authentic. The text
be supposed to be defective or redW1clant, and
~nse of it shall be literal or metaphorical, ac. g as it best supports his own scheme. Whole
ers or books shall be added or left out of the
canon, or be turned into parables by this in- •
e. Luther knew uot wdl how to reconcile the
e of St. James to tlte doctdne of justification
'th alone, and so he could not allow it to be di•

.
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vine. The Papists bring all the Apocrypha into
bible, aud stamp divinity upon it ; for they can
cy purgatory is there, and there find prayers for
dead. But they leave out the secona comman
because it forbids the worshipping of images.
thers suppose the Mosaic history of the creation
the fall of man to be oriental ornaments, or a
allegory, because the literal sense of those
chapters of Genesis do not agree with their th
Even an honest plain-hearted and unlearned C
tian is ready to find something in every chap
the bible to countenance his own private sentim
but he loves those chapters best which speak his
opinions plainest; this is a prejudice that sticks
close to our natures ; the scholar is infested wi
daily, and the mechanic is not free.
Self has yet a farther and a pernicious infl
upon our understandings, and is an unhappy
in the search after truth. When our own inclin
or our ease, our honour or our profit, tempt us to
practice of any thing of suspected lawfulness, how
we strain our thoughts to find arguments for it,
persuade ourselves it is lawful? We colour over
quity and sinful compliance with the names of v·
and innocence, or at least of constraint and nee
All the different and opposite sentiments and pr
of mankind are too much influenced by this
bribery, and give too just occasion for satirical
ers to say that self-interest governs all mankind.
When the judge had awarded the damages
person into whose field a neighbour's oxen
broke, it is rf>ported that he reversed his own
tence, when he heard that the oxen which had
this mischief were bis own. Whether this be a
tory or a parable, it is still a just representati
the wretched influence of self to corrupt the j ·
ment.
One way to amend this prejudice is to thrust
80 far out of the question, that it may have no
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of influence when·soever we are called to judge
consider of the naked nature, truth and justice
~ings. In matters of equity .between man and
our Saviour has taught us an effectual meana
rding aiainst this prejudice, and that is to put
neighbour in the place of myself, and myself in
place of my neighbour, rather than be bribed by
corrupt princ4ple of self-love to do injury to our
bours. Thence arises that golden rule of dealwith others as we would have others do with us.
the judgment of truth and falsehood, right and
g, good and evil, we ought to consider that eveman has a self as well as we ; and that the tastes,
'ons, iuclinations, and interests of different men
very different, and often contrary, and they diecontrary things : unless therefore all manner of
nt and contrary propositions could he true at
, self can never be a just test or standard of truth
falsehood, good and evil.
I. .The tempers, humours, and peculiar turns ef
•ind, whether they be natural or acquired, have
t influence upon our judgment, and become
occasion of many mistakes. Let us survey a few
em·.
I,) Some persons are of an easy and credulous
r, while others are perpetually discovering a
"t of contradiction.
e credulous man is ready to receive every thing
truth, that has but a shadow of evidence: every
book that he reads, and every ingenious man
whom he converses, has power enough to draw
into the sentiments of the speaker or writer.bas so much complaisance i11 him, or weakness
toul, that he is ready to resign his own opinion
che first objection which he hears, and to receive
sentiments of another that are asserted with a
"tive air and much assurance. Thus he is under
• d of necessity, through the indulgence of this
ulous humour, either to be often changing hia
·ons 9r ~ belie! e iJ!con~istencie$!
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The man o( contradiction is of a contrary hum
for he stands ready to oppose every thing that
said: he gives a s1ight attention to the reasona
other men, for an inward scornful presumption
they have no !>trength in them. When he read,
hears a discourse different from his own sentime
he does not give himself leave to consider wh
that discourse may be true; but employs all his
ers immediately to confute it. Your great dispu
nnd your men of controversy are in continual d
of this sort of prejudice; they contend often for
tory, and will maintain whatsoever they have as
ed, while truth is lost in the noise and tumult of
ciprocal contradictions; and it frequently hap
that a debate about opinions is turned into a mu
reproach of persons.
The prejudice of credulity may in some me
be cured, by learning to set a high value on t
and by taking more pains to attain it : remembe
that truth oftentimes lies dark and deep, and req ·
us to dig for it as bid treasure; and that folseh
often puts on a fair disguise, and therefore we sh
not yield up our judgment to every plausible ap
ance. It is no part of civility or good breedillf;
part with truth, but to maintain it with decency
candour.
..,
A !>pirit of contradiction is so pedantic and ha
that a man should take much pains with himself
watch against every instance ofit: He should 1
so much good humour at least, a!, never to oppose
~ thing without just and solid reason for it: He sho
~- abate somedegreesofprideand moroseness, which
"' never-failing iugredjents in this sort of temper,
should seek afte1· so much honesty and conscience
never to coutend for conquest or triumph, but to
view his own reasons, and to read the arguments
his opponents (if possible) with an equal indifferen
and be glad to spy truth and to submit to it, tho
it appear on the opposite side.
(2.) There is another pair of prejudices deriv
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two tempers of mind, near a-kin to those I
just mentioned; 11nd these are the dogmatical
the sceptical humour, that is, always positive,
always doubting.
By what means soever the dogmatist came by his
·ons, whether by his senses, or by his fancy, his
tion, or his own reading, yet he believes them
with the. same assurance that" he does a mathematruth; he has scarce any mere probabilities that
g to him ; every thing with him is certain and
ible; every punctilio in religion is an article of
faith, and he answers all manner of objections
a sovereign contempt.
fersons of this temper are seldom to be convinced
any mistake: a full assurance of their own notions
es all _the difficulties on their own side vanish so
· ly that the_y think every point of their belief is
n as with sun-beams, and wonder any one
Id find a difficulty in it. They are sma~d that
ed men should make a controversy .t>f what is
them so perspicuous and indubitable. The lowrank of people, both in learned and in vulgar
is very subject to this obstinacy.
epticism is a contrary pre~•1dice. The do$mais sure of every thing, .and the sceptic believes
ing. Perhaps he has found himself often misn in matters of which he thought himself well
red in his younger days, and therefore he is ato give assent to any thing again. He sees so
shew of reason for every opinion, and so ·many
ions ari!>ing also against every doctrine, that
is ready to throw~ff the belief of every thing;
renounces at once e pursuit of truth, and conhimself to say, hero is nothing certain. It is
if through the nfluence of such a temper, _he
not cast away 'his religion as well as his philoy, and abandon ~imself to a profane course of
regardless of hell Of heaven.
th these prejudices last mentioned, though they
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are so opposite to each other, yet they nrise frem
same spring, and that is, impatience of study,
want of diligent attention in the search of tr
The dogmatist is in haste to believe something:
cannot keep himself long enough in 5uspense,
some bright and convincing evidence appem· on·
side, but throws himself casually into the sentim
of one party or another, and then he will hear
ar~ument to the contrary. The sceptic will not
pams to search things to the bottom, but when he
difficulties on both sides, resolves to believe nei
of them. Humility
soul, patience in study, d"
gence in inquiry, with an horu,st zeal f01: tnub, w
go a weat way towards the cure of both these foll'
(i.J Another sort of temper that is very injur·
to a right judgment of things, is an inconstant, fie
changeable spirit, and a very uneven temper of m·
When such persons are in one humour, they p
judgment of things agreeable to it: when their
mour changes, they reverse their first judgment,
embrace a new opinion. They have no steadine
soul : they want firmness of mind sufficient to
blish themselves in any truth, and are ready to ch
it for the next alluring fohehood that is agreeable
t11eir change of humour. This fickleness is so
times so mingled with their very constitution by
ture, or by distemper of body, that a cloudy day,
a lowerinq sky shall strongly incline them to form
opinion both of themselves, and of persons and thi
round about them, quite different from what
believe when the &un shines, and the heavens
serene.
This sort of people ought to jud~e of things
persons in their most sedate, peaceful, and com
hours of life, and reserve these judgments for
conduct at more unhappy seasons.
(4,) Some persons have a violent and turgid
ner both of talking and thinkit1i ; whatsoever
judge of, it is always with a tincture of thi.i v
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y are always in extremes, and pronounce con-

ing ~very thing in the superlative.

If they think

an to be learned, he is the chief scholar of the

: If another has low parts, he is the _g reatest
head in nature : If they approve any book on
e subjects, it is the best book iu the world next
,the bible. If they speak of a storm of rain or hail,
the most terrible storm that fell since the crea: And a cold winter day is the coldest that ever
known.
ut tl1e men of this swelling language ought to
mber, that nature has ten thousand moderate
s in it, that does not always deal in extremes as
do.
6.) I think it may be called another sort of prejuderived from huniour, when some men believe a
ine merely because it is ancient, and has been long
'eved; others are so fond of novelty, that nothing
ails upon their assent so much as new thoughts
new notions. Again, there are some who set a
esteem upon every thing that is foreign and fared; . therefore China pictures a-re admireJ, how
ward soever: .Others value -things more for
of our own native growth, invention or manure, and these as much despise foreign things.
me men of letters and theology will not believe
position even concerning a sublime subject, till
thing mysterious, deep and difficult is cut off
it, though the scripture asserts it ever so plainly;
rs are so -fond of a mystery and things incomensible, that they would scarce believe the docof the Trinity, if it could be explained ; they
ine to that foolish rant of one of the ancients,
qztio impossibile est ; I believe it because it is
ssible.
fo cure these mistakes, rememl>el' that neither annor novel, foregn nor native, mysterious nor
· , are certain characters either of truth. or false-
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I might mention various other humours of
that excite in them various prejudices, and lead
into rash and mistaken judgments : but these
sufficient for a specimen.
VII. There are several other weaknesses which
long to human nature, whereby we are led into
take", and indeed are rendered almost incapable
passing a solid judgment in matters of great d
and difficulty. Some have a native obscurity of
ception, (or shall J call it a want of natural sagaci
whereby they are hindered from attaining clear
distinct ideas. Their thoughts always seem to
something confused and cloudy in them, and tl1
fore they judge in the dark. Some have a defect
memory, and then they are not capable of com
ing thei1· present ideas with a great variet) of otll
in order to secure themselves from inconsistency
judgment. Others may have a memory large enou
yet they are subject to the same errors from a D
rowness of soul, and such a fixation and confine111
-0f thought to a few objects, that they scarce e
take a survey of things wide enough to juJge wi
and well, and to secure themselves from all inco
tencies.
Though these are natural defects and weakn
yet they may in some measure be relieved by laboar,
diligence, and a clue attention to prnper rules.
But among all the causes of false judgmeut whi
.are \\ithin our~eh·es, I ought by no means to le
out that uni\ersal and original spring of error, whi
we are informed of by the word of God, and that ii;
the sin and defection of our first parents, whereby
our best natural power;; both of mind and body
impaired, and rendered very much interior to w
they were in a state of innocence. Our understand.
ing is darkened, our memory contracted, our corrupt humours an<l pas~ions are grown predominaat,
our reason enfeebled, and various disorders atten6
.our constitution and auimal nature, whereby th&
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is strangely impo5ed upon in its judgment of
• Nor is there any perfect relief to be expect..
earth. There is no hope of ever recovering
these maladies, but by a sincere return to God
ways of his own appointment, whereby we
be kept safe from all dangerous and pernicious
jn matters of religion; and though irnperfec..
d mistakes will hang about us in this present
the effects of our original apostacy from God,.
hope for a full deliverance from them when
·ve at heaven .

. IV.-Prejudices ariiingfrom otner persons.
it not for the springs of prejudice that are
in ourselves, we &hould not be subject to so
mistakes from the influence of others: But
our nature is so susceptive of errors on all
it is fit we should hQ.ve hints and notice given
far other persons may have power over us,
me the causes of our false judgments. This
all be cast into one heap, for they are all near
and mingle with each other ; but for distincll)ke let them be called the prejudices of educacustom, of authority, and such as arise from
nner of proposal.
~hose with whom our educntion is intrusted,
y the first foundation of many mistakes in our
r years. How many fooleries nnd errors are
into us by our nurses, our fellow-children,
vants, or unskilful teachers, which are not on. tained through the following part of our life,
etimes have a very unhappy influence upon
We arc taught that there are goblins and bugin the dark; our young minds are crowded
die terrible ideas of ghosts appearing upon
occasion, or with the pleasanter tales of fairies
gat midnight. We learn to pro11hesy betimes,
futurities by good or evil omens, an<l to prcRE
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5age approaching death in a family by ravens and
little worms, which we therefore call ii death-watch.
We are taucrht to know before hand, for a twelvemonth toaether, which days of the wet:k will be fair
or foul, ,:hjch will be lucky or unlucky; nor is there
any thing so silly, but may be imposed upon our
understandings in tliat early part of life; and these
ridiculous stories abide with us to0 long, and too
far influence the weaker part of mankind.
··We choose our particular sect and party in the
civil, the religious and the learned life, by the influence of education. Jn the-colleges of learning, some
sre for the nominals, and some for ,the realists, in
the science of metaphysics, because their tutors were
devoted to these parties. The old philosophy and
the new have gained thousands ofpartizans the same
way : and every religion has its infant votaries, who
are born, live and die in the same faith, without examination of any article. 'fhe Turks are taught
early to believe in Mahomet; the Jews in Moses;
,the Heathens worship a multitude of gods under the
force of their education. And it would be well ii 4
-there were not millions of-Christians who have little
•more to say for their religion, than that they were
,born .and bred up in it. The greatest part of the
Christian world can hardly give .any reason why they
believe the bible to be the word of God, hut because
·they have always believed it, and they were taught
.$0 from their infancy.
A Jews and Turks, and
American Heathens believe the most monstrous an4
incredible stories, because they have been trained
up amongst them, as articles of faith ; so the Papist,
believe their transubstantiation, and make no diftj.
culty of assenting to impossibilities, since it is the
current doctrine of their catechisms. By the same
means the several sects and parties in Chri-,tianitj'
.believe all the strained interpi:etations of scripturt
.by which they have been taught to support their on
. tenets: they find nothing difficult in all the absmi
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pses and far-fetched senses that nre sometimes put

p. the. words of

the sacred writers, because their
have been always accustomed to these glosses~
therefore they sit so s.mooth all(! easy upon theirentandings, that they know not how to admit
most natural and easy. inte~pretation in opposi..to them.
In the same manner we are nursed up in many.
'-'l and gross mistakes about domestic affairs, a~
. . as in matters of political concernment. It is
1'-'D the same ground that children are trained up
e \Vhigs and Tories betimes; und every 0111•
s the distinguishing terms of his own party,
Papi~ls learn to say their pmyers in Latin, withDll J meaning, reason, or devotion.
This sort of prejudice mu ... t be cured by calling all
principles of our young years to the bar of mnrea!>on, that \, e may judge. of the things of naand political-affairs by juster rules of philosophy.
o ,servation : And even . the matters of religio11
be inquired into by reason and conscience, and
the,,e have led us to believe scripture to be the·
of God, then that becomes our sovereign guide,
reason and conscience must submit t.> receive
dictnte.s.
•
J..- The next. prejudice which I shall mention is, •
which arises from the custom or fashion of those
gst whom we live. Suppose we have freed oures frorri the younger prejudices of our education,
we are in danger of having our minds turned
from truth by the influence of a general custom.
Our opinion of meats and drinks, of garments and
s of salutation, are influenced much more by
m, thau by the eye. the ear, or the taste. Cusprevails over sense itself, and therefore no wonif it prevail over reason too. What is it but custhat render , many of the mixtures of food and
es degant in Britain, which would be awkwarrl

•
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nauseoui in China, and indeed were nauseous.

196

LOGIC:

o:a,

to us when we first tasted them? What but cus&CIIII
could make those salutations polite in MuscmJ'4
which are ridiculous in France and England? \fi
all call ourselves indeed the politer nations, but it•
we who judge this of ourselves ; and that fancied pOi
liteness is oftentimes more owing to custom than re,,on. Why are the forms of our present garmelll
counted beautiful, and those fashions of our an~
tors the matter of scoff and contempt, which in thei
day were all decent and genteel? It is custom tW
forms our opinion of dress, and reconciles us by
grees to those habits which at first seemed very odi
and monstrous. It must be granted there are SOlllf
garments and habits which have a uatural congruity
or incongruity, modesty or immodesty, decency ft
indecency, gaudery or gravity; though for the mOlf
part there is but little reason in these affairs: Blif
what little there is of reason or natural decene,J
c~stom triumphs over it all. It is almost impoSiilif
to persuade a gay lady that any thing can be deed
that is out of fo~hion: And it were well if fasbii
stretched its powers no further than the busineatf
drapery and the fair sex.
· The methods of our education are governed bf
custom. It is custom and• not reason that setil;
every boy to learn the Ron,an poets, and begiat
little acquaintance with Greek, before he is bod
an apprentice to a soapboiler or leather seller. h
custom alone that teaches us Latin by the rules
Latin grammar ; a tedious and absurd method !
what is it but custom that has for past centuries,
fined the brightest geniuses even of the high ran)Qa.
th~ female world to the only b1tsi11ess of the ne
and secluded them mo~t unmercifolly from the
sures of knowledge, and the divine improvemed
reason ? But we begin to break all these chains,
reason begin& to dictate the education of youth.
the growing age be learned and wise !
It is by the prejudice arising from our own c
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- , that we judge of all other civil and religious
ancl practices. The rites and ceremonies of
ftl' and peace, in other nations, the forms of wedand funeral ~, the several ranks of magistracy,
trades and employments of both sexes, the puband the domestic affairs of life, and almost every
of foreign customs is judged to be irregular. It
imagined to be unreasonable or unnatural, by
who have no other rule to judge of nature and
1111110n, but the custom of their own country, or the
town where they dwell. Custom is called a.
JeCOnd nature, but we often mistake it for nature itself.
Besides all this, there is a foshion in opinions,
is a fashion in writing and printing, in style
language. In our day it is the vogue of the nathat parliaments may settle the succession of
crown, and that a people can make a ki ng; in the
age this was a doctrine a-kin to treason. Citas from the Latin poets " 'ere an embellishment of
IJle in the last century, and whole pages in that
~ were covered with them~ it is now forbidden by
om, and exposed by the name of pedantry;
whereas in truth both these are extremes. Someti.oes < ur printed books sh all abound in capitals, and
M1Detimes rej ect them all. Now we deal much in
• ) s, and most unreasonably despise systematic
laming, whereas out· fath ers had a just value for
~larity and systems; th en folio!> and qu artos were •
fashionable &ize•, as volumes in octavo are uow• .
.e are ever ready to run into extremes, aild yet cus- .
pi still persuades us that reason and uature are on ,
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This business of the fashions has a most powerful
illuence on our judgments; for it empl oys those two
ug engi r,es of fear and shame to operate upon
,ar understandings with unhappy success. vVe are
llhamed to believe or profo&s an unfashionable opin..
Jon in philo~ophy, and a cowardly soul dares not so
aach as indulge a thought cou rary to the establish~
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ed or fashionable faith, nor act in opposition to· ens•
tom, though it be according to the dictates of reaw
son.
I confess, there is a respect due to mankind, which
should incline even the wisest of men to foUow the
fonocent customs of their country in outward practices of the civil life, and in some measure to submit
to fashion in all indifferent affairs, where reasott
and scripture make no remonstrances against it. But
the judgments of the mine} ought to be for ever
free, and not biassed by the customs and fashions
of any age or nation whatsoever.
To deliver our understandings from this danger
and slavery, we should consider these three thingw-:
. I. That the greatest part of the civil customs ti
any particular nation or age spring from humodt
rather than reason. Sometimes the humour of tt.
prince prevails, and som~times the humour of tlfe
people. It is either the great or the many wth,.
dictate the fashion, and these have not always die
l1ighest reason on their side.
2. Consider also, that the ',Ustoms of the same Ill'
tion in different ages, the customs of different natit>dl
in the same age, a~d the customs of different toWIII
and villages in the same nation, are very various, and
-contrary to each other. The fashionable learninrc;
language, sentiments, and rules of politeness, dil&
greatly in diffore~t countries and ages of mankiDI,
but truth and reason are of a more uniform and stellllj
nature, and do not change with the fashion. Upfi
this account, to cure the prepossessions "hich iritle
from custom, it is of excellent use to travel, and ile6
the customs of various countries, and to rend die
travels of other men, and the history of past ~
that every thing may not seem strange an<l un
which is not practised within the limits e,f our
parish, or in the narrow space of our own lifeti~
3. Consider yet again, how often weoursel\'esb11t
changed our own opinion~ concerning the decencr,
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'ety, or congruity of several modes or practices
world, especially if we have lived tu the age of
or fbrty. Custom or fashion, eve11 in all its
ges, has been reedy to have some dewee of as•
ency over our understandings, and what at one
seemed decent appears obsolete and disagreeable
ards, when the fashion changes. Let us learn
re to abstract as much as possible from custom
shion, when we would pass a ju<lgment concern•
e real value and intrinsic nature of things.
t 1'/te aut!tority of men is the spring of another
nf prejudices.
ong these the authority of our forefathers ancl
nt authors is most remarkable.
We pay <lee to the opinions of others, merely because they
a thousand years before us ; an<l even the trifles
impertinences that have a mark of antiquity upon
are reverenced lor this reason, because they
from the ancients. It is granted, that the
nts had many wise and great men among them,
some of their writings, which time hath delivered
to us, are truly valuable: but those writers
rather in the infant state of the world; and the
phers, as well as the polite authors of our
are properly the elders, who have seen the misof the younger ages of mankin<l, and con-ect.
m by observation and experience.
e borrow all their rdigion from the fathers of
hristian church, or from their synods or couhbut he that will read Monsieur Daille on the
of the fathers, will find many reasons why they
y no means fit to dictate our faith, since we have
spel of Christ, and the writings of the apostles
phets in our own hands.
persons believe every thin~ th11t their kindre<ls;
parents, and their tutors beJieve. The veneraand the love which they have for their ancestors
e them to swallow down all their opinions at
without examining what truth or falsehood there
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is in them. Men take up their principles by inheri
and deftnd them, as they would their estates, b
they are born heirs to them. I freely grant, that
rents are appointed by God and nature to teach
all the sentiments and practices of our younger y
and happy are those whose parents lead them UIIIIII,
the paths of wisdom and truth ! I grant farther,
when persons come to years of discretion, and j
for themselves, they ought to examine the opin'
of their parents with the greatest modesty, and
an humble deference to their superior character;
ought, in matters perfectly dubious, to give the p
ference to their parents' advice, and always to
them the first respect, nor ever dt'part from
opinions and practice, till re.1son and conscie
make it necessary. But after all, it is possible
parents may be mistaken, and therefore reason
scripture ought to be our final rules of determina ·
in matters that relate to this world, and that w •
is to come.
Sometimes a favourite aut11or, or a writer o f "
name, drags a thousand followers after him into •
own mistakes, merely by the authority of his n..-:
and character. The sentiments of Aristotle were ·
bibed and maintained by all the schools in EuNft:
for S('veraJ centuries; and a citation from his writiy
was thought a sufficient proof of any proposition. l lo
great Descartes had also too many implicit beliefflt
in th e last age, though he himself, in his philosop
disclaims all such influence over the minds of his r
ers. Calvin and Luther; in the days of reformatillafro m Popery, were learned and pious men, and thel,.
have been a succession of th eir disciples even to
day, who pay too much reverence to the words
their master:e.. Th ere are others who renounce dtlir
authority, but giv e themselves up in too servile am
ner to the opinion and authority of other masten,
and follow as l>ad or worse guides in religion.
lf only learned, and wise, and good men had mo
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ce on the sentiments of others, it would be at
a more excusable sort prejudice, and there
d be some colour and shadow of reason for it ;
that riches, honours, and outward splendour
d set up persons for dictators to all the rest of
'nd, this is a most shameful invasion of the
of our understandings on the one hand, and as
ful a slavery of the soul on the other. The
man or the labourer, too often believes such a
pie in politics, or in morality, and judges cong the rights of the king and the people, just as
l'Blthy neighbours do. Half the parish follows
inion of the esquire, and tenants of a manor fall
the sentiments of their L01·d, especially if he
amongst them. How unreasonable and yet how
on is this !
for principles of religion, we frequently find
they are taken up and forsaken, changed and
ed by the influence of princes. In all nations
riests have much power also in dictating the reof the people, but the princes dictate to them:
where there is great pomp and grandeur at•
the prie:sthood in any religion whatsoever,
much the more reverence and stronger faith ·
people believe whatever they teach them: yet
often evident that riches, and dominions, and •
ties in church or state, have no manner of
ce to truth and certainty, wisdom and goodabove the rest of mortals, because these su'ties in this world are not always conferred acto meri-t.
less, where a man or wisdom and years, of
tion and experience, gives us his opinion and;
in matters of the civil or the moral life, reason
we houl<l pay a great attention to him, it is•
le he may be in the 1·ight. Where a man of
:exercise in piety speak~ of practical religion,.
is a due deference to be paid to his sentiments:
same we may say concerning an ingenious
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man long versed in any art or science, he may ·
expect due regard, when he speaks of his own a
and proper business. But in other things each
these may be ignorant eno11gh, notwithstanding
their piety and years, and particular skill: nor
in their own proper province are they to he belie
in every thing withont reserve, and without exa
tion.
To free ourselves from these prejuclicesy it is
cient to remember, that there is no rank nor cha
ter among mankind, v. hich has any just pretence
sway the judgments of other men by their au tho ·
for there have been persons of the same rank
character who have maintained different and cont
sentiments; but all these can never be true, and th
fore the mne nan.e or reputation that any of
possesses is not a ~ufl1 cient evidence fur truth.
Shall we believe the ancients in philosophy?
some of the ancients were stoics, some peripat11 ·
some platonics, and sbme epicureans, some cyni
and some sceptics. Shall we judge of matters of
Christian faith by the fathers or primitive writers
three or four hundred years after Christ? But
often contradicted one another, and tbemst:lves
and, what is worse, they ~metimes coutradi
the scripture itself. Now, among .di these differ
and contrary _sentiments in philosophy and relig"
which of the ancients must we believe, for we
not believe them all ?
Again; to believe all things , as our pre<lece
did, is the ready way to keep mankind in an ever
i'ng state of-infun.cy, and to.Jay an eternal bar agai
all the improvements of our reason and our ha
ness. Had the present age of philosophers satis
themselves with the substantial forms aud occult q
lities of Aristotle, with the solicl spheres, eccentr'
and epic) cles of Ptolemy, and the ancit·nt astron
rners; then the great lord Bacon, Copernicus,
Descartes, with the greater Sir Isaac Nt!wton,
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e, and Mr. Boyle, had risen in our world in
We must have blundered on still in succesgenerations -amongst absurdities and thick dark•
and a hundred useful inventions fo1· the happi•
of human life had never been known.
us it is in matters of philosophy and science.
you will say, shall not our own ancestors deterour jud~ments in matter of civil or religi ous
nment ( If, they mu'St, then the child of a
hen must believe that heathenism is true ; the
fa Papist must believe all the absurdities of
; the posterity of the Jews and Socinians
for f\ver be Socinians and Jews; and a man
father was of republican principles must make
s~iun of republican in his fami]y to the end
world. If we ought always to believe whatsoour parents, or our priests, or our princes, bethe inhabitants of China ought to worship their
idols, and the savages of Africa ou$ht to believe
nonsense, and practise the idolatry of their
fathers and kings. The British nation, when
heathen, could never have become Christhn;
hen it was a slave to Rome, it could never
been reformed.
'des, let us consider that the great God, our
n maker, has never given one man's under'ng a legal and rightful sovereignty to detertruths for others, at least after they are past the
of childhood or minority. No single person,
rned and wise, and great soever, or whatsonatural, or civil, or ecclesiastical relation he
have to us, can claim this dominion over our
St. Paul the apostle, in his private capacity,
eot do it; nor hath an inspired man any such
rity, until he makes his divine commission apOur Saviour himself tell the Jews, that if he
ot done such wondrous worksamon ~them, they
t sinned in disbelieving his doctrines, and
him for the Messiah. No bishop or pres-
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byter, no synod or council, no church or
.of men, since the days of inspiration, hath
rived to them from God to make creeds or
.of faith for us, and impose them upon our
ings. We must all act accordiog to the beat
.own light, and the judgment of our own c
.using the best ad,·antages which providence
en us, with an honest and impartial diligence.
quire und search out the truth : for every
must give an account of himself to God. TQ,
as the church, or the court believes, is but a
.and a dangerous fa,ith; this principle wo
more Heathens than Chriistians, and more
than Protestants : and perhaps lead more
tiell than to heaven; for our Saviour h"
.plainly told us, that if the blind will be locl
blind, they must botl) foll into the ditch.
Though there be so much danger of error
from the three prejudices }~st m~n tioned, y
I dismiss this head, I think it proper to take
that as education, custom and authority, are.
evidences of truth, so neither an: they cerwa
of falsehood ; for reason aQd .scripture may
dictate the same things which our parents, Olli'
our tutors, our friends, and our country be·
.profess. Yet there appears sometimes io
pride and petulancy in youth, zealom, to ca&t
sentiments of theic fathers and teachers, on
to shew that they carry 11011~ of the prejudices
.cation an(} authority about them. They i.od
manner of licentious opinions and practice.a,
vain pretence of asserting their liberty. But;
this is but changing one prejudice for anoth
sometimes it happens by this m~ans, that
n sacrifice both of truth and virtue to the vile
.dices of their pride and sensuality.
IV. There is another tribe of prejudices
are near a-kin to those of authority, and that ill,

:we rcctive a doctriue because.of the manner ia
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~is proposed to us by others. I have already men•
tioned the powerful influence that oratory and finewords have to insinuate a false opinion, and some•
times truth is refused and suffers contempt in the•
lps of a wise man, fur want of the charms of lan•
,iage : But there are several other manners of pro.
,-als whereby mistaken ~entiments are powerfully
conveyed into the mind.
&me persons are easily persuaded to believe what
aother dictates with a positive air and a great· <l&pee of assurance: they feel the overbearing _force of'
.,confident dictator, especially if he be of a superier
1811k or character to themselves.
· Some are quickly convinced of the truth of any
dootrine, when he that proposes it puts on all tt1e
airs of piety, and makes solemn appeals to heaven,
ad protestations of the truth of it: the pious mind
af.a weaker Christian is ready to receive any thing _
lbt is pronounced with such an awful solemnity.
It is a prejudice near a-kin to this, when a humble
.,ul is frighted into any particular sentiments of religion, because a man of great name or character
pronounces here~y upon the contrary sentiments,
•ts the disbeliever out of the church, and forbids•
him the gates of heaven.
Others are allured into particular opinions by gen,,;
Iler practices on the understanding: not only the
18ft tempers of mankind, but even hardy and rugged
IOU.ls are sometimes led away captives to error by
lhe soft afrs of address, and the sweet and engaging
met.hods of persuasion and kindness.
I grant, where natural and revealed religion plain•
tdictate to us the infinite and everlasting importance
etiany sacred doct1·ine, it cannot be improper to use
my of these methods, to persuade men to receh e
md obey the truth, after we have given sufficient
reason and argument to convince their understandings. Yet all these methods, considered in themlihes, have been often used to convey fo bchood
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into the soul, as well as truth; and if we
our faith merely upon these foundations, witho
gard to the evidence of truth and the stre
argument, our belief is but the effect of preju
For neither the positive, the awful or solemn,
terrible or the gentle methods of address carry
certain evidence with them that truth lies on
side.
There is another manner of proposing our
opinions, or rather opposing the opinions of
which demands mention here~ and that is, when
sons make a jest serve instead of an argument;
they refute what they call an error by a turn of'
and answer every objection against their own
ments, by casting a. sneer upon the objector.
scoffers practise with success upon weak and c
ly spirits : Such as have not been well establis
religion or mornlity have been laughed out o
best principles by a confident buffoon : theyyielded up their opinions to a witty banter, and
their faith and religion for a jest.
There is no way to cure these evils in such
generate world as we live in, but by leaming to
tinguish w.ell between the substance of any d
and the manner of address either in proposing,
tacking, .or defending it; and then by setting a·
and sevei·e guard of reason and conscience over
the .exercises of the judgment; resolving to yield
nothing but the convincing:evidence of truth,
ously obeying the light of reason in matters of
reason, and the dictates of revelation in things
relate to our faith.
Thus we have taken a brief survey of some
infinite varieties of prejudices that attend m
on every side in the present state, and the d
of error or of rash judgment we are perpetuall1.
posed to in this life : This chapter shall co
with one remark, and one piece of advice.
The remark is this. The same opinion, wh
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false or true; may be dictated by many prejudices at
the same time; for, as I hinted before, prejudice may
-llappen to dictate truth sometimes as well as error.
But where two or more prejudices oppose one ano.
d1er,, as it often happens, the stronger prevails and
gains the assent: Yet how seldom does reason interpose with sufficient pmver to get the ascendant of
them all, as it ought to- do !:
The advice-follows, viz. Since we find such a swarm .
of prejudices attending us both within and without;
1ince we fed the. weakness of our reason, the frailty
ilf our natures) and ouP insufficiency to guard oureelves from error upon this account, it is not at all
unbecoming the character of a logician or philosopher, together wi th the advice already given, to di- 1.ect e,·cry person iu search after truth to make his
daily addresses to heaven( all(l implore the God of
truth to lead him into all truth, and to a§k wisdom
of him who giveth liberally to them that ask it, and
iapbraideth us not with our own follies.
Such a devout practice will be an excellent preparative for the best improvement of all the directions and rules proposed in the two following chap-

ter,.

CHAP. IV.
&ENERAL DIRECTIONS TO ASSIST US IN JUDGING
ARlC!rHT,

THE chief design of the art of logic is to assist us

la formin-1 a true judgment of things ; a few proper
tlbservations for this end have been dropt occasionally in some of the foregoing chapteu : Yet it is ne. eessary to mention them again in this place, that we
may have a mol·e complete and simultaneous view of
tbe general directions, which are necessary in order
to jud&'e ari&"ht. A multitude of advices may be
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framed fur this purpose; the chief of them
.crder's sake, be reduced to the following h
I. Direct. When we consider ourselves as
phers, or searchers after truth, we should e
all our opinions afresh, and inquire what wu
ground of them, and whether our assent was
on just evidence ; and then we · should cast
those judgments which were formed here
without due examination. A man in pursui(
'knowledge should throw off all those p ·
which he had imbibed in times past, and
against all the springs of error mentioned in the
ceding chapter, with the utmost watchfulne•
the time to come.
Observe here, that this rule of casting away all
former prejudicate opinions and sentiments, ia
proposed to any of us to be practised at once,
dered '1S men of business or religion, tas frien•
neighbours, as fathers or sons, as m~gistrates,
jects or Christians; but merely as philosophers,
searchers ufter truth : and though it may be
pre!rumed that many of our judgments, both
-and false, together with the practiees built th
in the natural, the civil, and the religious life,
formed without sufficient evidence: yet an uni,
rejection of all these might destroy at once our
sent sense and practice of duty with regard to
ourselves, and our fellow-creatures. Mankind w
be hereby thrown into such a state of d~uqting
indifference, that it would be too long ere th
covered any principles of virtue or religion
train of reasoning.
Besides, the common affairs of human life
demand .a much speedier determination, and we
mal)y times act upon present probabilities: The
of mankind have not time and lei6ur11, ond
~ges sufficient t-0 · begin all their knowledge,
.and to build up every i;il!gle opinion and
afresh llpon the jmtest grounds of tvidence.
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Yet let it be observed also, that so far as any person is capab]e of forming and correcting his notions
and rules of conduct in the natural, civil, and re..
ligious life, by the strict rules of logic; and so far
as he hath time and capacity to review his old opinions, to re-examine all those which are any wal
doubtful, aud to determine nothing without just evidence; he is likely to become so much the wiser, and
the happier man, and, if divine grace assist him, so
much the better Christian. And though this cannot
be done all at once, yet it may be done by prudent steps and degrees, till our whole set of opinions
and principles be m time corrected and reformed, or
at least established upon juster foundations.
II. Direct. Endeavour that aU your ideas of those
objects, concerning which you pass: any judgment, .
be clear and distinct, · complete, comprehensive, ex-;
tensive and orderly, as far as you have any occasion
to judge concerning them . . This is the substance of
the last chapter of the first part of logic. The rules
which direct our conceptions must be reviewed, if
we would form our judgments aright. But if we will
make haste to judge at all adventures, while our ideas
are dark and confused, and very impe1·foct, we shall
be in danger of running into many mistakes. This
is like a person who would pretend to give the ~umtotal of a large account in arithmetic, without surTeying all the particulars ; or as a painter, who professes to draw a fair and distinct landscape in the
twil:ght, when he can hardly distinguish a house from. c
a tree.
Ouserve here, that this direction does not require
us to gain clear, distinct, complete ideas of thin~s in
all their parts, powers, and qualities, in an absolute
sense, for this be vngs to God alone, and is impossible for us to attain: I.mt it is expressed in a relative
or limited sense; that is, our ideas ~hould be clear,•
distinct, and comprehensive, &c. atleast !lo far as we
have occasion at- that time to judge concerning themr
S3
.
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We may fot·m many true and certain judgmeli
cerning God, engeb, animal~, men, heaven, hell,
by those partial and very imp~rfect conc~pti
them to which we have attained, if we judge no
ther coneerning them than our conceptions r
We may have a clear and distinct idea of
istence of many things -in Djlture, 11nd affirm thlll:
do exist, thoqgb our ide.as --of -1heir ,intimate e
and <:auses, their relations antl manners of
are very confuaed and obscure. We may jud
concerning several properties of any being,
other properties be unkno\\ n, for perhaps we
not all the properties of any being whatsoever.
&meti.mes we have clear ideas of the &bsolu
perties of -an object ; and we may judge of them
ce1·ta.inty, while the relative properties are vc
scure and unknown to us. So we may have a
and just idea of the area of a parallelogram, w·
knowing what relation it bears to the area
triangle or a polygon. I may know the length ef
diameter of a circle, without knowing what p
&ion it has to the circumference.
There are other things, whose external r
properties with respect to each other, 01:•whose
tion to us we know better than their own inw
absolute properties, or their essential <listing ·
attributes. We perceive clearly, that fire will
or burn us, and will evaporate watPr; and that
will allay our thirst, or quench the fire, th
know not the inward distinguishing particleft
prime essential properties of fire and water. We
know the king, and lord chancellor, and affirm
things of them in their leg.al charac~rs, thoug
can have but a confused idea of their persons
tural features, if we have .nev.er seen their faces.
the scripture has revealed God himself to us,
creator, preserver, redeeme:i:, .and sanctifier,
the .object of our worship, in clearer ideas th
has .revealed maoy other abetruse quu~oas

!11
may ,be·.raised about his own divine essence or sub..
stance, his ,immensity or omnip1·esence.
ulhis the~efore ,is the general observation.in order
io guide our judgments, that we 'Should not allow
ourselves to form a judgment concerning things far- ·
th-er th-an our.clear an<l,distinct ideas reach, aµd then
we are not in ,danger -of error•
.But there i&-oRe considerable objection against this
;rule, which is necessary to be answered; an_d there ·
<is.onejust and reasonable exception, which is as need-fuLto ,be mentioned.
FL'he objection is this : May we not judge fulsely
.concerning some total or complete ideas, when we
ha'1e a clear perception only of some parts or prope1·ties of thetD;? May we not affirm, that a11 that is in
-God is ,eternal, or that all his unknown attributes are
infinite, though we have so imperfect ~n idea of God,
.eternity. and infinity? -Again, may we not safely
judge of particular objects whose idea is obscure, by
a clear idea of the general ? May I not affirm, that
every unknown spet!ies of animals has inward spi-ings
of motion, because ! ,have a clear idea that these inw.ard .springs belong to an animal in general.
Answer. All those supposed unknown_parts, properties, or species, are clearly and distinctly perceiv-ed to be connected ,with, or contained in the known
,parts, pr.operties, or general-icieas, which we-suppose
to be ,clenr .and distinct as far as we judge of them :
And.as ,we have no particular idea of those unknown
divine .attributes, or unknown species of animals; so
·there is .nothing particular affirmed of them beyonu
what ,belongs to the general idea of divine attributes
-.or aniQ1als, with -which I clearly and distinctly perceive them to be connected.
It may be illustrated in this manner. Suppose a
long chain lies before me, whose nearest links I se·e
:ar.e iron rings, and I see tl1em fustened to a po t
near . me, but the most distant links lie beyond the
<J~~h of.my -sight, -so that 'I know not whether -they
l'ARTU.
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are oval or round, brass or iron : Now I may
ly affirm the whole length of this chain is
the post, for I have a clear idea that the distant
are connected ·with the neare::.t, if I can
whole chain by one link.
Or thus: If two known ideas, A and B,
dently joined or agree, and if C unknown be•
ed in A, and also D unknown he included in
I may affirm that C and D are joined and
for I have a clear perception of the union of
known ideas A and B ; and also a clear pe
the connection of the unknown ideas with the
So that clear and distinct ideas must still a ·
general necessary qualification in order to fo
judgments : and indeed it is upon this footing
ratiocination is built, and the conclusions are th
ed which deduce things unknown from thin
Yet it seems to me, that there is one just ·
or exception to this general rule of jud
built on clear and distinct ideas ; and it is thia
Exception. In matters of mere testimony, w
human or divine, there is always a necessity ti
and distinct ideas of the things which are
Though the evidence of propositions, w •
entirely formed by ourselvPs, depends on the
ness and distinctness of those ideas of whim
are composed, and on our own clear perce ·
their agreement or di~ngreement, yet they ma ·
assent to propositions formed by others, w
l1ave neither a very ch•ar conception in oursel
the two ideas contained in the words, nor how
agree or disagree; provided alway~ that we
clear and sufficient evidence of the credi.iility
persons who inform· us.
Thus, when we read in scripture the great
trines of the deity of Christ, and of thl· union
divine and human natur~s in him, of the
agency of the blessed Spirit, tbat the Son ii
brightness of the Father's glory; th~t all ·
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by'him, and for him; that the Son ~hall

&ive up his kingdom to his father, and that God shall

tie all in all; we may safely believe them : For though
.our ideas of these objects themselves are not suftfciently clear, distinct, and perfect, for our own minds·
form these judgments or propositions concerning
diem, yet we have a clear and distinct perception of
iGod's revealing them, or that they -are contained in
'ltripture, and this is sufficient evidence to determitre
our assent.
The same thing holds true in some m-easure, whetie
'eTedible human testimony assures us of some propositions, while we have no sufficient ideas of the sub•
lject and predicate of them to determine our assent.
'8o when an honest and learned mathematician ai•
mres a ploughman that Lhe three angles of a triangle
we equal to ~wo Jtight angles, or that the square of
1 hypothenuse of a right angled triaqgle is equal to
sum of the squares of the two sides ; the ploughean, who has but confused ideas of these things,
lllay firmly and safely believe these prQpositions upon
lie same ,ground, because he has -evidence of the
lkill and faithfulness of his informefl".
• Perllllps -aome may ob,ject,against this representation of' thinp.
1111d say that " we cannot properly be said to believe a J)ropesition any

lather than we ouraelve• )Jave ideas und.er the terma : therefore if we
• e no i<tea under the terms, we beli11ve nothiug but the connection
,I words o, sounds: and IC ,ve have !tut obscure 4nd,inadequate idaa
:llllder the tenm, then we partly believe a conaection of lliings, aad
,111111y a connection of sounds; but tltat we cannot proper1y lile said tt>
lltlieoe the proposition, for our faith can never go beyond our ideas,"
Now to set this matter in a dear light, I.11upposc that eveeyipropo.
aition .which is proposed to my as...ent,- is a sentence made up of terraa
,wbic:h have some ideas under tbem kno'll'll or unknown to me. I
-Cess, if I ,believe there are no iilea!I at all under the terms, a'Dd
lliere is nod1illg meant· by them, then iadeed, with regard to me,
i&iohe J:Dere joining of sounds; but if, for instance,• ploughman has
cndil>le information Crom an ·honest 11nd skilful matliematioiao, that
111 ellipsis is made by the sect.ion 'Of a. cone, be belie\"es the proposlfion,
ur he believes the sentence i s true, as it is made up of terms which
llis informan~ understands, tho11gh the ideas be unknown to him; that
la, be believes there are some idilas which his informant bas under
lbese words which are really conneciff, -Aad I lhmk d1is may j11stl7
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. III. Direct. When you have obtained ai clear ani
comprehensive ideal! as is needful, both ofthe sub,.
be called believing the proposition, for it is a belief of something nit
, than the mere joining of sounds ; it is a belief of the real connetliiii
of some unknown ideas belonging to those sounds, and in rl1is - 4
man may be said t0 believe the truth of a proposition which he~
not understand at alt.
With more reason still may we be said to believe a proposition upia
credible testimony if we have some sort of ideas under the i . _
though they are but partial, or inadequate, or obscure; such aa, cJ;
•ine <ut•wers were given by Urim and Thummim; for since it isplitily upon testimony we believe the known parts of the ideas sigmfti\l
by those words to be connected, upon the same testimony we may•
believe all the unknown parts of the ideas sirnilied by those
be ·connected, viz. because onr informant a knowing and faithl\il.
And in this srnse we may justly be said to believe a 1>ropositi0111f
scripture entirely, which we understand but very imperfectly, ~
God who reveals it is knowing and faithful in perfection,
And indeed, unless this representation of the matter be ~
there are but very few propositions in the world, even in lnm#II
things, to which we can give an entire assent, or which we ~
said either to know, or to believe, because there is scarce any •
on earth of which we have an adequate, and most perfect idea.
it is evident that in divine things there is scarc.e any th,ing whiek '11
' could either know or believe without this allowance; for though~
.90n and revelation join to inform me that God· is holy, how excceifiir
inadequate are my ideas of God, and of holiness? Yet I may boldlfQ
entirely assent to this whole prnposition, since 1 am sure that "etjf
known and unknown idea signified by the term God is connected wli'
the idea of the term holiness, because reason partly informs me, lllll
especially because the divine tdstimouy, whlch ha& connected them,
certainly credible,
· I might argue upon this head perhaps more forcibly from
doctrine of God's incomprehensibleness. If . we would belieYe •
thing but what we have ideas of, it would be impossible for 01 to M,i
lieve that God is incomprel1ensible: for this implies iu it a belief, tlll
,there a, e 60me unknown ideas be,onging to the nature of God. 1W,
fore we do both belie,·e and profess that something concerning a
known ideas, when we believe and· pr.ofess that God is incgmptekS,
sible.
,
I persuade myself that most of those very persons who object•~
J;DY representation of things will yet readily confc,,s they believe all lllt
propositions in 1eripture, rather than declal'e they do not belien •
ral of them : rl1ough they must acknowledge,that several ef them 11ft
far above their understaadinr, or that they have scarce any idea;;'
the trne s~nse ef them, And therefore, where prepositioa1 deri~
fr?m ~r~dible testimony are made up of dark or inailequate idea, t
think 1t 1s much more proper to 1ay, we believe them, than tba& w
do not believe them, lest we cot off a multitude of the propoeitiom ti
\he bible from Olll assent of faith,
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IIUd predicate of a proposition, then compare those

ideas of the subject anJ predicate together with the
utmost attention, and observe how far they agree and
wherein they differ : whether the proposition may
be affirmed absolutely or relatively, whether in whole ·
or in part, whether universally or particularly, and
then under what particular limitations. Turn these
ideas about in your mind, and take a view of them
cm all sides, just as a ma~on would do to see whether
two hewn stones exactly suit each other in every
part, and are fit to be joined in erecting a carved or
ilted pillar.
Compare the whole subject with the whole predicate in their several parts! take heed in this matter
dlat you neither add to, nor diminish the ideas con1-ioed in the subject or in the predicate; for such
ID inadvertence or mistake will expose you to great
error in judgment.
IV. Direction. Search for evidence of truth with
Yet let it be observed here, that when we believe • proposition
• mere testim,my, of which we have no ideas at all, we can onl1
N uid to give a general implicit assent to the truth of that proposidon, without any particular knowledge of, or e:rplicit aaaent to the
tpecial truth contained in that propO!>ition: and this our implicit assent
Ii oC very little use, unless it be to testify our belief of the knowledge
ad veracity of him that informs u,.
As our ideas of a proposition are more or less cle3r and adequate
• well as just and proper, so we explicitly asssent more or less to the
Jllllicular truth contained in that propositi0tt. And our a,sent hereb1
lilcomes more or lesa useful for the increase of our knowledge, or the
htion of our practice.
When diYine testimony plainly proposes to our faith such a propositilD whereof .we ha'fe but obscure, doubtful and inadequate idea,,
ware bound implicitly to believe the truth of it, expressed in those
tams, in order to shew our submission to God who revealed it, as a
GIid of pcrfeet knowledge and veracity : but it is our duty lo use all
'fll)Per methods to obtain a farther and explicit knowledge of the
,articular truth contained in the proposition, if we would improve
.,. ii either io knowledge or virtue, AH uecessary rules of grammar
IN criticism should he employed to find out the very ideas th~t belaig to those words, and which were designed by the divine speaker
• writer. Though we may believe the trutJ1 of a proposition whicq
a do not understand, yet we should ende3vour to undcrr.~d ever,

JIOPOlition wllicb we believe

111
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diligence and honesty, and be heru:tily ready to 1'111<
cieve evidence, whether for the agreement or ·
greement of ideas,
Search with diligence : spare no labour in 1earatiing for t.he truth in due proportion to the importan~
of the proposition. Read the best authors who haVll
'\vrit on that subject ; consult your1,,.ise and 1 ~
friends in conversation1 andbeoot unwillingtobo~
hint& toward your improvement from the meane,Jl
perwn, nor to •receive any. glimpse of Jightrfrom dtt
ntost unlearned. Diligence and humility is the W11f1
to thrive in the riches of the understanding, as well.
as in gold or, silver. Searobi carefully for the efidenoe of truth 1 and<Jig fo1.· wisdom as for hid treasnre..
Seat'Ck with a steall,g lwnesty ,q[ souJ,,. and a sinceJW.
i:mpiu·tiality to find the truth.
atoh against ewz,
temptation that might bribe. your judgmenij
warp.
it aside from truth. Do not indulge yourself to wisla~
any unexamined proposition we~ trua or ful e, A
wish 1often perverts the judgment, and tempts the
mind strangely to believe upon slight.evidence whal,,
soever we \\ish to be true or false.
V. :Dit·ect. Since the evidence of the ag,reement
or disagreem6Dl of two ideas is the ground of oa
assent to any proposition, or the great criterion of.
truth ; therefore we t.hould suspend om· judgment;
.and neitl1er affirm nor deny till this ev-idence appear
This direction is different from the second; forthough th~ evidence of the agreement or disagre&ment of two ideas most times dep«nds on the cleaness and distinctness of the ideas themselve5, yet' it'
does not always arise thence. Testimony may be.a.
sufficient evidence of the agreement or disagree.meat.
of two obscure ideas, a:s we have seen just before iJr
the exception under the second direction. Therefura,
though we are not universally and in all cases boand
to suspend our judgment, till our ideas of tlNt
objects themselves are clear and distinct, yet we,.
must always &uspend ow· judgment, and.. withlnlld
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our assent to, or denial of any proposition, till some

;.t evidence

appear of its truth or falsehood. It is
impatience of doubt and suspence, a rashness
..,I precipitancy of judgment, and hastiness to belave something on the one side or the other, that
~oges us into many errors.
.
This direction to delay and suspend our assent i
particularly necessary to be observed when
prnpositions ·offer thenu,elves to us as are sup~d by education, authority, custom, inclination,
ilterest, or other powerful prejudices: for our judgaaeut is led away insensibly to believe all that they
6:tate; and where prejudices and dangers of error
• multiplied, we should set the stricter guard upon
•assent.
Yet remember the caution or limitation here
w)iich I gave under the first direction, viz. that this
· not to be too strictly applied to matters of daily
ptice, either in human life or religion; but when
a consider ourselves as philo opher~, or searchers
*r truth, we should always withhold our assent
where there is not just evjdence : And as far and as
S. as we can in a due consistence with our daily
1f1Cessary duties, we should also reform and adjust
-tll our principles and practices both in religion and
the ci,·il life by these rules,
VI. Direct. \Ve mi1st judge of every proposition
bf those proper and peculiar mediums or means,
lfJiereby the evidence of it is to be obtained, whetht'r
it be sense, consciousness, intelligen~e, reason, ol'
timony. All our faculties and powers are to be
,aployed in judging of their proper objects.
Jf we judge of sounds, colours, odours, or sapors,
~ smoothness, roughness, softness, or hardness
of bodies, it must be done by the use of our senses:
but then we must take heed that our senses are well
disposed, as shall be shewn afterwards.
And since our senses, in their various exercises,
are in some cases liable to be deceived, and more
1111
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especially when by our eyes or ears we judge of the
fiuure, quantity, (fotance, and position of -0bjects that
a~e far off, we ought to call our reason into the assistance of our senses, and correct the errors of one
sense by the help of another.
It is by the pow,ers of sense and reason joined together, that we must judge philosophically of theiuward nature, the secret properties and powers, the
causes -and effects, the relations and proportions of a
thousand corporeal objects which surround u~ OI
earth, or are placed at a distance in the heavens.If a man on the one•hand confines himself onlyte
sensible experiments, and does not exercise reaSCII
upon them, he may surpr.ise·himself and others ~
strange appearances, and learn to entertain the world
with sights and shows, but will never become a philosopher : and, on the other hand, if a man impl'iSGI
himself in ,his closet, and employ the most exquisite
powers of reason ,to find out the nature of things ia:
the corporeal world, without the m,e of his senses,
and the practice of experiments, _he will frame IO
himself a scheme of chimeras instead of true philOIO-'
phy. Hence came the invention of substantial ro,..
and qualities, of materia prima and privation, wi
all tht> insiunificant names used by the peripa ·
writ-ers; an~ it was for want of more experiments &ha
the great Pescartes ,failed in several parts of his phi-i
losophical writings •
. In the abstracted and speculative parts of die
mathematics, which treat of quantity and number,. the faculty .of reasdn must be chiefly emploJ·ed IO
perceive the relatien of various quantities, and drn
certain and useful conclusions ; but' it wants the--.
sistance of sense also to be acquainted with Jin
angles, and figures. And in practical mathematici
our senses have still greater employment.
If we would judge of the pure properties and aotions of the mind, of the uature of spirits, their vari-0us perceptions and powers, we must not inquire ,I
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our eyes and our ears, nor the images or shapes laid

apin the brain, but we must have recourse to our own
IOJlsciousness of what passes within our own mind.
If we are to pass a judgment upon any thing that
!elates to spirits in a state of union with animal na-llre, and the mixed properties of sensation, fancy, appetite, passion, pleasure, and pain, which arise
dience, we must consult our own sensations, and the
lllaer powers which we find in ourselves, considered
• men or creatures made up of a mind and an ani
1111: and by just reas0nings deduce proper conse,aences, , and improve. our_koowledge in these sub.,

jacts.

.

If we have· occasion to judge concerning matters

eoe in past ag:es, or in distant countries, and where
ire

oursel-ves -cannot be present, the powers Qf senst!

ad reason, for the most part, are not sufficient to inlrm us, and we must th erefore have recou,rse to the
•imony of .other:s: _and this is either divine ·o r hu- IID,

In matters of mere human prudence, we shall find

6e greatest advantage by making wise observations
• om· own conduct, and the conduct of others, and.
Experience in this case is ec1ual to a natural sarracity,
• rather superior. A treasure of observatio;s and
aperiences collected by wi-e men, is of admirnble·
arvice here. And perhaps there is nothincr in the
aid of this kind equal to the sacred book°of Proierbs, even if we look on it as a mere human writing.
In questions of natural religion, we must exercise
6e faculty of reason which God has given us; and
ace he has been pleased to afford us his word, we
d confirm and improve or correct our reasonings
this subject by the divine assistance of the bible.
In matters of revealed religion, that is, Christianily, Judaism, &c. which we could never have known
the light of nature, the word of God is our only
dation and chief light; though he~e our reason

uurvey of the events attenrling such conduct.
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must be used, both to find out the true meaning
God in his word, and to de.rive just inferences frolii
what God has written, ns well as to judge of the
credentials whereby divine testimony is distinguished
from mere human testimony, or from imposture,
As divine revelation can never contradict right
reason, for they are two great lights given us by our
Creator for our conduct, so reason ought by no meam
to assume to itself n power to contradict di vine revelation.
Though revelation be not contrary to reason, pJ
there are. four classes wherein matters of revelntteil
may be said to rise above, or go heyond our reaSGII.
1, When revelation as~erts two things of whichwe
have clear ideas, to be joined, "hose connection•
ugreement is not discoverable by reason ; as whet
scripture informs us, that the dead shall rise, that tie
earth shall be burnt up, and the man Christ J•
sbull return from heaven, none of these thing& COllil
ever be found out or proved by reason.
2. When revelation affirms any proposition, wlile
reason has no clear and distinct ideas of the su~
or of the predicate ; as God created all things
Jesus Christ: by the Urim and Thummim God t
forth divine oracles. The predicate of each of
propositions is to us an obscure idea, for we kuow,d
:what was the peculiar agency of Jesus Christ whft
God the Father created the -world by him; nor hi
we any clear and cer tain conception· what the Ufflll
and Thummim were, nor how God ga\'e answ 1t
his people by them.
3. When revelation in plain nnd express language;.
declares some doctrine which our reason at preenl
knpws not with evidence and certainty how oru
what sense to reconcile some of its own princi
as, that the child Jesu s is the mighty Goel, Isa. 1
6., which proposition canies a seeming oppos· ·
to the unity and spirituality of the Godhead, whi4i
are principles of reason,
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+. When two propositions or doctrines are plain•
i,.userted by divine revelation, which our reason at
present knows not how or in what sense with evidence and certainty to reconcile with one another;
11, the Father is the only true God, John xvii. S.
and yet, Christ is over all, God blessed for ever,
lorn. ix. 5.
.
Now divine revelation having declared all these
propositions, reason is bound to receive them, be•
cause it cannot prove them to be utterly inconsistent
• impossible, · though the ideas of them may be oblCUre, though we ourselves see not the rational con11etion of them, and though we know not certainly
Jiew to reconcile them. In these cases reason must
llbmit to faith : that is, we are bound to believe what
God asserts, and wait till he shall clear up that which
aeems dark and difficult, and till the mysteries of
faith shall be farther explained to us, either in this
118l'ld, or in the wprld to come• , and reason itself
ictates this submi 1.ion.
VII. Direct. · It is very useful to have some gennl principles of truth settled in the mind, whose
lftllence is great and obvious, that they may be alays ready at hand to ai;sist us in judging of the
pt variety of things which occur. These may be
ailed first notions, or fundamental principles; for
iough many of them are deduced from each other,
Jd most or all of them may be called principles, when
ampare<l with a thousand other judgments which
we form under the regulation and influence of these
primary propositions.
Every art and science, as well as the affairs of cilife and religion, have peculiar principles of this
• belongin~ to them. There are metaphysical,
ysicnl, mathematical, political, economical, me<li' theolo&ical, moral, and prudential principles of
ment. lt would be too tedious to gi"e a speci•
• See something more on this subject, Direc, II, preccd. and chap,
act 6,
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men of them all in this pbce. Those which
most universal use to us, both as men and as Cb ·
may be found in the following chapter
:,:ules of judgment about pa1·ticular objects.
Vlll. Direct. Let the degrees of your as
every proposition bear an exact proportion
different degrees of evidence. Remember this.·
of the greatest principles of wisdom that m:i.n c
at in this world, and the best human security
the dangerous mistakes in speculation 01· pract'
1n the nature of thin~s, of which our know
made up, there is infimte variety in their d
evidence. And as God has given our minds a
to su11pend their assent till the evidence be
we have a power to receive things which are
ed to Us with a stronger or weaker belief, in ·
variety of degrees proportionable to their ev'
) believe, that the planets are inhabited, and
lieve that the earth rolls among them yearly
the sun; but I do not believe both these pro
with an equal firmness of assent, because the
ments for the latter are drawn from mathe
Gbservations ; but the arguments for the fo
but probable conjectures and moral reasonin
neither do I believe either of these propositi
firmly, as I do that the earth is about twent
thousand miles round, because the mathe
proof of this is much easier, plainer and s
And yet farther, when I say that the earth was c
by the power of God, I have still a more ·
assurance of this, than of all the rest, because
and scripture join to assure me of it.
IX. Direct. Keep your mind always open
ceive truth, and ,never set limits to your im
ments. Be always .ready to hear what may be
jected even against your favourite opinions, and
which have bad longest possession of our
Ancl if there should be any new and uncontr
evidence brought agains~ ~hese old or beloved
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ts, do not wink your eyes fast against the light,
part with any thing for the sake of truth : Reber when you overcome an error, you gain truth;
victory is on your side, and the advantages are all
own.
I confess those grand principles of belief and pracwhich universally influence our conduct, both
regard to this life and the life which is to come,
d be supposed to be well settled in the first year;;
r studies, such as the existence and providcmce
, the truth of Christianity, the authority of
· ture, the geneml rules of morality, &c. \\' e
Id avoid a light fluttering genius, ever ready to
ge our foundations, and to be carried about with
kind. of doctrine. To guard against which
nveniences, we should !al.lour with earnest diliand fervent prayer, that our most fundamental
important points of belief and practice may be
lished upon just grounds of reason and scrip, when we come to years of discretion, and fit to
for ourselves in such important points. Yet
it is possible that the folly or prejudices of
ger years may have established persons in some
ken sentiments, even in very important matters,
ould always hold ourselves ready to receive any
advantage toward the direction or improvement
of our established principles, as well as opinions
leaser moment.

CHAP. V.
IAL RULES TO DIRECT US IN JUDGING OF PARTICULAR OBJECTS,

would be endless to run through all those parr objects concerning which we have occasion to
ajudcrment at one time or another. Things of
most frequent occurrence, of the widest extent,
of the greatest importance, are the objects an<l
cises o!· ~ense, of reason ~q speculation, the
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matters or morality, religion and · prunence, of hu
man ·and divine testimony, together 'Yith the essays
of reasoning upon things past and future. Special
rules relating to all these will be the subject of the
following sections.

!.-Principles and Ru/,es ef Judgment concerning the objects qfSmse.
THOUGH our senses are sometimes liable to be
deceived, yet when they are rightly disposed, and fitly exercised about their proper objects, with thejust
a sistance of reason, they give us sufficient evidence
of tmth.
This may be proved from an argument drawn
from the wisdom, goodness, and faithfulness of God
our creator. It was l,e gave us our senses, and he
would not make us of such a constitution as to be
liable to perpt>tual deception and unavoidable error
in using these faculties of sen!ie in the best manner
we are capable of, about these very things which are
the proper objects of them.
This may be proved also by the ill consequences
that would follow from the supposition of the contrary. If we could have no certainty of the dictates of
our senses, we could never be sure of any of th e common affairs and occurrences of life. Men could not
transact any of their civil or moral concerns with any
certainty or justice : nor indeed could we eat or
drink, walk or move with safety. Our senses direct
us in all these.
Again, the matters of religion depend in some measure upon the certainty of the dictates of sense; for
faith comes by hearing; and it is to our senses that
God appeals in working miracles to p rnve his own
revelation. Now, if when our eyes and ears, and
other organs of &ense, are rightly d isposed and exercised about their proper objects, they were always
liable to be deceived, there could be no knowledge
of the gospel, 110 proof of divine revelation by visions,
voices or miracles.
SECT,
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Our senses will discover things near us and round
tillout us, which are necessary for our pres@nt state,
)ith sufficient exactness, and things distant also, as
ir as they relate to our necessary use of them.
Nor is there need of any more accurate rules for thelie of our senses in the judgment of all the common
irs of life, or even of miraculous and divine oper~
· ns, .than the vulgar part of mankind are suffintly acquainted with by nature, and by their own
aly observations.
But if we would express these rule · n a more ex• manner, how to judge by the dictates of our
anses, they should be represented thus :
I. We must take care that the organs of our sense
'9. rightly disposed, and not under the power of any
I.temper or considerable decay; as for instance,
fatour eyes are not tinctured with the jaundice. when
would judge of colours, lest we pt·onounce them
yellow : that our bands are not burning in a fe1 or benumbed with frost or the palsy, when we
Id judge of the heat or coldne s of any object;
our palate be not vitiated by any disease, or by
. other improper taste, when we would judge
the true taste of any solid or liquid. This di. n relates to all our ienses, but the following
chiefly refel' to our sight.
• We must observe whether the object be at a
r distance, for if it be too near or too far off,
eyes will not sufficiently distinguish many things
b are properly the objects of sight ; and th_e reif possible,. we must make nearer approache~
e object, 01· remove farther from it, till we have
'ned that due distance which gives ll.'i the clear•
perception.
We must not employ our sight to take a full
ey at once of objects that are too lat·ge for it, but
ust view them by parts, and then judge of the
e: Nor must our senses judge of objects too
; for iOme things which appear through glasses
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to be really and distinctly existent, are either u
invisible, or greatly confused, when we would j
of them by the naked eye.
4. We must place ourselves in such a position
ward the object, or place the object in such a
tion toward our eye, as may give us the clearest
presentation of it : for a different position gr
alters the appearance of the shape of boJies.
for this 1·eason we should change th~ position
of the eye and the object in some cases, that by vi
ing the objec in several appearances, we may
a more complete and certain judgment concerning·
5. We must consider what the medium is by w ·
objects m·e represented to our senses ; whether it
thinner or thicker; whether it be air or vapour,
water, or glass,. &c. ; whether it be duly eulighte
or dusky; whether it reflect or refract, 01· only tr
mit the appearance of the object; and whether it
tinctured with any particular colour; whether is
· moving or at rest. ..
. . ·
6. We must sometimes use other helps to es·
our senses; and if we make use of glasses, we m
make all just allowances for the thickness or '
ness of them, for the clearness or dulness, for
smoothness or rnughness, for the plainness, the
vexity or concavity of them, and for the distance
whis;h these glasses are placed from the eye, or
the object, or from one another, if there be two
more glasses used, and _all this according to the r
of art. The same sort of caution should be used
so _in m_e diums which assist the hearing, such
speaking-trumpets, hearing-trumpets, &c.
7. If the object may be proposed to more se
than one, let us call in the assistance of some o
senses to examine it, and this will increase the e
dence of what one sense dictates. For example,
ear may assist our eye in j1,1dging of the distance
bodies, which are both visible and sonorous, as
exploded cannon, or a cloud charged with thun
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Our feeling may assist our sight in judginO' of the
kind, the shape, situation, or distance of bodies that
are nearer at hand, as whether a garment be silk or
stuff, &c. So if I both see, hea.r, and embrace my
friend, I am sure he is present.
8. We should also make several trials, at some
distant times, and in different circumstances, ~ompar•
iag former experiments with later, and our own observations with those of other persons.
It is by such methods as these that modern philosophy has been so greatly improved by the use of
aensible experiments.

II.-.Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters ef Reason and Speculation.
IT is by reason we judge both in matters of speculation and practice; there are peculiar rules which
relate to things practical, whether they lie matters
of religion, morality, or prudence, yet many things
in this section may be applied to practical inquiries
and matters of faith, though it chiefly relates to
knowledge or speculati6ns of reason.
l. Whatsoever clear ideas we can join together
without inconsistency, are to be counted possible,
.because almighty power :can make whatsoever we
can conceive.
2. From the mere possibility of a thing we can.n ot
infer its actual existence : nor from the non-existence
afit can we infer its impossibility.
Note, The idea of God seems to <:laim an exemp •
lion from this general rule; fot· if he ·be possible, he
t:ertainly exists, because the very idea includes eternity, and he eannot begin to be: if he exist not, he
is impossible, for the very same reason.
S. Whatsoever is evidently contained in the idea
rl any thing, may be affirmed of thAt thing with certainty. Reason is contained in the idea of a man ;
and existence is contained in the idea of God ; and
SECT.
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therefore we may affirm God ·exists, and man is re&•
son able,
·
4. It is impossible that the same thing should be,
and not be at the same time, and in the same respect.
Thence it follows, that two contradictory ideas can,,
not be joined in the same part of the same subject,
nt the same time, and in the same respects; or, that
two contr:idicto1-ypropositions can never be both true.
5 , The more we converse with any subject in it,
various properties, the better knowledge ofit we are
likely to attain; and l.,y frequent and repeated inquiries and experiments, reasonings and conversations about it, we confirm our true judgments of that
thing, and correct our former mistakes.
6. Yet after our utmost inquiries, we can never be
assured by reason, that we know all the powers and
properties of any finite being.
7. If finite beings are not adequately known by us,
much less the things which are innnite : for it is of •
the nature of .a finite mind not to be able to compre,,
hend wl1at is infinite.
8. We may judge and argue very justly and cer..
taiuly concerning infinities, ·in some parts of them,
or so fur as our ideas• reach, though the infinity of
them hath something :incemprebensible in it. And
this is built on the general rule following, viz.
9. Whatsoever is sufficiently clear and evideni
ought not to be denied, though there are other thin~
belonging to the same subject, which cannot be comprehended. I may affirm many things with certaintJ
concerning human souls, their un:on with bodies,
concerning the divisibility of matter, ~nd the attributes of God, though many things relating to th~
are darkness to us.
10. If any opinion proposed has eitl1er no argu•
me1Jts, or equal ai•guments for and against it, we must
remain in perfect suspense about it, till convincing
evidence appear on one side.
11. )Vhere present necessity of action does 11-0&
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constrain us to determine, we should not immediately
yield up our ass.e nt to mere probable arguments,
•ithout a due reserve, if we have any reasonable
tiope of dbtaining greater light and evidence on one
tide or the other : for when the balance of the judgment once resigns its equilibrium or nE:utrality to a
tlere probable:argument, it is too teady to settle itself
1111 that side, so that the mind will not easi~V' change
dmt judgment, though bl'ight and strong evidence
tppear afterwards on the other side.
12. Of two opinions, if one has unanswetable difftculties attending it, we must not reject it immelliltely tiH we examine whether the contrary opinion
lias not difficulties as •unanswerable.
13. If each opinion has objections against it, which
we cannot answer, or reconoile, we should rather
entl,rnce that whioh has the least difficulties in it,
•d whi:ch has the best argument to support it: and
~t our assent bear ptoportion to the superior evidence.
1'4-. If a:ny doctrine hath very sttong and sufficient
light and evrdence to comrnand our assent, we should
aot teject it because there is an objection or two
against it, which we are not able to answer; for upon
diis footing a common Christian would be baffled out
of every article of his faith, and must renounce even
tile clictates of his reason a1·1d his senses; and the
IDost learned man perhaps would hold but very few
of them fast; for some objections which attend the
11Ct'ed doctrine of the eternitv and the omnipresence
(/ God, and the philosophical doctrines of light,
atoms, spactl) motion, &c. al'e hal'dly solvable to this

day.
15. ,Vhere two extremes are proposed, either in

of speculation or practice, and neither of
'1em has certain and convincing evidence, it is gc11erally the safest to take the middle way. Moderation is more likely to come near the truth than doubtfid extremes, This is au excellent rule to judge of the
llllltters
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.characters and value of the greate5t part or
and things ; for nature seldom deals in super!
Jt is a good rule also by which to form our jud
in many speculative controversies ; n reconciling
<lium in such cases does often best secure t
well as peace.
16. When two different propositions have
very strong and cogent evidence, and do not
appear inconsistent, we may l;,elieve both o
though we cannot at present see the way tor
them. Reason, as well as om· own consciou
assures us, that the will of man is free, and that
titudes of human actions are in that respect
gent; and yet reason and scripture assure us,
God fornknows them all, and this implies a
fatality. Now, though learned men have not tq
day hit on any so clear and happy method as ia
sired to reconcile these propositiol}s ; yet since
not see a plain inconsistency in .them, we justlJ
lieve them both, because their evidence is great.
17. Let us n9t therefore too suddenly dete •
difficult matters, that two things are utterly ·
_sistent: for there ore many propositions which
appear inconsis,tent at first, and yet afterw
find their . consistency, and the way of reco
_them may, be. made plain and easy : as also,
.other propositions which may appear consi
,1irst, hµt' after due exaroinijtion we find their•
,eistency.
18. For the same reason .we should not

call

difficulties utterly insolvable, or those objectio
.amwerable, which we are not presently able
·swer: time and diligence may give farther light.
19. In short, if we will secure ourselves tr
ror, we should not be too frequent or hasty in
-ing the certain consistency or inconsistency,
solute universality, necessity or impossibility oftb'
·where there is not the brightest evidence.
but a young and raw philosopher, who, when he
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two particular ideas evidently agree, immediately asserts them to agree universally, to a~ree necessarily,'
and that it is impossible it should be otherwise: or
when he sees evidently, that two particular ideas happen tu disagree, he presently . asserts their constant ·
and natural incom,istency, their utte1· impossibility of'
agreement; and calls every·thing contr~ry to bis opinion absurdity and nonsensct; A true . philosopher•
will:affirm or deny with' much caution or modesty,
unless he hall thoroughly examined, and found the
e,idence of every_ pi1rt of his assertion exceeding' ,
plain • .
20. Let us have a cai·e of -building our assurance
of any_impol'tant point of doctrine upon one sinµ-le
argumeut, . if there are more to be obtained. ~~ e
should not".slight and reject aJ.l other arguments
1hich support the same doctrine, lest if our favoul'ite
arguments should be refuted, and fail ·us, we should'
be tempted to abandon that important principle of'
truth. I think this was a -very Cl:l'lp1_tbl'e practice .in •
Descartes, and some of,his followers, ,who, when he
. had found out the argu.ment for the exh,tence of God,
derived from the i<lea of a most perfect and self-ex~tent being, he seemed .to despise aud abandon all
other arguments against atheism.·.
21. If we happen to -have our ·chief arguments for ·
111y opinion refuted, .we .should not immediately give
up the opinion itself; for perhaps it may be a truth. still, and -we ·may find it to be justly supported by
other arguments, which we might once think weaker,
or perhaps by new arguments which we knew not ·

before.·

22. We ought to esteem lhat to be sufficient evidence of a proposition, where both the kind and the
i>rce of the arownents or proofs are as great as the
nature of the thing admits, and as the necessity or
exigencies of the case requires. So if we have·a
credible and certain testimony that Christ rose from
the dead, it is enough; we are not to expect mathe•
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matical or ocular demonstration for it, at least bl
day.
23. Though we should seek what proofs m
nttaiued of any proposition, and we shculd
any number of arguments which are just and e
fbr the con6rmo.tion of the same truth ; yet we
not judge of the truth of any proposition by the
her of argument. which are brought to support it,
by the strength and weight of them: a building
stancl firmer and longer on four pillars of m
than on ten of san~ or earth, or timber.
2(.. Yet where certain evidence is not to be
or expected, a coniiiderable number of prob
guments carry great weight with them, even in
ters of speculation. That is a probable hypo
in philosophy or in theology, which goes forth
wards the solution of many difficult que,stions
on any subject.
III.-Principles and rules efJt,dgment in
ters of Morality and Religion.
Here it may be proper, in the first place, to
tion a few definitions of words or terms.
By matters of morality and religion I mean.
things which relate to our duty to God, ourselr
our fellow-creatures.
l\foral good, or virtue, <;>r holiness, is an ac •
temper conformable to the rule of our duty.
evil, or vice, or sin, is an action or temper uu
mable to the rule of our duty, or a neglect to
Note, The words vice or virtue chiefly impl
relation of our actions to men and this wowl •
· and holiness rather imply their re]~tio.n to, &id
the other world.
Natqral good is that which gives us pleas
satisfaction. Natural evil is that whicb givea q
or. grief.
SEcT.

H11ppiness consi11t$ in th~ l\t~inment of the ·
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and most lasting natun,-1 good. Misery consists in
suffering the highest and most lasting natural evil;
that is, in shott, heaven or hell.
Though this be a just account of perfect happiness
and perfect misery,yet wheresoever pain overbalances
pleasure, there is a degree _o f misery; and whereso•erer pleasure overbalances pain, there is a degree of
happiness.
.
I proceed now to lay down some princples and ,
roles of judgment in matters of morality and religion.
I. The will of our Maker, whether discovered by,
reason or revelation, carries the highest authority'
with it, and is therefore the highest rule of duty to•
intelligent creatures; a conformity or non-conformity,
to it determines their actions to be morally goo~ or
evil.
2. Whatsoever is really an immediate duty to- ·
wards ourselves, or towards our fellow-creatures, ii. ,
more remotely a duty to God; ·and the:r:efore in the:·
practice of it we should hav.e an eye to the will pf ·
God as our rule, and to his glory as our end.
3. Our wise and gracious Creator has closely united our duty and our happiness together; and has
connected sin, or vic'e, and punishment; that is, he
has ordained that the highest natural good -and evil
should have a close connection with moral good and
evjl; and that both in ,the nature of things, .and by
bis own positive appointment,
· 4. · Conscience should seek all due information in
order to <let.ermine what is duty, and what is sin, be- cause happiness and misery depend upon i't.
5,. On this account, our inclination to present
tempor9:I good, and 1our aversion to -pre~ent temporal
evil, must be wisely overbalanced by the consideration of future and eternal good or evil, that is, hap-.
piness or misery. And for this reason we should
not omit a duty, or commit a sin, to gain any tem•
poral good, or to avoid any temporal evil.
6. · '1J10ugh our natural reason in a state 'of inno•

us.
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ce11ce mig'bt ~e ~ufficient to {j.l)d out those duti•
which were -'ec~slfl.l"y fop an innocent. creature. ia
order to abide in the f~VO\\P. qf his Maker, yet i1t a
fallea state OU.l'. ~tural l'.e8$0D is- by po tJ}Cftn~ sufficient to finc,i em all that ~ n~ess~ry to restore a
si~ql creature tot.be divine favour.
T. TherefOle God. h1.¥1 ~ondes~~nded in vnr•
ages of mankind to reveal to sinful men wbat he re•
quires of them iQ or<le1• t-0 their restoration, and has
appoil;lted in h,i.~ word. i;01;ne peculiar mattei:s of fai~
and practice in, Ol'de • to their saJ.v&t,on. This is
called revealed :i;eligion, as the things knQwable coa-,
cerning• Go<l. anq. our duty by the lig_ht Qf nature,. is
called nat,ural religion,
8. There are also man.y parts of n;iornlity, and nat~
ral religion, or many natural duties relating to God,
to ourselves, and to our, ueighbou.rs, which. would
be exceeding difijct4lt a~d tedious {oi; the bulk of
mankind to find out l\nd determin.e by, natural rea,, '
son: therefore it has pleas~d God, in tJ1is satred
book of di11ine revelation, to e;,:press th~ mo,st neoes,
sal')I dq,ties of this kii;id in a very plain and e~y manner, and make them intelligible tQ souls of the low.
E'St capacity ; or they may b~ ver-y easily derived
thence by the use of reason.
9. As there are some duties much mo~e neqess~
~nd more import~nt than others {lre, so every duly
~requires our applicatiQn to understa_n<,l and p.rnctise
it in proportion to its necessity and i1:nportance.
lo. Where two d,uties seem to stapd in oppositioa
to each other, and we Cl\llno\ practise l;>oth, the le$!
must give way to the greater, .i.nd the omissiou of the
less i8 uot sinful. So ceremoni41l laws. give way ij)
moral: God will have n;ierny aud not S[icritice.
11. ln duties ofnatu;,;aL,eligion,,we ml\y jud.ge of the
different degrees.of thei,: nec.essity ~nd importance by
reason, accordi1Jg to their greatef or fi\Ci>re apparent
1end,mcy to the honou o(God, and the good ufm~:
but in. Dltltter.s of reve11led religl9n..., it is only tlivine
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revelation can certainly inform us what is .most- ne~
we, ma,y be assisted
also in that search by the exel'Cls.es, of'i·eason.
12. In actions wherein there may be some scruple
about the, duty or ]afflfulness of them, we should
thoo.se &}ways. the safest side, and abstain as, far a,
we oan from the practic~ Qf things whose lawfulnei,s
wesm,pect. ·
13. P.oints of the greatest impo1ttance in human
life, or in rel'igion, g.re ge,nerally the mo1,t evident,
both in ~he n~ture o( things, and in the word of
God; and when~ points of taith or practice are exceeding diffitult to find out, they caunnot be exceedmg im.portaot. · This prnposition may ue proved by
the gooclness a.nd fa,ithf°L\lness of God, aSJ well as by
~pedence aIJd ob.servation.
l¼. ln some oftJi.e outward.practices and forms of
.teligiQn.,. ~ well as. hwnan affairs, there is, frequent..
ly a pr~sent necessity of speedy action one way or
ether :- h1 S!J~h 1;1.; case, having surveyed arguments
OQ bQtq side.s,. a.s fax as our time and cir<:umst~ncei
admit, we mui.t. guide our practice by those 1·easons
wl\iyh ap,pea,; most probable, and s.e em at that time
tQ Qverha{ll,noe the rest, yet always reserving room
to qdmit far,t her light and evidence, w.Jwu such occurrences retu.i:n agai1,1. It is a preponderation of
~ircq_n1stautial . a.rgument_s that must determine our
aQtio.i~ iu a, tbo..us,apd occurrences. ·
15. "-"e may also determine upon the probable
arguments \Vhe-re tbe matte1· is•of s.mall conseque,n ce,
ancl w~ulcl not ans:wer the trouble of s.e.ek.ing after
certainty,. Life and time, a.re more precious th:m to
ha,ve a large shai1e of them laid om -iIL scrupulous.in,quii-ies,_w,hethe~ smoking tobacco, 01: w..earing a periwig, b~ lawfol OJ." no.
16~ In ai:Iairs of greater, hnportance, and -which
•ay. h~ve a long,_ las.ting, and extensive influence
Of) our future, conduct or ~appines~ we should. not
~e- up w,~th pxobabilities~ if certainty may be a~

869.sary, and most important; yet
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tained. Where there is any doubt on the mi
such cases we should call in the assistance of all
ner of circumstances, reasons, motives, consequ
on all sides: we must wait longer, and with
request seek human and divine advice before we
ly determine our judgment and our practice,
ing to the Roman sentence;, Quod statuen<mm est
deliberandum est diu. We should be long in
dering what we must determine once for all.
SECT.

IV.-Principles and Rules of Judgmtttl
Matters of human Prudence.

THE great design of prudence, as distinct
morality and religion, is to determine and m
every affair with decency, and to the best ad,an
This is decent, which is agreeable to our
condition, or circumstances, whether it be in
our, discourse, or action.
That is advantageous, which attains the m0&t
best purpose , and avoids the most and greatea
.con venieuces.
As there is infinite variety in the circumstan
persons, thing , actions, times and places, so we
be furni1:1hed with such general rules as are 1
mo<lable to all this variety by a wise judgment
,discretion: for what is an act of consummate
dence in some times, places and circumstance
be consummate follv in other • Now these
may be ranged in
following manner.
I. Our regard to persons or things should be
verned by the degrees of concernment we haYe
them, the relation we have to them, or the ex
ions we have from them. These should be the
sures by which we should proportion our dili
and application in any thing that relates to them.
2. We should alway consider whether the
we pursue be attainab e ; whether it be worth7
pursuit; whether it be worthy the degree of p

the
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whether it be ,vorthy of the means used in order to
attain it. This rule is necessary both in matters of
knowledge and matters of practice.
3. When the advantages nnd disadvantages-, con•
veniences -and inconveniences of any action are ba•
lanced together, we must finally determine on that
side which has I.he superior weight; and the soonel'
in things which are necessarily and speedily to ha
done or dete1·mined.
4-. If advantages and disadvantages in their own
nature are equal, then those which are most cel'tain
or likely as to the event, should turn the scale of oi.w
judgment, and determine our practice.
S. Where the improbabilities of success or ad van•
tage are greater than the probabilities, it is not pru•
dence to act or veoture. It is proper to inquire whe-ther this be not the case in almo!lt l.\ll lotteries ; fo_.
they that hold stakes will certainly ~cure part to
tbemselv~s; and only the remainder being divid,ed
into prizes must render the improbability of gain to
each adv~nturer greater than \he probability.
6. We should not despise or neglect any real ad•
vantage, and abandon the pursuit of it, though we
cannot attain all the adv~nto.ges that we desire. This
would be to act like children, who are fond Qf som~
Lhing which strikes their f4noy most, and s1.dlen and
regardless of every thing el~e, if they are not humour..
ed in that fancy.
7. '{hough a general kt\owl.ed,ge of things be use•
ful in science and in hquw.Q life, yet we should con·
tent ourselves with. l\ more 11qpevficial knowledge 0£
those things which hl\ve fue least r,elation to. oui: chief
end and design.
8. This rule holds good also in mattei:s of busi•.
ne.;s and practice, a11 well as in matters of knowledge;
and therefore we should nol grasp at every tning,
lest in the end we attain nothing. PE:rsons that
either py aq inconstancy of tempe1•, or by a vain &m•
1/it,Aon, wUl. p~raue ~v~.ry 11ort of art and science, 11tud,y.

.
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and business, seldom grow excellent in any of
and projectors who form twenty schemes, seldc
sufficient application to finish one of them, or
it turn to good account.
9. Take heed of delaying and trifling amon
means instead of reaching at the end. Take
wasting a life in mere speculative stu<lies, whi
called to action and employment : dwell not too
in philosophical, mathematical, or grammatical
of learning, when your chief design is law, pb
or divinity. Do not spend the day in ga
flowers by the way side, lest night c-,me upon
before you arrive at your journey's end, and then
will not reach it.
10. When the case and circumstances of wise
, good men resemble our ca~e and circumstancea,
may borrow a great deal of instruction towarda
prudent conduct from their example, as well as•
cases we may learn much- from their eonversatiCII
advice.
1 I. After all other rules remember this, that
speculation in matters of human pPudence can
be a perfect director- without-experience and o
tion. We may be content therefore in our yo
years to commit some unavoidable mistakes in
of prudence, and we shall- see mistakes en
the conduct of othe11s, both which ought to be
sured up among our useful observations, in o
teach us better judgment for time to come.
times the mistakes,_ imprudences -and follies,
ourselves or others have been guilty of, give us
er and more effectual lessons of prudence,
wisest counseb, and the fairest examples could
have done.

V .-Principles and Rules ef Jurlgmmt in
ters ef human Testimony.
THE evidence of human testimony is not so
to lea<l us into the knowledge of the essence and
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ward -nature of things, as to acquaint us with the ex•
istence of things, and to inform us of matters of fact
both past an<l pre.sent. And though tht're be a great
deal of fallibility in the testimony of men, yet there
are some things we .m ay be almost as certain of, as
that the sun shines, or that five t\~enties make a bun•
dred. Who is there at London that knows any thing
of the world, but believes that there is such a city as
Paris in France; that the Pope dwells at Rome;
that Julius Cresar was an emperor; or that Luther
had a great band jn the reformation ?
If we observe the following rules, we may arrive
at such a certainty in many things of human testi•
111ony, as that it is morally impossible we should be
deceived, that is, we may obtain a moral certainty.
I. Let us consider whether the thing reported be
in itself pos~i nle; if not, it can never be credible,
wbosoeyer relates it
2. Comider farther whether it be probable, whether
there are any concurring.circumstances to prove it,
besides tQe mere _,testimony of the person that relates it. I confess, if.these last conditions are wanting, the thing may be true, but then it.ought to have
the stro11ger testimony to support jt,
3. ,Consider whether .the person who relates it
be capable of }mowing the truth ; whether he be a
skilful judge in such matters, if it be a business of
art, and a nice appearance in nature, or some curi•
ous experiment in philosophy. But if it be a mere
occurrence in life, a plain sensible matter of fact, it
is enough to inquire whether he who relates it were
an eye or ear witness, or whether he himself had it
only by hearsay, or cun ti;ace it up to the original.
. 4:, Consider whether the llilrrator be honest and
faithful, as well as skilful; whether he hath no bias
upon his mind, no peculiar gain -or pxofit by believing or .r~porting it, no interest or principle which
might war_p his own belief aside from truth, or wh,ich
might tempt him to prevaricate, to speak falsely, or
•
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to give a ' .representation 11 Httle different fr.om the
naked truth of things. In short, whether there be no
-occasion of suspicion conce,ning his report.
5. Consitler whether' several persons ag1,ee together in the .:report of this matter; and if -so, then
whether these pel'sons who joiiled -together ih their
testimony might not be -supposed ·to combine together
in a fahehood. Whether they ,are persons of -sufficient skill, pi:obitiy and 0'Fedity. It might •be also
inquired, whether they are of-different nations,- sects,
parties, opinions, or interests. !For ~he -more divided
they ·are jn all •these,- tl.1e more U.kt!ly ,is. their report
to he true, i.f they ,lslg1:ee tolf:ethe~ .in their acc:oni:rt ~
the s:ame thmg; and especially 1f threy persist ,n it
without wavering.
·
'
'6 . Conside:r farther, ~1 hether the l'epo!!t -were capable of being easily 1,efuted ot !first if it had ·net
been true; if so, this confirms the1 te&'t!imony.
·
7. Inquire yet .again, ,~hetne11 fhel'e ha-s been
a constant, unifomm t1'lf.d-ition a,1d beli-ef\ of thi-s mal•
ter from the 11e:ry .ffost ag'e -ov time when the thing
was transactedf ·without. ,any -reasom1~Jle doubts or
contradidi:ons. 10r.,.
8. Ifauy part ,ofit .hath been-doubted by ,anyeoosi<lerable.persons, W1bethe11 iit tlias •been se,frched •out
and afterwards cenfwm6d, by having -all tlfe scruples
and doubts removed. hi either,·, of these cases· uh~ tes•
timouy becomes move firm ·ancl, credible.

. 9. lnqui.re, on the other hand, wheth~r there are
ainy consicrerable objections remaiil:ing •agai11st the belief of that proposition so attested. Whether there be
any thing. very,imp11obable,in the thing it'Self. :\V!Je..

ther any concurrent circumstances· se.em to oppose'
it. Whether any per.son or pers0ns, give -wpositive
and plain testimony agai11~t it. vVh~ther they areequa:lly, skilful, and equally faithful as tho, e who assert it. Whether there be· as many or mere in·num•
her; and whether they might have any secret bias
or .influence on them to contradict it.
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10. Sometimes the entire silence of a thing may
have something of weight towards the decision of a
doubtful point of history, or a matter of human faith,
,iz. where the fact is pretended to be public, if the
persons who are silent about it were · skilful to observe, and could not but know such an occurrence :
if they were engaged by principle or by interest to
liave declared it : if they had fair opportunity to
speak of it: and these things may tend to make the
matter suspicious, if it be m ,t very well attested by
positive proof.
11. Remember that in some reports there are more
marks of falsehood than of truth, and in others there
are more marks of truth than falsehood. By a comparison of all these things together, and putting
every argument on one side a.ml the other into the
balance, we must form as good a judgment as we can
which side preponderates ; and give a strong or
feeble assent or dissent, or withhold our judgments
e11tirdy, according to greater or lesser evidence, according to more plain or dubious marks of truth or
falsehood.
•
12. Observe, that in matters of human testimony
there is oftentimes a great mixture of rruth and
falsehood irt the report itself: some parts of the story
may be perfectly true, and some utterly false; and
some may have such a blended confusion of circum•
ltances which are a little warpt aside from the truth,
aad misrepresented, that there is need of good skill
and accuracy to form a judgment concerning them,
and determine which part is true, and which is false.
The whole report is not to be believed, because some
parts are indubitably true, nor the whole to be re•
jected, because some parts are as evident falsehoods.
,ve may draw two remarkable observations from
this section.
0bse1·v. 1. How certain is the truth of the Christiw 1·eligion, and particularly of the resurrection of
Christ, which is a matter of fact on which Cbris-
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tianity is built. ,ve have alrno~t all tl1e concurrent
evidences that can be derived from human testimony,
joining to confirm this glorious truth. The fact is
not impossible; concurrent .circumstance;; cast a fa.
vourable aspect on it; fr was foretold by one who
wrought miracles, and -therefore not unlikely nor tlll•
expected ; the apostles and first disciples were eye
and ear-witnesses, for they conversed with their risen
Lord; they were the most plain honest men in themselves: the temptijtions ofw0rldly interests di<l rather
discourage their belief and report of it: they all
agreed in this matter, though they were men of dif.
ferent,characters : Pharisees and fishermen, and publicans, men of J u<lea and Galilee, and perhaps Heathens, who were early convert8(1; the thing might
easily have been disproved, -if it were false: it -hath
been conveyed by constant tradition and writing
down to our times; those who at first doubted were
afterwards convinced by .certain proofs ; nor have
any pretended to give any proof of the contrary, but
merely denied the .fact with impudence in opposition
to all these evidences.
,, Observ.· II. How weak is the faith which is due to
a mµltitu<le of-things in ancient human history. For
though . many of these criteria, or marks of credi.bility, are .found plainly in the more general and
-public facts, yet as to a multitude of particular fadl
and circumstances, how deficient are they in &udi
evidence as should demand our assent ! Perhaps
.there is nothing that ever was done in all past ages,
and which was not a public fact, so well attested•
the resurrection of Christ •

VI.-Prt"nciples and Rules if Judgment iii Matters qf divine Testimony.
As human testimony acquaints us with matten of
Tact, both past and present, which lie beyond the
. ,..reach of our own personal notice ; so divine testimony
. SECT,
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is suited to inform us botli ofd1e nature of things, as
well as matters of fact, and of things future, as well..
as present or past.
Whatsoever is dictated to us by God himself, or- by men who are divinely inspired, must be believed
with full assurance. Reason demands us to believe
whatsoever" divine revelation dictates: . for God is
perfectly wi!>e, and cannot be deceived ; he is faithful
and good, and will not deceive his creatures: and when
reason has found out the certain marks or credentials of divine testimony to belong to any proposition,
there remains then no farther inq~iry to . be made,
but only to find out the true sense and meaning ol'
that which G od has revealed, .for reason itself demands th e belief of it.
Now,.cl i,·ine testi monJ. ,or. r evalation requires these ··
fo.ilowiug credentials. ,
I. That the propositions or doctrines revealed be
not inconsistent with reason; for inteUig.ent creaturei;
can never be bound to believe real inconsistencies.
Therefore we are . sure the Popish doctrine of tranmbstautiation is not a matter , of divine revelation,
because it is contrary to all our senses and our reason, even in their proper exercises.
God can dictate nothing but wl1at is ";Ol'thy of
himself, and agreeable .to his own nature and divine
perfections. - Now many of these perfections are discovered by the light of reason, and whatsoever is inconsistent with these perfections cannot be a divine
revelation . .
But let it be noted, that in matters of practice towards our fellow-creatures, God may command us
to act in a manner contrary to what reason would
direct antecedent to that command. So Abraham
was commanded to offer up his son a sacrifice : the
lsraelities were ordered to borrow of-the Egyptian&
without paying them, and to plunder and slay the
inhabitants of Canaan : because God has a sovereig11
right to all things, and can with equity disposses~

,
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his creatures of life, and every thing which he has
given them, and especially such sinful creatures as
mankind; and he - can appoint wh(?m he pleases to
be the instruments of this just dispossession or deprivation. So that these divine commands are not
really inconsistent with right reason: for whatsoever
is so, cannot be believed where that inconsistency
appears.
2. Upon the same account the whole doctrine or
revelation must be consistent with itself; every part
of it must be comistent with each other; ·a nd though
in points of practice latter revelations may repeal or
cancel former divine laws, yet in matters of belief no
latter revelation can be inconsistent with what bu
Leen heretofore revealed.
3. Divine revelation must be confirmed by some
divine and supernatural appearances, some extraor•
·dinary signs or tokens, visions, voices, or miracles
wrought, or prophecies fulfilled. There must be
some demonstrations of the presence and power of
God, !>uperior to all the powers of nature, or the set•
,tied connection which God, as creator, has established among his creatures in this visible world.
4. If there are any such extraordinary and wonderful appearances and operations brought to oontest with, or to oppose divine revelation, there most,
am!, always will be such a superiority on the side rl
that revelation whirh is truly divine, as to manifeat
that God is there. This was the case when lhe
Egyptian scrcerers contended with Moses. But the
wonder~ which Moses wrought did so far tran~cend
the power of the magicians, as made them confesr,
Jt was the finger of God.
5. These divine appearances or attestations to revelation must be either known to ourselves, by om
own personal observ{ltion of them, or they must be
-8ufficiently attested by others, accordin~ to the pri,j,;.
tiples and rules by which ru atters ofhumanfaitbart
o be j,udged in th-e foregoing section.
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Some of those, who lived in the nations and ages
where miracles were wrought, were eye and ear witnesses of the truth and divinity of the revelation;
but we who live in these di:.tant a<Yes, must have
them derived down to us by just aud incontc>stabl~
history and tradition. We also, even in these distant times, may see the accomplishments of some
aocient predictions, and thereby obtain that advantage towards the confirmation of our faith in divine
revelation beyond what tbose persons enjoyed who
lived when the predictions were pronounced.
6. There is another very considerable confirmation of divine testimony: and that is, when the doctrines themselves, either on the publication or the
belief of them, produced supernatural effects. Such
were the miraculous powers which were communicated to believers in the first ages of Christianity, the
conversion of the J ews or Gentiles, the amazing success of the gospel c,f Christ without human aid, its
power in changing· the hearts and lives of ignorant
and vicious H eath ens, and wicked and profane creatures in all nations, and filling them with a spirit of
tirtue, piety, and goodness. Wheresoever persons
have fo und this effect in their own hearts, wrought
by a belief of the gospel of Christ, they have a witness in themselves of the truth of it, and abundant
reason to believe it divine.
Of the difference between reason and revelation,
and in what sense the latter is superior, see more in
Chap. II. Sect 9, and Chap, IV. -Direct. 6.

VII.-Principles and Rules qf Judging con-.
cerning Things, past, present, and to come, by the
mere Use of Reason.
THOUGH we attain the greatest assurance of things
past and future by divine faith, and learn many matters of fact, both past and present, by human faith,
yet reason also may, in a good degree, assist us to
SECT.
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judge of matters of fact both past, present, and to
come, by the following principles.
1. There is a system of beings round about us, of
which we ourselves are a part, which we call the
world; and in this world there is a course of nature,
·o r a settled order of cause&, effects, antecedents,
concomitants, consequences, &c. from which the
author of nature doth not vary but upon very im•
portant occasions.
Where antecedents, concomitants and conse$(uences, en.uses and effects, signs and things signi•
lied, subjects and adjuncts, are necessarily comn:cted with each other, we may infer the causes from the
effects, and the effects from causes, the antecede11ts
from tbe consequences, as well as consequences frOlll
antecedents, &c. and thereby be pretty certain rJ.
many things both past, present and to come. It is
by this principle, that astronomers can tell whatday
and hour the sun and moon were eclipsed five hundred years ago, and predict all future eclipses u
long as the world shall stand. They can tell precisely at what minute the sun rises or sets this day
at Pekin in China, or what altitude the dog-star had
at midnight or midnoon in Rome, on the day whm
Julius Cresar was slain. Gardeners, upon the suie
principle, can fore tel the months, when every plant
will be in bloom, and the ploughman knows the weeb
'of ba1·vest : we are sure, if there be a chicken, there
was an ecr.g: if there be a rainbow, we are certaitt it
rains not1ar off: if we behold a tree growing on the
earth, we know it hM natumlly-a root under ground.
. 3. Whe-re there is n necessary connection betwea
cnuses a11d effects~ antecedents and consequence,,
signs and things signified, we know -also, that like
causes will have like effects, and proportionable caua
.will have proportionab1e effects, contrary i:auscs will
have· contrary effects; and obsening men may t'ona
'many judgments by the rules of similitude 11ml proport1011, where the causes, effects, &c, arc not •
tirely the same!
·

PA!l.T II.

THE RIGHT USE OF ltEASO N .

24 7

4. Where there is but a probable and uncertai11
connection between antecedents, concomitants, and
consequences, we can give but a conjecture, or a
probable determination. If the clouds gather, or
the weather-glass sinks, we suppose it will rain: if
a man spit blood frequently with coughi11g, we suppose his lungs ate hurt: if very dangerous symptoms
appear, we expect his death •
5. Where causes operate freely, with a liberty of
indifrerence to this or the contrary, there we cannot
certainly know what the effects will be: for it seems
to be contingent, and the certain knowledge of it belongs only t-o God. This is the case in the greatest
part of human actions.
6. Yet wise men, by a just observation of human
nature, will give very probable conjectures in this
matter, also concerning things past, 01· things future,
because human nature in all ages and n tions has
such a -conformity to itself. By a knowledge of the
tempers of men an<l their present .circumstances, we
may be able to give a happy guess what their conduct will be., and what will be the event, by an observation of tlle like cases in former timei;. This
made the emperor Marcus Antoninus to say, " By
looking b ack into history, and considering the fate
and 1·evolutions of govemmeuts, you will be able to
form a guess, and almost prophecy upon the future.
For things past, present and to come, are strangely
uniform, and of a colour; and are commonly cast ia
the same mould. So that upon the matter, forty
years of human life may serve for a sample of ten
thousand." Collier's Antoninus, Book VII. Sect. 50.
7, There are also some other principles of judging
concerning the past actions of men in former ages,
besides books, histories and traditions, which are medimns of conveying liuman testimony; as we may
infer the skill and magnificence of the ancients, by
some fragments of their statues, and ruins of heir
buildings.
e kno'Y wh~t Roman legions came in"'.
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to Great Britain by numbers of bricks dug out of
earth in some pa1 ts of the island, with the mar
some particular legion upon them, which must
been employed there in brick-making. We
some mistakes in history by statues, coins, old al
utensils of war, &c. We confirm or disprove
pretended traditions and historical writings, by
clals, images, pictures, urns, &c.
Thus I have gone through all those particular
jects of our judgment which I first proposed,
have laid down principles and rules by which
may safely conduct ourselves therein. There •
variety of other objects concerning-which we are
casionally called to pass a judgment, viz. The
meters of persons, the value and worth of •
the sense and meaning of particular writers, m
of wit, oratory, poesy, matters of equity in ju
courts, matters of traffic and commerce between
and man, which would be endless to enumerate.
if the general and special rules of judgment 1J
have been mentioned in these two last chaptni
treasured up in the mind, and wrought into
very temper of our souls in our younger yean,
will lay a foundation for just and regular ju
«:oncerning a thousand special occurrences in
}jgious, civil, and learned life.
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ASbytheourfirstideasworkareofframed,
the min.dis perception, where•
and the sec.:>nd is jmlg•
ment, which joins or disjoins our ideas, .ind forms a
proposition, so the third operation of the mind is
reaioning, which joins several propoi;itions together;
and makes a syllogism, that is, an argument whereby
we are wont to infer some things that are less known,
from truths which are more evident.
In treating of this subject, let us consider more
particularly,
I. The nature of a syllogism, nnd the parts of
which it is composed.
2. The several kinds of syllogisms, with particu•
Jar rules relating to them.
3. The doctrine of syllo~isms, of false reasoning,
together with the means of avoiding them, and the
manner of solving or answerini them.
4-. Some general rules to direct our reasoning.

CHAP. I.
Oi THE NATURE OF A SYLLOGISM, AND THE PARTS
OF WHICH JT JS COMPOSED.

IF the mere perception and comparison of two
ideas would shew us whether they agree or disagree;
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then all rational propositions would be matte
telligence, or first principle , and there would
use of reasoning, or drawing any consequenc
is the narrowness of the human mind which ·
duces the neces. ity of reasoning. When e
unable to judge of the truth or falsehood of a
position in au immediate manner, by the mere
templation of its subject and predicate, we are
constrained to use a medium, and to compare
of them with some third idea, that by seeing h
they agreee or disagree with it, we may be
judge how far they agree or disagree among
!elves: as, if there are two lines A and B,
know not whether they are equal or no, 1
third line C, or an inch, and apply it to each of
if it agree with them both, then 1 infer that A
nre equal; but if it agree with one, and not ·
other, then I conclude A and Bare unequal: ifit
with neither of them, there can be no com
So if the question be, "'hether God must
sl1ipped, we seek a third idea, suppose the idea
c1·eator, and say,
Our Creato1· must be worshipped.
God is our Creator.
Therefore God must be worshipped.
The comparison of this third idea, with
distinct parts of the question, usually requir
propositions, wliich are called the premises : the
proposition, which is drawn from them, is the
~ion, wherein the que~tion itself ls answered,
subject and predicat~ joined either in the n
the affirmative.
The foundation of all affirmative conclusi
laid in this general truth, that so far as two p
ideas agree to any third idea, they agree also
them~el ves. The character of a creator
God, and worship agrees to a creator, therefore
1hip agrees to God.

The foundation of all negative conclusiom
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that where one of the two proposed ideas agrees with
a third idea, and the other disagrees with it, they
must needs disagree so far also with one another: as,
if no sinners are happy, and if angels are happy,
then angels are not sinners.
Thus it appears what is the strict and just notion
of a syllogism: it is a sente11ce or argument made up
of three propositions, so disposed as that the last is
necessarily inferred from those which go before, at
in the instances which have been just mentioned.
In the constitution of a syllogism, two things may
be considered, viz. the matter and the ,form of it.
The matter of which a syllogism is made up, is
three propositions; and ·these three propositions are
made up of three ideas, or terms variously joined.
The three terms are .called the remote matter of a
syllogism; and the three propositions the pro.rime or
immediate matter of it.
The three terms are named the major, the minor,
and the middle.
The predicate of the conclusion ·is called the ma•
jor term, because it is generally of a larger extension
than the minor term, or the subject. The major
and minor terms are called the extremes.
The middle term is the third idea invented and
disposed in two propositions in such ;i manner as to
shew the connection between the major and minor
term in the conclusion; for which reason the middle
term itself is sometimes called the argument.
. Th<> proposition which contains the predicate of
the conclu!iion, connected with the middle term, is
usually called the major proposition, whereas the
minor proposition COf!Dects the middle term with the
subject of the conclusion, and is sometimes called
the assumption.
Note, This ex.a ct distinction of the several parts of
a syllogism, and of the major and minor terms connected with the middle term, in the major and minor
propositions, does chiefly belong to simple or cate•
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gorical syllogis1t1s, of which we shall spea1da
next chapter, though all syllogisms whatsoever
something analogical to it.
Note farther, that the major proposition is
ra11y placed first, and the minor second, and the
clusion in the last place, where the syllogism·
gulai·ly composed and represented
.
The form of a syllogism is the f1aming and
ing of the premis~s acco1·ding to art, or just p ·
ples of reasoning, and the regular inference of
-conclusion from them.
The art of reasoning, or inferring one thing
another, is generally expressed and known bf
particle therefore, when the argument is fonned
cording to tbe rules of art; though in commo1
course or writing such icasual particles as for,
cause, manifest the act of reasoning, as well 11
illative particles then and therefore: and w
any o f these words are used, there is a perfect
gism expressed or implied, though perhaps the
propositions do not appE;ar, ot a11e not placed·

gular forms.

·

CHAP. II.
OF THE VARIOUS KJND9 OF SYLLl')GJSl\fS,

TICO.LAR RULES RELA'rlNG 1'0 THEM,

SYLLOGJSM8 are divided into various kinds, •
according to the question whioh is proved by
a.ccordiHg to the nature and composition of
accordiug to the middle terrn, which is llseato
tbe question.

L-Of universal and JJarticular Syllogismr,
negative and q.jfi1~ative.
AccoRDING to the question which is to be pr

SECT.
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universal negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative. This is often called a division of
syllogisms drawn from thP. conclusions; for so many
sorts of conclusions there may be which are marked
with the letters A, E, I, O.
In an universal affirmative syllogism, one idea is
proved universally to agree with another, and may
be universally affirmed of it, as every sin deserves
death, every unlawful wish is a sin, therefore every
unlawful wish deserves death.
In an universal negative syllogism, one idea is
proved to disagree with another idea universally, and
may be thus denied of it, as, no inju!>tice can be
pleasing to God; all persecution for the sake of conscience is injustice ; therefore no persecution for
conscience sake can be pleasing to God.
Particular affirmative, and particular negative syllogisms may be easily understood by what is said of
universals, and there will be .mfficient examples given
of all these in the next section.
· The general principle \!POD which these universal
and particular syllogisms are founded is this ; whataoever is affirmed or denied nniversally of any idea,
may be affirmed or denied of all the particular kinds
of beings which are coutainrd in the extension of
that universal idea. · So the desert of death is affirmed universally of sin, and an unlawful wish is one
particula1· kind of sin, which is contained in the uni,·ersal idea of sin ; therefore the desert of death may
be affirmed concerning an unlawful wish: and so of
the rest.
Note, In the doctrine of syllogisms n singular and
an iudefinite proposition are ranked among universals, as was before observed in .the doctrine of proOilt ions.
SECT,
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compound. This is drawn from the nature and
-composition of them.
Single syllogisms are made up of three propositions: compound syllogisms contain more than three
propositions, and may be fol'med into two or mo.11
syllogisms.
Single syllogisms, for distinction sake, may be
divided into • simple, complex, and conjunctive.
Those are properly called simple or categoric&
syllogisms, which are made up of three plain singlt,
or categorical propositions, wherein the middle term
is evidently and regularly joined with one partli
the question in the major proposition, and with the
other in the minor, whence there follows a plait
single conclusion ; as, every human -virtue is to be
sought with diligence; prudence is a hu man ,•irtue,
therefore prudence is to be sought diligently.
Note, Though the terms of propositions may be
complex; yet where the composition of the whole
argument is thus plain, simple, and regular, it ia
_properly called a simple syllogism, since the com.pletion does not belong to the syllogistic form of it.
Simple.syllogisms have several rules belonging to
them, which beiog .observed, will generally secure
us from false inferences : but these rules being fowided on four general ,axioms, it is necessary to meo,
tion these axioms beforehand, for the use of thole
.who will enter in,t:o the speculative reason of all thae
. rules.
· .4.riom ·l. :Particular propositions are contained ii
urtiversals, and may be inferred from them; but UDo
versals are not contained in particulars, nor can be
inferred from them •
.Axiom 2. In all universal propositions, the subjeci
is universal : in all particular propositions, the
ject is particular.
• As ideas and propositions are divided into single and coiu
and single are subdivided into •imp le and complex ; so there art Ille
s:.me diTiiio,118 and sub-divisions applied to •yllogisms.
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Axiom 3. In all affirmative propositions, the pre•
di<:ate has no greater extension than the subject; for
its exte_nsion is restrained by the subject, and therefore it is always to be esteemed as a particular idea.
It is by mere accident, if it ever be taken universally, and cannot happen but in such universal or singular propositions as are reciprocal.
Axiom 4. The predicate of a negative proposition ·
is always taken universally, for in its whole extension
it is- denied of the subject. If we say no stone is vegetable, we deny all sorts of vegetation concerning
stones.
The rules of simple, regular &yllogisms are these:
Rule I. The middle term must not be taken twice
particularly, but once at least universally. Fur if
the micklle term be taken for two different parts or
kinds of the same uuiversal idea, then the sul:>ject· •
of the conclosion is compared with one of these parts,
and the predicate with another part, and ·this will" !
never shew whether that subject and predicate agree
or disagree: there will then be four dtstinct terms in
the svllogism, and the- two parts of the question will
not be compared with tlie same third idea; as if I
say, some ·men are pious, and some men are robbers, I can never infer tbat some robbers are pious,
for the middle term, men, being taken twice particularly, it is not the same men who are spoken of in
the major and minor propositions.
Rule II. The terms in the conclusion must never ·
be taken more .nniversally than they are in the premises. The reason is derived from the first axiom,
that generals can never be inferred from particulars.
Rule Ill. A neg-ative conclusion cannot be proved by two affirmative premises. For when the two
terms of the conclusions are united or agree to the
middle term, it does not follow by any means that
they di&agree with one another.
Rule IV. If one of the premises be negative, the
conclusion must be negative. For if the middle term .
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be denied of either part of the conclusion, it may
shew that the terms of the conclusion disagree, but
it can never shew that tl\ey agree.
_
Rule V. If either of the premises be particulart
tlte conclusion must be particular. This may be
provE>d for the most part from the first axiom.
These two last rules are sometimes united in tbi1
single sentence. The conclusion always follows the
weaker part of the premises. Now negatives and
particulars are counted inferior to affirmatives and.
universals.
Rule VI. From two negative premises notlling CQ
be concluded. For they separate the middle term
both from the subject and predicate of the conclu•
sion, and when two ideas disagree to a third, we cannot infer that they either agree or disagree with each
other.
Yet where the negation is a part of the middle
term, the two premises may look like negatives according to the words, but one of them is affirmatiTt
in sense; as, what has no thought cannot reason;
but a worm has no thought; therefore a worm c~
not reason. The minor proposition does really •
Orm the middle term concerning the subject, viz. ,.
worm is what has no thought, and thus it is pro~
ly in this syllogism an affirmative proposition.
Rule VII. From two particular premises notbin1
can be concluded. This rule depends chiefly on the
first axiom.
A more laborious and accurate proof of these
rules, and the derivation of every part of them in all
possible cases, from the foregoing axioms, require
so much time, and are of so little importance to 11sist the right use of reason, that it is needless to i1r
sist longer upon them here. See all this done ingeniously in tht! Logic, called the Art of Thinking,
Part 111. Chap. III. &c.

PA.ltT III,

THE ltIGHT ·USE OF KEA.SON,

257

III.-Ofthe Modes and Figures of simple Syllogisms.
SIMPLE syllogisms are adorned and surrounded in
the common books of Logic with a variety of inventions about modes and figures, wherein, by the artificial contexture of the letters A, E, I, and 0, men
have endeavoured to transform Logic, or the Art of
Reasoning, into a sort of mechanism, and to teach
boys to syllogize, or frame arguments and refute
them, without any real inward knowledge of the
questiou. This is almost in the same manner as
school-boys have been taught perhaps in their trifling
years to compose Latin verses; that is, by certain r
tables and squares, with a variety of letters in' them,..
herein by countin~ every sixth, seventh, or eighth
letter, certain Latin words should be framed in the
orm of hexameters or pentameters ; and this may be
one by those wlio knew nothing of Latin or verses.
I confess some of these logical subtilties have
uch more use than those versifying tables, and theremuch ingenuity discovered in determinin~ the preise number of syllo~isms that may be formed in
very figure, and giving the reasons of them; yet
e light of nature, a good judgment, and due con- ideration of things, tend more to true reasoning,.
an all the trappings of moods and figures.
But lest this book be charged with two great dets and imperfections, it may be proper to give
hort hints of that which some_ logicians have spent
much time and paper upon.
All the possible combinations of three of the lets, A, E, I, 0, make three propositions amount
sixty-four; but fifty-four of them are ex.eluded
om forming true syllogisms, by the seven rules in
e foregoing section : the remaining ten are variousdiversified by figures and modes into fourteen
llogisms.
The figure of a syllogism is the proper disposition
f the middle term with the part:; of the question.. ,
SECT.
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A mode is the regular determination of p
· tions according to their quantity and quality, th
their universal or particular affirmation or n
which are signified by certain artificial worda •
in the consouants are neglected, and these four
A, E, I, 0, are only regarded.
These are generally counted three figure •
In the first of them the middle term 1s t.he
of the major proposition, aml the predicate rl
minor. This contains four modes, viz. Ba
Celerant., Darii, Ferio. And it is the e ctllen
this figure that all sorts of questions or concl
may be proved by it, whether A, E, I, or 0,
universal or particular, affirmative or uegati e,
Bar- Every wicked man is trulv miserable;
ba- All _tyrants are wicked men :
ra. Therefore all tyrants are truly miserable.
Ce- He that is always in fear is not happy;
la- Covetous men are always in fear:
rent. Therefore covetous men are not happy.
Da- Whatsoever furthers our salvation is good
ri- Some afflictions further our salvation:
i.
Therefore some afflictions are good for us.
Fe- Nothing that must be repented o(is tralJ
sirable;
Ti- Some pleasures must be repented C'f:
o. Therefore there are wme pleasures wh
not truly de11irable.

In the second figure the middle term is tlie
cate of both the premises ; this contai is four Bl
viz. Cresare, Camestres, Festino, Boroco, and i
roits only of negative conclusions; as,
Cre- No liar is fit to be believed;
sa- Every good Christian is fit to be belie,e-4

re.

Therefore no good Christian is a liar,
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The reader may easily form examples of the rest.
The third figure requires that the middle term be
the subject of both the premises. It hath &ix modes, ·
viz. Darepti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Hocardo,
Ferison; and it ndmits only of particular conclusions: as,
Da- Whosoever loves God shall be saved ;
rep• All the lovers of God have their imperfections:
ti. Therefore some who have imperfections shall
be saved.
I leave the reader to form examples of the rest.
The modes of these three figures are comprised in
four Latin verses.
Bar·bara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, quoque prima.
Cmsare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, secunda:.
T ertia Darepti sibi vendicat, atque Felapton •
.A.dju'!'gens Disamis, Davisi, Brocado .Ferison.

The special rules of the three figures are these.
In the first figure the major proposition must al. ways be universal, and the minor affirmative.
In the second fig1,1re also the major must be univei·s.al, and one of the premises, together with tbe
conclusion must be negative.
In the third figure the minor must be affirmative,
and the conclusion always particular.
There is also a fourth figure, wherein the middle
term is predicated in the major proposition, and suhjectt!d in the minor: but this is a very indirect manner of concluding, and is never used in the sciences,
nor in human life, and therefore I call it useless.Some logicians will allow it to be nothing else but a
·mere inversion of the first figure; the modes of it,
viz. Baralipton or Barbari, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapismo, Ferison, are not worthy to be explained by
one example.
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S1.:cT. IV.-Of Compler Syllogisms.
IT is not the mere use of complex terms in a
gism that givei. it this name, though oneofthe
is usually complex : but those are properly
complex syllogisms, in which the middle term is
nected with the whole subject, or the whole p
cate in two distinct propositions, but is interm1
and compared with them by parts, or in a more
fused manner, in different forms of speech; as,

,

The sun is a senseless hein.,.,
The Persians worshipped the sun:
Therefore the Persians worshipped a sensele11
ing.
Here the predicate of the conclusion i11, wo '
ped a senseless being, part of which is joined
the middle term sun in the major proposition,
the other part in the minor.
Though this sort of argument is confessed to
entangled, or confused, and irregular, if ex ·
by the rules of simple syllogisms; yet there is a
variety of arguments used in books of learning,
,in common life, whose consequence is strong
,evident, and which must be ranked under tlib h
as,
I. Exclusive propositions will form a complex
'gument ; as, pious men are the only favourites of
.v en; true Christians are favourites of heaven:
fore true Christians are pious men. Or thus,
pocrites are not pious men; therefore hypocrites
110 favourites of heaven.
II. Exceptive propositions will make such com
syllogisms; a~, none but physicians came to the
sultation; the 11urs1:: is no physician; therefore
nurse came not to the consultation.
III. Ur, compar·ative propositions; as, know
is better than riches; virtue is bc:tter than know
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therefore virtue is better than riches. Or thus, a
dove will fly a mile in a minute : a swallow flies swifter
than a dove; therefore a swallow will fly more than a
mile in a minute.
IV. Or inceptive and desitive propositions; as, the
fogs vanish as the sun rises : but the fogs have not
yet begun to vanish : therefore the sun is not yet
risen.
V. Or modal propositions; as, it is necessary that
a General understand the art of war~ but Caius does
not understand the art of war ; therefore it is necessary that Caius should not be a General. Or thus, a
total eclipse of the sun would cause darkness at noon ;
it is possible that -the moon at that time may totally
eclipse the sun : therefore it is possible that the moon
may cause darkness at noon.
Beside all these, there is a great number of com•
plex syllogisms which can hardly be reduced under
any particular titles, because the forms of human
language are so exceeding various ; as,
Christianity requires us to believe what the Apostles wrote : St. Paul is an apostle: therefore Christianity requires us to believe what St. Paul wrote.
No human artist can make an nnimal; a fly or a
worm is an animal : therefore no human artist can
make a fly or a worm.
The father always lived in London; the son always
lived with the father: therefore the son always Ii ved
in London.
The blossom soon follows the full bud ; this peartree hath many full buds : therefore it will shortly
have many blossoms.
One hail-stone never falls alone; but a hail-stone
fell just now; therefore others fell with it.
Thunder seldom comes without lightning; but it
thundered yesterday : therefore probably it lightned

also.
Moses wrote before the Trojan war; the first

•
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Greek historians wrote after the Trojan war; th
fore the first Greek hi,torians wrote after Mo
Now the force of all these arguments is so
dent and conclusive, that though the form of the
logism be never so irrt'gular, yet Wt! are sure the
ferences are just and true; for the premi&es, a
ing to the reason of things, do really contain
conclusion that is deduced from them, which ·
never-failing test of true syllogisms, as shall be s
hereafter.
The truth of most of these complex syllogism
also be ma<le to appear, if needful, by reduc;ng t
either to regular simple syllogisms, or to some
the conjunctive syllogisms, which are de~cribed
the next section. I will give an instance only in
first, and leave the rest to exercise the ingenuir,
the reader.
The first argument may be reduced to a syll •
in Barbara, thus,
The sun is a senseless being;
\1/hat the Persians worshipped is the sun:
Therefore what the Persians worshipped is a
less being. Though the conclusive force of thia
gument is evident without this reduction.
SECT,

V.-OJ Co11junctive Syllogis1111.

THOSE are called conjunctive syllogisms, w
one of the premises, namely the major, has ·
parts, which are joined by a conjunction, or
5uch particle of speech. Most times the •
minor, or both, are explicitly compound proposi •
and generally the major proposition is made 1'
two distinct parts or propositions, in such a
• Perhaps some of these syllogisms may be reduced to tbaa
I caU connective afterwards; but it ts of 11ttlc moment 10 wbae
they beloug ; for it 1s not any formal set ofruk-a, 10 much•
alcncc and force of rea!lon, that must determiDC &ht nth or
ef all such sylloiisms.
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as that by the as ertion of one in the minor, the
other is either as&erted or denied in the conclusion;
or bv the denial of one in the minor, the other is
eith~r asserted or denied in the concluiion. It is
hardly possible indeed to fit any short defi.n ition to
include all the kinds of them ; but the chief amongst
them ai·e the conditional syllogism, the disjunctive,
the relative, and the connective.
I. The conditional or hypothetical syllogisms are
those whose major, or minor, or both, are conditional
propositions; as, if there be a God, the world is governed by Providence~ but there is a God: therefore
the world is governed by Providence.
The syllogisms admit two ~orts of true argumentation, where the major is conditionaJ.
l. When the antecedent is asserted in the minor,
that the consequence may be asserted in the conclusion ; such is the p1·e.ceding example. This is called
arguing from the -p osition of the antecedent to the
postion of the consequent.
2. When the consequent is contradicted in the
minor .p roposition, that the antecedent may be contradicted in the conclusion; as, if atheists are in the
right, then the world exists without a cause; but the
world does not exist without a cause: therefore athejsts are not in the right. This is called arguing
from the removing of the consequent to the remo ving
-of the antecedent..
To remove the antecedent or consequent here does
not merely signify the denial of it, but the contradiction of it; for -the mere denial of it by a contrary
proposition will not make a true syllogism, us ap•
pears thu~ ; if every creature be reasouable, every
brute is i:easonable; but no brute is reasonable:
therefore no creature is rea!:ionable. Whereas, if
you say in the minor, but every brute is not rea onable: then it woulv follow truly in the conclusion:
t-herefore every creature is not reasonable.
,vhen the antece~en:t ,or consequent are negative
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propositions, they are removed by an affirmati,e ;
if there be no God, then the world does not ·
ver creating wisdom ; but the world does ·
creating wisdom : therefore there is a God: la.
instance the consequent is removed or cont
in the minor, that the antecedent may be con
ed in the conclusion. So in this argument of SL
I Cor. xv. " If the <lead rise not, Christ died
vain;" but Christ did not die in vain: therefore.
dead shall rise.
There are also two sorts of false areguing, viz. (
from the removing of the antecedent to the remo
of the consequent; or, (2.) from the position of
consequent to the position of the antecedent.
amples of these are easily framed ; as,
( 1.) If a minister were a prince, he must be hon
ed; but a mini~ter is not a prince:
Therefore he must not be honoured.
(2.) If a minister were a prince, he must be
oured ; but a minister must be honoured:
Therefore he is a prince.
Who sees not the ridiculous falsehood of
these syllo(J'isms?
Observ.
If the subject of the antecedent
the consequent be the same, then the hypoth
syllogism may be turned into a categorical one;
if Cre~ar be a king, he must be honoureu; but
is a king: therefore, &c. This may be ch
thus: Every king mm,t be honoured; but
a king; therefore, &c.
Observ. II. If the major proposition only be
ditional, the conclusion is categorical : but if the
nor or both be conditional, the conclusion ia
conditional; as, The worshippers of images are·
bters; if the papists worship a crucifix, they
worshippers of an image: therefore, if the
worship a crncifix, they are idolators. But
sort of syllogisms should be a.voided as much as
sible in disputation, because they greatly em

I.
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a cause : the syllogisms whose major only is hypo•
thetical, are very frequent, and used with great ad•
vantage.
II•. A disjunctive syllogism is when the major pro•
position is disjunctive ; as, The earth moves in a
circle or an ellipsis ; b1.1t it does not move in a circle:
therefore··it moves in an ellipsis.
A disjunctive syllogism may have many members
or parts thus.: it is either spring, .summer, autumn,
or winter.; but ·it is not spring., .autumn or winter:
therefore it is summer.
Tne true method .of arguing here is,from the as•
sertion of oDe to the denial of the rest, or from the
denial of one or more to the assertion of what re•
mains; but the 1najor should be so framed that sevei:al parts of it cannot be true together, though one
of them is evidently true.
III. A relative syllogism requires the major pro.,
position to be relative; as, Where Christ is, there
aball his serv.ants be; but Christ is,iJ,l b'18.ven >therefore his servants .shall be there also. Or, As is the:
ptain, so are his soldiers; but the captain is a coward : therefore -his 1okliers are so too.
Arguments that relate to the- doctrine of propor•
·on, must be referred to this head; As, as two are to
four, ,o are three to six; but two make the · half of
our: therefore three make the half of six.
Beside~ these, there is anotper sort of syllogism
hich is very natural and common, and yer authors
e very little notice of it, call it by an improper
ame, and describe it very defectively, and that is,
IV. A connective syllogism. This.some have calcopulative; but it does by no means require the•
jor to be a copulative nor a compound proposition
according to the definition given of it, Part II. Chap~
L Sect. 6.) hut it requires that two or mm·e ideas
so connected either in the complex subject or preicate of the major, that if one of them be affirmed
r denied in the miuor, common sense will ,1mturally

.
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shew us what will be the cqnsequence. It would be
very tedious and useless to frame particular rules
about them, as will appear by the following Pxam•
ples, which are very various, ;ind yet may be farther
multiplied.
(I.) Meekness and humility always go together;'
Moses was a man of meekness: therefore Moses wu
also humble. Or we may form this minor, Pharaoh
Was no humble man; therefo1·e l1e was not meek.
(2.) No man can serve .God and Mammon; the
covetous man serves Mammon : therefore he cannot
serve God. Or the minor may run thus, the true
Christian serves God ; therefore he does not sem
Mammon.
(3.) Genius must join with study to make a great
man; Fiorino has genius, but he cannot study: there-·
fore Fiorino will never be a great man. Or thus,
Quintus studies hard, but has no genius : therefore
Quintus will never be ~ great man.
(4.) Gulo cannot make a dimier without flesh and
fish; there was no fish to be gotten to-day : therefore
6ulo this day cannot make a dinner.
( 5.) London and Paris are in different latitudes;
t:be lati~ude of London is 51 deg. 1 half: therefore
this cannot be the latitude of Paris•
. (6.) Joseph and Benjamin had one mother; Rachel was the mother of Joseph : therefore she wu
~enjamin's mother too.
(7.) The father and the son are of equal stature;
the father ht six feet high : therefore the son is six
,feet also.
(8.) Pride is inconsh,tent with innocence; •
have innocence : therefore they have no pride. Or
thus; devils tJave pride : therefore they have not innocence •
. I might multiply other instances of these connective syllogisms, by bringing in all sorts of exceptive,
exclusive, comparative, am! modal propositions into
the composition of them; for all these may be wrought
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into conjunctive, · as well as into simple syllogisms,
and thereby we may render them complex. But it.
,would waste time and paper without equal profit~
Concerning these various kinds of conjunctive syl..
.logisms, take these. two observations.
Observ. I. Most of them may be transformed into
~ategorical syllogisms by those who have a mind to
prove the t.ruth of them that way; or they may be
easily converted into. each other by changing the
forms of speech.
· ·
•
. Ob.serv. H. These conjunctive syllo(J'isms are seldom deficient or faulty in the form of tl1em ; for such
-a ·deficiency would be dis.covered at the first glance
;generally by common reason, without any artificial
-:rules of logic: the chief care therefore is to see that
.the major proposition be true, upon which thew hol~ ~
force. of the. argumeut usually dep_ends• .

SECT.

VI.-0.f compound Syllogismi. ·.

. WE properly call those compound syllogisms- ~
_wbich are made of two or more single syUogisms, .
and may be resolved into them. The chief kinds
are these, Epichirema, Dilemma, ProsylJogismus,
and Sotites.
I. Epichirema is ·a syllogism • which contains the
proof of the major -or minor, or both, before it draws
the conclusion • . This is often used in writing, in
puplic speeches, and in common conversation, that
_-so each part of the diicourse may be confirmed and
.put out of doubt, as it moves on towards the conclu..
sion, which wa~ chiefly designed. Take this-instance;_
Sickness may be good for us; for it weans us from
the pleasures of life, and makes us think of dying ;
But we are uneasy under sickness, which appears
by -our impatience, complaints, groaning, &c.
Therefore we are uneasy sometimes under that.-

which is gqod for u5•..
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Another instan<:e you mny see in Cicero'•
in defence of Milo, who had slain Clodiu.
major proposition is, that it is lawful for one
kill another who lies in wnit to kill him; w •
proves from the custom of nations, from
e'luity, examples, &c. ; his minor is, that 0
laid wait for Milo; which he proves by bis
gunrds, &c. and th.en infers the conclusion,
was lawful.for Milo to kill Clodius.
II. A Dilemma is an argument which divida
whole into all its parts or members, by a dij
proposition, and th.en infers something conee
each part which is finally inferred concerning
whole. Instances of this are frequent; us, . in
life we must eithet obey our vicious inclination
resist them; to obey them will bring sin and sor
to resist them.is laborious and painfol : theribe
cannot be perfectly free from sorrow or pain in
life.
A Dilemma becomes faulty or ineffi:ctual
ways; first, when the members of the division
•not well opposed, or not fully enumemted; for
the major is false. &condly, when what is
concerning eai;;h part is not just; for then the
js not true. Thirdly, when it may be re,oned
equal force upon him who utters it.
.
There was. a famous ancient instance of 11M
wherein a Di~,mna was retorted. Euathl111
mised Protagoras a reward when •he had ta11pt
,the art of pleading, and it was to be paid
<lay that he guined any cause in the court. •
oonsideraule time Protagoras,goe5 to IMV •witb:
Jus for the reward, and u1>es \his Dilemma;
the cause will go on my side, or on ·youn;
cause goes on my side, you must pay me •
to the flentence of Ute judge: if the conse
your side, J.QU must p11.y me according to yoe
gain ; tt-hernfore .wbeth~· the cause goes .fer
against me, you must pay me the reward.
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Euathlus retorted this Dilemma thus : Either I shall
gain the cause or lose .it; if I gain the cause, then
_n othing will be due to you, according to the sentence
of the judge ; but if I lose the cause, nothing will be
due to you according to my bargain; therefore whether I gain or lose the cause, I will not pay you, for
.nothing will be due to you.
.
Note 1. A Dilemma is usuaJI y described as though.
it always proved the absurdity, inconvenience, on
unreasonableness, of some opinion or practice ; and
this is the most common design of it ; but it is plain,
that it may also be used to prove the truth or advantage <'f any thing proposed ; as in heaven we shall
either have de&ires or not; if we have no desires,
tiien we have full satisfaction : if we have desires,
they shall be satisfied as fast as they arise : therefore
in heaven we shall be completely satisfied. Note 2. This sort of argument may be -compos.e d
of three or four me1nbers, and may be called a T1·i- ··
lemma.
III. A Prosyllogism is when two or more syllo•gisms are so connected together, that the conclusion
of the former is the major or minor of the following;
as, blood cannot t11ink ; but the soul of man thinks :
therefore the soul of man is not blood ; but the soul
of a brute is his blood, according to the scripture;
therefore the soul of a. man is different from the spul
.o f a brute.-See another instance in the introduction
to this treatise.
IV. A Sorites is when several middle terms · ~re ,
chosen to connect one another successively in several ,
-propositions, till the last proposition connects its pi;e..
dicate with the first subject. Thus, all men of. 1:evenge have their souls often uneasy: uneasy souls
are a plague to themselves; now to be one's own
plague is folly in the extreme : therefore all men of
revenge are extreme fools.
,
The apostle, Rom. viii. 29. gives us an instance of
this sort of argument, if it were reduced to exact.

Zs
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fonn : W ,lwm he · -ioreknew those be. pr«I
whom he predestina,ted he c~led ; whom

he

he justified : wlwm he justified , be gl«iied:
fure whom he forek11ew be gJorjfied.
To these syllogisms •it, n:iay not be Jmpror,: ..
lndoction, 'lt'hieh is-wh~ti-0111 se,veral ~
positions we infer one gfJIICFal ; .as, the
•
tbe Socmians oaDJM>t be proved ffM! U:le
eaneot I be •pr.ovetl from tRe Acts of the A
cannot be -proved foom the •Ep.isdes,
Revelation; therefore jt uanoot be prollt'd .
New-Testament.
•
Not~, This sort of a~gu.ment is oftffl def.
cause diere is not due, care taken to enn111en8e
particulars .on which the COBclusion 1hoold
AU t.Rese four -kinds of syllogisms in this
may be called redoodant, _because they hue
than three pr~posit1ons. But there ,is ODe
syllogism which is defective, and .is called an
mema, becauiie only the conclusion with on
premises is expressed, while the other is ,au
and reserved in the mind: thu11, there is no
Jigion withoat good morals: tbP.refure a .blare
not be truly relig.i-0us; or thus, it is our ducy
our neighbours ,as ourselves: therefore there
fow .wJ10 perfci>rm their duty.
Note, This is tbe most common sort _of
amongst mankind both in .writing nnd in.
for it would take up too much time, auu too
ruani the disoo1use, to dra.w out all our
i-o mode ai;id figure. Besides, mankind le,e
-so much compliment paid to their uaderstan ·
to suppose that they kno.w the major or miaor
is suppressed and implied, - when you proaoa
<>ther premises and the conclusion.
If ther-e be any debate about this argume
syllogism mu st be completed, in order to try it,

neru.e

and goodness, ~ addlpg the absent prepo,isiol.
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V JJ ......:qr tlze .m1ildle Terms, .ef common .Places
er T()pic$, and Invention ef Arguments.

THE next division of syllogisms is according to tlie
middle term, which is made use of in the proof of
any proposition. N~ the .middle term (ns we have
hinted before) ,is often. arlled Argnment, because the
force of the syllogiaJm~epeods upon it: -w~ must make
a little delay here to treat briefly of the doct1-.iue of
topics, or ·places wihence middle t-eons or arguments

al'e.drawn.

All arts and sciences have some gener~I subjects
wllioh ·belong to them, which are . called Topics or
common places; because middle terms .are borrowed,
and arguments derived from them for the proof of
t.heir various propositions -which -we have occasion to
discourse of. The topics of Grammar, are etymology, ·noun, ·1·erb, construction, significatioo, &c.
The oopic~ of Logic are , gen us, species, difference,
property, definition, div,i sion, &c. The topics of
Ontology 0r Metaphysics, art! cause, -effect, action,
pass.ion, ide11tity, opposition, subject, aLljw1ct, sign,
&c. The topics of Morality .G>r Ethics, are law, sin,
duty, authority, freedom 0f -wi1J, command, threatening, reward, punishment, &c. The topics of Theo}Qgy, arc, God, Christ, faith, .hope, worship, s.alvatiou, &c.
To these several topics t,her-e belong particular observations, axioms, canons or r.u les•, which are laid
down in their ·pr~pe1t sciences ; .as,
Grammar hath such co.non, viz. words in a dif...
ferent construction obtain a different sense, word1;
derived from the same primitive may probably have
some affi11ity in their original meaning, &c.
Canons in logic are such .as these ; every pait of
a division, singly taken, must contain less than the
• A canon i1 a proposition decladng some p•operty of the snbject'

whieh i1 not e&!)l'e~etl in the ~efinit~on w- division of it.
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whole: A definition must be ~eculiar and proper
the thmg de·fined. Whatever 1s affirmed or deni
of the genus, may be affirmed or denied of the
cies, &c.
Metaphysical canons are such as these;
causes belong only to intelligent agents. If a
ral and necessary cause operate, the effect will '1
&c. and there are large catalogues of many more
each distinct science.
Now it has been the custom of those who
logic or rl1etoric, to direct their disciples, when
want an argument, to consult the several topics
are suited to their subject of discourse, and to
milge over the definitions, divisions and canons
belong to each topic. This is called the inven '
of an argument, and is taught with much sole
in some schools.
I grant there may be good use of this practice
persons of a lower genius, when they are lo co
any discourse for the public; or for those of su
,or parts to refresh their. memory, and revive
acquaintance with a subject which has been lon,r
.1,ent from their thoughts, or when their natural
-rits labour under indispo&ition and languor;
when a man of moderate sagacity has made h'
master of his theme by just diligence and inq
he has ~eldom need to run knocking at the doors
all the topics, that he may furnish himself with
ment or matter of speaking; and indeed it is 7
·man of sense and judgment that can use com
places or topics well : for amongst this variety he
ly knows what is fit to be left out, as well as wha&
· fit to be spoken.
·
By some 'logical writers this business of topics
invention is treated of in such a manner with ma
matical figures and diagrams, filled with the ba
ous technical wmds, Napcas, Nipcis, Ropcos, N
rop, &c. as though an ignorant lad were to be
mechanically, in certain artificial harntS&ea
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trammels, to find out arguments to prove or Tcfote
any proposition whmsoever, without any rational
knowledge of the ideas. Now there is no need to
throw words of contempt on such a practice; the
very description of it carries reproof and ridicule in
abundance.
SECT.

VIII.-Of several Kinds of Arguments and Inmonstrations.

WE prooeed now·to the di,•ision of sylJogisms according to the middle term ; and in this part -of our
treatise the syllogisms themsela;es are properly caUed
arguments, and are thus distributed.
I. Arguments are called Grammatical, Logical,
Metaphysical, Physical, Moral, Mechanicalt Theological, &c. according to the art, science or subject,
whence the middle term or itopic is b~owed. Thus,
i£we ,prove ,that ,no man tihould steal fFom -his neighbour because the 1soripture f0tthids •it, this is a theological argument: if we -p1:o-ye it fr.om the laws of the
land, it is political ; but if we prove it from the prin~
ciples of reason and equity, the n.t"gument is moral.
II. Arguments are-either certain and -evident, or
doubtful and merely probable.
P,obable arguments are those whose conclusions
are proV-ed by some probable medium; as, this hill
was -once a church-yat·d, or a field of battle, 1becnuse
there are many human bones found -he-re. This is
not a eertain •argument, for human bones might have
been conveyeclithere some other way.
Evident and certain arguments are called demonstratioRs ; for they prove their conclusions by clear
medinms and undoubted p·inei,ples; •and they are
generally -divided ·into these ·two sorts:
1. Demomt·r ations ·a priori, whioh prove the effect
by its •nece&Sory cause; as, I prove the · scripture is
infallibly true1 because it is the w0t1d .of Go<l, who
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2. Demonstrations a posteriori, which infer
cause from its necessary effects; as, I infer thel'e
been the hand of some artificer here, because I
a cnrious engine. Or, I infer, there is a God, fl
the works of his wisdom in the visible world.
· The last of these is called "demonstratio TOU OTI,
because it proves only the existence of a thing;
,first named " demonstratio TOU DIOTE," because
shews also the cause of existence.
But note, that though thf'se two sorts of argumen
are most peculiarly called demonstrations, yet
erally any strong and convincing argument obta'
that name; and it is the custom of mathematic·
to call all their ~rguments demonstrations, from w
medium soever the}' derive them.
.
III. Arguments are divided iuto artificial and'
artificial.
·
An artificial argument is taken
and circumstances of the things ; and if the
ment be strong, it produces a natural certainty:
the world was at first created by God, because
thing can create itself.
An inartificial argument is the testimony of ano
and this is called origina], when our information
ceeds immediately from the personl, concern
from eye or ear witnesses of the fact : it is called
' dition when it is delivered by the report of othen.
e have taken notice before, tbat testimony
either divine or human. If the human te&timoo7
strong it produces a moral certainity; but di,ine
timony produces a supernatural certainty; which
for superior.
Note, Arguments taken from human testim
as well as from laws and rules of equity, are called
ral ; and indeed the same name is also applied
every sort of argume1it which is drawn from the
actions of God, or the contingent actions of
wherein we cannot arrive at a natural certainty,
content ourselves with nn high degree of probab'
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which in many cases is scarce inferior to natural cer•
tainty. ·
IV. Arguments are either direct or indirect. It
is a direct argument where the midd)e term is such·
as proves the question itself, and infers that very proposition which was the matter of inquiry. An indi•
rect or oblique argument proves, or refutes some other proposition, and thereby makes the thing inquired appear to be true by plain consequence.
Several arguments are called indirect; as, (I.) when
some contradictory propo ition is proved to be false,
improbable or impossible t or when, upon supposition
of the falsehood, or denial of the original proposition,
some absurdity is inferred. This is called a proof
per impossibile, or a reductio ad absurdum. (2.) When
some other proposition is p.roved to be true which iS'
less probable, and thence it follows, that the original proposition is true, because it is more probable.
This is an argument /!X magis probabile ad minus.
(3.) "\\Then any other proposition is proved upon
which it was before agreed to yield the original question. This is an argument ex concesso.
V. There is yet another rank of arguments which
have Latin na;mes; their true distinction is derived
from the topics or middle terms which are used in
them, though they are called an address to our judgment, our faith, · O\Jr ignorance, our profession, our
modesty, or our passions.
1. If an argumel)t be taken from the nature or
existence of th_ings, and addressed to the reason of
mankind, it is calle<l argumentum adjudioium.
2. \\then it _is .borrowed from some convincing
testimony, it is called argumentum ad fidem, an address to our faith.
3. When it is drawn from any insufficient medium
whatsoever, and yet the opposer has not skill to re- ·
fute or answer it, this is argumentum ad ignorantiam,
an address to our ignorance.
4. When it is built \lpon the professed principles
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or opinions of the person with whom we argue, whether the opinions be true or false, is is named argumentum ad hominem, an address to our professed
principles. St. Paul often uses this argument when·
he reasons with the Jews, and when he says, I speak
as a man.
5. When the argument is· fetched from the sentiments of some wise, great, or good man, whose authority we reverenct! and hardly dare oppose, it' is.
called argumentu.m ad verecundiam, an address. to our
modesty.
6. I add finally, when an argument is borrowed
from any topics which are suited to engage the inclinations and passions of the hearen on the side 0£
the speaker, rather than to com·ince the judgment,.
this is argumentum ad passiones, an address to the
passions; or if it be mad:e publicly, it is called ad
populum, or an appeal to the people.
After all these divisions of syllogism or argument
arising from the middle term, there is one distinctioa
proper to be mentioned, which arises from the pr~
mises. An argument is called uniform when both
the premises are derived from the same spring of
knowledge, whether it be sense, 1·eason, consciou~
uess, human faith, or divine faith: But when the
two premises are derived from different springs of
knowlttdge, it is called a mixed argument.
"Thether the conclusion must be called human or
divine, when one or both premises are matters of divine faith, but the conclusion is drawn by human
mason, I leave to be disputed and determined in the
srhools of theol0gy.
Thus the second chapter is finished, and a particular account given of all the chief kinds of syllogisms or arguments which are made use of among
men, or treated of in logic, together with special
rules for the formation of them, as far as it is neces•
sary.
If a syllogism agree with the rules which are gi\'en
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for the construction and regulation of it, it is called
a true argument : if it disagree with these rules, it is
a paralogism, or false argument: but when a false
argument puts on the face and appearance of a true
one, then it is properly called a sophism or fallacy,
which shall be the subject of the next chapter.

CHAP. III.
THE DOCTRINE OF SYLLOC-1S1\-IS.
FROM truth nothing can really follow but what is
true; whensoever thereforP. we find a false conclusion
drawn from premises which seem to be true, there
· must be some fault in the deduction or inference;
or else one of the premises is not true in the sense
in which it is used in that argument.
1
"\\ hen an argument carries the face of truth with
it, and yet leads us into mistake, it is a sophism:
and there is some need of a particular description of
these fallacious arguments, that we may with more
ease and readiness detect and solve them.
·

SEcT. I.-Of several Kinds of Soplz£sms and their

So-

lutiQn.

As the rules ofright judgment and of good ratio..
cination often coincide with each other, so the doctrine of prejudices, which was treated of in the second
part of logic, has anticipated a great deal of what
might be said on the subject of sophisms : yet I s~all
mention the most remarkable springs of false argu•
mentation, which are reduced by logicians to some of
the following heads.
I. q'he first sort of sophism is called ignorantia
elenchi, or a mistake of the question; that is, when
something else is proved which has neither any ne•
cessary connection or inconsiitency with the thing

flA
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inquired, and consequently gives no determination
to the inquiry, th,ough it may seem at first sight to
determine the question ; as, if any should conclude
that St. Paul was not a native Jew, by proving that
' he was born a Roman ; or if they should pretend to
determine that he was neither Roman nor Jew, by
proving that he was born in Tarsus in Cilicia; these
sophisms are refuted by shewing that these three may
be true; for he was born of Jewish parents in the
city of Tarsus, and by some peculiar privilege granted to his parents, or his native city, he was born a
denizen of Rome. Thus there is neither of these
three characters of the apostle inconsistent with each
other, and therefore the proving one of them true
does not refute the other.
Or if the question be proposed, whether excess of
wine cannot be hurtful to him that drinks it, and the
sophister should prov~ that it revives his spirit, it
· exhilarates his sou], it gives a man courage, and
makes him strong and active, and then he takes it
for granted that lie has proved his point.
,Bqt the -respondent may easily shew, that thouqh
wine may do all this, yet it ;may be finally hurtful
both to the soul and body of him that drinks it to
excess.
Disputers, when they grow warm, are ready to
.run into this fallacy ; they dress up the opinion of
their adversary as they please, and ascribe sentiments
to him which he doth not acknowledge, and when
they have with a great deal of pomp attacked and
confounded these images of straw of their own making, they triumph over their advt!rsary, as though
they had utterly confounded his opinion.
It is a fallacy of the same kind which a disputant
is guilty of, when he finds that his adversary is tco
hard for him, and that he cannot fairly prove the
question first proposed ; he then with slyness and
subtl'ety turns the discourse aside to some other kin~ rec.l_poin~ which he can prov~, and exul~s._in that
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new argument wherein this opponent never contradicted him.
·
The way to prevent this fallacy is by keeping the·
eye fixed on the precise point of dispute, and neither.
wandering from it ourselves, nor suffering our. anta- ·
$o?ist to wander from it, or substitute any thing.elst!
m its room.
II. The next sophism is called petitio principii,
or a supposition of what is not granted; that is, when
any proposition is prove<l by the same proposition in ,
other words, or by ~omething that is equally uncertain and disputed: as if any one undertake to proV'e
that the human soul is extended through all the parts
of the body, because it resides in every member,
which is but the same thing in other words. Or, if
a Papist should pretend to prove that his religion is·
the only. Catholic religion, and is ~erived from Chri::.t
and his apostles, because it agrees with the doctrine
of all the fathers of the Church, all the ho]y .Martyrs, ;
and all, the Christian· wodd throughout aU ages:
whereas this is a great point in contest, whether their:
religion does agree with that of all the ancients, and
the primitive Christians or no . .
III. That sort of fallacy which is called a Circle ·
is very m~ar a-kin to the petitio principii; as, when
one of the premises in a syllogism is questioned and
oppo:,ed, and we intend to prove it by the conclusion:
e>r, when in a train of syllogisms we prove the last
\ly recurring to what was the conclusion of the first.
The Papists are famous at this sol't of fallacy, when
they prove the scripture to be the word of God by
the authority or infallible testimony of their church;
and when they are called to shew the infallible authority of their church, they pretend to prove it by
the scripture.
,
IV. The next kind of sophism is called non causa
pro C&lusa, or the assignation of a false cause. This
the Peripatetic philosophers were guilty of continually, when they told us that certain beings, which ,
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they called substantial forms, were the springs of
colour, motion, vegetation, and the various operations of natural being in the animate and inanimate
world; when they informed us that nature wasterribly afraid of a vacuum, and that it was the cause
why the water would not fall out of a long tube if it
was turned upside down : the moderns as well as the
ancients fall often into this fallacy, when they positively assign the reasons of natural appearances,
without sufficient experiments to prove them.
Astrolo~ers are overrun with this sort of fallacies,
and they cheat the people .grossly by pretending to
tell fortunes, and to deduce the cause of the various
occurrences in the lives of men from the various positions of the stars and planets, which they calJ
Aspects.
When comets and eclipses of the sun and moon
nre construed to signify the fate of princes, the revolution of states, famine, wars, and calamities of all
kinds, it is a fallacy that belongs to this rank of
sophisms.
There is scarce any thin~ more common in human
life than this sort of deceidul argument. If any two
accidental events happen to concur, one is presently
made the cause of the other. If Titius wronged his
neighbour of a guinea, and in six months after he fell
<lown and broke his leg, weak men will impute it to
the divine vengeance on Titius for his former injustice. This sophism was found also in the early days
of the world: for when holy Job was surrounded
with uncommon miseries, his own friends inferred,
that he was a mo~t heinous crjminal, and charged
him with aggravated guilt as the cause of his calamities; though God himself by a voice from heaven
solved this uncharitable sophism, and cleared his
servant Job of that charge.
How frequent is it among men to impute crimes
to wrong persons ? We too often charge that upon
the wicked contrivance and premeditated malice of
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a neighbour, which arose merely from ignorance, or
from unguarded temper. And, on the other hand,
when we have a mind to excuse ourselves, we practise the same sophism, and char~e that upon our inadvertence or our ignorance, which perhaps was de•
signed wickedness. What is really done by a necessity of circumstances, we sometimes impute to
choice. And again, we charge that upon necessity,
which was really desired and chosen.
Sometimes a person acts out of judgment in opposition to his inclination ; another person perhaps acts
the same thing out of i~1clination, and against his
judgment. It is hard for us to determine with as ...
surance what are the inward springs and secret causes
of.every man's conduct: and therefore we should be
cautious and slow in passing a judgment, where the
case is not exceeding evident: and if we should mistake, let it rather be on the charitable than on the
censorious side.
It is the same sophism that charges mathematical,
learning with leading the min,ds of men to scepticism
and infidelity,. and as unjustly accuses the new philosophy of paving the way to heresy and schism.Thus the reformation from Popery has been charged
with the murder and blood of millions, which in truth
is to be imputed to the . tyranny of the princes and
the priests, who would not suffer the p~ople to re ..
form their sentimeHts and their practice according
to the word of <;}od. Thus Christianity in the primitive ages was char~ed by the Heathens with all the
calamities which betel the Roman empire, because
the Christians renounced the Heathen gods and idols.
The way to relieve ourselves from those sophisms,
and to secure ourselves from the danger of fallin<T
in0
to the~, is an honest and diligent inquiry into the
real nature and causes of things, with a constant
watchfulnesi against all those prejudices that might
warp the judgment aside frlHn truth in that inquiry.
V, The next is calledfaltacia .acqidentis, or a so..
· 2 A 2
·
.
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pliism wherein we pronounce concerning tlie nalere
and essential properties of any subject n.ccordin
something which is merely accidental to it.
is a-kin to the former, and is also very frequent ia
human life. So if opium or the Peruvian bark hat
been used imprudently or unsuccessfully, wbetebf
the patient has received injury, some weaker people
absolutely pronounce against the use of the bark or
opium upon all occasions what~oever, and are readf
to call them Poison. So wine has been the accidea•
tal occasion of drunkenness and quarrels; learning
and printing may have been the accidental cause fl
sedition in a state ; the reading of the bible by accident has been abused to promote heresies or destructive en·ors; and for these reasons they have
been all pronounced evil things.. Mahomet forbade
his followers the use of wine; the Turks discou~
learning_in their dominions ; and the Papists forbid
the scripture to be read by the laity. · But how ery
unreasonable are the inferences, and the prohibitioaa
which are built upon them!
VI. The next sophism borders upon the fo1,net;
and that is, when we argue from thut which is tra
in particular circumstances to prove the same thing
true absolutely, simply, and abstracted from all circumstances; this is called in the schools a sophism,
a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter; u,,
that which is bought in the shambles is eaten for
dinner; raw meat is bought in the shambles: therefore raw meat is eaten fo1· dinner. Or thus, Li'1
writes fables and improbabilities when he describes
prodigies and omens; therefore Livy's Roman biltory
is never to be believed in any thing. Or thus, there
may be some mistake of transcribers in some part rA
scripture: therefore scripture alone is not a safe guich
for our faith.
• : This sort of sophism has its reverse also ; as when
we argue from that which is true simply and abso·Iutely to prove the iame ~iBg true in all particular
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~ircumstances whatsoever•; as if a traitor should
argue from the sixth commandment, Thou shalt not
kill a man, to prove that he himself ought not to
be hanged; or if a madman should tell me I ought not
to withhold his sword from him, because no man
ought to withhold the property of another.
These two species of sophisms are easily solved by
-shewing the difference betwixt things in their absolute nature, and the same things surrounded with
peculiar circumstances, and consid~red in regard to
special times, places, persons and occasions; or by
shewing the <lifference between a mor~l and metaphysical universality, and that the proposition will
hol<l good in one case, but not in the other.
VII. The sophisms of composition and division
come next to be considered.
The sophism of composition is when we infer any
thing concerning ideas in a compounded sense,
which is only true in a divided sense. And when it
is said in the gospel that Christ ma<le the blind to
see, and the deaf to hear, and the lame to walk, we
ought not to infer hence, that Christ performed contradictions ; but those who were blind before were
made to see, and those who were deaf before were
made to hear, &c. So when the scripture assures
us the worst of sinners may be saved, it signifies only,
that they who have been the worst of sinners may
repent and be saved, not that they shall be saved in
their sins. Or if any one should argue thus, two
and three are even and odd; five are two and three:
therefore five are even and odd Here that is very
falsely inferred concerning two or three in w1ion,
which is only two of them divided.
The sophism of division is when we infer the
same thing concerning ideas in a divided sense,
which is only true in a compounded sense; as, if we
• This is arguing from moral universality, which admits of some
uceptions, in the same manner a!i may be argued from metaphy
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should pretend to prove, that every soldier in the
Grecian army put an hundred thousand Persians II>'.
flight, because the Grecian soldiers did so, Or if(
man should argue thus; five is one number; two'
and three are five : therefore two and three are one
number.
This sort of sophism is committed when the
All is taken in a collective and a distributive ~
without a due distinction ; as, if any one shouli
reason thus; all the musical instruments of the Jew.
hh temple made a uoble concert ; the harp is a
cal instrument of the Jewish temple; therefore die
harp made a noble concert. Here the word .All i9
the major, is collective, whereas such a conclusiol
requires that the word All should be distributive,
It is the same fallacy when the universal word All
or No refers to species in one propo!.ition, and to in,•iduals in another; as, all animals were in Noah'•
ark ; therefore no animals perished in the flood:
whereas in the premise all animals signifies e,-,
kind of animals, which does not exclude or denv the
drowning of a thousand individuals.
'
VIII. The last sort of sophisms arises from oar
abuse of the ambiguity of words, which is the larp,
aml' most extensive kind of fallacy; and indeed seve,
ral of the former fallacies might be reduced to thia
head.
When the words or phrases are plainly equivocal,
they are called Sophisms of Equivocation; Jls, if wt
should argue thus, he that sends forth a book into
the light, desires it to be read; he that throws •
book into the fire, sends it into the light : therefore bf
that throws a book into the fire desires it to be r~
This sophism, as wdl as the foregoing, and all of
the like nature, are resolved by showing the differen&
&enses of the words, terms or phr ses. Here ligb&
in the major proposition signifies the public view ti
tbe world ; in the minor it signifies the brightness of
flame and tire, and therefore the syllogism llaa foul
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terms, or rather it has no middle term, and proves
nothing.
But where such gross equivocations and ambiguities appear in argument, there is little danger of imposing upon ourselves or others. The greatest danger, and which we are perpetually exposed to in
reasoniug, is, where the two senses or sjgnifications
of one term are near a-kin, and not plainly distin ,
guished, and yet they are really sufficiently different
in their sense to lead us into great mistakes, if we
are not watchful. And indeed the greatest part of
controversies in the sacred or civil life, arises from
the different senses that are put upon words, and the
different idea~ which are included in them; as hath
been shewn at large in the first part of Logic, Chap.
IV. which treats of words and terms.
There is, after all these, another sort of sophism
which is wont to be called an imperfect Enumeration,
Ol' a false lnducti,m, when from a few experiments or
observations, men infer general theorems and universal propositions. But this is sufficiently noticed
in the foregoing chapter, where we treated of that
sort of syllogism which is called Induction.
SECT.

IJ.-Two general Tests qf true Syllogisms, and

Methods qf solving all S!Jllogisms.
BESIDES the special description of true syllogisms
and sophisms already given, and the rules by which
the one are framed, and the other refuted, there are
these two general methods of reducing all syllogisms whatsoever to a test of their truth and falsehood.
I. The first is, that the premises must (at least
implicitly) contain the conclusion; or . thus, one of
the premises must contain the conclusion, and the
other must shew, that the conclusion is contained in
it. The reason of this rule is this ; when any proposition is offered to be proved, it is necessary to
find another proposition which confirms it, which
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may be called the containing Propositions ; but
because the second must not contain the first ia
an express manner, and in the same words•, therefore it is necessary that a third or ostensive propoai,
tion be found out, to sht:w that the second proposi•
tion contains the first, which was to be proved. Let
us make an experiment of this syllogism. Whosoever is a slave to his natural inclinations is miserables
the wicked man is a slave to his natural inclinatio111:
therefore the wicked man is miserable. Here it is
evident that the major proposition .contains the conclusion : for under the general character of a &la,,
to natural inclinations, a wicked man is contained or
included; and the minor proposition declares it;
whence the conclusicn is evidently d'educed, that the
wicked man is miserable.
In many affirmative syllogisms we may suppose
either the major or the minor to contain Jh~ conclusion, and .the other to shew it : for-there is no grea&.
difference. But in negative syllogisms it is the neptive proposition that contains the conclusion, and the
affirmative proposition shews it; as, every wise maa
masters his passions ; no angry man masters his JIii"'
sion: therefore no angry man is wise. Here it is more
natural to suppose the minor to be the containin~proposition; it is the minor implicitly denies wisdoa!
concerning an ansry man, becasse mastering thepue
sions is included m wisdom, and the major show, it.
Note, this rule may be applied to complex and
conjunctive, as well as simple syllogisms, and it
adapted to shew the truth or falsehood of any oflhem.
II. The second is this, as the terms in every syllogism are usually repeated twice, so they mUBt be
taken preciseli in the same i;ense in both places: for
• It is confL'SSe<l, that the conditioru&l and disjunctive D'l&jor JIii'
positions do expresaly contain all that is in the conclusion; but dill
it is not in a certain and conclusive manner, but only in a dubiwaforll
er speech, and mingled with other terms, and. &berefore it ii 1111 . .
santu express pro~tion.
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. the gr_eatest _part _of mistakes, that_ rise ~n forming
syllogisms, 1s derived from some httle difference in
· the sense of one of the terms in the two parts of the
syllogisms wherein it is used. Let us conside1· the
following sophism~
1. It is a sin ·to kill a man ; a murderer is a man:
tl1erefore it is a sin to kill a murderer. Here the
word kill in the first proposition signifies to kill unjustly, or without a law; in the conclusion it is taken
'absolutely for putting a man to death in general,
and therefore the inference is not good.
· 2. '\iVhat I am you are not ; but I am a man :
therefore you are not a man. This is a relative
sy Hogism : but if it be reduced to a regular categorical form, it will appear there is ambiguity in the
ter.ms, thus: what I am is a man; you are not what
I am: therefore you are not , a man. Here what I
·am in the major proposition., is taken especially for
my nature; but in the minor proposition the same
words are taken individually for my person ; therefore the inference must be false, for the syllogism
does not take the terlI,l what I am both times in the
same sense.
3. He that says you are an animal, says true; but
he says you are ~ goose, because you are an animal :
therefore he that says you are a goose, says true. In
the major proposition the word animal is the predicate of an incidental proposition ; which incidental
proposition being affirmative, rendeTs the predicate
of it particular, according to Chap. II. Sect. ~.
· Axiom 3. and consequently the word animal there
sianifies onl human animality. In the minor propgsition, the word animal, for the same season, signifies the animality of a goose ; whereby it becomes
an ambiguous term, and unfit to build the conclusion
upon. Or if you say the word animal, in the minor,
is taken for human animality, then the minor is evi~
dently false.
It is from this last general test of syllogisms that

284

LOGIC: OJI.,

PARTIII,

we derive the custom of the respondent in answerilf
the arguments of the opponent, which is to disal
guish upon the major or minor proposition, and
dare which term is used in two senses, and in • •
sense the proposition may be true, and in what Bell
it is false.

CHAP. IV.
SOME GENEl'l.lL I\ULES TO DIRECT OUJl RE.lSONllllt

. MosT of the general and special directions given
form our judgments aright in the preceding part
Logic might be rt!hearsed he1·e; for the judg
which we pass upon things are genernllybuilt on
secret reasoning or argument by which tl1e pr
sition is supposed to be proved. Bu.t there may
yet some farther assistances given to our reaso1Wf1
powers in their search after truth, and an ohse
tion of the following rules will be of great im
tance for that end.
I. Rule. Accustom yourselves to clear and
tinct ideas, to evident propositions, to strong
convincing arguments. Converse much with
friends, and those books, and those parts of I
ing, where you meet with the greatest clearnea.
thought and force of reasoning.
The matical sciences, and particularly arithmetic,
metry, aud mechanics, abonnd with these a
tages : an<l if there were nothing valuable in
for the uses of human life, yet the very &
lative parts of this sort of learning are \\ ell w
our study ; for by perpetual examples they teach
to conceive with clrarness, to connect our ideas
propo.. itions in train of dependence, to reabon '
strength anti demonstration, an<l to distinguish
tween truth and falsehood. Something of these
0
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ences should be studied by every man who pretends
to learning, and that (as Mr Locke expresses it) not
so much to make us mathematicians, as to make us
Teasonable creatures.
· We should gain such a fu.miliarity with evidence
of perception and force of reasoning. and get such a
habit of discerning clear truth, that the mind mny
-be soon offended with obscurity and confusion : then
we shall, as· it were, natu1·ally and with ease resu-ain
-our minds from rash judgment, before we attain just
evidence of the proposition which is offered to us;
and we shall with the same ease, and, as it were, na•
turally seize and embrace every truth that is proposed with ju t evidence•
. This habit of conceiving clearly, of judging justly,
and of reasoning well, is not to be attained merely
· by the happiness Df constitution, the brightness of
genius, the best natural parts, or the best collection
-of logical precepts. · It is custom and practice that
must form and establish this habit. We must apply
ourselves to it till we perform all this readily, and
without reflecting on rules. A coherent thinker,
and a strict reasoner, is not to be made at once by a
et of rules, any more than a good painter or musician
may b~ formed extempore by an excellent lecture on
music 01· painting. It is ofinfinite importance therefore in our younger years, to be taught both the value
wd the practice of conceiving clearly and reasoning
right: for when we are grown up to the middlw of
life, or past it, it is no wonder that we should not
learn good reasoning, any more than that an ignorant clown shOLdd not be able to learn fine language,
dallCing, or a courtly behaviour., when his rustic airs
l1ave grown up with him till tbe a~e of forty.
For want of this care, some persons of rank and
education dwell .all their days among obscure ideas ;
they conceive and judge always in confusion; they.
take weak arguments for demon tration, they are led
away with the disgniHs and shadows of truth. Now,
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iif such persons happen to bave a bright imaginati
a ,·olubility of speech, and a copiousness of lauguagti
they not only impose many enors upon their o
understandings, but they stamp the image of their
-own mistakes upon their neighbours a]so, and sp
.their errors abroad.
It is a matter of just lamentation and pity, to ca
sider the weakness of the common multitude ofJDIDi
kind in this respect, how tliey receive any thing in1
.their assent upon the most trifling grounds. Trm
reasoning ath very little share in forming their
opinions. They resist the most convincing ar
ments by an obstinate adherence to their prejudice,,
and believe the most improbable things with the
greatest assurance. They talk of the abstrusest mysteries, and determine upon them with the utmoa&
.confidence, and without just evidence either frOlll
reason ,Qt' revelation. A confused ·heap of dark an4
.inconsistent. ideas make up a good part of their knowledge in matters of philosophy as well as religion;
.havmg never been;taught .the use and value of clear
.and just reasoning. ·
•
Yet it must be still ;eon fessed that there are soa
..mysteries in religion, "both natural and revealed, u
..well as some ab~truse points in philosophy, whereia
the wise as well as the unwise must be content w~
.o bscure ideas. There are several things, especiallJ
relating to the invisible world, which are unsea,ch.
able in our present state, and therefore we must be,
lieve what revelation plainly .dictates, though the
ideas may be obscure. Reas,on itself demands tbl
of us ; but we should seek for the bright.est evidence
both of ideas, and of the connection of .tlumi, where~oever it is attainable.
Rule II. Enlarge your general acquaintnce wiah
-things daily, in order to attain a rich furniture .rl.
topics, or middle terms, whereby those propositiom
zwhich occur may be either proved or disproved; bat
.3~pecially meditate and inquire with great diligence
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and exactness into the nature, properties, circumstances and relations of the particular subject abou17
which you judge or argue. Consider its causes, ef...
fects, consequences, adjuncts, opposites, signs, &c.,
so far as is needful to your pt"esent purpose. You:
should survey a question round about, and on alt
sides, and extend your vit>ws as far as pt>ssible, to'.,
every thing that has a connection wjth it. . This
practice has many advantages in it; as,
I. It will be a means to suggest to your mind pro-,
per topics for arguments about any proposition that
rel.ates to the same subject.~
2. It will enable you ~ith greater readiness and.
justness of thought to ~ive an answer to any sudden
question upon that subJect,. whether it arises in your
o wn mind, or be proposed by others..
9. This will instruct• you to giv.e a plainer and ·
speedier solution of any difficulties- that may atten<h-;
the theme of your di~course, and to refute the objections of those who .have espoused a contrary opi- ,
nion.
•
4. By such a large survey· of the whole subject in
all its properties and relations, you will be better secured from in.consistencies, that is,- from asserting or
denying any thing in one pl~e, which contradicts ,
what you have asserted. or denied in another; andto attain these ends, an extensiven~s of understand-·
ing and a large memory are of unspeakable service.
One would be ready to wonder sometimes, how
easily great and wise and learned men ate led into .
assertions in some parts of the same treatise, which
are found to be scarce consistent with what they have
asserted in other places : but the true reason is the
narrowness of the mind of man, that it cannot take
in all the innumerable properties and relations of
one subject with a single view · and the1·efore whilst
they are intent on one particular part of their theme., . ·
they bend all their force of thought to prove or dis--

prove some proposition that relates to that pa_rij
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without a sufficient attention to the consequwhich may flow from it, and which may unhlPIII,
aifect another pa.rt of the same subject ; and bj tilt
means they are sometimes led to say things wllii
are inconsistent. In such a case the great d
in dispute and controversy take pleasure to cast
!lense and self. contradiction on their antagonillt willt
huge and hateful reproaches. For my part, I rd9
choose to pity human nature, whose necessary
r.(jtwness of understanding exposes us all to some•
grees of this frailty. But the most extensive a
possible of our whole subject is the best re...i,
:sgainst it. It is our judging and arguing upon a Jlll'6'
tial view of things, that ex.eoses us.to mistakes,
pushes us into absurdities, or at least to the
borders of them.
Rule Ill. ln searching the knowledge of thinJs,
always keep the precise point of the prssent queatta
in your eye. Take heed that you add nothing to
while you are arguing, nor omit any part of
"\Vatch carefully lest any new ideas slide iu, to
gle themselves either with the subject or precti
See that the question be not altered by the amb'
of any word taken in different senses; nor let
secret prejudices of your own, or the sophistical
of others, cheat your understanding by chnDRing
question, or shuffling any thing else in its room,
And for this. end it is useful to kt'ep the , . _
matter of inquiry as simple as may Le, and diaengapl
from a complication of id~as, which do not necea. .
1·ily belong to it. By admittieg a complicauoa
ideas, and t&iking too many things at once into
question,. the mind is sometimes dazzled ad bewilii
dered; and the truth is lost in such a variet1 •
ronfusion of ideas ; whePeas by limiting and nar
.mg the question, you take a fuller survey of lht
l'J.hole of it,
By keeping the single point of inquiry in ourca-wtWt v.iew, we shall be secured from sudden, l'IUt
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and impertinent responses and determinations, which
some have obtruded instead of solutions and solid an-swers, before they perfectly-know the questions.
Rule IV. When you have exactly consider~d theprecise points of inquiry, or what is unknow~ in
the question, then consider what, and how much
you know already of this question, or of the ideas
and terms of which it is composed. It is by a comparison ·of the known and unknown parts of the
question together, that you may find what reference
.the part known hath unto, or what connection it ·
hath with the , thing that is sought: those ideas,
whereby the known ·and unknown parts of the question are connected, wilL furnish you with middle
terms or arguments whereby the thing proposed
may be proved .or disproved. In this part of your, work, vii. comparing ideas
together, take due time, and be . not too hasty to
come to a ~etermination, especially in points of importance. Some men, when they see a little agreement or disagreement between ideas, they p.-esume a ;
great deal, and so jump into .the conclusion: this is
a short way to fancy, opinion, and conceit: but a
most un~afe and uncertain way . to true knowledg~
and wisdom.
Rule V. In choosing your middle •terms or·argu- .
ments to prove any question, always take such topics ._
as are surest, and least fallible, and which carry the. ·
greatest evidence aod strength with them. Be not
so solicitous about the number, as. the weight of
your arguments, especially in proving any proposi-.
tiou which admits of natural certainty, or of com-,.
plete demonstration. Many times we do injury to a ..
cause by dwelling upon trifling arguments. ·We
amuse our hearers with uncertainties, by multiplying ,
the number of feeble reasonings, before we mention ,
tho.se which are more substantial, conclusive, and
convincing. And too often we yieW up our. own as- .
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sent to mere probable arguments, wliere cenaia
proofs may be obtained.
Yet it must be confessed there are many a1111,
wherein the growing number of probable arpments
increases the degree of probability, and gives •fPIIII&
and sufficient confirmation to the truth ~ a
sought; as,
(1.) When we are inquiring the true sense
word or phrase, we are more confirmed in the. sp
fication of it, by finding the same expression ao 111111
in several authors, or in several• placus of. the aame
author.
(2.) When we are searching out the true meaning
or opinion of any writer, or inquiring into uy •
cred doctrine of scripture, we come to a surer deto,
mination of the truth by several distinct places when,
in the same thing is expressed or plainly implied: because it is not probable that an honest skilful md.
er should mistake the meaning of the writer in IDIDJ
plaws, as he may in one or two.
( S.) When we would prove the importance ofIIJJ
scr1ptural doctrine or duty, the multitude of -...
wherein it is repeated and inculcate:! upon the nad.
er, seems naturally to instruct us that it is a maua
of greater importance than other things which 111
but slightly or singly mentioned in the bible.
{4.) In searching out matters of fact in times )JIit;
or in distant places, (in which case moral evidence·
sufficient, and moral certainty is the utmost •laidl
can be attained), here we derive a greater assUl'IDCI
of the truth of it by a number of persons, or amal.
titude of circumstances concurring to bear wu·•• •
ofit.
(5.) From many experiments in natural philoa,i
phy, we mote safely infer a general theorem, .thaa
we can from one or two.
(6.) Iu matters which require present pra ·
both sacred and civil, we must content ourselves
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.sons or arguments. . Where there are several rea~ons on each side, for and against a thing that is to
bedone01·omitted,asmallargument added to the heap
may justly turn the balance on one side, and deterniin~ the judgment, as I have noted in the second
part of Logic.
To conclude; a growing acquaintance with mat•
ters oflearning, and a daily improvement of our under~tandings in affair& human and divine, will best
teach us to judge and di~tinguish in what cases the
number of arguments add to their weight and force :
it is only ~xperience can fully inform us when we must
be determined by probable topics, and when we mu&t
seek and expect demonstratious.
Rule VI. Prove your conclusion, a~ far a.s possible,
by some propositions that are in themselves more
plain 1 evident and certain than the conclusion ; or at
least such as are more known, and more intelligible
to the person whom you would convince. If we neglect this rule, we shall endeavour to enlighten that
which is obscure by something equally or more obscure, and to confirm that which is doubtful, by something equally or more uncertain. Common sense
dictates to all m~n, that it is impossible to establish
any truth, and to convince others_of it, but by some•
thing that is bette1· known to them than that truth is.
Rule VII. Labour in all your a1·guings to enlighten the · understanding, as well as to conquer and
captivate the judgment. Argue iu such a manner as
may give a natural, distinct, and solid knowledge of
things to your hearers, as well as to force their as,sent by a mere proof of the question. Now to attain this end, the chief topic or medium of you1·
demonstration should be fetched, as much as possible, from the nature of the thing to be proved, or
from those things which are most naturally connected
with it.
Geometricians sometimes break this rule without
_necessity, two ways, viz~ ·

/
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- 1. When they prove one proposition only by shew•
ing what ab&urdities will follow if the contradictory
proposition be supposed or admitted. This is called
Reductio ad absurdum•,
Demonstratio per im_poaibile; as for instance, when they prove all tbe,Radiiof
a circle be equal, by supposing one Radius to be
longer or shorter than another, and then shewing
what absurd consequences will follow. This, I con•
fess, forces the assent, but it does not enlighten the
mind by shewing the true reason and cause why all
Radii are equal, which is derived from . the very COD•
struction of a circle : for since a circle is formed by
fixing one end of a strait line in the centre, aml
moving the other end round, (or which is all one, by
compasses, kept open to a certain extent), it follows
evidently that every part of the circumference being
thus described must be equally distant from the centre, and therefore the Radii, which are lines from
the centre to the circumference, must be all equal.
2. Geometricians forget this rule when they heap
up many far-fetched lines, figures and proportions
to prove som_e plain, simple, and obvious proposition,
This is called a Demonstratio per aliena et remota,
or au argument from unnatural and remote mediums:
as if in order to prove the Radii of a circle are all
equal, l should make several triangles and squares
about the circle, and then from some properties and
propositions of squal'es and triangles prove that the
Radii of a circl~ are equal.
_
Yet it must be confessed, that sometimes such
questions happen, that it is hardly possible to prove
them by di1'ect arguments drawn from the nature of
things, &c. and then it may not only be lawful, but
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• Note, This rule chiefly refers to the establishment of some truth,
7atber than to the refutation of error. It is a very common an J ,,ae.
ful way of arguing to refute a false propusition, by &hewing what
evident falsehood or absurdities will follow fi-om it. For what proposition ~oever is really absurd and false, does elfectuallY. prove that
p,1nclple to be false from which it is derived ; so that this way of re•
fut.ins an error is not unusually cwled Reductio ad abiw-dum.
·
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necessary to use indirect proofs, and arguments drawn
from remote mediums, or from the absurdity of the
contradictory suppositions.
Such indirect and remote arguments may also be
sometimes used t.o confirm a proposition which has
been before proved by. arguments more direct and
immediate.
Rule VIII. Though arguments should give light
to the subject, as well as constrain the assent, yet you
must learn to distinguish well between an explication
and an argument: and neither impose upon yourselves, nor suffer yourselves to be imposed upon
. by others, by mistaking a mere illustration for a
convincing reason.
Axioms themselves, or self-evident propositions,
may want an explication or illustration, though they
a.re not to be proved by reasoning.
·
Similitudes and -allusions have oftentimes a wny
happy influence to explain some difficult truth, and
to render the ide$ ofit familiar and easy. Where tha
· resemblance is just and accurate, the influence of a
simile may proceed so far as to hew the possibility·
of the thing in question : but similitudes must not be
taken as a solid proof of the truth or existence of
those things to which they have a resemblance. A
too great deference paid to similitudes, or an utter
rejection of them, seem to be two extremes, and ought
to be avoided. The late ingenioui Mr. Locke, even
in his inquiries after truth, makes ~reat use of !limilies
for frequent illustration, and is very happy in the invention of them, though he warns us al$0 lest we mistake them for conclusive arguments.
Yet let it be noted here, th t a parable or a similitude used by any author, may give a &ufficient proof
of the true sense and meaning of that author, provided that we draw not this similitude beyond the
scope and design which it was brought: as when our
Saviour affirms, Rev. iii. S. I will come to thee as
a thief; this will plainly prove that he describes the
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unexpectedness ot his appearance, though it will
by no means be drawn to signify any injustice in u
design.
Iiule. IX. In your whole course of reasoning,
keep your mind sincerely intent in the pursuit 'cl
trudt; and follow solid argument wheresoever it
leads you. Let not a party spirit, nor any p&IISioa
or prejudice whatsoever, stop or avert the current
of your reasoning in quest of true knowledge.
When you ate inquiring therefore into any Sllbject, maintain a due regard to the arguments and objections on both sides of a question : consider, com•
pare, and balance them well before you determine
for one side. It is a frequent, but a very faulty prac,.
ti<:e, to hunt after arguments only to make good one
side of a question, and entirely to neglect and refuse
those which favour the other side. If we have not
given a due weight to arguments on both sides, we
do but wilflllly misguide our judgment, and ab•
our reason by forbidding its search after truth. Wbea
we espouse opinions by a secret bias on the mind
through the influences of fear, hope, honour, credit,
intel·est, or any other prejudice, and then seek arguments only to support those opinions, we have neither done our duty t.o God nor to ourselves; and it
i'I a matter of mere cl1ance if we stumble upon truth
in our way to ease and preferment. The power rl
reasoning was given us by our Maker, for this very
end, to pursue truth ; and we abuse one of his richest gifts, if we basely yield u p to be led astray by any
of the meaner ppwers of nature, or the perishing
interests of this life. Reason itself, if honestly obey-ed, will lead us to receive the divine revelation of the
Jospel, whe1·e it is duly proposed, and this will ahcw
us the path oflife evedasting.
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OF DISPOSITION AND METHOD.

JT is not merely a clear and distinct

idea, a wellformed proposition, or a just argument, that is sufficient to search out and communicate the know)edge
of a subject. There must be a variety and series of
them disposed in a due manner, in order to attain
this end : and therefore it is the design of the last
part of Logic to teach us the art of method. It is
tlzat must secure our thoughts from that confusion,
darkness, and mistake which unavoidably attend the
meditations and discourses even of the brightest genius who despises the rules of it.
1. We shall here consider the nature of method,
and the several kinds of it.
2. Lay down the general rules of method, with a
few particulars under them.

CHAP.L
el'

T~E NATURE OF METHOD, AND THE SEVERAL
KINDS OF IT, VIZ. NATURAL AND ARBITRARY, SYN•
THETIC AND ANALYTIC.

METHOD, taken in the largest sense, implies the
placing of several things, or performing several operations, in such an order as is most convenient to at•
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tain some end proposed: and in this sense it is applied to all the works of nature and art, to all the
divine affairs of creation and providence; and to
the artifices, schemes, contrivances and practicea of
mankind, whether in natural, civil, or sacred aff'ain.
Now this orderly disposition of things includes the
ideas of prior, poste1 ior, and simultaneous; of 111perior, inferior, and equal; of ht.ginning, end, and
middle, &c. which are described more particularlf
among the general affections of being in ontology.
But in Logic method is usually taken in a more
limited sense, and the nature of it is thus described:
method is the disposition of a variety of lboughta 8ll
any subject, in such order as may bt>st serve to 6ad
out unknown truths, to explain and confirm trutbt
that are known, or to fix them in the memory.
It is distributed into two general kinds, (viz.} na,,
tural and arbitrary.
Natural method is tbat which observes the order
of natrue, and proceeds in such a manner as tbaulle
knowledge of the thingi. which foUow depend&, 1H
great measure, on the things which go before, aa4
this is twofold, (viz.) Synthetic anu Analytic, wlaida
are sometimes called Synthesis and A11alysi11•.
• The word Analysis has three or four sense., wweh i& 111'7 IIG&
be improper to take notice of here.
1. It ,ignifi.,. the general and particullll' heads or a discoune, with
their mutual coun,ctions, both co-ordinae. and 1 1 U ~ dlDII
out by way of abstract into one or more tables, which are frt'fjlltllllJ
placed lib an index at the begi11ning or ead of a book,
2. It ,igoilies the resol•ing of a diSt'ourse into itg nrious 111bjrda
and arguments ; as when any writiag of the ancient propheta ii naal,
ved into the prophetical, historical, doctrinal, and practical par1I fl
it, it is aaid to be analyJied in general. When a sentence i1 d.unr,ed into the Nouns, Verbs, Pronoum, Ad.-erbs, and other particle, rf
speech wbl~b compose it, th<.'D it is said to be a.'lalysed gra,DIIIINllly,
When the same aentcnce jg distingui•bed into $abject and PrMilalt,
Pro1>osition, Argument, Act, Object, Clluse, Effe<>t, Adjunct, Oppo.
aite. &c, then it is analyK-d logically, and metaphy,ically. Thia 1111
is what is cloie6y neaot in the theological schools, when they speak al
an RI ysing a text of Scripture.
/J. Analy,is signifies particularly the science or algebra, whNII
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Synthethic method is that which begins with the
parts•, and leads onward to the knowledge of the
whole ; it begins with the most simple principles, and
Aeneral truths, and proceeds by degrees to that which
is drawn from or compounded of them : and therefore it is called the method of composition.
Analytic method takes the whole compound as it
finds it, whether it be a species or an individual, and
leads us into the knowledge of it by rnsolving it into its first principles or parts, its generic nature, and
its special properties ; aud therefore it is called the
method of resolution.
As synthetic method is generally use<l in teaching ·
the sciences, after they are invented, so analytic is
most practised in finding out things unknown.Though it must be confessed that both methods are
sometimes employed to find out truth, and to communicate it.
If we know the parts of any subject easier and bet•
ter than the "hole, we consider the parts di<:,tinctly,
and, by putting them together, we come to the knowledge of the whole. So in grammar we learn first to
know letters, we join them to make syllables, out of
sylla bles we compose words, and out of words we
make sentences and discourses. So the physician or
apothecary knows the nature and powers of his sim•ples, viz. his drugs, his herbs, his miuerals, &c.;
aud putting them together, and considering their sea question being proposed, one or more letters, as x, y, re, or vowels,
as, a, e, i, &c. are made m,e of to signify the unknown number,
which being intermingled with severdl known numbers in the ques.
tion, is at last by the rul~ of art sepllratcd or released from that entanglement, and its particular value is found ouL by shewing its equa,.
tion, or equality to some known number.
4. It signifiei analytical method, as heTe exiilained in Logic.
• Note, It is coofeued' that synthe!>i:; often begins with the genu'S
ar.d proceed~ to the species and individuals. But the genus or generic nature is tht:n considered only ns a i,by,,ical or e1Sential part cf
the species, though it be sometimes called an univer al or log1cd
whole. Thus synthetic method ma:ntain'i its own dee:cription ~tm, for
it beJins with the parts, and proceeds to the whole which is com,. > o-td of them,
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,veral ,·irtues, he finds what will be the nature 111d
,powers of the bolus, or any compound medicine.
This is the synthetic method.
But if we are better acquainted with the whole
than we are with particular parts, rhen Wf' divide or
resolve the whole into its parts, and thereby gain a
distinct knowledge of them. So in vulgar life we
learn in the gross what plants or minerals are; and
then by chemistry we gain the know ledge of salt,
:sulphur, spirit, water, earth, which are the principles
of them. So we ~re first acquainted with the whole
body of an animal, and then by anatomy or disse.
tion we come to learn all the inward and outward
parts ofit. This is the analytic method.
According to this most general and obvious idea
.of the synthetic and analytic methods, they differ from
.each other as the way which leads up from a valley
to a mountain differs from itself, considered as it leada
.down from the mountain to the valley ; or as St.
Matthew and St. Luke prove Christ to be the son o(
'Abraham; Luke finds out by analysis, rising from
, Christ_.!:o .his ancestors; Matthew teaches it in the
_synthetic , method, beginning from Abraham, and
,shewing ~hp.t Christ is found among his posterity.J'herefore it_.is an us1,1.al thing in the sciences, when
.we have )Jy ,analysis found out a truth, we use the
_synthetic method to explain and deliver it, and prove
i t to be true.
In this ea5y view of things, these two kinds ofmethod may be preserved conspicuously, and entirely
distinct: but the subjects of knowledge being infinite,
.and the ways whereby we arrive at this knowledge
·being almost infinitely various, it is very difficult,
and almost impos&ible, always to maintain the precise distinction between these two methods.
This will evidently appear in the following obser•
vations.
Obs. I. Analytic method being used chiefly to find
,r>ut things unknown, it is not limited or confined
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merely to begin with some whole subject, and pro•
ceed to the knowledge of it& parts, but it takes its·
rise sometimes from one single part or property, or·
from any thing whatsoever that belongs to a subject"
which happens to be first and most· easily known,
and thereby enquires into the more abstruse and miknown parts, properties, causes, effects, and modes·
of it, whether absolute and relative; as for instance,
( t.) Analysis finds out causes by their effects. So·
in the speculative part of natural philosophy, when·
we observe light, colours, motions, hardness, soft-·
nesS) and other properties -and powers of bodies, or
any of the common or uncommon appearances of
things, either on earth, or in heaven, we search out·
the causes of them. So by the various creatures we·
find out the Creator, arn.l learn. his wisdom, pow et' ~·
an<l gooduess.
(2.) It finds out effects by their causes.· So the ·
practical and mechanical part of natural philosophy '
considers such powers of motion, as the · wind, the
fire, the water, &c. and then contrives · what uses
they may be Hpplied to, and what will ·be their effects in order to make mills and engines of various
kinds.( 3.) It finds out the general and special nature of
a thing, by considering the various attributes of the
individuals, and observing what is common, and what
is proper, what is accidental, and what is essential:
So by~surveying the colour, the shape, motion, rest,
placet solidity, extension of bodies, we come to find
that the nature of body in general is solid extension ;
because all other qualities of bodies are changeable,
but this belongs to all bodies, and it endures through
all changes; and because this is proper to a body·
alone, and agrees· not to any thing else; and it is the·
foundation of all other properties.
(4.) It finds out the remaining propertie·s or parts
of a thing, by having some parts or properties given.•
So the area of a triangle is found by knowing the

900

LOGIC! OR,

l'ART IY,

he.ight and the base. So by having two sides, aadan angle of a triangle given, we find the remai1W19
5ide and angles. So when we know cogitation is die
prime attribute of a spirit, we infer its immaleriali~
and· thence its immortality.
(5.) Analysis finds the means necessary to altaia
n proposed _encl, by having tbe end first assigoed.~o in morn!, political, economical affairs, having
proposed the government of self, a family, a society,
or a nation, in order to their best interest, we cen•
sider and search out what are the proper laws, rule,
nnd means to effect it. So in the practices of artificers, and the manufactures of various kinds. !he
end being proposed, as, making cloth, housei, ships,
&c. we find out ways of composing these things for
the several uses of human life. But the putting au,:
of these means in execution l.o attain the end, is ~yn•
thetic method.
Many other particnlars might be r~presented, i.
~ht:w the v:u·ious forms of an~lytic Jl)ethod, wherehJ
1ru1h is found out, al;)d some of them come very nea
to synthetic, so as hnrdly to be distinguished.
Obs. U, Not only the investiga.tion of truth, b..a
the communication of it also is often practisecl ii
such a method, as neither agrees precisely to syn•
thetic nor analytic. Some scienc<tS, if you conside,
the whole of them in general, are trnated in synt.he~
order; so physics, 01· nntural philosophy, begins ueu,.
ally with an account of the general nature and p•
perties of ma.tter or bodies, and by degrees d ~
to consideJ;- the particular spcci~s Qf bodUJ», witi
t htir powers and properties; yet it is very evidem,,
that when philosophers come to particular plant,~
animnls, then by chenustry aud anatomy they a~111
Ql' resolve these bo<lies into weir several COQ&tituea..
parts. On the other hand, Logic is begun in. aM•
Ly.tic mt>thQd; the wh<>le is divided . mtQ its integral
~tt6, a.cco~iog to th,e four operations of di.e mind·
yet hex~ l\!ld 1.h~re s_y11thetjc method is used in thepftl)o
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ticular branches of it, for it treats of the ideas in general first, and then descends to the _several species
of them ; it teaches us how propositi.ons are made up
of ideas, and syllogisms of propositions, which is the .
order of compositions.
The ancient scholastic writers have taken a great- ·
er deal of pains, and engage,d in useless disputes about these two methods·; and after all have not been '
able give such an account of them as to keep them
entirely distinct from each other, neither in the the- ·
ory nor in the practice. Some of the moderns have •
avoided this confusion in some measure, by confin.,. · ·
ing themselves to describe almost. nothing else but
the synthetic and analytic methods of geometricians •
and algebraists, whereby they have too much narrowed the nature and rules of method, as though every·
thing were to be treated in mathematical forms.
Upon the whole, I conclude, that neither of thesetwo methods should be too scrupulously and superstitiously pursued, either in the,,invention or in the
communication of kl?,owledge. It is · enough if the
order of nature be but observed in making the know- ledge of things following depend on the knowledge
of the thi~gs which go before. Oftentimes a mixed
method will be found most effectual for these purposes ; and indeed a wise and judicious prospect of
our _main end and clesi~n muat regulate all• method
whatsoever.
Here the rules.of natural method -ought to be pro- posed, (whether it be analytic, .or synthetic,- or-mix- .
ed:) but -it is proper first to•give some account of ·
arbitrary method, lest it lie thrust at too great- a dis- ..
tance from the first mention of it. ,
· Arbitrary method leaves the ·order· of nature, and
..accommodates itself to many purposes; such as, to ,
treasure up things, and retain th em in memory;- to
harangue and persuade mankind to any practice in
the religious or civil life; or to delight, amuse, or en-_ .
tertain the mind.
2C2
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As-for the-as5i.st'anoe of the memory, iu most thinp
a nJ1tural order has an happy. influeoce; for reason
itaelf, deducing one thieg fr.om another• grea~ ae,,.
sists the memory, by the natural connection, an4
mutual dependance of things. But there are var-iOUI
other methods wbioh mankind have made us~ of fbr
this purpose, and indeed there are some subjj!$,
that Qan har-dly be deduced to aualysis,Qr synthesis.
In reading or writin$ history, some follQw ~
order of the governors ot a nation, and dispose &ffl\1
transaction under theii: pai:ticular r-eigns: so the-aa,..
cred books of Kings- and Chr-onicles ni,e writ.ten,
Some write in annals or. journals,, antl make a new
Qhapwr of every year. Some put all those trau&aotion11 tog@tber which relate to one subject, that is, alL
th& affairs of one war, one league, one confederucy,,
one council, &c. though, it. last many years, nnd under many ruler-s.
So in writing the lives of men, which is called:
Biography, some ~uthors follow the tract of the#
years, and place every thing in the precise order, ei
time when it occurred : others throw the temper aDtlt
characters of the persons, ,their private life, theia
public stations, thdr personal occurrences, their d~
mestic conduct, their speeches, their books. or writ•
ings, their sickness and death, into so many di~tinc&
chapters.
ln chronology, some writers make their epoch1 tt
begin· all with one letter: so in the book called Duetor Historicus, the periods all begin with C; 11,
-Creation', Cataclysin or deluge, ChaWean Empire,
Cyrus, Christ, Constantine, &c. Some divide their
accounts of time according to the four gr~at mona,.
chies, Assyrian, Persian, Grecian, and Roman.Others think it serves the memory bes.t to div-ide all
their subjects into the remarkable-number- of seven11
so Prideaux has written an Introduction to HilitOPy,
And there is a book of divinity called Fosciculu1
Controversiorum by an ~uthor o[ the- &arue llllJlllt;

PAI\T IV.

THE RIGHT U$E OF. J!.EASON.

sos

written in the same methu<l, wherein_eyery controversy has seven questions belonging to if; though the
order of nature seems to he too much neglected by a
confinement to this- septennFy numb.er.
Those writers and speakers whose chief business
is-to amuse and delight, or allure, terrify, or persuade
mankind, do not confine themselves- to any natural
order, but in a cryptioal or hidden method adapt
every thing to their designed. ends. Sometimes they
omit those things which might injure their design,
or gr0w tedious to their hearers, though they seem
to have a necessary relation to the point in hand:
S()metimes they add those things which have no great
reference to the subject, but are suited to allure or
refresh the mind and the ear. They dilate sometimes, and flourish long upon little incidents, and
they skip over, and but lightly touch the drier part
of their theme. They place the first things- last,
and the last things first, with wondrous art, and yet
so manage it as to conceal their artifice, and lead the
senses and passions of their hearers into a pleasing
and powerful captivity.
It is chiefly poesy and oratory that requires the
practice of this kind of arbitrary method: they omit
thingi essential which are not beaut,ful; they insert
little needless circumstances, and beautiful digressions, ; they inv.ert time and actions, in order to
place every thing in the most affecting light, and for
this end in their practice they neglect all· logical
forms; yet a good1 acquaintance with the forms of
Logic and natural method, is of' admirable use to
those who would attain these arts in perfection.
H.e1·eby they will be able to range theit own thoughts,
in such a method and scheme, as to make a more
large and comprehensive survey of their subject and
design in all the parts of it; and by this means they
will better juJge what to choose and what to refuse ;
and how to ,dress and manage the whole scene before
thei:n, so as to attain, thei.c own ends ~ith greater
glory and s_ucce~s!
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CHAP. II.
THE RULES OF METHOD, GENERAL AND SPECIAL,
THE general requisites of true method in the pursuit or communication of knowledge, may be all com•
pri&ed under the following heads. It must be (1.)
Safe. (2.) Plain and easy. (3.) Distinct. (4.) Full,
or with, ut defect. (5.) Short, or without superfluity.
(6.) Proper to the subject and the design. (7.) Con•
nected.
I. Rule. Among all the qualifications of a good
method, there is none more necessary and important
than that it should be safe and secure from error;
and to this end these four particular or special directions shoulcl be observed.
I. Use great care and circumspection in laying
the foundations of your discourse, or your scheme of
thoughts upon any subject. Those propositions
which are to stand as first principles, and on which
the whole argument depends, must be viewed on all
sides with the utmost accuracy, lest an error, being
admitted there, should diffuse itself through the
whole subject. See therefore that your general definitions or descriptions are as accurate as the nature
of the thing will bear: See that your general divisions and distributions be just and exact, according
to the rules given in the first part of Logic: See
that your axioms be sufficiently evident, so as to demand the assent of those that examine them with
due atte1Jtion. See that your orst and more im•
mediate consequences, from these principles, be well
drawn; and take the same care of all other propositions that have a powerful and spreading intiuence
through the several parts of your discourse.
For want of this care, sometimes a large treatise
has been written by a long deduction of corniequences
from one or two doubtful principles, which principles
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have been effectually refuted in a few lines, and thus
the whole treatise has been destroyed at once ; so the
largest and fairest building sinks and tumbles to the
ground, if the foundations and corner-stones of it
are feeble and insufficient.
2. It is a very advisable thing that your primary
aud fuudamental propositions be not only evident
and truti, but they should be made a little familiar
to the mind, by dwelling upon them before you pro..
ceed farther. By this means you will gain so full an
acquaintance with them, that you may draw consequences from them with much more freedom, with
greater variety, brighter evidence, and with a firmer
certainty, than if you have but a slight and sudden
view of them.
3. A8 you proceed in the connection of yom nrg1,1ments, see that your ground be made firm in every
&tep. Se& that every link of your chain of reasoning
be strong and good : for if bqt one link be feeble and
doubtful, the whole chain of arguments feels the
weakness of it, and lies ex.posed to every objector,
and the original question remains undetermined.
4. Draw up all your proposition& arul arguments
with so much caution, and express yoar ideas with
such a just liiuitation, as may preclude or anticipate .
any objections. Yet remember this is only to be done
aa far as it is possible, without too much entangling
the question, or introducing coro.plicat.ed ideas, and
obscuring tl,ie sense. But if such a cautious llnd
limited dress of the question should tender tlie ideas
too much complicated, or the ser,se obscure, then it
is better to keep the- argument more simple, clearand easy to be- 1.Jnderstood, and afterwards mention
the objections distinctly in thei1· full strength, and
1ive a di.stiO(;t answerc to them.
II. Rule. Let your method be plain and easy, so
that your hearers 01· readers~ as well as yourself, may;
tun through it. without embarrassment, and may tnk~
11 clear and comprehensive view Qf the ~hale schemf.
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To this end the following particular directions will
be useful.
I. Begin always with those things which are best
known, and most obvious, whereby the mind may
have no difficulty or fatigue, and proceed by regular
and easy steps to things that are more difficult. And
as far as possible let not the understanding, or the
proof of any of your positions, depend on the positions that follow, but always on those which go before. It is a matter of wonder that in so knowing
en age as this, there should be so many persons offering violence daily to this rule, by teaching the
Latin lano-uage by a grammar written in Latin,
.which method seems to require a perfect knowledge
of an unknown tongue, in order to learn the first
rudiments of it.
2. Do not affect excessive haste in learning or
teaching any science, nor hurry at once into the
midst of it, lest you be too soon ,involved in severnl
new and strange ideas and propositions, which cnn•
not be well understood without a longer and closer
attention to those which go bt•fore. 8uch sort of
haste is but a waste of time, and will constrain you
to take many steps backward again, if you would ur,.
rive at a regular and complete knowledge of the
subject.
3. Be not fond of crowding too many tnougbts
and reasonings into one- sentence or parngraph, beyond the apprehension or capacity of, your readers
or hearers. There are some persons:of ·good genius,
and a capacious mind, who write and speak very ob,,
scurely upon this account; they affect a long train
of dependencies, before they come to a period ; they
'imagine that they can never fill their page with too
much sense; but they little tbiak how they bury
their own best ideas in the crowd, and render them
in a manner invisible and useless to the greatest
part of mankind. Some men may be great scholars,
yet th~y are but poor teachen.
'
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4. For the same rem,on, avoid too many subdivisions. Contrive yom- scheme of thoughts in such
manner as may finish your whole argument with as
few inferior branchings as reason will admit; and
let them be such as are obvicus and open to the understanding, that they may come within one single
view of the mind. This will not only assist the understanding to receive, but it will aid the memory
also to retain truth : whereas a discourse cut out into a vast multitude of gradual subordinations has
many inconveniences in it; it gives pain to the mind
and memory, in surveying and retaining the scheme
of discourse, and exposes the unskilful hearers to
mingle the superior and inferior particulars together;
it leads them into a thick wood, instead of open daylight, and places them in a labyrinth instead of a
plain path.
5. Give all diligence in your younger years to obtain a clear and easy way of expressing your conceptions, that your words, as fast as you utter them,
may stamp your ideas exactly on the mind of the
hearer. This is a most happy talent for the conveyance of truth, and an excellent security against mistakes and needless controversies.
II I. Rule. Let your method be distinct, and without the perplexing mixture of things that ought to
be kept separate, and this will be easily practised by
four directions.
1. Do not bring unnecessary heterogeneous• matter in your discourse on any subject; that is, do not
mingle an argumen t on one subject with matters that
relate entirely to another, but just so far as is necessary to give a clearer knowledge of the subject in
hand. Examples in Logic 10ay be borrowed from
any of the sciences to illustrate the rules: but long
interpositions of natural philosophy, of the imagination and passions, of agency of spirit united to bo• Thing, of one kind are called Homogeneou a; things of clifferent
kinda are c:Jlled H~terogeneous.
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dies, &c. break the thread of discourse, ahd perplex
the subject.
2. Let every complicated theme or idea be divided
into its distinct single parts, as far us the nature of.
the subject, and your present design requires It.
Though you must not abound in needless subdivisions, yet something of this work is very necessa17;
.and it is good judgment alone can dictate how far
to proceed in it, aud when to stop.
Compound ideas must be reduced to a simple
form, in order to understaml them wetl. You may
easily master that subject in all the parts of it by a
regular succession, which would confound the un.derstanding to survey them at once. So we come
to the knowledge of a very perplexed diagram in
geometry, or a comp1icated machine in mechanics,
by having it parcelled out to us into its several parts
nnd principles, according to this, and the foregoing
rule of method.
8. Call every idea, proposition and argument to
its proper class, and keep each part of the subjel!t
in its own place. Put those things all together that
belong to one part or property, one consideration
or view of your subject. This wlll prevent needless
repetitions, and keep you from intermixing things
which ar~ different. We must maintain this dis•
tinction of things an<l places, if we would be safe
from error. It is confusion that leads us in to endless mistakes, which naturally arise from a variety
of ideas ill-joined, sorted, or ill-di!;posed. It is one
great use of metho<l, that rnultitmles of thoughts and
propositions may be so drstinctly ranged in their
proper situations, that the mind may not be overwhelmed with a confused attention to them all at
once, nor Le distracted with their variety, nor be
tempted to unite things which ought to be separated,
nor disjoin things which shoul,l be united.
4. In the partition of your discourse into distinct
heads, take heed that your particular:; do not inter•
~
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fere with the general, nor with each otli.er. Think
it is not enough that you make use of distinct expresaions in each particular, but take care that the ideas
be distinct abo, lt is mere foolei:y to multiply distinct particulau in treating of things, where the difference of your particulars lie only in namts and

words.
IV. Rule. The method of treating a subject should
be plenary or full, so that nothing may be wanting;
not~ing which is necessary or proper should be
tllDltted.

When you are caJlecl to explain a subject, do not

pass by nor skip over any thing in it which is very
difficult or obscure.
When you enum.e11ate the parts or the properties
oi any subject, do it in a complete and comprehen1iv& manner.
When you are asssrting or proving any truth, see
that evei,y doubtful or disputable part of the argument be welL supJ.>o7ted and confirmed.
Ii you are to illustrate or argue a point of difficulty, be not too scanty of woi:ds, but rather become
a little copious and diffusive in your language: set
the truth before the reader in several lights, turn the
,arious sides. of it to view, in order to give a full
idea and firm evidence of the pPoposition.
When you ai;e chawins up a-narrative of any mat~ or faat, s«e that no 1mportan~ circumstance be
tlllitted.
When you propose the solution of any difficulty,
.eensider all the various cases wherein it can happen,
tnd shew how they may be solved.
In short, let your enumerations, your divisions-,
and distributions of thin~s be so accurate, that no
Medful part or idea be left out.
'li'his fulness of method does not require that every
iing $hould be said which can be said upon any
mbject; for this would make each single science
adless : but you should
every thing which is ne-
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(:essary to the design in view, and which bas a proper and direct tendency to this end; always propor•
tioning the amplitude of your matter, and the fulness
of your discourse, to your great design, to the length
of your time, to the conveniencf', delight, and ,profit of your hearers.
V. Rule. As your method must be full with011t
deficiency, so it· must be short, or without superfluity. The fuluess of a discourse enlarges our know.ledge, and the well-concerted brevity -saves our time.
In order to observe this rule, it will be eno.1gh to
;point out, the chief of those superfluities or , te<lun-0ances whlch , some _.persons are ~uilty of in their
discourses, with a due caution agamst them.
1. Avoid all needless repetitions of the same thing
in different parts of your discourse. It must be confessed there are several cases wherein. a review of
.the same foregoing proposition is needful to explain
or prove r.everal of the following . propositions; but
let your method be so contrived as far as possible,
.that it may oc<:asion the fewest ·rehearsals ef the same
thing ; for it is I not grateful to the hearers without
evident necessity.
!. Have a care . of tedious prolixity, or drawing
out any part of,your discourse to an unnecessary and
tiresome l ~ . flt is much more honourable for
.an instructor, ~n 011ator, •a pleader, or a preacher,
.that his hearers ~ould say, .I was afraid he would
have done, than that they should be tempted to shew
signs of uneasiness, and lo~ for -the conclusion.
Besides, there is another mconvenience in it; when
you affect to amplify on the former branches of a discourse, you will often lay a necessity upon yourself
.of contracting the latter and most useful parts.of.it,
and perhaps prevent yourself in the most important
.part of your design. Many a preacher has been
guilty of this fault in former days, nor is the.present
,age without some instances of this weakeess.
s. Do not multiply explications where there.is no
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difficulty, or darkness, or danger of mistake. Be>
not fond of tracing every word of your theme through
all the grammatical, the, l0<tiical and metaphysicaJ:
characters and relations of it; nor shew -your criticallearning in spreading abroad "the various senses of•
word, aod the various origin of those senses, the
etymology of terms, the synonymous and the paronymous or kindred names, &c. where the chief point
of discourse does not at all require it. You would
laugh at; a pedant,. who, professing to explain the
Athanasian Creed, should acquaint you, that Athanasius is derived. from a Greek -w0rd which signifies ,
immortality, and that the same word ( Athanasia) signifies also the herb Tansy.
There are .some persons so fond of thei1· learned•
c1istinctious, that tl1 ey w-ill shew their subtlety by
distinguishing .where there is no difference : and the
same silly affectation will introduce distinctions upon.
every occurrence, and bring three Ol" four- negatives
upon every subj~ct or.discourse; first to declare what it is not, and then what it is • whereas such negatives
. ought never to be mentioned where there is no app!}rent danger of mistake. . How, ridiculous would
that writer be, who, if he were speaking of the Nicene Creed, should declare negatively, J. That he
did not mean the doctrine which -the inhabitants of
Nice believed: .nor,. 2. A creed written by them; but
S. Postively a creed composed by several Christian
bishops met together in the city of Nice ? The poaitive is sufficieut here, and the two negatives are im~rtinent. ..
4. Be not fond of proving .those things which need
no proof, such as selt:.evident propositions and truths
universally. confessed, or such as are entirely agreed
to and granted by our opponents. - It is this vain affectation of proving every thirig that has led geometricians to form useless and intricate demonstrations
to support some theorems, which are sufficiently evident to the eye by inspection, or to the mind .by ther
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first mention of them ; and it is the same humour
that reigns sometimes in the pulpit, and spends half
the sermon in proving some general truth which is
never disputeil or doubted, and thereby robs the
auditory of more useful entertainment.
5. As there are some things so evidently true, that
they want no proof, so there are others so evidently
false, that they want no refutatiou. It is mere trifling, and a waste of our precious moments, to in•
vent and raise such objections as no man would
ever make in earnest, and that merely for the sake
of answering and solving them: this b1eaks in notoi-iously upon the due brevity of method.
6. A void in general all learned forms, all trappings
of art, and ceremonies of the schools, where there is
no need of th em. l t is reported concerning the late
Czar of Muscovy, that wlien he first acqm,iuted himself with mathematical learning, he practised all the
i-ules of circumvallution and contravallation et the
siege of a town in Lh•onia; and by the length of
those formalities he lost the opportunity of taking
the town.
7, Do not suffer every occasional and incidental
thought to carry you away into a long parenthesis, and
thus to stretch out your discourse, anti divert you from
the point in hand. In the pursuit of your subject,
if any useful thought occur which belongs to some
other theme, note it down for the sake of your memory on some other paper, and lay it by in reserve
for its proper place nnd seasot1 : but let it not in•
l'orporate itself with yom- present theme, nor drnw
off your mind from your main bnsinessj though it
should be ever so inviting. A man, who walks di..
rectly but slowly towards his journey's end, will arw
1·ive thither much sooner than his neighbour, who
runs into every crooked turning which he meets, and
wanders aside to gaze at every tbiug that strikes hi!f
eyes by the way, or to gather every gaudy flowtir that
grows by the ii<le of the road.
•
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To sum up all ; there is an happy medium to be .
observed in our method, so that the brevity may not
render the sense obscure, nor the argument feeble,
nor our knowledge merely superficial : and, on the
other hand, that the fulness and copiousness of our
method may not waste the time, tire the learner, or
till the mind with trifles and impertinencies.
The copious and the contracted way of writing
have each their peculiar advantages. There is a proper use to be made of large paraphrases, and full,
particular, and diffusive explications and arguments;
these are fittest for those who design to be acquainted thoroughly with every part of the subject. There
is also an use of shorter hints, abstracts and compendiums to instruct those who seek only a slight and
general knowledge, as well as to refresh the memory
of those who have learned the science already, and
gone through a larger scheme. But it is a gross •
abuse of these various methods of instruction, when ·
a person has read a mere compendium or epitome of
any science, and he vainly imagines that he understands the whole science. So one boy may become
a philosopher by reading over the m<:lre dry definitions and divisions of Scheibler's compendium of
Peripateticism : so another may boast that he understands Anatomy, becau~e he has seen a skeleton;
and a third profess himself a learned divine when he
can repeat the apo!>tle's creed • .
VI. Rule. Take care that your method be proper ,
to the subject in hand, proper to your present de6ign, as well as proper to the age and place where- in you dwell.
I. Let your method be proper to the subject. All
sciences must not be learned or taught in one me- .
tbod. Momlity and theology, metaphysics and logic,
will not be easily and happily reduced to a strict
mathematical method: those who have tried have
found umch incom enience therein.
Some things have more need to be be explained
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than to be proved : as axiorns or self-evident propo~itions ; ahd indeed all the first great principles,
the chief and most Important doctrines both of nil•
tural and revealed religio!'I ; for when the sense of
them is clearly explail:1ed, they appear so evident in
the light of nature OJ' scripture, that they want no
other proof. Thete are othet things thnt stand in
nee«i of proofs as well as explicatio11, as mat1y
mathettultical theoren:ls, and several deep controversies in morality and divinity.
There are yet
other sorts of subjects which want rnthet to be warmly impressed upon the mind by fervent exhortations,
and sta.nd tJlote in need of this than they do either
ot ptoof' <)t explkatitm ; sllch are the most general,
plain nnd obvious duties of piety to\vards God, and
love towards m~n, with a government of all our
inelination~ and pai.sions. Now . these several subjects ought to be treated in a different manner and
method.
Again, There a're s00\e subjects in the same ttell• '
tise which are more useful and necessary than others,
and some parts of a subject which are eminently and
d1iefly designed by a writer or speaker: true method
'1/ill teach us to dwell longer upon these themes, and
to lay out more thought and language upon them;
whereas the same art of method will tench us to cut
short those things which are used only to introduce
our main subject, and to stand as a scaffolding merely to aid the structure of our discourse. It will teach
us also to content ourselves with brief hints of those
matters which are merely occasional artd incidental.
2. Your method must be adjusted by your design;
for if you treat of the same ~ubject 'f<ith two different
v!e~s and designs, you will find it necessary to use •
<l11ferent methods. Suppose the doctrine of the sacred
•trinity were your theme, and you were to rt!ad u lecture to young students on that subject, or if you de•
t.igned a treatise for the conviction of learned meu, you

would pursue a very di!!'ereJlt ll!e~hod !'rom ~hat which
j
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would be proper to regulate 1\ practical discourse, or
a serm011 to instruct vulgar Christians merely in · the
pious l111pro\1ement of this <locttine, and awaken them
to their duties which 41'e deritted thence.
fo short, we must not first lay down certain and
precise rules of method, and resolve to confine the
matter we discourse of to that particular form and
otder of topics; but we 1nu8t well con~ider and study
the subject of our discourse thoroughly, and take
a just survey of our t>resent design, and these will
give sufficient hints of the particular form and 01·der
in which we should handle it, provided that we are
moderatdy skilled in the genet'al laws of method and
otder.
Yet let it be noted here, tl1at neither the subj~ct,
nor matter of a discourse, nor the particular <lesign
of it, can so precisely determine the method, as to
leave no rootn . fot· liberty and nriety. The vny
same theme may be handled, and that also with the
sAme desigu, i11 several different methods, among
which it is hard to sny which is the best. In wl'iting
a system of divinity, some begin with the scripture,
and thence deduce all other doctrines and dutiei.
Some begin with the being of God and his attribntes,
so far as he i& known by the light of nature, and then
proceed to the doctrines of revelation. Some clistingui!\h the whole subject into the Ctedencla and Agenda,that i;i, things to be believed, and things to be <lone.
Some think it is best to explain the whole Christian
religion by an histtJl'ical detail of all the discoveries
which God has made of himself in l1is lower world,
beginning at the creation in the first chapler of
Genesis, an<l so proceeding onward according to
• the narrative of the Old and New Testament. And .
there are others that endeavour to include the whole
of religion under these four heads, viz. the ..Apo&tles'
Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the ten Commandments,
and the two Sacraments; though I ca11not but thi uk
this is the least accurate of any. The same variety .
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may be allowed in treating other subjects; this very
treatise of Logic is an instance of it, whose method
differs very considerably from any others which I
have seen, as they differ also greatly from one another, though several of them are confessed to be
well written.
S. Though a just view of our subject and our design may dictate proper rules of natural method, yet
there must be some little difference at least paid to
the custom of the age wherein we dwell, and to the
humour and genius of our readers or hearers, which
if we utterly reject and disdain, our performances
will fail of desired success, even though we may have
follol\'ed the just rules of method. I will menlion
but this one instance : in the formitr century it was
frequent with learned men to divide their theme or
subject into a great mu ltitude of co-ordinate members or parts : they ·abounded also in the forms of
Logic and distinction, and indulged numerous ranks
of subordination. Now though we ought not to
ab!indon the rules of just method and division, in
order to comport with the modish writers in our age
who have renounced them; yet it is prudent to pay
so much respect to the cu~tom of the age, ·as to use
these forms of division with due mo<leration, and not
affect to multiply them in such a manner, as to give
an early aud needless disgust to the generality of our
present readers. The same may be said concerning
various other methods of conduct in the affairs of'
learning, as well as in the affairs of life, wherein we
must indulge a little to custom: aud yet we must by
no means suffer ourselves so far to be imposed upon
and governed by it, as to neglect those rules of method, which a .-e necessary for tne safe, easy end
complete inquiry into truth, or the ready and effectual communication of it to others.
VII. Rule. The last requisite of method is, that
the parts of a discourse should Le well connected;
and these three short directions will suffice for this
purpose.
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t. Keep your main end and design ever in view,
and let all the parts of your discourse have a tendency towards it, and as fur as possible make that
tendency visible all the way : otherwise the readers
or hearers will have reason to wonder for what end
this or that particular was introduced.
2. Let the mutual relation and dependence of the
se,·eral branches of your discourse be so just noel
evident, that every part may naturally lead onwal'd
to the next, without any huge chasms or breaks
which interrupt and deform the scheme. The conntction of truths should arise and appear in their
successive ranks and order, as the several parts of a
fihe prospect ascend just behind each other, in their,
natural and regular elevations and distances, an<l
invite the eye to climb onward with constant plea..
sure _till it reach the sky. \Vhatsoe\ler ht>rrid beauty
a precipice or a cataract may add to the prospect of
a country, yet such sort of tediolls and abrupt ap•
pearances in a scene of reasoning are real blemishea
and not beauties. When the reader is passing over
such a treatise, he often finds a wide vacancy, and
makes an uneasy stop, and knows not how to transport his thoughts over to the next particular, for
want of some clue or connecting idea to lay hold of.
S. Acquaint yourself with all the proper and decent forms of transition from one part of a discourse
to another, and practise them as occasion offers.
'\.Vhere the ideas, propositions and arguments, are
happily disposed, and well connected, the truth in•
dted is secure; but it renders the discourse much
more agreeable, when proper and graceful expression joins the parts of it together in so entertaining
a manner, that the reader knows not how to leave
off till he hath arrived at the end.
These are the general and most important rules of
true method; and though they belong chiefly to the
communication of knowledge, yet an early and tho-
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rough acquaintance with them.will be of considerable
use towards the pursuit and attainment of it,
Those persons who have never any occasion to ,
communicate knowledge by writing or by public discourses, may also with great advantage peruse these
rules of method, that they may learn to judge with,
j11stice and accuracy concerning the performances of
others. And besides, a good acquaintance with method will greatly a'lsist every one in ranging, disposing, and managing all human affairs,
The particul.ar means or methods for a farther improvement. of the understanding are very various,
such as, meditation, reading, conversing, disputing
by speech or bl writing~ question and answer~ &c.
And iu each of these practices, some special forms •
may be observed, and special rules may be given to
facilitate and secure our inquiries after truth : but
this would require a little volume by itself, and a
treatise .of Logic has always been ei;teemed sufficiently comp,lete without it.
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